ADRIAN S. DE LA PAZ, PETITIONER, VS. DIRECTOR OF PATENTS AND PETROPHIL CORPORATION, RESPONDENTS.

This is a simple case of a denial of a motion to dismiss a
petition to cancel patent by the Director of Patents after petitioner had
adduced evidence.^[1]

On February 9, 1982 respondent Petrophil
Corporation (Petron for short) filed with the
Philippine Patent Office a petition for cancellation of letters of patent with
respect to Invention No. 14132 issued on February 27, 1981 “for the
processing of the manufacture of fuel for diesel engines” on the ground
that the same is not an invention, new or patentable within the meaning and
contemplation of the patent law.

After petitioner filed his answer and the parties failed to
arrive at a settlement the trial on the merits ensued.  Respondent Petron
adduced its evidence until it rested its case. 
Petitioner then filed a motion to dismiss which in effect is a demurrer to the evidence alleging
that no sufficient evidence had been adduced to support the petition.  After respondent Petron
filed an opposition to the same, on June
23, 1987 respondent Director of Patents issued Resolution No. 87-07
denying the motion to dismiss and its supplement thereto and setting the case
for hearing for the reception of evidence of petitioner.  A motion for reconsideration of said
resolution filed by petitioner was denied by respondent Director of Patents in
a resolution dated January 27, 1988.

Hence this petition wherein it is alleged that respondent
Director of Patents committed a grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion
to dismiss merely on a procedural ground when it had been clearly shown that
there is no cause of action.

The petition is devoid of merit.

Rule 184-C(d) of the Rules of Practice
on Patent Cases provides as follows:

“Rule 184-C(d)
– No Motion To Dismiss:  – No
motion to dismiss on any of the grounds enumerated in the Rules of Court shall be
entertained.  Instead such grounds
shall be pleaded as Affirmative Defenses, the resolution of which shall
be made in the decision on the merits. 
The Hearing Officer, may, for good cause shown, conduct a hearing on any
of the Affirmative Defenses if this will promote expediency in the resolution
of the pending case.” (Underscoring ours).

Petitioner claims that respondent Petron
has no cause of action.  This is one of
the grounds for a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court which
is referred to under the aforequoted Rule 184-C(d) of the Rules of Practice on Patent Cases which may not
be entertained but instead shall be pleaded as an affirmative defense, the
resolution of which shall be made in a decision on the merits.

Similarly, Rule 184-G of the Rules of Practice on Patent Cases aforestated provides as follows:

“Rule 184-G – Demurrer to
Evidence not Allowed:  – No
demurrer to evidence shall be entertained after the presentation of
Petitioner’s evidence.  Respondent shall
forthwith be required to present evidence in its behalf.”

The motion to dismiss submitted by petitioner is admittedly in
the nature of a demurrer to the evidence which under the foregoing rule may not
be entertained and respondent shall be required to present evidence in its
behalf.

Said rules were promulgated by the Bureau of Patents pursuant to
Section 78 of R.A. No. 165 as amended which have the force of law and control
the procedure in that Office.  The
provision of the Rules of Court which applies to patent cases in a suppletory character cannot prevail over the provisions of
the said Rules of Practice in Patent Cases.

Obviously, said rules were established to allow liberality in the
reception of evidence and to resolve the merit of the case only after all
parties have presented their evidence.

Moreover, in the resolution of the respondent Director of Patents
dated June 23, 1987 denying the motion to dismiss the observation was made to
the effect “that this case is nearing its termination, (and) it is the
stand of this office that inasmuch as there are still matters that should be
threshed out and determined in the course of the trial, the resolution of the
subject motion to dismiss shall be incorporated in the decision on the merits
in accordance with existing provision of the Rules of Practice in Patent
Cases.”^[2]

The matter of grant or denial of the motion to dismiss is
addressed to the sound discretion of the respondent Director of Patents and
unless there is a showing that there is grave abuse of discretion in the
exercise of the same his action shall not be disturbed by the appellate court and that the appellate
court should not substitute its judgment thereby.  Petitioner failed to
discharge his burden in this case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit
with costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, (Chairman), Cruz, Griño-Aquino, and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

^[1]
This case was erroneously consolidated with G. R. No. 76119 entitled
“Philippine Shell Petroleum Corporation, et al vs. Court of
Appeals” wherein the issue was the correct payment of filing fees.  Said case has been resolved in a decision
rendered on April 10, 1989
which decision is now final and executory.

^[2]
Page 64, Rollo.