PAZ A. CRUZ, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND ERLINDA ESTRADA, RESPONDENTS.

There is merit to the claim of the petitioner that respondent Court
of Appeals committed reversible error in awarding to the private respondent the
whole lot sought to be registered although in her opposition to the application
filed in the lower court, the
latter claims only a portion thereof. This petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which was
given due course after this Court had deliberated upon the allegations, issues
and arguments adduced in the petition, the separate comments of both the
Solicitor General and the private respondent and the respective replies thereto
by the petitioner, must then be granted.

The pleadings disclose the following operative facts:

On 5 May 1981, petitioner filed with the then Court of First
Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Pangasinan an amended application for
the registration of a parcel of land, denominated as Lot No. 2040 AP-1-01056,
located in Domalandan, Lingayen, Pangasinan with an area of 25,722 square
meters and bounded as follows:

The application was docketed as Land Registration Case No.
N-3638, LRC Record No. N-56080.

Private respondent filed on 16 January 1982 an opposition
alleging therein that she is the owner and possessor of two (2) parcels of land,
to wit:

“(a) A parcel of unirrigated riceland with an
area of 2063 sq. m., bounded on the North by Felizardo Manaoat; on the East by
Felizardo Manaoat; on the South by Gregorio Aviles; and on the West by Castor
Aviles; and

(b) A parcel of land with an area of 4,620
square meters, bounded on the North by Fortunata Aviles; East by Maria Manaoat;
South by Agno River; and West by Maria Paz Aviles.”

which are encroached upon and sought to
be registered by the petitioner. Private respondent claims that she acquired these lots from her
grandmother, Fortunata Aviles, who in turn acquired them from Gregorio Aviles,
father and predecessor-in-interest of the petitioner.^[2]

During trial, private respondent presented in evidence a proposed
Subdivision Plan for Lot No. 2040 (Exhibit “9”) that indicates a
portion, identified as Lot No. 2040-A, which she claims to be the residential
portion of the property she had acquired from her grandmother.

The Government, through the Office of the Solicitor General, also
opposed the petition alleging that the land applied for forms part of the
public domain.

After due trial, the court handed down a decision on 14 June 1985
granting the petitioner’s application for registration but excluding therefrom
the portion contested by the private respondent, Lot No. 2040-A; the
registration of this lot was then ordered in favor of the latter. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:

“Accordingly, pursuant
to the Land Registration Act, known as Act 496, as amended, this Court hereby
confirms the title of the herein applicant over the parcel of land denominated as Lot 2040 excluding the residential portion found on the NORTHEASTERN
PART thereof described as Lot 2040-A of the proposed Subdivision Plan of
private oppositor (Exhibit 9), described and bounded in Plan AB-1-01056 marked
as (Exhibit A and series) and the technical description (sic) (Exhibit B), and
therefore adjudicates the said property in the name of the herein applicant,
Paz Aviles Cruz, of legal age, Filipino, widow and resident (sic) of Domalandan
Center, Lingayen, Pangasinan, Philippines as her exclusive property, subject to
the legal easement in favor of the government.

The Court also confirms the title of the herein private oppositor,
Erlinda Estrada over the residential portion of the land located in the
northeastern part thereof denominated as Lot No. 2040-A (Exhibit 9-a) described
and bounded in the proposed Subdivision Plan, marked as Exhibit 9 for private
oppositor, with an area of 3,383 square meters, more or less, and hereby
adjudicates the said portion of property subject of registration, in the name
of Erlinda Estrada, of legal age, married to Genaro Estrada and resident (sic)
of Domalandan East, Lingayen, Pangasinan, Philippines as her exclusive
property.

The opposition of the Republic of the Philippines is hereby ordered
dismissed for lack of basis.

Once this decision has become final and executory let the
corresponding decree and title be issued to the parties.

The applicant is hereby ordered to submit a Subdivision Plan which
excludes the northeastern portion of
Plan
AP-1-01056, adjudicated to private oppositor Erlinda Estrada with an
area of 3,383 sq.m. at her own expense.”^[3]

This disposition is supported by the court’s findings of fact, to
wit:

“That the land, subject matter of registration, located in
Domalandan Center, Lingayen, Pangasinan, was originally owned by the late
Gregorio Aviles, father of the applicant, Paz Aviles Cruz, having bought the
said property. After Gregorio Aviles
purchased the property, he declared the same for taxation purposes under Tax
Declaration Nos. 559, 694, 958 and 4629 (Exhibits K-5 to K-8) and took
possession over the land up to his death in 1940. During the time that Gregorio Aviles was in physical possession
of the land, he introduced improvements, gathered and appropriated the fruits
of the existing coconut trees, camachili trees and bamboo grooves and nobody
ever disturbed him of (sic) his possession over the property. There was also a distillery plant that was
constructed in the property by a corporation called Los Domalandaneses and it
was Gregorio Aviles who give (sic) the permission and consent in (sic) the
installation of said distillery plant.

In April 1940, the late Gregorio Aviles executed a deed of assignment
in favor of his children (Exh. J) and the land in question was allotted to the
applicant as her share and after the death of Gregorio Aviles, his daughter,
Paz Aviles Cruz, took possession of the property in question and declared the
property for taxation purposes under tax Declaration Nos. 849, 553, 692, 966
and 62292 (Exhibits K to K-4) respectively and continued gathering and
appropriating the fruits of the improvements existing therein (bamboo grooves,
camachili and coconut trees). Likewise,
in 1956, the applicant improved a part of the land by converting about one
hectare thereon into fishpond (sic) and after the fishpond was constructed, she
has (sic) it leased to different persons, namely, Felix Aviles for 5 years,
Bernabe de Vera for 10 years, Toribio Magsanoc for 15 years and Jeorge Aquino
for 5 years as shown by the contract of lease executed between the applicant
and the lessees (Exhs. M, N and 0); that the lease rentals were paid to the
herein applicant and that nobody shared with her in the said rentals. Applicant was likewise never molested or
disturbed in her possession over the property and the real estate taxes were
paid by Paz A. Cruz as evidenced by tax receipts showing her payment of said taxes
(Exhibits L to L-7).

That originally the area appearing in the
tax declaration of the land was only one and one-half (1½) hectares but the
area was gradually increased to; 2½ hectares on the southern part of the
property starting from 1934 up to 1966 and that the portion constituting the accretion
(sic) is indicated in the plan from point 4 (Exhibit A-1); that the property in
question and the property owned by private oppositor are divided by concrete
monuments and growing coconut trees.”^[4]

Only the private respondent appealed from the said decision to
the then Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals); the Republic of
the Philippines did not. The appeal was
docketed as AC-G.R. No. 08030 (now CA-G.R. CV No. 08030). In her Oppositor-Appellant’s Brief submitted
therein, private respondent claims that the trial court erred in:

“I

x x x DISALLOWING THE APPLICATION OF PRIVATE OPPOSITOR ERLINDA
ESTRADA FOR REGISTRATION OF THE PORTION OF LAND IN QUESTION AND IN ADJUDICATING
SAID DISPUTED PORTION TO APPLICANT PAZ A. CRUZ.

II

x x x IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS ACCRETION TO THE LAND SUBJECT OF
THE APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION AND IN ASSUMING THAT THE ENTIRE ACCRETION
PERTAINS TO THE UNDISPUTED PORTION BELONGING TO APPLICANT PAZ A. CRUZ.

III

x x x IN NOT AWARDING THE DISPUTED FISHPOND AND NIPA PORTIONS OF
THE LAND IN QUESTION TO PRIVATE OPPOSITOR ERLINDA ESTRADA, WHICH PORTIONS ARE
ACTUALLY ACCRETIONS TO THE RESIDENTIAL PORTION WHICH THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY
AWARDED TO HER.

IV

x x x IN DISREGARDING OPPOSITOR-APPELLANT’S ESCRITURA DE
COMPRAVENTA (EXHIBIT 4) AN ANCIENT DOCUMENT WHICH CLEARLY AND UNEQUIVOCABLY
(sic) SUPPORTS OPPOSITOR­-APPELLANT’S CLAIM OF OWNERSHIP NOT ONLY OVER THE
RESIDENTIAL PORTION BUT ALSO OVER THE DISPUTED FISHPOND AND NIPALAND PORTIONS
OF THE LAND SUBJECT OF THIS APPLICATION.”^[5]

and prays:

“WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable
Court that the Decision of June 14, 1985 and the Amending Decision of July 31,
1985 both issued by the trial court: -?

a) be modified and a new one rendered denying
the application of Paz Cruz for the registration of the parcel of land
denominated as Lot 2040 of the proposed subdivision plan (Exhibit 9), and
granting the opposition of private oppositor Erlinda Estrada by ordering the
registration of the said disputed portions in private oppositor’s name.

b) be affirmed, insofar as it confirms the
title of private oppositor Erlinda Estrada over the residential portion on the
Northeastern part of the property denominated as 2040 A of the proposed
subdivision plan (Exhibit 9).

Private oppositor prays for such other reliefs and remedies just
and equitable under the premises.”^[6]

From the above assignment of errors and prayer, it is quite
obvious that the private respondent does not claim the entire Lot No. 2040, but
only the residential portion, denominated as Lot No. 2040-A in the proposed
Subdivision Plan, and the so-called fishpond and nipa land portions.

In its Decision of 29 December 1987,^[7]
public respondent resolved the appeal in favor of the private respondent on the
basis of the following findings and
conclusions, to wit:

“The applicant admitted she originally owned only 1 ½ hectares
but her land increased by accretion.

Against this claim of accretion is the documentary evidence that
the disputed portion of the land was sold by Gregorio Aviles original owner of
whole (sic) land to Fortunata Aviles as
shown in the deed of sale (Exh. 4). Fortunata Aviles in turn sold said portion to the herein oppositor. Since the sale of the disputed portion to
Fortunata Aviles the land was in her possession in concept of owner until she
transferred it to the herein oppositor. Aside from the tax declaration and payment of taxes. The (sic) oppositor in fact exercised acts of
ownership of (sic) said portion by mortgaging the residential and fishpond areas
for a loan of P3,000.00 to the Rural Bank of Bugallon.

On this score, We do not give much credence to the appellee’s
contention that the identity of the land in the Escritura de Compraventa is not precise. It is assumed that the Rural Bank of
Bugallon which accepted the land in dispute was identified and inspected by
bank inspectors before accepting it as collateral.

Moreover, the accretion on the land of appellant applicant which
was originally only 1½ hectares can be only minimal considering that the body
of water adjacent to said land or canal as shown in the Commissioner’s Report
(sic).

When the boundary between two estates is a river or a tream (sic),
the bed of which belongs to neither of them,
the gradual increase of one side is for the benefit thereof and does not
prejudice the property on the opposite side because, in accordance with the
provisions of Article 366 of the Civil Code, the owner of an estate increased
by alluvion (sic) acquires the title by accretion. (Roxas vs. Tuason, 9 Phil. 408).

Furthermore, if indeed there was an accretion, the land of the
oppositor would have also been benefitted (sic).

It is obvious therefore that the applicant had encroached on the
land of the private oppositor Erlinda Estrada. On this score the tax declaration submitted by the applicant showing
that it has an area of 25,224 started only in 1980 while the tax declaration of
the land claimed by the oppositor in the name of her predecessor-in­-interest
Fortunata Aviles started in 1951. (Exh.
5, p. 162, rec.).

It is to be noted also that the original decision adjudicated 3,383
square meters to the oppositor Erlinda Estrada. The trial court amended its decision correcting some clerical
error (sic).

In view thereof, the Court is constrained
to modify the decision by granting to the oppositor the registration of
the land denominated at (sic) Lot 2040 of the proposed subdivision plan.”^[8]

and then decreed that:

“WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby modified
adjudicating and granting the registration of Lot 2040 of the subdivision plan
in favor of the oppositor Erlinda Estrada.

Both applicants and private oppositor are ordered to submit their
modified subdivision plans.

For this purpose, let the records of this case be remanded to the
lower court for said modification and approval of said plans.”^[9]

Unable to agree with the public respondent’s conclusions and
disposition, petitioner availed of this recourse under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court and, in pleading that this Court should give due course to the petition,
alleges that (a) the assailed decision is based on findings which are totally
devoid of support or are glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of
discretion; (b) the dispositive portion of the said decision is self-contradictory
and equivocal that it has thrown the parties into confusion; and (c) there was,
in the resolution of the controversy, excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion because although only a portion of Lot 2040 is contested by the private respondent, the public respondent
awarded her the entire lot; moreover, it directed the parties to subdivide Lot
No. 2040 between themselves without indicating the areas constituting their
respective shares.

In its Comment^[10] to
the instant petition, the Office of the Solicitor General expresses its
agreement with the decision of the trial court, maintains that the petitioner
has established a registerable title over the parcel of land denominated as Lot
No. 2040, excluding the residential portion found on the northeastern portion
described as Lot No. 2040-A of the proposed Subdivision Plan of the private
respondent (Exhibit “9”), and joins the petitioner in her prayer that
the decision promulgated by the public respondent be set aside and that of the
trial court be reinstated and affirmed by this Court.

As stated in the opening paragraph of this ponencia, We
gave due course to this petition. It is
clearly impressed with merit. We agree
with the petitioner that the challenged decision is based on findings which are
not supported by evidence. As spelled
out in the succeeding pages, the public respondent’s conclusions are either
grounded on surmises and conjectures or based on a misapprehension of facts. In the instant petition, therefore, there
exist three (3) of the several exceptions to the rule on conclusiveness of
findings of fact by the Court of Appeals, namely: (a) when the findings of fact
are contrary to those of the trial court;^[11] (b)
when the conclusion is based entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures;^[12]
and (c) when it is based on a misapprehension of facts.^[13]
It thus behooves this Court to review the public respondent’s findings of fact
and conclusions based thereon.

We likewise agree with the petitioner’s allegation that the
dispositive portion of the assailed decision is confusing. This confusion arises from the public
respondent’s failure to distinguish, based on the proposed Subdivision Plan
submitted in evidence by the private respondent (Exhibit “9”), Lot
No. 2040 from Lot No. 2040-A. It also
stems from the public respondent’s failure to take into account the fact that
while in her opposition to the application for registration, private respondent
specifies only two (2) parcels of land, with a total area of 6,683 square
meters, which she acquired from her grandmother Fortunata Aviles who in turn
bought these lots from Gregorio Aviles (father of the petitioner), in her
Oppositor­-Appellant’s Brief, she mentions three (3) portions, which constitute
the property acquired from her grandmother, without specifying their respective
areas. Thus:

“The portion bought by Fortunata Aviles consists of (a) the
residential portion which is bounded on the N. by Erlinda Estrada; on the S. by
Fortunata Aviles (fishpond portion); on the E. by Tranquilino Manaoat; and on
the W. by Castor Aviles and Paz Aviles;

(b) the fishpond portion which is bounded on
the N. by Fortunata Aviles (the residential portion) on the E. by Tranquilino
Manaoat; on the S. by the nipa land portion; and on the W. by Castor Aviles and
Paz Aviles (TSN ibid, Erlinda Estrada p. 35 January 30, 1984 p. 16) and the

(c) nipaland portion which is bounded on the N.
by the fishpond portion; on the E. by Maria Manaoat; on the S. by Agno River
and on the W. by Paz Aviles Cruz (TSN ibid Erlinda Estrada January 16, 1984, p.
16);”^[14]

Private respondent undertook no serious efforts in her Brief,
Comment or Memorandum filed in CA-G.R. CV No. 08030 to identify these three (3)
portions vis-a-vis the two (2) parcels described in her opposition —
the first of which is identified as “unirrigated riceland”, while the
second is plainly described as a parcel of land. She also failed to indicate the so-called fishpond and nipa land
portions over which she claims ownership. The reason for this seems to be that these did not originally form part of the two (2) parcels. As unequivocally admitted in the private
respondent’s third assignment of error, the so-called fishpond and nipa land
portions “ARE ACTUALLY ACCRETION OF (sic) THE RESIDENTIAL PORTION WHICH THE
TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY AWARDED TO HER.”^[15]
There is, however, nothing in her discussion of this assigned error to support
her theory. Upon the other hand, since,
as determined by the land registration court, the property acquired by
Fortunata Aviles from Gregorio Aviles lies on the northeastern portion of the
property sought to be registered by the petitioner, it is not possible for the
Agno River to be on the former’s boundary. The private respondent, in her aforesaid Brief,^[16]
agreed with this conclusion. Said the
trial court:

“x x x The contention of the herein private oppositor is
however vague and ambiguous because if we carefully examine and peruse the
meter (sic) and bounds of the property sold by Gregorio Aviles appearing in
Exhibit 4 (Deed of Sale) the land sold by Gregorio Aviles in favor of Fortunata
Aviles and her co-vendees is bounded on the S. by the property of the seller,
Grerio Aviles and not the Agno River. x
x x.”^[17]

The Escritura de Compraventa (Exhibit “4”)
executed by Gregorio Aviles on 15 July 1939 also shows that the Agno River does
not run along any of the boundaries of the subject property; the one (1)
hectare portion sold to Teodorico, Petra, Prudencio, Castor and Fortunata is
bounded by properties owned by the following: on the North by Alvaro Reyes and
Felizardo Manaoat; on the East by Felizardo Manaoat; on the South by Gregorio
Aviles; and on the West by Juan O. Reyes. Indeed, the Agno River is not located in any of its boundaries. Thus, the share pertaining to Fortunata
Aviles, which the private respondent had acquired, cannot possibly have the
Agno River as a boundary. The
unqualified admission by the private respondent that the fishpond and nipa land
portions are accretions conflicts with, and therefore removes the basis for, the
public respondent’s conclusion that the property purchased by Fortunata Aviles
from Gregorio Aviles consists of three (3) portions, namely: residential,
fishpond and nipa land portions. This
adds force to the petitioner’s contention that the public respondent’s
conclusions are devoid of evidentiary support.

Thus, the property on the southern boundary of the second parcel
described in the private respondent’s aforementioned opposition in the land
registration case, is not the Agno River. The Agno River is situated
along the southern boundary of the land applied for by the petitioner. Consequently, the accretions by reason of
the action of the said river could only benefit the petitioner. The land registration court did not,
therefore, err in holding that the increase in the area of the property
belonging to the petitioner was due to accretion. It thus necessarily follows that the public respondent’s
conclusion — that the accretion can only be minimal and if indeed there was
such an accretion, the land of the private respondent would also have been
benefited — is purely conjectural and based on an erroneous premise that the
property subject of the Escritura de Compraventa has the Agno River as
one of its boundaries. Equally
erroneous, if not certainly illogical, is its postulation that it cannot give
much credence to the petitioner’s contention — that the identity of the land
in the Escritura de Compraventa is imprecise — because it is assumed
that the land in dispute, which was accepted by the Rural Bank of Bugallon as a
security for a loan, was identified and inspected by bank inspectors. There is no evidence at all that the said Escritura
de Compraventa was shown to and examined by bank inspectors. Besides, Fortunata was only one (1) of five
(5) vendees who declared, for taxation purposes, her share therein. If any inspection was conducted by the Bank,
only that portion so declared by her may have been inspected. Moreover, acceptance by the bank of property
as security for the loan is not evidence of the correctness of the boundaries
of the land or of its total area.

Doubtless, the findings of fact of the trial court are fully
supported by the evidence.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the public respondent Court
of Appeals of 29 December 1987 in CA-G.R. CV No. 08030 is hereby SET ASIDE and
the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan of 14 June 1985, as
amended on 13 July 1985 to correct clerical errors, is hereby REINSTATED and
AFFIRMED in toto.

Costs against private respondent.

SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr., (Chairman), Bidin, Romero, and Melo, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Brief for Oppositor-Appellant (Annex “A” of Petition), 4-5.

^[2]
Brief for Oppositor-Appellant (Annex “A” of Petition), 5-6.

^[3]
Brief for Oppositor-Appellant (Annex “A” of Petition), 8-9.

^[4]
Rollo, 15-16.

^[5]
Brief for Oppositor-Appelant (Annex
“A” Petition), 1-2.

^[6]
Id., 24.

^[7]
Per Associate Justice Jorge R. Coquia, concurred in by Associate Justices Josue
N. Bellosillo and Venancio D.
Aldecoa, Jr. ; Rollo, 14-20.

^[8]
Rollo, 18-19.

^[9]
Id., 19-20.

^[10]
Rollo, 35, et seq.

^[11]
Sacay vs. Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593 [1986]; Glan People’s Lumber and
Hardware vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 173 SCRA 464 [1989]; Robleza vs. Court of Appeals, 174 SCRA 354 [1989].

^[12]
Joaquin vs. Navarro, 93 Phil., 257 [1953].

^[13]
Dela Cruz vs. Sosing, 94 Phil. 26 [1953]; Castillo vs. Court of
Appeals, 124 SCRA 808 [1983].

^[14]
Brief for Oppositor-Appellant (Annex “A” of Petition), 10-11.

^[15]
Brief for Oppositor-Appellant (Annex “A” of Petition), 2; 21-23.

^[16]
Id., 21.

^[17]
Id., 22.