G.R. No. 82870. December 14, 1989
DR. NEMESIO E. PRUDENTE, PETITIONER, VS. THE HON. EXECUTIVE JUDGE ABELARDO M. DAYRIT, RTC MANILA, BRANCH 33 AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.
PADILLA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to annul and set aside
the order of respondent Judge dated 9
March 1988 which denied the petitioner’s motion to quash Search
Warrant No. 87-14, as well as his order dated 20 April 1988 denying petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration of the earlier order.
It appears that on
31 October 1987, P/Major Alladin Dimagmaliw,
Chief of the Intelligence Special Action Division (ISAD) of the Western Police
District (WPD), filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 33,
presided over by respondent Judge Abelardo Dayrit, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, an
application[1] for the issuance of a search warrant,
docketed therein as SEARCH WARRANT NO. 87-14, for VIOLATION OF PD NO. 1866
(Illegal Possession of Firearms, etc.), entitled “People of the Philippines,
Plaintiff, versus Nemesio E. Prudente,
Defendant.”
In his application for search warrant, P/Major Alladin Dimagmaliw alleged, among
others, as follows:
“1. That he has been
informed and has good and sufficient reasons to believe that NEMESIO PRUDENTE
who may be found at the Polytechnic University of the Philippines, Anonas St., Sta. Mesa, Sampaloc,
Manila has in his control or possession firearms, explosives, handgrenades and ammunition which are illegally possessed
or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense which the said
NEMESIO PRUDENTE is keeping and concealing at the following premises of the
Polytechnic University of the Philippines, to wit:
a. Offices of the Department of Military Science
and Tactics at the ground floor and other rooms at the ground floor;
b. Office of the President, Dr. Nemesio Prudente at PUP, Second
Floor and other rooms at the second floor;
“2. That the undersigned
has verified the report and found it to be a fact, and therefore, believes that a Search Warrant should be issued
to enable the undersigned or any agent of the law to take possession and bring
to this Honorable Court the following described properties:
a. M 16 Armalites with
ammunitions;
b. .38 and .45 Caliber handguns and pistols;
c. explosives and handgrenades;
and,
d. assorted weapons with ammunitions.”
In support of the
application for issuance of search warrant, P/Lt. Florenio
C. Angeles, OIC of the Intelligence Section of ISAD, executed a
“Deposition of Witness”[2] dated 31 October 1987, subscribed and sworn
to before respondent Judge. In his
deposition, P/Lt. Florenio Angeles declared, inter
alia, as follows:
“2.
Q: Do you know P/Major
Alladin Dimagmaliw, the
applicant for a Search Warrant?
A: Yes, sir, he is the Chief, Intelligence
and Special Action Division, Western Police District.
“3. Q: Do
you know the premises of Polytechnic University of the Philippines at Anonas St., Sta. Mesa, Sampaloc,
Manila?
A: Yes sir, the said place has been the
subject of our surveillance and obserÂvation during the past few days.
“4. Q: Do
you have personal knowledge that in the said premises is kept the following
properties subject of the offense of violation of PD No. 1866 or intended to be
used as a means of committing an offense:
a. M 16 Armalites with
ammuÂnitions;
b. .38
and .45 Caliber handguns and pistols;
c.
explosives and handgrenades; and
d.
Assorted weapons with ammuÂnitions?
A: Yes sir.
“5.
Q: Do you know who is or who are
the person or persons who has or have control of the above-described premises?
A: Yes
sir, it is Dr. Nemesio Prudente,
President of the Polytechnic UniverÂsity of the Philippines.
“6.
Q: How do you know that said
property is subject of the
offense of violation of Pres. Decree No. 1866 or intended to be used as the
means of committing an offense?
A: Sir,
as a
result of our continuous
surveillance conducted for several days, we gathered information from verified
sources that the holder of said firearms and explosives as well as ammunitions
aren’t licensed to possess said firearms
and ammunition. Further, the premises is
a school and the holders of these firearms are not students who were not
supposed to possess firearms, explosives and ammunition.”
On the same day, 31
October 1987, respondent Judge issued Search Warrant No. 87-14,[3]
the pertinent portions of which read as follows:
“It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned, after
examining under oath appliÂcant ALLADIN M. DIMAGMALIW and his witness FLORENIO
C. ANGELES that there are good and sufficient reasons to believe (probable
cause) that NEMESIO PRUDENTE has in his
control in the premises of Polytechnic University of the Philippines, Anonas St., Sta. Mesa, Sampaloc,
Manila, properties which are subject of the above offense or intended to be
used as the means of committing the said offense.
“You are hereby commanded to make an immeÂdiate search at any
time in the day or night of the
premises of Polytechnic University of the Philippines, more particularly (a)
offices of the Department of Military Science and Tactics at the ground floor
and other rooms at the ground floor; (b) office of the President, Dr. Nemesio Prudente at PUP, Second
Floor and other rooms at the second floor, and forthwith seize and take
possession of the following personal properties, to wit:
a. M 16 Armalites with
ammunition;
b. .38 and .45 Caliber handguns and pistols;
c. explosives and hand
grenades; and
d. assorted weapons with
ammunitions.
and bring the above described properties to
the undersigned to be dealt with as the
law directs.”
On 1 November 1987, a Sunday and All Saints Day, the search warrant was enforced by some 200 WPD operatives led by P/Col.
Edgar Dulla Torre, Deputy
Superintendent, WPD, and P/Major Romeo Maganto, Precinct 8 Commander.
In his affidavit,[4]
dated 2 November 1987, Ricardo Abando y Yusay, a member of the searching team, alleged that he
found in the drawer of a cabinet inside the wash room of Dr. Prudente’s office a bulging brown envelope with three (3)
live fragmentation hand grenades separately wrapped with old newspapers,
classified by P/Sgt. J.L. Cruz as follows:
(a) one (1) pc. – M33 Fragmentation hand grenade (live); (b) one (1) pc.
– M26 Fragmentation hand grenade (live); and (c) one (1) pc. – PRB-423
Fragmentation hand grenade (live).
On 6 November 1987,
petitioner moved to quash the search warrant.
He claimed that (1) the complainant’s lone witness, Lt. Florenio C. Angeles, had no personal knowledge of the facts
which formed the basis for the issuance of the search warrant; (2) the
examination of the said witness was not in the form of searching questions and
answers; (3) the search warrant was a general warrant, for the reason that it did
not particularly describe the place to be searched and that it failed to charge
one specific offense; and (4) the search warrant was issued in violation of
Circular No. 19 of the Supreme Court in that the complainant failed to allege
under oath that the issuance of the search warrant on a Saturday was urgent.[5]
The applicant, P/Major Alladin Dimagmaliw, thru the Chief, Inspectorate and Legal Affairs
Division, WPD, opposed the motion.[6]
After petitioner had filed his reply[7]
to the opposition, he filed a supplemental motion to quash.[8]
Thereafter, on 9 March
1988, respondent Judge issued an order,[9]
denying the petitioner’s motion and supplemental motion to quash. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration[10]
was likewise denied in the order[11]
dated 20 April 1988.
Hence, the present recourse, petitioner alleging that respondent
Judge has decided a question of substance in a manner not in accord with law or
applicable decisions of the Supreme Court, or that the respondent Judge gravely
abused his discretion tantamount to excess of jurisdiction, in issuing the
disputed orders.
For a valid search warrant to issue, there must be probable
cause, which is to be determined personally by the judge, after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things
to be seized.[12]
The probable cause must be in connection with one specific offense,[13]
and the judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form
of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant
and any witness he may produce, on facts personally known to them and attach to
the record their sworn statements together with any affidavits submitted.[14]
The “probable cause” for a valid search warrant, has
been defined “as such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed, and that objects sought in connection with the offense are in the
place sought to be searched.”[15]
This probable cause must be shown to be within the personal knowledge of the
complainant or the witnesses he may produce and not based on mere hearsay.[16]
Petitioner assails the validity of Search Warrant No. 87-14 on
the ground that it was issued on the basis of facts and circumstances
which were not within the personal knowledge of the applicant and his witness
but based on hearsay evidence.
In his application for search warrant, P/Major Alladin Dimagmaliw stated that “he has been informed” that Nemesio Prudente “has in his control and possession” the firearms and
explosives described therein, and that he “has verified the report and found it to be
a fact.” On the other
hand, in his supporting deposition, P/Lt. Florenio C.
Angeles declared that, as a result of their continuous surveilance
for several days, they “gathered
informations from verified
sources” that the holders of the said fire arms and explosives are not
licensed to possess them. In other
words, the applicant and his witness
had no personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances
which became the basis for issuing the questioned search warrant, but acquired
knowledge thereof
only through information from other sources or persons.
While it is true that in his application for search warrant,
applicant P/Major Dimagmaliw stated that he verified
the information he had earlier received
that petitioner had in his possession and custody the firearms and explosives
described in the application, and
that he found it to be a fact, yet there is
nothing in the record to show or indicate how and when said applicant verified the earlier
information acquired by him as to justify his conclusion that he found such information to be a fact. He might have clarified this point if there
had been searching questions and answers, but there were none. In fact, the records yield no questions and
answers, whether searching or not vis-a-vis the said
applicant.
What the records show is the deposition of witness, P/Lt.
Angeles, as the only support to P/Major Dimagmaliw’s
application, and the said deposition is based on hearsay. For, it avers that they (presumably, the
police authorities) had conducted continuous surveillance for several days of
the suspected premises and, as a result thereof, they “gathered information
from verified sources” that the holders of the subject firearms and explosives
are not licensed to possess them.
In Alvarez vs. Court of First Instance,[17]
this Court laid the following test in determing
whether the allegations in an application for search warrant or in a supporting
deposition, are based on personal knowledge or not –
“The true test of sufficiency of a depoÂsition or affidavit to
warrant issuance of a search warrant is whether it has been drawn in a manner that perjury could be charged
thereon and the affiant be held liable for damage caused. The oath required must refer to the truth of
the facts within the personal knowledge of the applicant for search warrant,
and/or his witnesses, not of the facts merely reported by a person whom one
considers to be reliable.”
Tested by the above standard, the allegations of the witness,
P/Lt. Angeles, in his deposition, do not come up to the level of facts of his personal
knowledge so much so that he cannot beheld
liable for perjury for such allegations in causing the issuance of the
questioned search warrant.
In the same Alvarez case,[18]
the applicant stated that his purpose for applying for a search warrant was
that: “It had been reported to me by a person whom I consider to be
reliable that there are being kept in said premises books, documents, receipts,
lists, chits and other papers used by him in connection with his activities as
a money lender, charging usurious rate of interests, in violation of law.”
The Court held that this was insufficient for the purpose of issuing a search
warrant.
In People vs. Sy Juco,[19]
where the affidavit contained an allegation that there had been a report to the
affiant by a person whom he considered reliable that in said premises were
“fraudulent books, correspondence and records,” this was likewise
held as not sufficient for the purpose of issuing a search warrant.
Evidently, the allegations contained in the applicaÂtion of
P/Major Alladin Dimagmaliw
and the declaration of P/Lt. Florenio C. Angeles, in
his deposition were insuffiÂcient basis for the issuance of a valid search
warrant. As held in the Alvarez
case:
“The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within
the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose
thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual making the
affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable
cause.”
Besides, respondent Judge did not take the deposition of the
applicant as required by the Rules of Court.
As held in Roan v. Gonzales,[20]
“(m)ere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not
sufficient. The examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce and attach them to the record.”
Moreover, a perusal of the deposition of P/Lt. Florenio Angeles shows that it was too brief and
short. Respondent Judge did not examine
him “in the form of searching questions and answers.” On the
contrary, the questions asked were leading as they called for a simple
“yes” or “no” answer.
As held in Quintero vs. NBI,[21] “the questions propounded by
respondent Executive Judge to the applicant’s witness are not sufficiently
searching to establish probable cause.
Asking of leading questions to the deponent in an application for search
warrant, and conducting of examination in a
general manner, would not
satisfy the requirements for issuance of a valid search warrant.”
Manifestly, in the case at bar, the evidence failed to show the
existence of probable cause to justify the issuance of the search warrant. The Court also notes post facto
that the search in question yielded, no armalites,
handguns, pistols, assorted weapons or ammunitions, as stated in the
application for search warrant, the supporting deposition, and the search
warrant itself. Only three (3) live
fragmentation hand grenades were found in the searched premises of the PUP,
according to the affidavit of an alleged member of the searching party.
The Court avails of this decision to reiterate the strict
requirements for determination of “probable cause” in the valid
issuance of a search warrant, as enunciated in earlier cases. True, these requirements are stringent but
the purpose is to assure that the constitutional right of the individual
against unreasonable search and seizure shall remain both meaningful and
effective.
Petitioner also assails the validity of the search warrant on the
ground that it failed to particularly describe the place to be searched, contending that there were several rooms
at the ground floor and the second floor of the PUP.
The rule is, that a description of a place to be searched is
sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort,
ascertain and identify the place intended.[22]
In the case at bar, the application
for search warrant and the search warrant itself described the place to be
searched as the premises of the Polytechnic University of the Philippines,
located at Anonas St., Sta
Mesa, Sampaloc, Manila, more particularly, the
offices of the Department of Military Science and Tactics at the ground floor,
and the Office of the President, Dr. Nemesio Prudente, at PUP, Second Floor and other rooms at the
second floor. The designation of the
places to be searched sufficiently complied with the constitutional injunction
that a search warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched, even
if there were several rooms at the ground floor and second floor of the PUP.
Petitioner next attacks the validity of the questioned warrant,
on the ground that it was issued in violation
of the rule that a search warrant can be issued only in connection with
one specific offense. The search warrant
issued by respondent judge, according to petitioner, was issued without any
reference to any particular provision of PD No. 1866 that was violated – when
allegedly P.D. No. 1866 punishes several offenses.
In Stonehill vs. Diokno,[23]
where the warrants involved were issued upon applications stating that the
natural and juridical persons therein named had committed a “violation of
Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue Code and Revised
Penal Code,” the Court held
that no specific offense had been alleged in the applications for a search
warrant, and that it would be a legal heresy of the highest order to convict
anybody of a “violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws,
Internal Revenue Code and Revised Penal Code” without reference to any
determinate provision of said laws and codes.
In the present case, however, the application for search warrant was captioned: “For Violation
of PD No. 1866 (Illegal
Possession of Firearms, etc.).” While the said decree punishes several
offenses, the alleged violation in this case was, qualified by the phrase
“illegal possession of firearms, etc.“
As explained by respondent Judge,
the term “etc.” referred to ammunitions and explosives. In other words, the search warrant was issued
for the specific offense of illegal possession of firearms and explosives. Hence, the failure of the search warrant to
mention the particular provision of PD No. 1866 that was violated is not of
such a gravity as to call for its invalidation on
this score.
Besides, while illegal possession of firearms is penalized under Section 1 of PD No.
1866 and illegal possession of
explosives is penalized under Section 3, thereof, it cannot be overlooked that
said decree is a codification of
the various laws on illegal possession of firearms, ammuÂnitions and
explosives: such illegal possessions of items destructive of life and property are related offenses or belong
to the same species, as to be subsumed within the category of illegal possession of firearms, etc. under P.D. No. 1866. As observed by respondent Judge:[24]
“The grammatical syntax of the phraseology comparative with
the title of PD 1866 can only
mean that illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions
and explosives, have been codified under Section 1 of said Presidential Decree
so much so that the second and
third are forthrightly species of illegal possession of firearms under Section (1)
thereof. It has long been a practice in
the investigative and prosecution arm of the government, to designate the crime
or illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions and explosives as ‘illegal
possession of firearms, etc.’ The Constitution as well as the Rules of Criminal
Procedure does not recognize the issuance of
one search warrant for illegal possession of firearms, one warrant for illegal
possession of ammunitions, and another for illegal possession of
explosives. Neither is the filing of
three different informations for each of the above
offenses sanctioned by the Rules of Court.
The usual practice adopted by the courts is to file a single information
for illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions. This practice is considered to be in accordance
with Section 13, Rule 110 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides that: ‘A complaint or information must charge but
one offense, except only in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a
single punishment for various offenses.
Describably, the servers did not search for
articles other than firearms, ammunitions and explosives. The issuance of Search Warrant No. 87-14 is
deemed profoundly consistent with said rule and is therefore valid and
enforceable.” (emphasis supplied)
Finally, in connection with
the petitioner’s contention that the failure of the applicant to state, under
oath, the urgent need for the issuance of the search warrant, his application
having been filed on a Saturday, rendered the questioned warrant invalid for
being violative of this Court’s Circular No. 19, dated 14
August 1987, which reads:
“3. Applications filed
after office hours, during
Saturdays, Sundays and holidays shall likewise be taken cognizance of and acted
upon by any judge of the court having jurisdiction of the place to be searched, but in such cases the applicant
shall certify, and state the facts under oath, to the satisfaction of the judge,
that the issuance is urgent.”
it would suffice to state that the above section
of the circular merely provides for a guideline, departure from which would not
necessarily affect the validity of an otherwise valid search warrant.
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the petition is
GRANTED. The questioned orders dated 9 March
1988 and 20 April 1988 as well as Search Warrant No. 87-14 are hereby ANNULLED
and SET ASIDE.
The three (3) live fragmentation hand granades
which, according to Ricardo Y. Abando, a member of
the searching team, were seized in the washroom of petitioner’s office at the
PUP, are ordered delivered to the Chief, Philippine Constabulary for proper
disposition.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa,
Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, and Regalado, JJ., concur.
[1]
Annex “A”, Rollo, p. 24
[2]
Annex “B”, Rollo, p. 26
[3]
Annex “C”, Rollo, p. 28
[4]
Annex “D”, Rollo, p. 29
[5]
Rollo, p. 52
[6]
Annex “E”, Rollo, p. 30
[7]
Annex “F”, Rollo, p. 33
[8]
Annex “G-1”, Rollo, p. 42
[9]
Annex “H”, Rollo, p. 51
[10]
Annex “I”, Rollo, p. 64
[11]
Annex “J”, Rollo, p. 72
[12]
Sec. 2, Art. III, 1987 Constitution
[13]
Sec. 3, Rule 126, Rules of Court
[14]
Sec. 4, Rule 126, Rules of Court
[15]
Quintero vs. NBI, et al., G.R. No. L-35149, 23 June 1988; 20th Century Fox Film Corporation vs.
CA, et al., G.R. Nos. 76649-51, 19
August 1988
[16]
People vs. Sy Juco,
64 Phil. 667; Alvarez vs. CFI, 64 Phil. 33; US vs. Addison, 28
Phil. 566
[17]
Supra.
[18]
Supra.
[19]
Supra.
[20]
G.R. No. 71410, 25 November 1986, 145 SCRA
694
[21]
Supra.
[22]
People vs. Veloso, 48 Phil. 169, 180.
[23]
20 SCRA 383, L-19550, 19 June 1967
[24]
Annex “H”, Rollo, p. 59