PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. EUGENIO JAVAR Y PABLO, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

Eugenio Javar y Pablo has appealed the decision dated December 7,
1987 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 32, which found him:

“x x x guilty
of murder beyond reasonable doubt and sentenced to suffer life imprisonment, to
indem­nify the Heirs of the deceased (Reynaldo Balberan^[1]) in
the sum of P46,500.00 and to pay the costs.

“Pursuant to Article 29, RPC, as amended by RA 2167, the
accused should be credited with the full time of his preventive imprison­ment.”
(p. 24, Rollo.)

The information against Javar alleged:

“That on or about May 20, 1984, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and
confederating with one whose true name, identity and present whereabouts are
still un­known, with intent to kill and with treachery and evident
premeditation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and use personal violence upon the person of REYNALDO BALBERAN Y
VALDEZ, by then and there stabbing him with a bladed weapon on the stomach
thereby inflicting upon him mortal and fatal stabwound which was the direct and
immediate cause of his death.” (p. 5, Rollo.)

On May 20, 1984 at about 8:30 in the evening, while Rodolfo
Arpon, Reynaldo Balberan and Danilo Garcia were converting with each other in
front of St. Joseph Chapel at the corner of Road 10 and Road 11, Fabie, Sta.
Ana, Manila, Teodoro “Teody” Garcia came along and confronted
Reynaldo Balberan, saying: “Ikaw
matagal ka ng may atraso sa akin” (p. 66, Rollo). A heated argu­ment ensued between them. Garcia challenged Balberan to a fight, but
the latter did not accept the challenge. So, Teodoro left. He talked to
the accused, Javar, who was his friend and who happened to be standing at the
doorway of his house nearby. Javar
approached Arpon, Balberan and Danilo Garcia and asked them who their enemy
was. They replied that it was
“Teody.” Without any warning, Javar pulled out an 8-inch-long knife
and aimed it at Arpon and Garcia, but he did not strike them. After the two men had fled, he turned on
Balber­an, grabbed him by the shoulder, and stabbed him below the navel. Having done that, he returned to his house.

The victim was rushed to the Philippine General Hospital where he
expired on arrival. The cause of death
was shock secondary to stab wound which cut through the artery that supplied
blood to his left kidney, and penetrated his stomach and descending colon as
well (Exh. A, Testimony of Dr. Bienvenido Muñoz, pp. 4-5, Tsn, Oct. 8, 1984).

Arpon who gave a written statement to the police on the killing,
described the accused as a braggart, who always played with his balisong. The investigating officer, Marcelo Tadeo, took a statement from the
accused after informing him of his constitutional rights. He observed that the accused had a tattoo
“ss” signifying that he is a member of the Sigue-Sigue gang. The father of the accused was present during
the custodial investigation. The
records, together with the testimony of the investigating officer, indicate
that the accused was arrested on June 14, 1984 at 11:00 P.M. In his signed “Sinumpaang
Salaysay,” he admitted having killed a person, with a kitchen knife ten
inches long.

The evidence of the defendant consisted of his own testimony and
the testimonies of his mother, Adelina Pablo-Javar, and his godmother, Irma
Rodriguez. They alleged that on the
date and time of the killing, the accused had come from the market and went to
sleep. For unknown reasons, his house
was stoned and he was awak­ened by the noise. Seeing some persons in front of the St. Joseph Chapel at the corner of Roads 10 and 11 Fabie, Sta. Ana,
Manila, and that “Teody” Garcia and “Rudy” Arpon were
engaged in a heated exchange of words, the accused went out of his house and
approached them. He was still some
three armslengths from them when he heard someone shout “May Tama! May
Tama!” (“Someone’s been hit!”) (p. 68, Rollo), and saw people
scampering away. “Teody” and
“Rudy” were fighting with each other. The accused denied that he caused the death of Reynaldo Balberan
or that he attempted to attack the companions of said victim.

The accused was prodded by his mother to spend the night and hide
at his sister’s house on Road 13, for the group of the victim was allegedly
troublesome and most of the time under the influence of drugs and she was
apprehensive that her son could get involved.

The accused allegedly did not want to admit any­thing at the
custodial investigation but the investiga­tor warned him “baka hindi ka
tumagal diyan” (“You might not last long”) (p. 69, Rollo) so he
signed the statement. He was allegedly
maltreated by pouring water diluted with hot pepper on his genitals; subjecting
him to electric shock; and allowing the father of the deceased to maul him (pp.
22-28, Tsn, Jan. 20, 1987). The
accused, however, did not complain of maltreatment to the proper authorities
nor submit himself to a medical examination.

The accused denied that he killed the deceased and attacked
Balberan’s two companions.

Nevertheless, the trial court convicted him of the murder of
Balberan in a decision which is now before this Court for review of the
following assignment of errors:

1.   The trial court erred in giving credence to
the unreliable testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and completely
disregard­ing the evidence for the defense.

2.   The trial court erred in giving probative
value to the sworn statement of accused (Exh. “C”) admitting that he
committed the crime despite the fact that it was taken in violation of his constitu­tional rights.

3.   The trial court erred in convicting the
accused-appellant of the crime of murder despite failure of the prosecution to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt; and

4.   The trial court erred in convicting
accused-appellant of the crime of murder instead of homicide absent proof of
treachery, granting without admitting, that he killed Reynaldo Balberan.

The Court is not convinced that the ill-feeling which the
prosecution witness Arpon supposedly harbored against the accused arising from
a gambling quarrel could have sufficiently motivated him to give perjured
evidence against the accused for a grave felony like murder. Improper motives on the part of a
prosecution witness are not
presumed. The presumption is that he
was not so moved and his testimony is entitled to full faith and credit (People
vs. Perez, 175 SCRA 203; People vs. Doctolero, 193 SCRA 632). Although the witness described the accused
as a braggart and “makulit” (p. 16, Rollo), his candid assessment of
the character of the accused did not amount to improper motive, nor did it
prove that he had an axe to grind against the accused.

Long settled in criminal jurisprudence is the rule that when the
issue is one of credibility of witnesses, appellate courts will generally not
disturb the findings of the trial court, because the latter is in a better
position to decide that question for it heard the witnesses themselves and
observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial, unless the
court plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if
considered, might affect the result of the case (People vs. Serdan, 213 SCRA
329; People vs. Yambao, 193 SCRA
571).

“It is doctrinally entrenched that the evaluation of the
testimony of witnesses by the trial court is received on appeal with the
highest respect because it is the trial court that has the direct opportuni­ty
to observe them on the stand and detect if
they are telling the truth or lying in their teeth.” (People vs.
Santito, Jr., et al., 201 SCRA 87.)

“Furthermore, findings of fact of trial courts are accorded
great weight by an appellate tribunal for the latter can only read in cold
print the testimony of the witnesses which commonly is translated from the
local dialect into English. In the
process of converting into written form the statements of living human beings, not only fine nuances but a world of
meaning apparent to the judge present, watching and listen­ing, may escape the
reader of the written translated words.” (People vs. Arroyo, et al., 201
SCRA 616, 624.)

The defense assails the trial court for having given full weight
to the extrajudicial confession (Sinumpaang Salaysay) given by the accused
while in custody and without the advice and assistance of counsel. Par. (1), Section 12 of Article III of the
1987 Constitution provides that:

“Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to
remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his
own choice. If the person cannot afford
the services of coun­sel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in
writing and in the presence of counsel.”

Further, Par. (3) of the same Section provides:

“Sec. 12. x x x.

“(3) Any
confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof
shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.”

It is now settled in this jurisdiction that even if the right to
counsel may be waived, the waiver must be voluntary, knowing and intelligent,
and must be made in the presence and with the assistance of counsel (People vs.
Estevan, 186 SCRA 34). Otherwise, the
confession of the accused becomes inadmissible in evi­dence even if he fails to prove that he was
coerced to execute the same (People vs. Nolasco, 163 SCRA 623). Nowhere do the records of this case indicate
that the accused-appellant was assisted by counsel when he made such waiver. The fatal omission renders his extrajudi­cial confession
inadmissible (People vs. Lim, 196 SCRA 809). Any statement obtained in violation of the con­stitutional provision,
whether exculpatory or inculpato­ry, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible
in evi­dence. Even if the confession
speaks the truth, if it was made
without the assistance of counsel, it becomes inadmissible in evidence
regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily given
(People vs. Estevan, supra).

“We have zealously guarded and protected this right of the
accused, ruling time and again, in a long line of decisions, that uncounselled confessions are inadmissible in
evidence.

“No custodial investigation can be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by
the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee
himself or by anyone on his behalf.” (People vs. Campos, 202 SCRA 387,
399.)

Nevertheless, the inadmissibility of the appel­lant’s
extrajudicial confession does not necessarily entitle him to a verdict of
acquittal. His guilt was established
beyond reasonable doubt by independent evidence, i.e., the eye-witness
testimony of Arpon, his neighbor who positively identified him as the person
who killed Balberan. “Where there
is independent evidence, apart from the accused’s uncounselled confession, that
the accused is truly guilty, he accordingly faces a conviction.” (People
vs. Como, 202 SCRA 200, 211.)

The accused is trying to implicate Teody as the assailant of
Balberan for he allegedly had a motive: he and the deceased had a heated argument before the stab­bing
incident. It is axiomatic, however,
that motive is immaterial once the identity of the assailant has been positively identified.

Was treachery present in the commission of the crime?

For alevosia or treachery to be appreciated as an aggravating or
qualifying circumstance, the offender should have employed means, methods or forms
in the execution of the crime which tended directly and specif­ically to insure
its execution without any risk to himself arising from the defense which the
offended might make (Art. 14[16], Revised Penal Code; People vs. Cempron, 187
SCRA 248).

The trial court pointed out that when the accused suddenly
plunged a ten-inch kitchen knife
in the victim’s stomach after solicitously inquiring who their enemy was (so
that the victim was completely disarmed of the real intention of the accused),
treachery was present. The accused pretended to aim his
knife first at Rodolfo Arpon and Danilo Garcia thereby, lulling Balberan to believe that he himself was in no
danger. The killing of the victim under
those circumstances was treacherous. As
aptly noted by the trial court:

“x x x. After
a careful, dispassionate and judicious evaluation of the evidence, we find that the prosecution
has sufficiently established the presence of the qualifying circumstance of
treach­ery. The deceased was
unarmed. The accused attacked the
deceased without warning, unexpected. The deceased was in a very defenseless position. The accused immobilized and incapacitated
the deceased who had no chance to defend himself. These surrounding facts and circum­stances leave no doubt in our mind
that the measures taken by the accused forestalled any danger to himself
insuring the success of his intent to murder the deceased.” (p. 74,
Rollo.)

Even a frontal attack can be treacherous when it is sudden and
unexpected and the victim was unarmed (People vs. Cruz, 213 SCRA 611).

The flight of the accused who hid in his sister’s house after the
killing, was a tacit admission of guilt (People vs. Balansi, 187 SCRA 566,
572-573). As the Bible says: “The righteous is brave as a lion, but
the wicked man fleeth even if no one pursueth” (People vs. Cruz, 213 SCRA
611, 619).

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Eugenio Javar y Pablo
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER defined and penalized
under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. The appealed decision is AFFIRMED but with modification of the penalty
which should be reclusion perpetua, not life imprisonment, for
they are not synonymous (People vs. Baguio, 196 SCRA 459, 468; People vs.
Jaymalin, 214 SCRA 685, 693), and the death indemnity is increased to
P50,000.00 in accordance with the more recent decisions of this Court (People
vs. Bañez, 214 SCRA 109; People vs.
Ragabuto, G.R. No. 98062, Sept. 11, 1992; Abaya vs. People, G.R. No. 96389,
Dec. 11, 1992).

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, (Chairman), Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, and Quiason, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Name in parenthesis supplied.