PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. NOELITO MANZANARES, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

On March 1, 1985, an information was filed in the Regional Trial
Court in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, charging Noelito Manzanares, together with
two other persons, with the crime of murder committed as follows:

That on or about
the 3rd day of January, 1985, in the municipality of Valenzuela, Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the said
accused (Noelito) Joselito Manzanares, Alejandro alias Danding Manzanares and Danny Manalayon, conspiring and
confederating together and helping one another, with intent to kill one Rolando
Frias, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously with evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength and treachery, attack,
assault, and stab with bladed weapons they were then provided, the said Rolando Frias, hitting the latter on the different parts of his body, thereby causing him serious physical
injuries which directly caused his death.^[1]

Of the three accused, only the appellant was apprehended and
tried. The other two are still
at-large.

After a plea of not guilty at the arraignment, trial commenced, and on
September 9, 1987, a decision was rendered by the trial court convicting the
appellant of the crime charged,
the dispositive portion of which
reads:

WHEREFORE, finding the accused Noelito Manzanares Guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged, the Court hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua.

The accused is hereby ordered to
pay the offended party the
sum of P9,500.00 representing the expenses
incurred by the complainant for her husband’s internment and to indemnify the
heirs of deceased Rolando Frias the sum of P30,000.00 (People vs. Dela Fuente,
G.R. No. 63251-52, December 29, 1983).

SO ORDERED.^[2]

Before us on
appeal, the appellant raises the following assignment of errors:

I

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING
FULL WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES AND IN
DISREGARDING THE THEORY OF THE DEFENSE.

II

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING
ACCUSED-APPELLANT NOELITO MANZANARES GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER DESPITE INSUFFICIENCY OF
EVIDENCE.

The prosecution presented two alleged eyewitnesses to the
crime. The first witness was the wife
of the victim, Lydia Salvador Frias, who testified that on the evening of
January 3, 1985, while she and her husband were standing side by side waiting
for their passenger jeepney in front of the Libiran Furniture store along the
MacArthur Highway in Malanday, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, the appellant, Noelito
Manzanares, unsuspectingly approached her husband from the side, and without warning, suddenly stabbed
him with a bladed weapon, hitting him on the
left side of his body.^[3]
Immediately, Alejandro Manzanares and a certain Danny Manoloyon who were closely
following the appellant, took turns in stabbing the victim several times more with a “balisong” and an
“icepick,” respectively, causing the latter to fall to the ground,
where he was stabbed once more by Danny Manoloyon before they fled.^[4]

As soon as the assailants left the scene, Lydia shouted for help
and a certain Mr. Castro
responded. Without any delay, Lydia and Mr. Castro brought the
victim to the Fatima Hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival.^[5]

The second eyewitness, Vilma
Bonacwa, substantially testified that at about 9:30 in the evening of
January 3, 1985, she was at the street corner near the
Kadiwa store where she intended to purchase some goods when she saw the victim,
Rudy Frias, being chased by Danny Manoloyon and the appellant. The victim was caught near the Libiran
Furniture Store where he was repeatedly stabbed by the appellant and Danny
Manoloyon As the victim fell to
the ground, the perpetrators ran away. Vilma then reported the incident to the barangay authorities.

Dr. Alberto Reyes of the NBI medico-legal office testified that
he performed the autopsy upon the body of the victim and found seven stab wounds. Two of them were fatal — caused by bladed instruments that
entered the right lobe of the Liver and
punctured the pancreas.

The appellant denied any participation in the killing of the
victim and interposed the defense of alibi, declaring that he was sleeping at
his home located inside the ACA compound in Malanday, Valenzuela, Metro Manila
at the time of the incident. He
declared further that the following morning, after going through his normal
routine, he went to work in Makati where he repairs watches.

The appellant insists that Lydia Frias testified falsely because
she held a grudge against him. Their
families, he says, were neighbors in the
ACA compound. Sometime 1982 or 1983, he
was engaged in a fist tight with
Danny Fatias, son of the victim
and his wife, witness Lydia Frias. Since then, his family and the Friases were no longer on speaking terms.

Furthermore, the appellant would try to discredit witness Lydia Frias by declaring that the latter
pressured him to point to Danilo Manoloyon as the assailant, and threatened to drag him into the case if he refused. Since he did not agree to her demand because he
did not know Danilo Manoloyon personally, Lydia made good her threat to implicate him in the killing of her husband.

Likewise, the appellant rebuts
the testimony of witness Vilma Bonacwa by saying that both of them had an argument in the past over his courtship of the wife of Vilma’s brother.

After a thorough review of the records, we find the evidence for the
prosecution sufficient to prove the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable
doubt.

The appellant
argues that Lydia Frias could not have been
present at the scene of the crime; that the only evidence of her presence is
her own self-serving testimony.

We find this argument
devoid of merit. Even if the appellant’s family and the Friases had not
been the best neighbors, the Court finds the animosities claimed by the appellant not enough to impel Lydia Frias to testify
falsely against the accused in the killing of her husband as to do so would mean letting the actual
perpetrators go scotfree. Withal, Lydia
Frias testified that the appellant is her neighbor as well as the godfather of
her brother’s son. Hence, with those
interpersonal relationships, close in our culture, Lydia Frias would not
prevaricate to implicate her “compadre” in so serious a crime as murder.

We also find the testimony of Mrs. Frias strongly corroborated by
the testimony of the other prosecution witness, Vilma Bonacwa — a
disinterested party. The appellant and
Danny Manoloyon were positively identified by these two witnesses who are all
neighbors at the ACA compound and well known to each other. Recognition was easy because the killing
scene was well lighted by the Libiran Furniture Store lights and Meralco
streetlight nearby.

Well-settled is the rule that absent any credible evidence to
prove the charge of bias and prejudice, it is presumed that the prosecution
witnesses would not have imputed to the
appellant the crime with which
he was accused unless he was guilty thereof.^[6] The absence of any evidence as to the existence of an improper motive sustains the
conclusion that no such improper motive exists, and that the testimony of the
witnesses, therefore, should be given full faith and credit.^[7]

Additionally, the trial court stated that:

A careful study and a judicious evaluation of the testimonies for and
against the accused, the Court is persuaded that the narration of the witnesses
for the prosecution is the more credible story. (Sic) Not only did
complainant appear convincing with her
straight-forward answers, but hers was the more coherent and believable
version. She had the support of a
disinterested witness, Vilma Bonacwa, neighbor of both the complainant and
accused. Complainant testified she saw
accused Noelito stabbed (sic) her husband first then followed by accused
Alejandro Manzanares and Danny Manaloyon. Witness Vilma Bonacwa stated that she saw Noelito Manzanares and Danny
Manaloyon chased (sic) the victim; that they overtook him; that Danny Manaloyon
stabbed the victim followed by Noelito Manzanares. They appeared and sounded credible and their credibility is
reinforced by the fact that they had no reason to testify falsely against the
accused.^[8]

In view of the
trial judge’s vantage point which enables him
to observe the witnesses’ behavior during the trial, we held in People
vs. Otero:^[9]

After everything is said and done, we come back, as we
invariably do in cases of this nature, to a recognition
of the rule that the Supreme Court will not interfere with the judgment of the
trial court in passing on the credibility of the opposing witnesses, unless
there appears in the record some fact or circumstance of weight and influence, which
has been overlooked or the significance of which has been misinterpreted.

The alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of Mrs. Frias and
Vilma Bonacwa refer only to minor matters which are not sufficient to blur or
cast doubt on their straightforward attestations. Far from being badges of fraud and fabrication, the
inconsistencies in their testimonies may in fact be justifiably considered as
manifestations of the truthfulness on material points of the prosecution
witnesses. These little deviations also
confirm that the witnesses had not been rehearsed. The most candid witnesses may make mistakes sometimes but such
honest lapses do not necessarily impair their intrinsic credibility.^[10]
In the case at bar what is important is that the witnesses positively
identified the appellant as one
of the assailants. Rather than
discredit the testimonies of prosecution witnesses, discrepancies on minor
details must be viewed as adding credence and veracity to such spontaneous testimonies.^[11]
As a matter of fact, complete uniformity in details would be a strong
indication of untruthfulness and lack of spontaneity.^[12]

Finally, the defense of the appellant, which is alibi, deserves little,
if at all, consideration. To be
believed, alibi must be supported by the most convincing evidence as it is an inherently weak though
paradoxically volatile, if allowed to go unchecked, human argument that can be
easily fabricated to suit the ends of those who seek its recourse. Accordingly, we find the appellant’s refuge in alibi as unavailing
against the positive identification of the appellant by the witnesses.^[13] Furthermore, when the appellant’s alibi is
supported only by the testimony of his mother, the alibi loses evidentiary
weight.

Also, for the defense of alibi to prosper, it does not suffice to
prove the whereabouts of the accused at the time the crime was committed; it
must be undisputedly demonstrated that at the time of the commission of the crime, it was physically impossible for the
suspect to have been at, or near, the scene of the crime.^[14] In the present case, the appellant testified
that he was, at the time of the incident, in a place within walking distance
from the scene of the crime. Be that as it may, the most damning evidence against the accused-appellant
stares us in the face: his positive identification, without an iota
of doubt, by the prosecution witneses
as one of Frias’ assailants.

A potent evidence as well against the accused- appellant is, as the Solicitor General proffers,^[15]
the circumstance of “flight,” strongly indicating the appellant’s
consciousness of guilt, it being shown that the subpoena issued for his
appearance at the preliminary investigation was returned unserved because he
could not be located at his given address. In fact, it took the authorities from January 4, 1985 to April of the same year, five long months, to apprehend the appellant^[16] — even if his alleged co-perpetrators
continued to remain at large.

The crime committed by the appellant is murder qualified by
treachery. There is treachery when the
offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means,
methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to
insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.^[17]
Here, the unarmed and unsuspecting victim was repeatedly stabbed by the three
accused with bladed weapons. The mode
of attack they employed posed no danger
to themselves as there was no way Rolando Frias could have defended himself against the might and
madness of his three armed attackers.

Obviously, there was also abuse of superior strength as the
three armed accused ganged up on an unarmed victim. This fact, however,
cannot be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance, absorbed as it is by
treachery.

WHEREFORE, we find the appellant GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of murder qualified by treachery. The decision^[18]
appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman), Paras, Padilla, and Regalado, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Rollo, 2.

^[2]
Decision, 7;
Rollo, 19; rendered by Judge
Adriano R. Osorio.

^[3]
T.s.n., May 31, 1985, 4-8.

^[4]
Ibid., 8-9.

^[5]
Ibid.

^[6]
People v. Retubado, No. 58585,
January 20, 1988, 162 SCRA 276, 284; People vs. Ali,
L-18512, October 30, 1969, 29 SCRA 756.

^[7]
Supra.

^[8]
Decision, 4; Rollo, 16.

^[9]
51 Phil. 201; People vs.
Ganduma, G.R. No. 64507, April 25, 1988, 160 SCRA 799, 804.

^[10]
People vs. Cabato, No. L-37400, April
15, 1988.

^[11]
Aportadera vs. C.A., No.
L-41368, March 16, 1988.

^[12]
People vs. Bazar, No. L-41829,
June 27, 1988, 162 SCRA 609.

^[13]
People vs. Batac, G.R. No.
54500, January 29, 1988.

^[14]
People vs. Pineda, G.R. No. 72400, January 15, 1988.

^[15]
Brief for the Appellee,
14-15; Rollo, 40.

^[16]
T.s.n., June 24, 1987, 9-10.

^[17]
Revised Penal Code, Art. 14(16).

^[18]
In view of People vs. Millora,
et al. (G.R. Nos. L-38968-70, February 9, 1989); the imposable penalty for
murder, absent any modifying circumstance, is reclusion perpetua. That is the penalty imposed in the instant
case. Notwithstand­ing my dissent in Millora, for the reason that our previous
interpretation of Art. III, Sec. 19(1) of the 1987 Constitution was more
favorable to the accused, I have to abide by the decision of the majority of my
colleagues.