ANTIPAZ PRESCO Y PARAS, ANTONIO AMORES Y PARAS, AND ANSELMA PARAS, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MARIANO UMALI, JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF CAVITE, BRANC…

Review on certiorari of
the decision* rendered by the respondent Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP–11357, entitled:  “Antipaz Presco y Paras, et al., petitioners, versus Hon. Mariano M. Umali, etc. et al.,
respondents,” which dismissed for reasons therein stated, the petition for
the annulment of (a) the Decision rendered by the Municipal
Trial Court of General Trias, Cavite, in Civil Case No.
329, entitled:  “Simplicio Sanchez, plaintiff, versus Antipaz Presco,
defendant,” and (b) the Order issued by the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 25, on
24 November 1986, dismissing the Amended Complaint filed in Civil Case No.
TM-69, entitled:  “Antipaz Presco, et al.,
plaintiffs, versus Modesto Paras, et al.,
defendants.”

The facts which gave rise to this petition are as follows:

On 22 September 1982,
herein private respondent Simplicio Sanchez, claiming
to be the registered owner of a parcel of land with an area of 794 square
meters situated in Tejero, General Trias, Cavite,
under TCT No. T-112547 of the land
records of the province of Cavite, filed a complaint
with the Municipal Trial Court of
General Trias,
Cavite, docketed therein as Civil Case No. 329, to
oust herein petitioner Antipaz Presco
from the said land on the ground that he (Simplicio)
needed the same for the use of his married son who had no place of his
own.  The defendant (Antipaz) denied the
allegations of the complaint and claimed that the house occupied by her, as
well as the lot on which it was
constructed, belonged to her mother, which, the latter inherited from her
deceased parents, Clemencia Tagle
and Felipe Paras.

After trial, or on
24 September 1984, judgment
was rendered by the municipal court, ordering the defendant (Antipaz) to
immediately surrender possession of the disputed property to the plaintiff (Simplicio).  The
defendant was further ordered to pay the plaintiff the
amount of P100.00 a month, beginning 7 May 1982, as compensation for the use of the land,
and P200.00, for attorney’s fees.

In rendering judgment in favor of the plaintiff, the municipal
court found that the parcel of land in question was covered by a certificate of
title duly issued in the name of the plaintiff, and the ownership and title of
the plaintiff to the said property was
confirmed by one Modesto Paras who testified that the
said land was sold to him by his
mother, Clemencia Tagle and
he, in turn, sold a part thereof to the plaintiff, Simplicio
Sanchez.  The municipal court further
found that the defendant had not presented any evidence to rebut and overcome
the validity of the plaintiff’s title to the said property.^[1]

The defendant (Antipaz) did not appeal
from the said municipal court judgment. 
Instead, on 31 October 1984,
the said Antipaz Presco,
together with Antonio Amores y Paras
and Anselma Paras, grandson
and daughter, respectively, of the late
spouses Clemencia Tagle and
Felipe Paras, filed a complaint against Modesto Paras and Simplicio Sanchez with
the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, docketed
therein as Civil Case No. TM-69, for the
annulment of the certificates of title covering the lot in question, which were
allegedly issued fraudulently in the respective names of the said Modesto Paras and Simplicio Sanchez and
for the reconveyance of the lot to them (plaintiffs
in the case).^[2]

Meanwhile, on 10
December 1984, the Municipal Trial Court of General Trias, Cavite
issued a writ of execution in Civil Case No. 329.^[3]
Antipaz Presco, however,
refused to vacate the land so that soon
thereafter, Simplicio Sanchez (as plaintiff) filed a
motion for the issuance of an order for the demolition of the house of Antipaz Presco (as
defendant).  In view thereof, the
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. TM-69 before the RTC of Cavite amended their complaint to include the judge of the
Municipal Trial Court of Gen. Trias, Cavite, as party defendant, claiming that the motion for
the demolition of the house occupied by Antipaz Presco, if granted and enforced by said municipal
court, would cause irreparable damage and injury to said co-plaintiff Antipaz Presco.  Consequently, plaintiffs in Civil Case No.
TM-69 prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain
the said municipal court from ordering the demolition of the house of Antipaz Presco.^[4]

 The defendants in Civil Case No. TM-69
(herein private respondents) filed their Answer to the Amended Complaint,
claiming as special and affirmative defenses that:  (a) plaintiffs’ cause of action, if any, was
barred by res judicata, estoppel and/or laches, and the statute of
limitations; and (b) the plaintiffs’ cause of action involved a dispute over
real property and, pursuant to the provisions of PD 1508, it should have been
brought first before the Barangay Council of Tejero, General Trias, Cavite, for conciliation or mediation before filing the
same with the court, hence, the RTC of Cavite
acquired no jurisdiction over the case (Civil Case No. TM-69).^[5]

Upon motion of the defendants in Civil Case No. TM-69 (who are
herein private respondents), a preliminary hearing was conducted on their
affirmative defenses and on 24 November 1986, the trial court dismissed the
complaint on the grounds that:  (1) the
complaint was filed without a previous confrontation before the Lupon of
Barangay Tejero, General Trias, Cavite, in accordance with Section 2, P.D. 1508; and (2) it
appeared that the plaintiffs Antipaz Presco and Antonio Amores y Paras were the children of sisters of the defendant
Modesto Paras, while the other plaintiff Anselma Paras was the sister of
the said defendant Modesto Paras, and yet, no earnest
efforts had been exerted by the plaintiffs towards a compromise agreement with
the defendants, in accordance with the provisions of Article 222 of the Civil
Code.^[6]

The plaintiffs (herein petitioners) filed a motion for
reconsideration of the RTC order dismissing their complaint, but their motion
was denied on 16 February 1987.^[7]

Whereupon, the petitioners, as plaintiffs in Civil Case No. TM-69
filed a petition for certiorari with writ of preliminary injunction with the Court of Appeals,
docketed therein as CA-G.R. No. SP-11357, wherein they prayed that upon the
filing of their said petition, a restraining order be issued to maintain the status
quo among the parties pending
hearing and resolution of the issues by said appellate court and that, after
hearing, (a) a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to be valid until the
final disposition of the said petition; (b) the decision or judgment rendered
by the Municipal Trial Court in Civil
Case No. 329 and the writ of execution it had issued be declared null and void; (c) the decision or order of
dismissal rendered by the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. TM-69 be
declared null and void for being contrary to law; (d) Ordering the private
respondents to pay the costs of suit; and for other reliefs,
just and reasonable in the premises.^[8]

On 17 November 1987,
however, the respondent appellate court dismissed the petition for the reason
that the remedy of the petitioners was
appeal and not certiorari.^[9] The petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration of the CA decision, and when their motion was denied on 24
February 1988,^[10] they filed the present petition before this
Court.  The petition was given due course
and parties were required to submit their respective memoranda.^[11]

The principal issue for resolution is whether or not the
respondent Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in ruling that the
remedy of the petitioners was appeal
(not certiorari) from the decision rendered in Civil Case No. 329 of the Municipal Trial Court of General Trias, Cavite, and the order of dismissal in Civil Case
No. TM-69 of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite.

As a rule, errors of judgment or of procedure, not relating to
the court’s jurisdiction nor involving grave abuse of discretion, are not reviewable by certiorari.  The Court has repeatedly held that certiorari
is not the remedy when appeal is
available.  However, there are exceptions
to the rule.  For instance, certiorari
is justified where the trial judge capriciously and whimsically exercises his
judgment,^[12] or where an appeal is not adequate to
protect one’s rights or where there may be danger of failure of justice,^[13] and in order to prevent irreparable damage
and injury to a party.^[14] Certiorari may be availed of where an
appeal would be slow, inadequate, insufficient, and will not promptly relieve a
party from the injurious effects of the judgment complained of, or in order to
avoid further litigation.^[15]

In the case at bar, while an appeal from the decision in Civil
Case No. 329 of the Municipal Trial Court of General Trias,
Cavite was available to the petitioner Antipaz Presco, such remedy was
not adequate in the light of her answer that the house and land occupied by her
and from where she was sought to be
ejected, belonged to her deceased mother. 
In actions of forcible entry and detainer, the
main issue is possession de facto, independently of any claim of
ownership or possession de jure that
either party may set forth in his pleadings;^[16] and an appeal does not operate to change the
nature of the original action.  On
appeal, in an ejectment case, it is within the
discretion of the court to look into the evidence supporting the assigned
errors relating to the alleged ownership of appellant insofar as said evidence would indicate or determine the
nature of appellant’s possession of the controverted
premises.  Said court should not however
resolve the issues raised by such assigned errors.  The resolution of said issues would
effect an adjudication on ownership
which is not sanctioned in the summary action for unlawful detainer.^[17]

Thus, an appeal by petitioner Antipaz Presco from the judgment of the municipal court in the ejectment proceedings (Civil Case No. 329) would have
affected only the material possession of the land disputed by the parties, but would not resolve the issue of
ownership put forth by petitioner Antipaz Presco.  Hence, the
filing of an action for reconveyance to resolve the
issue of ownership was proper, and this was done by her in Civil Case No. TM-69
before the RTC of Cavite.

Appeal from the dismissal order of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite in Civil Case No. TM-69, while also available to the
herein petitioners, since the dismissal of their amended complaint was a final
order, was nonetheless inadequate.  It
appears that the private respondent Simplicio Sanchez
had, in the meantime, asked the Municipal Trial Court of General Trias, Cavite
to issue an order for the demolition of the house of Antipaz
Presco which, if granted by the said court, would
have caused irreparable damage and
injury to Antipaz Presco.

The rule is that an order of demolition is not appealable^[18]
unless there is an allegation that it has substantially varied the terms of the
judgment or where the terms of the judgment are not very clear and there is room
for interpretation.^[19] However, a proper recourse could be through
a special civil action of certiorari or prohibition.^[20] This is in consonance with the principle
that in ejectment cases, the judgment must be
executed imme­diately when it is in favor of the plaintiff in order to prevent
further damages to him arising from the loss of possession.^[21] The reason for execution is even stronger
when the judgment has
long become final and executory.^[22] Even the pendency
of an action for nullification of sale and title is not a bar in the execution
of judgment in an ejectment case.^[23]

An appeal, then, from the Regional Trial Court’s order dismissing
petitioners’ amended complaint in Civil Case No. TM-69, could not immediately
relieve Antipaz Presco from
the injurious effects of an order of demolition issued in Civil Case No. 329 by
the municipal court.  There was a danger
of a failure of justice if her home should be demolished pending resolution of
a slow and tedious process of appeal from the order of dismissal in said Civil
Case No. TM-69.

Besides, the reasons for the dismissal of the amended complaint
in Civil Case No. TM-69 were patently erroneous as to amount to grave abuse of
discretion.  In dismissing the amended
complaint, the trial court ruled that: 
(1) the complaint was filed without a confrontation between the parties
before the Lupon Chairman of Barangay
Tejero in accordance with PD 1508, which requirement
is juris­dictional and its non-compliance a ground for dismissal of the
complaint; and (2) no earnest efforts had been exerted by the plaintiffs
(petitioners herein) towards a compromise settlement with the defendants
(private respondents herein) pursuant
to the provisions of Article 222 of the Civil Code, given the fact that co-plaintiff (herein
petitioner) Anselma Paras
was the sister of the defendant (herein private respondent) Modesto Paras, while the co-plaintiffs (also herein petitioners) Antipaz Presco and Antonio Amores y Paras were children of
Flora Paras and Adriana Paras,
sisters of said defendant (herein private respondent) Modesto Paras.

This Court has already ruled in several decisions that while the
referral of a case to the Lupon Tagapayapa
is a condition precedent for the filing of a complaint in court, however, the conciliation process under PD 1508 is not
a jurisdictional requirement so that non-compliance therewith cannot affect the jurisdiction which the
court has otherwise acquired over the subject matter or over the person of the defendant.^[24]

And be that as it may, it would appear that the amended complaint
filed by the petitioners before the RTC in Civil Case. No. TM-69 was coupled
with the provisional remedy of a preliminary injunction, so that the
petitioners could go directly to court.^[25]

As to Article 222 of the Civil Code, it finds no application in
this case for, while the defendant-private respondent Modesto Paras may have been closely related to the plaintiffs-petitioners, his
co-defendant-private respondent Simplicio Sanchez is
a complete stranger to the plaintiffs-petitioners.

WHEREFORE, certiorari prayed for is GRANTED and the Decision rendered by
the Court of Appeals in case CA–G.R.
SP-11357 and the resolution denying the motion for reconsideration dated
24 February 1988, as well as the order issued by the Regional Trial Court of Cavite on 24 November 1986 dismissing the Amended Complaint
in Civil Case No. TM-69, are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.  The Regional
Trial Court of Cavite is ordered to proceed with the trial of said Civil Case No. TM-69
on its merits.  Without pronouncement as
to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman), Paras, Sarmiento, and Regalado, JJ., concur.

* Penned by Justice Nathanael P. de Pano, Jr. and concurred in by Justices
Hector C. Fule and Cecilio
L. Pe.

^[1]
Rollo, p. 43

^[2]
Id., p. 51

^[3]
Id., p. 47

^[4]
Id., p. 54

^[5]
Id., pp. 61-66

^[6]
Id., pp. 67-69

^[7]
Id., p. 73, par. i

^[8]
Id., p. 70

^[9]
Id., p. 10

^[10]
Id., p. 23

^[11]
Id., p. 89

^[12]
Butuan Bay Wood Export Corp. vs. CA, G.R. No.
L-45473, April 28, 1980, 97
SCRA 297

^[13]
Jaca vs. Davao Lumber, G.R. No. L-25771, March 29, 1982, 113, SCRA 10

^[14]
Marcelo vs. De Guzman, G.R. No. L-29077, June 29, 1982, 114 SCRA 657

^[15]
De la Cruz vs. IAC, G.R. No. 63612, January 31, 1985, 134 SCRA 417; Balagtas Realty Corp. vs. Romillo,
G.R. Nos. L-48376-85, July 16, 1984,
130 SCRA 415; Lobete vs. Sundiam,
G.R. No. L-38278, June 28, 1983,
123 SCRA 95; Velasco vs. Segundo, G.R.No.
58187, September 30, 1982,
117 SCRA 573

^[16]
Alvir v. Hon. Vera, et al., G.R. No. L-39338, July 16, 1984, 130 SCRA 357

^[17]
Dela Santa v. C.A.,
G.R. No. L-30560, November 18, 1985,
140 SCRA 44

^[18]
Cua v. Lecaros, G.R.
No. 71909, May 24, 1988,
161 SCRA 480

^[19]
Corpus v. Alikpala, G.R. No. L-23707, January
17, 1968, 22 SCRA 104; Uytiepo v. Aggabao, G.R.
No. L-28671, September 30, 1970,
35 SCRA 186

^[20]
David v. Ejercito, G.R. No. L-41334, June 18, 1976, 71 SCRA 484

^[21]
Salinas v. Navarro, G.R. No.
50259, November 29, 1983,
126 SCRA 167

^[22]
Gonzales, Jr. v. IAC, G.R. No. 63614, August 28, 1984, 131 SCRA 468

^[23]
Ramirez v. Bleza, G.R. No. L-45640, July 30, 1981, 106 SCRA 187

^[24]
Gonzales vs. CA, G.R. Nos. 59495-97, June 26, 1987, 151 SCRA 289, Millare vs. Hernando, G.R. No. 55480, 151 SCRA 484;
Fernandez vs. Militante, G.R. No. 59801, May 31, 1988, 161 SCRA 695; Blardony vs. Coscolluela,
G.R. No. 70261, February 28, 1990

^[25]
See Sec. 6, PD 1508