PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. NORIEL FULE Y CAYUBE, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

Appellant Noriel Fule was charged with killing his father Mauro Fule
in an Information, dated 8 September 1986, which read:

“The undersigned 3rd Assistant City Fiscal accuses Noriel Fule
y Cayube of the crime of parricide, defined and penalized under Article 246 of
the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:

That on or about August 17, 1986, in the City of San Pablo and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused aboved-named, with
intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and stab his natural father Mauro Fule with a bladed weapon with which
said accused was then conveniently provided, thereby inflicting a stab wound
upon said Mauro Fule which directly caused his instantaneous death.

Contrary to law.”^[1]

On arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty. After trial, the court a quo
found him guilty in a decision dated 8 January 1988, the dispositive portion of
which follows:

“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered finding the accused Noriel Fule guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Parricide defined and penalized under Article 246 of the Revised Penal
Code committed with one mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender without
any aggravating circumstance to offset the same, hereby sentences him to Reclusion
Perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased the sum of
P30,000.00 as civil liability for his death, without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency and to pay cost.”^[2]

Hence this appeal, where the following are assigned as errors:

“1. The lower court grievously erred in giving
credence to the prosecution witnesses who only adduced evidence of suspicion
that it was the appellant who killed his father which testimonies were replete
with self-contradict­ion, incredibilities and infirmities; and

2. The lower court grievously erred in holding
that the guilt of the appellant was proved beyond reasonable doubt, and in not
acquitting the appellant.”^[3]

The facts found by the trial court were summarized by it in the
following manner:

“On August 17, 1986, in Barangay San Jose, San Pablo City, the
deceased was one of those bayanihan workers who constructed the house of
spouses Sofronio Abrera and Fidela Cayube. When it was about 4:00 P.M. that day the bayanihan workers were
treated to a drinking spree by said spouses. Later, in that same afternoon, the deceased went out of the house of
said spouses where he confronted, argued, and berated the accused who was then
with Normy Fule, another son. Sofronio
Abrera was fetched from the house because the deceased and the accused were
already engaged in a heated argument about the selling of [a] horse. Abrera pacified them and brought the
deceased back to his house to drink some more while the brothers, accused and
Normy Fule, went away. Later on or
about 5:30 P.M. or so deceased left his tools at Abrera’s house and stepped out
of the house. The deceased went and sat
inside the front seat of the passenger jeep of Carlito Eronico which was parked
nearby, while Eronico was still inside the dining room of the house of said
spouses.

The accused returned to the jeep where he again had a verbal tussle
which culminated with the deceased slapping the former. In reaction thereto, the accused pulled a
knife and stabbed the deceased on the chest.

When Carlito Eronico went out of the house of said spouses at about
8:00 P.M., he saw the deceased seated and stooping in the front seat of his
parked jeep and thinking that the deceased was only drunk at that time, he
drove for home. When he arrived home,
Eronico tried to wake him up, but could not so he called the assistance of the
relatives of the deceased. Together
with Sofronio Abrera, Eronico went back to be informed that the deceased was
already brought to the San Pablo City Community Hospital where he was
pronounced dead. The body of the deceased
was later transferred to a funeral parlor in Rizal Avenue, San Pablo City,
where the autopsy was performed by Dra. Emma Gesmundo Brion.

That very same night Fidela Cayube went to the house of Civilian
Security Unit member Avelino Bautista informing him that the accused wanted to
surrender to the Mayor of San Pablo City. Bautista lost no time in informing the Mayor of the desire of the
accused to surrender. The Mayor
instructed Bautista to get the accused. Bautista in the company of Sofronio Abrera, was able to fetch the
accused at Barangay San Gabriel. When
asked why he killed his father, Mauro Fule, the accused told Bautista that he
was slapped by his father and taken by surprise that was why he stabbed his
father. Subsequently, the accused was
brought to the residence of Mayor Zacarias Ticzon before whom he also readily
admitted killing his father, Mauro Fule.”^[4]

The defense presented appellant who claimed that what had
transpired between him and his father^[5] at
4:00 o’clock p.m. of that tragic day was merely a “fatherly
admonition” which Sofronio Abrera mistook for a bitter argument.^[6]
He also claimed that he was pointed to as the killer by his uncles (brothers of
his father) because of a grudge they had against him for siding with his mother
when his parents had separated one from the other.^[7]

Appellant further claimed that he could not have been his
father’s assailant and killer as he was in the house of Norbelito Bacod from
5:00 o’clock to 8:00 o’clock on the night of 17 August 1986.^[8]
The defense also presented Norbelito
Bacod who stated that appellant was in his house the night in question but that
appellant left his house around 7:00 o’clock that evening.^[9]

Another defense witness, Fidela Cayube, denied ever having gone
to Avelino Bautista to seek his help in bringing about the surrender of
appellant. She claimed that she and
appellant, accompanied by her husband, went directly to the house of Mayor
Zacarias Ticzon and there saw Avelino Bautista.^[10]

Prosecution presented Normy Fule, appellant’s brother, as sole
eyewitness. However, on
cross-examination, Normy Fule retracted his prior testimony that he had seen
appellant kill Mauro Fule and admitted that he did not actually see appellant
stab their father. Despite the absence
of an eye-witness, the trial court found that there was sufficient
circumstantial evidence to convict appellant, namely: (1) that appellant had the opportunity to commit the crime; (2)
that appellant had a motive to kill the deceased; (3) that appellant had
admitted to Mayor Zacarias Ticzon and Avelino Bautista that he had stabbed his
father Mauro Fule; (4) the surrender of the appellant upon the advice of his
aunt, Fidela Cayube, to surrender if he were guilty; and (5) the appellant’s
failure to assert his innocence at the earliest possible time, either before
the police authorities or the fiscal’s office.

The basic issue in this case, therefore, is whether there is
sufficient circumstantial evidence to support appellant’s conviction.

The requisites of a valid conviction on the basis of
circumstantial evidence are set out in Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of
Court: “(a) there is more than one
circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven;
and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.”

Appellant basically claims that the prosecution failed to
establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt as the circumstances relied upon by
the trial court to sustain his guilt had not been proven.

As to the opportunity to commit the crime, prosecution witness
Normy Fule’s testimony put the appellant at or near the scene of the killing,
at or around the time of the stabbing.^[11]
Appellant claims that the trial court erred in shifting the burden of proof to
the defense to prove his alibi.^[12] In People
v. Almario,^[13]
it was held that the “Court has consistently stated that for the defense
of alibi to prosper it must be established by clear and convincing evidence
that the accused was at some other place for such a period of time as to negate
his presence at the time and place of the crime was committed.”
Appellant’s own witness, Norbelito Bacod, stated that appellant left his home
around 7:00 that evening. Appellant
himself admitted in his testimony that it would only take him twenty-five (25)
minutes to walk from Noberlito Bacod’s house to the scene of the crime.^[14]
There was, therefore, sufficient time for appellant to have gone from Bacod’s
house to the Abrera’s house or yard.

Appellant, however, attacks Normy Fule’s credibility alleging
that, during cross-examination, Normy had admitted that he had pointed to
appellant as the guilty party “because according to other persons, there
will be no witnesses in favor of my father, and I [Normy] thought I could
help.”^[15]
Appellant suggests that that statement clearly showed the charge against him
was merely a fabrication of the deceased’s relatives. The Court notes, however, that aside from the fact that Normy
Fule did not identify who these “other persons” were, his testimony
did not in fact even insinuate that his father’s relatives were behind the
alleged scheme against appellant.

Appellant also claims that the trial court erred in not
considering the exculpatory statement made by Normy Fule. However, an examination of the record shows
that the retraction or modification by Normy Fule of his testimony is not
sufficient to acquit appellant, considering that Normy did not specifically
state that appellant was innocent, that appellant did not stab their father
Mauro Fule. When asked by the fiscal on
re-direct examination to explain the change it his testimony, the witness Normy
Fule merely stated that he did not actually see appellant stab their father as
he had at first testified.^[16]

Appellant also contends that motive was not sufficiently proven
by the prosecution as there was no direct testimony on the alleged resentment
harbored by appellant towards his father for having taken a horse from his care
about a year before, nor as to his father slapping him. Appellant in fact denied having quarrelled
with his father and having been slapped by him.

Appellant, however, did not deny that his father took a horse
back from him. Also, appellant was
publicly upbraided by his father in a voice so loud as to cause other persons
to intervene. The Court agrees with the
trial court that these, together with the appellant’s admission made separately
to Mayor Ticzon and to Avelino Bautista that he (appellant) stabbed his father
because the latter had slapped him,^[17] are
quite sufficient to show that appellant had a motive to cause the victim’s
death.

It is appellant’s contention that Mayor Ticzon’s testimony
regarding appellant’s oral acknowledgment of guilt should not have been
admitted in evidence as it was hearsay. Avelino Bautista had testified to the same effect but, curiously,
appellant did not urge the same argument that such testimony was hearsay. In any case, it is settled that when
testimony is presented to establish not the truth but tenor of the statement or
the fact that such statement was made, it is not hearsay.^[18]
In Aballe v. People,^[19] the
Court held that an oral admission by the accused of authorship of a crime is
admissible in evidence against him:

“The declaration of an accused expressly acknowledging his guilt
of the offense may be given in evidence against him.

The rule is that any person, otherwise competent as witness, who
heard the confession, is competent to testify as to the substance of what he
heard if he heard and understood all of it. An oral confession need not be repeated verbatim, but in such
case it must be given in its substance.”^[20]
(Underscoring supplied)

Appellant also attacks Mayor Ticzon’s credibility claiming that
the witness, in his testimony, corrected the date of appellant’s surrender
stated in his affidavit to match the date stated in Avelino Bautista’s (another
prosecution witness) affidavit and testimony. The Court does not find this material, considering that appellant does
not deny having gone to Mayor Ticzon to surrender. It has been the constant holding of this Court that variance
between the testimony and the affidavit of a witness does not itself affect the
witness’ credibility considering that affidavits, being taken ex parte,
and prepared by someone other than the affiant, are usually incomplete and
inaccurate.^[21]
Thus, in People v. Loveria,^[22] the
Court said:

“x x x. The appellant
further claims that Richard Bales did not implicate him in his affidavit but
pointed to him on the witness stand. Affidavits, taken ex–parte, are generally considered to be
inferior to the testimony given in open court (People v. Pacola, G.R. No.
L-26647, August 14, 1974, 58 SCRA 370). The Court has consistently held that an affidavit taken ex-parte,
is almost always incomplete and inaccurate, sometimes from partial
suggestions, sometimes from want of suggestions and inquiries, without the aid
of which the witness may be unable to recall the connected collateral
circumstances necessary for the correction of the first suggestions of his
memory and for his accurate recollection of all that belongs to the subject
(People v. Tan, 89 Phil. 337 (1951); People v. Gonzales, G.R. No. L-40727,
September 11, 1980, 99 SCRA 697; People v. Avanzado, Jr., G.R. No. 73116,
February 29, 1988, 158 SCRA 427).”^[23]
(Underscoring supplied)

The firmly settled rule is that the findings of fact of the trial
court as to the credibility of witnesses are accorded great respect by the
Supreme Court.^[24]
The trial court found Mayor Ticzon and Avelino Bautista to be credible
witnesses:

“The Court has no valid reason to question the veracity of the
testimony of Bautista. Even under
thorough cross-examination he did not waver on the substantial points of his
testimony. Cayube tried to downplay the
role played by Bautista by claiming she never went to his house to fetch him. However, she did not explain how Bautista
was present at the residence of the Mayor when the accused was surrendered. How could Bautista have known [of] the
private plan of Cayube to surrender the accused at a certain time and
date? The inevitable conclusion is that
Bautista was fetched by Cayube.

The accused also tried to undermine the credibility of the Mayor
when he testified on the facts and circumstances of his surrender denying
having admitted the stabbing of his father. However, the Court cannot divine what possible motive could the mayor
have to fabricate such a lie. The Mayor
[has] nothing to gain. There was no
showing at all that the Mayor has an axe to grind against the accused or his
relatives. Evidently, the Mayor and the
accused were complete strangers prior to the surrender. The Court believes that Cayube arranged the
surrender of the accused to the Mayor because off the latter’s official
capacity as the highest public city official after the accused agreed to
surrender. x x x.”^[25]

The Court also finds the allegation made by appellant that Mayor
Ticzon had testified against him because of the political connections of a
barangay captain who was the brother-in-law of the deceased Mauro Fule to be
too conjectural to warrant serious consideration.^[26]

The Court, however, notes that the circumstances of surrender and
the allegedly tardy protestation of innocence on appellant’s part cited by the
trial court as indicative of his guilt are not properly taken as such. These circumstances, standing by themselves,
are not necessarily indicative of either the guilt or the innocence of a
person; they are, at worse, ambiguous in nature.

However, the Court believes that the three (3) remaining
circumstances of opportunity, motive and admission are, taken together,
sufficient to prove appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In the case at bar, appellant had the
opportunity and the motive to commit the crime charged. To round up and buttress these two (2)
circumstances, there is the acknowledgment appellant made twice, to Mayor
Ticzon and to Avelino Bautista, which we have ruled to be admissible, that he
had killed his father in a fit of rage.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the trial court dated 8 January
1988 is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that the civil liability of
appellant is increased to P50, 000.00, in line
with current jurisprudence.

SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr., (Chairman), Bidin, Davide, Jr., and Romero, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Record, p. 1.

^[2]
Id., p. 81.

^[3]
Rollo, p. 43, Decision p. 7.

^[4]
Records, pp. 77-78, Decision; pp. 2-3.

^[5]
In his testimony, appellant acknowledged
that the victim was his father (TSN, 3 December 1987, p. 3).

^[6]
TSN, 3 December 1987, pp. 5 and 11.

^[7]
Id., pp. 5, 9 and 10.

^[8]
Id., p. 6.

^[9]
Id., 7 January 1988, p. 4.

^[10]
Id., 22 October 1987, pp. 10-11.

^[11]
TSN, 1 April 1987, p. 12.

^[12]
Appellant’s Brief, p. 11.

^[13]
171 SCRA 291 (1989).

^[14]
TSN, 3 December 1987, p. 13.

^[15]
Appellant’s Brief, p. 7.

^[16]
TSN, 19 May 1987, p. 2.

^[17]
TSN, 28 May 1987, p. 3; TSN, 16 July 1987, p. 4.

^[18]
People v. Gaddi, 170 SCRA 649 (1989); People v. Cusi, 14 SCRA 944
(1965).

^[19]
183 SCRA 196 (1990).

^[20]
183 SCRA at 205.

^[21]
People v. Sabio, 102 SCRA 218 (1981);
People v. Gonzales, 99 SCRA 697 (1980).

^[22]
187 SCRA 47 (1990).

^[23]
187 SCRA at 58-59.

^[24]
People v. Idnay, 164 SCRA 358 (1988).

^[25]
Decision, p. 5, Records, p. 79a.

^[26]
In People v. Arbois (138 SCRA
24 [1985]), the Court similarly struck down the motives ascribed to the
prosecution witness as mere conjectures.