PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. NORBERTO CLORES Y CORAL, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

We affirm the Decision^[1] promulgated on 7 March 1988 by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Caloocan City, Branch 131, acting as a
Special Criminal Court, finding Appellant, Norberto Clores
y Coral, guilty of Murder for the killing of Rodolfo Reyes y de Paz and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua; to
indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P30,000.00; and to pay the
costs.

The prosecution evidence, as narrated in the appealed Decision
(pp. 1-2, Rollo, pp. 14-15), discloses that on 24
December 1986, at about 2:00 o’clock in the morning, Celso
Escobar, the lone eyewitness in this case, was about to go home from a dancing
party held at Zapote Street, Barangay
178, Camarin, Caloocan
City, when he saw, from a distance of about four (4) arms lengths, Appellant
and a certain Jedy, suddenly attack from behind and
stab Rodolfo Reyes, who at that time was standing beside the road preparing to
go home.  The latter had given no provocation whatsoever.  Appellant Clores
and Jedy took turns in stabbing the victim, with Clores using a bladed weapon about six (6) to eight (8)
inches long, while Jedy used a longer weapon about
twelve (12) to fourteen (14) inches in length, until the victim fell to the
ground.  Both weapons were not recovered
by the police from the crime scene.  When
attacked, the victim was unable to shout or ask for help although he gave out a
scream before he expired.  It was only
after the assailants ha run away and after the victim had fallen flat on his
face that the incident caught the attention of other people who were still
loitering after the party.  The victim
was immediately rushed to the Quezon City General Hospital where he was declared dead on arrival.  Escobar did not go to the hospital but
instead informed the victim’s brother-in-law, who lived just in front of the
dance hall, of the tragedy.

Soon thereafter, Escobar accompanied the widow of the victim to a
police sub-station to report the incident. 
Two policemen immediately proceeded to the scene of the crime and were
thereafter assisted by Escobar in locating the house of Appellant.  The latter was found sleeping in his
house.  Having been identified by Escobar
as one of the assailants of the victim, Appellant was then taken to the Caloocan City Police Station where he denied participation
in the crime.  Witness Escobar and the
victim’s widow, Mylvin Anson Reyes, gave their sworn
statements to the police.

For his part, Appellant
narrated that on 23 December 1986, at around 7:00 o’clock in the
evening, after having come from work, he was going home to Area D, Camarin, Caloocan City, when he
was accosted by a man whom he met for the first time and who introduced himself
as Celso Escobar. 
The latter asked him for some money with which to buy two (2) cases of
beer.  Since Escobar appeared to be drunk
at that time and because he was afraid that he might create trouble, Appellant
claimed that he gave him all the money
in his pocket amounting to thirty five pesos (P35.00).  While he was walking home, he saw one of the
companions of Escobar challenging anyone for a fight.  He then saw Escobar engaged in a fistfight
with another man whom he did not recognize. 
When he reached his residence, he prepared his supper and went to
bed.  At around 4:00 o’clock in the morning of 24 December 1986, he was awakened by police
officers and was taken to the Caloocan City Police
Station.  He claims that he was asked to
identify the assailant of the victim, but
was unable to do so as he was not at
the crime scene.  He was then informed
that he was implicated by Escobar as one of the assailants of the victim, which
he denied.  According to him, the only
reason he could think of as to why he was implicated was his failure to give
Escobar the amount the latter was demanding (RTC Decision, pp. 2-3, Rollo, pp. 15-16).

The Trial Court gave more
credence to the prosecution version, attributed greater weight to the testimony of lone prosecution witness, Escobar, which it found to be
logical, straightforward and more probable compared to the alibi and the
denials interposed by Appellant, and adjudged the latter guilty of Murder with
the qualifying circumstance of treachery.

Disagreeing with said
Decision, Appellant addresses this appeal to this Court, ascribing the
following errors below:

“FIRST:

The trial court gravely erred in giving much weight and credence to
the version of lone eye-witness Mr. Celso Escobar;

SECOND:

The trial court also erred in finding and considering the existence
of the qualifying circumstance of `treachery’ in the instant case; and

THIRD:

The trial court likewise erred in finding the herein accused-appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged.”

This appeal lacks
merit.  Admittedly, the prosecution
presented only one eyewitness to the commission of the crime, Celso Escobar, who pointed to Appellant as one of the
assailants of the victim.  The fact that
his testimony is uncorroborated, however, will not detract from its
credibility.  There is no law which
requires that the testimony of a single witness has to be corroborated, except
where expressly mandated as in treason where the testimony of at least two
witnesses to the same overt act is needed (People vs. Canada, G.R. No. L-63728, 15 September 1986, 144 SCRA 121).  The testimony of only one witness, if
credible and positive, is sufficient to support a conviction even in a charge for
Murder (People vs. De la Cruz, G.R.
No. L-71044-45, 16 March
1987, 148 SCRA 582).

When it comes to the
matter of credibility of a witness, settled are the guiding rules some of which
are that (1) the Appellate court will not disturb the factual findings
of the lower Court, unless there is a showing that it had overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied same fact or circumstance of weight and substance
that would have affected the result of the case (People vs. Ablaza,
G.R. No. L-27352, 31 October
1969, 30 SCRA 173), which showing is absent herein; (2) the findings of the
Trial Court pertaining to the credibility of a witness is entitled to great
respect since it had the opportunity to examine his demeanor as he testified on
the witness stand, and, therefore, can discern if such witness is telling the
truth or not (People vs. Amoncio, G.R. No. L-49069, 22 June 1983, 122 SCRA 686) and (3) a
witness who testifies in a categorical,
straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner and remains consistent on
cross-examination is a credible witness (People vs. Barros, G.R. No. L-34249, 3 May
1983, 122 SCRA 34).

The Trial Court described
Escobar’s testimony as “logical, straight-forward and more probable”
and not “in any manner shaken by cross-examination to which he was
exposed” (RTC Decision, p. 5, Rollo, p.
18).  We have found no reason to overturn
that finding.  Escobar’s testimony
faithfully re-states the sworn declaration he gave to the police authorities on
24 December 1986,
a few hours after the incident transpired. 
He was one of the Barangay Tanods
of the area (TSN, 13 April 1987, p. 7), concerned with peace and order in
the community.  He was about four (4) arms lengths away from
the actual occurrence and saw Appellant stab the victim once “on the upper
right, above the buttocks.” This coincides with the medical certificate
which indicated the location of one of the stab wounds as on the “trunk” (Exhibit
“A”).  He had known Appellant
for about a month before the incident and the place where he was residing which
he described as near the house
of the victim, and could not have been mistaken in his identification.  He had also known the other assailant
“Jed” for about two weeks before the incident and saw him stab the
victim once.

There can be no question either about Appellant’s
identification as one of the assailants by Escobar during both his direct and
cross-examination.  It has been held that
positive identification of an accused by a credible witness demonstrates his
culpability (People vs. Sabater, G.R. No. L-38169, 23
February 1978, 81
SCRA 564).  It bears stressing that
Appellant was identified by witness Escobar not only during the trial, but
immediately after the commission of the crime before the investigating police
officers.  The early identification of appellant
by a prosecution witness bespeaks of his spontaneity and veracity (People vs. Chavez, G.R. No.
L-38603, 30 September 1982, 117 SCRA 221).

Appellant, in denying his
participation in the crime, resorted to alibi and claimed that he was sleeping
at the house where he was staying after coming from work at the time of the
incident in question.  Well-settled is
the rule that alibi is generally a weak defense since it is easy to concoct.  For this reason, it is viewed with caution
and is accepted only when proved by positive, clear and satisfactory
evidence.  For alibi to prosper, it is
not enough to prove that the person accused of a crime was somewhere when the
crime was committed.  It must likewise be
demonstrated that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the
scene of the crime at that time (People vs. Candado, G.R. No. L-34089, 1 August 1978, 84 SCRA 508).  As found by the Trial Court, the distance
between Appellant’s place of residence and the scene of the crime was barely
one-half kilometer (RTC Decision, p. 6, Rollo.
p. 19), hence, Appellant’s posture
cannot be sustained.  “Positive
identification of the accused is more credible than his denials and alibis, which were not
established by full, clear and satisfactory evidence” (People vs. Candado, supra). 
Nothing could be more settled then that alibi cannot prevail over the
positive identification made by a prosecution witness.

Besides, Appellant had
involved himself in contradictions.  He
said that it was around 7:00 P.M. when he saw Escobar on 23
December 1986 after
having come from work.  But when asked
for his working hours, he answered that they worked half day up to 1:00 P.M. that day because of the yuletide season
(TSN, 5 November 1989, pp. 3
& 5).  It is also highly improbable that Escobar,
whom he admittedly did not know, would demand money from him.  The impression
that Appellant wanted to convey by his testimony was that Escobar was the
culprit as he saw the latter engaged in a fistfight with an unidentified
man.  If this were the truth, he could
have disclosed his impression during the police interrogation; however, all he
declared then was that he did not know the culprit as he was not at the crime
scene.

Appellant’s submission
likewise is that witness Escobar testified against him because he did not give
him the amount he was demanding. 
According to Appellant, this tarnished the witness’ credibility and
showed his bias (Rollo, p. 28).  Aside from the fact that Escobar denied
having approached Appellant and demanded money from him, this circumstance
alone would not be a convincing motive for witness Escobar to falsely implicate
Appellant in such a heinous crime as Murder.

Appellant further alleges
that witness Escobar’s testimony is also discredited by his inaction and failure
to call for help and pursue the assailants. 
(Rollo, p. 29).  However, an eyewitness to a crime like Murder cannot normally be expected to immediately respond to the
victim or summon assistance, much less pursue the criminals who are armed.  Under such circumstances, the natural
instinct of self-preservation would prevail. 
Besides, Escobar directed his attention more at informing the family of
the victim and reporting the incident
to the police.

Appellant makes capital
of the fact that the physician who examined the cadaver of the victim was not
presented as a witness.  Hence, the possible relative positions of the
victim and assailants could not be determined which also raised doubts as to
who between Clores and Jedy
actually inflicted the stab wounds.  The
fact remains, however, that from the evidence adduced, each of them had stabbed
the victim once (TSN, 15 July 1987, p. 11). 
Besides, in the face of
positive identification of the Appellant, the kind of weapon used, as well as
the location of the stab wounds, assume secondary importance.  Notably also, the medical certificate
presented in evidence was
authenticated and admitted by the
lower Court (Exhibit “1”, TSN, 9 October 1987, p. 5; 6 November 1987,
p. 4).

On the matter of the
existence of treachery, Appellant claims that from the unsubstantiated medical
evidence, it appears that the victim sustained stab wounds in the trunk and
chest, hence, the attack was frontal and negates the presence of
treachery.  The “trunk”,
however, is, in fact, at the back of an individual.  As categorically stated by witness Escobar in
his testimony, he saw Appellant stab the victim above the buttocks, proving in
fact, that he was stabbed from behind. 
The stab wound on the chest must have been that inflicted by Jedy, the other assailant.

But even assuming that
the attack was frontal, as suggested by Appellant, there could still be
treachery if the attack was suddenly made, as the evidence in this case
indicates (People vs. Acabado, G.R. No. L-26104, 31
January 1969, 26
SCRA 727), on an unarmed and helpless victim who was given no chance whatsoever
to defend himself from the fatal blows. 
The requisites that the law requires for a finding of treachery have
thus been established.

Finally, appellant claims
that because of the conflicting versions of the prosecution and the defense,
motive is important in determining the truth. 
According to him, there was no motive for him to kill the victim (Rollo, pp. 32-33). 
Motive, however, need not be established where the appellant has been
positively identified and there is no doubt as to the identity of the culprit,
as in the case at bar (People vs. Demeterio, G.R. No.
L-48255, 30 September 1983, 124 SCRA 914).  And in case of contradictory declarations and
statements, greater weight is generally given to the positive testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses than to denials by an accused (People vs. Mostoles, Jr., G.R. No. L-38644, 30
September 1983, 124
SCRA 906).

In fine, no cogent reason
has been adduced to warrant a reversal of the findings and conclusions of the Trial Court adjudging Appellant
guilty, to a legal and moral certainty, of Murder.  In accordance with the majority opinion in
People vs. Munoz and Millora, et al., (G.R.
Nos. L-38968-70, 2 February 1989), the
imposable penalty, in the absence of any aggravating or modifying circumstance, is reclusion perpetua.^[2]

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED.  Costs against
accused-appellant, Norberto Clores y Coral.

SO ORDERED.

Paras, Padilla, Sarmiento,
and Regalado,
JJ., concur.

^[1]
Penned by Judge Antonio J. Fineza.

^[2]
This ponente, however, maintains her dissent
in that case as to the imposable penalty.