ESPIRITU SANTO PAROCHIAL SCHOOL, SISTER MARY MARTINEZ, AND SISTER MA. ENCARNACION DE LOS SANTOS, PETITIONERS, VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ESPIRITU SANTO PAROCHIAL S…

This suit for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court was brought against the National Labor Relations Commission upon the
finding that the seven individual private respondents had been illegally
dismissed by the petitioners.  The facts
are not disputed.

The said seven individual private respondents were hired by the
petitioner-school on a probationary basis on June 1, 1984,^[1]
whereupon, sometime between April 1 and 15, 1985,^[2]
their services were terminated.  On May 8, 1985, they charged the
petitioner-school with unfair labor practice and illegal dismissal.  They likewise asked for damages.  The labor arbiter ruled as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

a. finding respondents guilty of unfair labor practice, thus
enjoining them to cease and desist from committing acts herein complained of;

b. ordering respondents to rein­state herein individual
complainants to their positions with full backwages
from the date corresponding to the start of the school year 1985-1986 until
actually reinstated;

c. ordering respondent to pay complainant the sum equivalent to ten
percent (10%) of the total award as attorney’s fees; and

d. dismissing the claim for damages for insufficiency of evidence.

The Socio-Economic Analyst of this Office is directed to effect a
computation of the aforestated backwages
of the individual complainants, whose Report shall form part of this decision.^[3]

The school appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission,
but the decision of the labor arbiter was affirmed on February 29, 1988 except for the charge of unfair
labor practice which was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.

In the present petition, the school submits the following issues:

1. The respondents-teachers were not dismissed.  Their contracts have, simply, expired and not
renewed.

2. Their contracts subsist from schoolyear
to schoolyear, and unless renewed, the same
automatically expire;

3. Although Article 282 of the Labor Code (now Article 281) fixes
probationary periods to six months Biboso
v. Victorias Milling Company, lnc.,^[4]
and Buiser v. Leogardo^[5]
supposedly held that the contract of probationary employment may provide
otherwise;

4. The school is not guilty of unfair labor practice, much less,
of illegal dismissal, because school authorities, in terminating the seven
private respondents services, did not allegedly know that they were union
members.  Furthermore, it was the head
teachers themselves, also leaders of the union, who recommended termination.

In their comment, however, the said seven private
respondents-teachers contend as follows:

1. Under the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, teachers
undergo a probationary period of three years, during which, they may be
dismissed only for a just cause.

2. Since the said seven teachers were laid off after less than
one year of probationary service, the lay-off was illegal.

The Solicitor General submits that the National Labor Relations
Commission committed no grave abuse of discretion for the following reasons:

1. There was no existing contract between school and teachers
stipulating probationary employment on a schoolyear-to-schoolyear
basis.  What the teachers have are only
their appointment papers.

2. The petitioner can not rely on the decision in Biboso because, in that case, the employment contracts were
specifically on a year-to-year basis.

3. The teachers dismissal was therefore without just cause and
accordingly, null and void.

4. There is no basis “not to re-hire”^[6]
the said teachers in view of their performance ratings given by head-teachers
ranging from 80% to 90%.

The Court agrees with the labor arbiter that:

The issues thus obtaining are: 
(a) whether or not the individual complainants were lawfully dismissed
when respondents failed to re-hire them; (b) whether or not respondents
committed acts of unfair labor practice in terminating the services of
individual complainants, and (c) whether or not complainants are entitled to
damages resulting from the dismissal of individual complainants.^[7]

The Court also agrees that:

There is no dispute that the individual complainants were
probationary employees pursuant to the policy enunciated by the Bureau of
Private Schools extending the probationary employment of teachers to three (3)
years.

The above policy, however, did not repeal or render inoperative
Article 282 of the Labor Code, as amended which provides that:

x x x The
services of an employee who has been engaged on a probationary basis may be
terminated for a just cause or when he fails to quality as a regular employee
in accordance with reasonable standards made known to the employee at the time
of his engagement.  x x
x

We see no clear evidence that the individual complainants were
terminated either for a just cause or that they have failed to qualify as
regular employees in accordance with the standards set by respondent school
made known to the former at the time of hiring. 
In fact, it is shown that the individual complainants were issued
individual certifications of employment and whose performance ratings ranged
from 85% to 90% (Annexes “D”, “D-1” to “D-5″ –
Complainants’ Position Paper).^[8]

The Court, finally, stamps its approval on the following:

It is not denied that the complainants were hired as probationary
teachers, but the reason for their termination should nevertheless be for a
valid cause or causes.  It must be
clearly shown that they have failed to meet certain standards or criteria made
known to them beforehand.  It cannot be
said that they failed to meet respondents’ standards because of their high
marks of performance.  Hence, We see no
valid reason for the school not to re-hire them, except, of course, for some
reasons known only to the school authorities but which they did not make known
to herein complainants.  x x x^[9]

As to contentions, advanced so vehemently by the petitioners,
that “the decision not to re-hire the seven individual respondents was
made by the three head teachers of the school, all of them leaders and
organizers of the respondent union . . .”^[10]
and that “[h]ence, there could not have been any
anti-union bias . . .,”^[11]
suffice it to say that the fact that no “anti-union bias” has been shown
is not entirely exculpatory.  The fact
remains that the private-respondents teachers were dismissed not for cause,
when, under both the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools and Article 281
(formerly Article 282) of the Labor Code, probationary workers may be
terminated only for cause.

It will not also do to say that since the contracts to teach in
question were for fixed periods, they die a natural death, so to speak, on the
expiration of such periods, which is supposed to be Biboso’s
teaching.  It should likewise be pointed
out, however, and so we reiterate the Solicitor General’s very submission, that
in Biboso, the contracts to teach were for definite
periods.  (“None of the complainants
who testified disputed the fact that they all signed identical contracts of
employment which provided for a definite period of employment expiring June 30
of the particular school year.”^[12])
On the other hand, the contracts involved here stipulate no period.  In that eventiality,
the three-year probation period provided by the Manual of Regulations for
Private Schools must apply.  Under the
Manual, no teacher may be removed unless for just and valid causes.  The petitioners can not, therefore,
successfully invoke Biboso.  Resort therefore to the Manual is not only
justifiable but unavoidable.

That “it is of common knowledge that in all private schools, the
first three years of probationary employment . . . is on a schoolyear
basis . . .”^[13]
is self-defeating.  First, the Court is
unaware of any “common knowledge” thereof. 
If such a custom indeed exists, it has not been adequately proven.  Under Article 12 of the Civil Code, “[a]
custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence.”

Second, the petitioners can not talk of a “three year
probationary employment expiring each school year.” If it expires per schoolyear, it is not a three-year period.

Recourse to the school manual of the petitioner school, which
provides:

III. 
ACADEMIC PERSONNEL POLICIES

. . .

C. PROBATIONARY:

Teachers who have not served the school for three consecutive years
are classified as non-permanent.  They
are under probation.  Their contract with
the school automatically terminates effectively (at the) end of every school
year unless the teacher concerned is dismissed for cause or has resigned from
the service before the end of the school year. 
Probation is a test of moral and professional fitness of a teacher.^[14]

is equally unavailing.  The school manual must yield to the decree of
the Manual or Regulations for Private Schools of the Department of Education,
which has the character of law.

While the facts are hazy as to the existence of an “anti-union
bias”, so strongly stressed by the petitioners, the same can not validate
the questioned dismissals that were, unarguably, without the sanction of a
legal cause.

Accordingly, we find no grave abuse of discretion committed by
the respondent National Labor Relations Commission in its assailed decision.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.  The decision of the public respondent
promulgated on February 29, 1988,
is AFFIRMED in toto except that back wages shall be
limited to three years.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman), Paras, and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Padilla, J., no part; former
partner of law firm, counsel for petitioner-school.

^[1] Rollo, 28.

^[2] Id.,
52.

^[3] Id.,
26.

^[4]
No. L-44380, March 31, 1977,
76 SCRA 250.

^[5] No.
63316, July 31, 1984, 131
SCRA 151.

^[6] Id.,
69.

^[7] Id.,
27.

^[8] Id.,
27-28.

^[9] Id.,
28-29.

^[10] Id.,
6-7; emphasis in the original.

^[11] Id.,
7.

^[12] Supra,
252.

^[13] Rollo, id., 9.

^[14] Id.,
9-10; emphasis in the original.