MANUEL L. SIQUIAN, PETITIONER, VS. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, AND THE COURT OF APPEALS, RESPONDENTS.

The information charging petitioner Manuel L. Siquian, the then municipal
mayor of Angadanan, Isabela, of the crime of falsification of public document
under Art. 171, par. 4 of the Revised Penal Code filed by Second Assistant
Provincial Fiscal before Branch XX of the of the Regional Trial Court of
Cauayan, Isabela reads as follows:

That on or about the 1st day of July, 1975, in the Municipality of
Angadanan, Province of Isabela, and within the preliminary jurisdiction of this
Honorable court, the accused Manuel L. Siquian, being then the Municipal Mayor
of Angadanan, Isabela, taking advantage of his position as such Municipal Mayor
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously prepare and sign a
false document, knowing it to be false, to wit, an official communication to
the Civil Service Commissioner, dated July 1, 1975, which is required by law in
order to support the appointment of a certain
Jesusa B. Carreon to the position of clerk in the Office of the Municipal
Secretary which (sic) he appointed as such by stating and making it appear in
said document that there was such a position
existing and that funds therefore were available, when in truth and in fact, as
said accused well-know (sic), there was no such position or item and no funds
were available for said position in the Fiscal Budget of Angadanan for 1975-76,
nor was there any special ordinance creating said position and appropriating
the necessary funds therefor.

* * *

[Rollo, pp. 23-24.]

Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the offense
charged and the trial of the case ensued. The facts as found by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) are as follows:

It appears from the evidence that sometime in June, 1975, Jesusa
Carreon, 20 years old, single
and a resident of Ilagan, Isabela, went to the accused Manuel L. Siquian, Mayor
of the Municipality of Angadanan, Province of Isabela, to apply for employment
in the office of the Mayor. Earlier,
she and her friends went to the Municipal
Hall of Angadanan to ask information if there was any vacancy. When she was informed that there was, she
went to see the accused in his
house.

The accused must have agreed to appoint her because he accompanied
her to the office of the Municipal Secretary, Emilio Valenzuela. The latter,
however, was not there. Even so,
the accused told Jesusa Carreon to report for work the following day and that
she should be included in the budget. The accused then accompanied her to the Office of the Municipal
Treasurer, Calo Battung. The Treasurer
agreed that she could report for work.

One week after, Jesusa Carreon went alone to the Office of the
Municipal Secretary. He was there. When she went to the accused, she was told to go back to the Municipal
Secretary to work for her appointment papers.

She was appointed
clerk to the Municipal Secretary in the Office of the Municipal Secretary, on
July 1, 1975 by the accused.

* * *

Accompanying her appointment is the certification, among others, of
the availability of funds (C.S. Form No. 203) dated July 1, 1975, issued by the
accused Manuel L. Siquian, pursuant to
the requirements of Memorandum Circular No. 5, Series of 1975, addressed to the
Commissioner of Civil Service, Manila (Exh. “C”).

*
* *

Jesusa Carreon took her oath of Office (Exh. “A-1”) on
July 1, 1975, and promptly began to work on the same day. Her monthly salary was P120.00. She rendered services for the months of
July, August, September, October, November and December 1975 (Exhibits
“B”, “B-1” to “B-5”). She was not, however, paid. As early as October 1975, she went to the Municipal Treasurer to receive
her salary, but she was told that there was no money yet. In November 1975, she went to see the accused, but the latter told her to see the treasurer. She went to the
Treasurer who told her that there was no money. Because of this, she went to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
at the Provincial Capitol in Ilagan, Isabela, to ask (sic) information regarding
her unpaid salaries. She was interviewed by Atty. Efren Ambrosio, Provincial Administrator.
Atty. Ambrosio asked her if she had complete appointment papers. Thereafter, she filed her verified complaint
dated April 20, 1976, against the accused. Her complaint is addressed to Governor Faustino N. Dy (Exhibit
“G” and “G-1”).

It also appears from the evidence that the Municipal council of
Angadanan, Isabela, failed to enact the annual budget for the municipality for
the Fiscal Year 1975-1976 (Exhs. “H”, “H-1”, and
“H-2”). Accordingly, and
pursuant to PD No. 477, the annual budget for the previous Fiscal Year
1974-1975, was deemed re-enacted (Exh. “H-1”). Thus, the Municipal Plantilla of Personnel
for the Fiscal Year 1975-1976 is the same as the Plantilla of Personnel for the
Fiscal Year 1975-1976. No supplemental
budget was enacted by the Municipal
council of Angadanan.

In the Plantilla of
Personnel for 1974-1975, which was deemed re-enacted for the Fiscal Year
1975-1976, there was no new item or appropriation for the position of clerk in
the Office of the Municipal Secretary of Angadanan, Isabela. The new position of clerk in the office of
the Municipal Council appearing in the Municipal Plantilla for Personnel
(Exhibit “H-2”) for 1974-1975, was filled-up as early as October 16,
1974 by the accused when he appointed Clarita G. Ramirez to that position
(Exhibits “J” and “J-2). With respect to the new position of a Clerk to the office of the
Municipal Mayor in the Plantilla for 1974-1975, it was already filled-up by the
appointment of Miss Marivic A. Tallod on June 16, 1975, by the accused
(Exhibits “K” and “K-4”). As early as June 28, 1974, the same position was held by Miss Felicidad Visitacion who was appointed by the
accused, but she resigned (Exhs. “K” and “K-1”).

* * *

[Rollo, pp. 26, 28, 29-30.]

After trial, the Court found the petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged and decreed:

WHEREFORE, finding the accused Manuel L. Siquian guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of falsification of public document as charged in
the information, the Court hereby sentences said accused to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of from FIVE (5) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS, and ONE (1) DAY
of prision correctional (sic) as minimum to SEVEN YEARS of prision mayor as
maximum and to pay a fine of THREE THOUSAND (P3,000.00) PESOS.

SO ORDERED. [Rollo, 35.]

On appeal, the respondent Court of Appeals ruled as follows:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is in accordance with law and
the evidence and is hereby therefore affirmed. Costs against the accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED. [Rollo, p. 42.]

Hence, this petition for review seeking reversal of the CA decision
and the acquittal of petitioner Manuel L. Siquian. Petitioner contends that the respondent court has decided a
question of substance not in accord with law and jurisprudence when it affirmed
the decision of the trial court convicting him of the crime of falsification
despite the following:

A. The evidence on
record which consists of the testimony of the prosecution’s principal witness,
shows the absence of criminal intent on the part of the accused.

B. There is no
evidence that the accused took advantage of his position as Municipal Mayor
when he made the allegedly falsified certification.

C. The statement
that “Funds for the position are available” is not a narration of
facts but a conclusion of law.

D. The petitioner
was deprived of his right to due process of law when the trial court proceeded
with the trial in his absence despite a pending petition for change of venue
with the Supreme Court. [Rollo, p. 13.]

Petitioner’s arguments, however, are bereft of any merit.

The offense of falsification by a public officer under Article
171 of the Revised Penal Code is committed by “any public officer, employee or notary who, taking advantage of his
official position, shall falsify a document
by committing any of the following acts:
. . . ; 4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of
facts; . . .”  It is settled that in
this fourth kind of falsification, the following requisites must concur:

(a) That the
offender makes in a document untruthful statements in a narration of facts;

(b) That he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated
by him; and,

(c) That the facts
narrated by the offender are absolutely false [Cabigas v. People, G. R. No. 67472, July 3, 1987, 152
SCRA 18.]

All these requisites had been fully met in the case at bar. Petitioner, a public officer, being then the
mayor of the municipality of Angadanan, Isabela, made an untruthful statement
in the narration of facts contained in the certification which he issued in
connection with the appointment of
complainant Jesusa Carreon. The
certification, having been issued by a public official in the exercise of the
function of his office is a public document [U.S. v. Asensi, 34 Phil. 765
(1915).] It is immaterial whether or not the Civil Service Commissioner to whom
the certification was addressed received the document issued by
petitioner. Since the certification was
prepared by petitioner in accordance with the standard forms prescribed by the
government (specifically the Civil Service Commission) pursuant to law, the
certification was invested with the character of a public document [People v.
Asensi, supra citing U.S. v. Vy Guico, 12 Phil. 209 (1908)]
falsification of which is punishable under Article 171 of the Revised Penal
Code. Here, falsification of such
document was committed when the petitioner stated that funds were available for
the position to which Jesusa Carreon was appointed when he knew that, in
reality, the position itself did not even exist and no funds had been
appropriated therefor.

Petitioner’s stance that the certification which he issued
contained no narration of facts but rather a conclusion of law is not
meritorious. The respondent court, upholding the Solicitor General’s
arguments, correctly ruled as follows:

“Conclusion of law” is defined as a proposition not
arrived at by any process of natural reasoning from a fact or combination of
facts stated but by the application of the artificial rules of law to the facts
pleaded [Levins v. Rovegno, 71 Cal. 273, 12 p. 161; Black’s Law Dict., p. 362.]

From the above-cited definition, it can be deduced that the
certification by the appellant that “funds for the position are
available” does not require the application of the artificial rules of
law. To certify that
funds are available for the position what
one should do was (sic) to refer
to the budget and plantilla of personnel
of the applicable fiscal year and ascertain
if such item exists and funds are
allocated therefor.

In the present case, despite the presence of the records which shows
that there is no position and funds therefor referred to in the certification,
the appellant, fully aware of the data provided by the records, certified falsely that “funds for the position
are available” [Rollo, p. 41.]

It is undisputed that the Municipal Council of Angadanan failed
to enact the annual budget of the municipality for the Fiscal Year 1975-1976
and therefore, the annual budget for the last fiscal year, 1974-1975, was
deemed re-enacted under P.D. No 477. In
the Municipal Plantilla of Personnel (Exh. “B-2”) accompanying the
Annual Budget for the Municipality of Angadanan, Isabela for the Fiscal Year
1974-1975, there is no such position as Clerk to the Municipal Secretary in the
Office of the Municipal Secretary, the position to which Jesusa Carreon was
appointed. Accordingly, there is no appropriation made in the Annual
Budget for the Fiscal Year 1974-1975 for such position, thus rendering
petitioner’s statement in his certification utterly false. The requisite of absolute falsity of the
statement made in the document is met when there exists not even an iota of
colorable truth in what is declared in the narration of facts [U.S. v. Bayot,
10 Phil. 518 (1908)], as in this case. From the foregoing, it can be seen that the first and third requirements
laid down in the Cabigas case, supra, are fully satisfied.

The second element of the offense is likewise present. Under the civil service rules and
regulations, specifically the Guidelines in the Preparation
of Appointment for Original Appointment (Exhs.
“D” and “D-3”), a certification of the availability of
funds for the position to be filled up is required to be signed by the head of
office or any officer who has been delegated the authority to sign. As an officer authorized by law to issue this
certification which is designated as Civil Service Form No. 203, as revised,
the petitioner has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts
narrated by him in said certification which includes information as to the
availability of the funds for the position being filled up.

Contrary to petitioner’s claim, the existence of a wrongful
intent to injure a third person is not necessary when the falsified document is
a public document. This has already
been authoritatively decreed in the 1955 case of People v. Po
Giok To [96 Phil. 913 (1955).] The Court in the aforementioned case
explicitly stated that wrongful intent on the part of the accused to injure a
third person is not an essential element of the crime of falsification of
public document. The rationale for this
principal distinction between falsification of public and private documents has
been stated by the Court in this wise: “In the falsification of public or
official documents, whether by public officials or private persons, it is
unnecessary that there be present the idea of gain or the intent to injure a
third person, for the reason that, in contradistinction to private documents,
the principal thing punished is the violation of the public faith and the
destruction of the truth as therein solemnly proclaimed” [People v. Po
Giok To, supra at 918, citing People v. Pacana, 47 Phil. 48 (1924).] In falsification of public documents
therefore, the controlling consideration is the public character of a
document and the existence of any prejudice caused to third persons or, at
least, the intent to cause such damage becomes immaterial [People v. Pacana, supra.]

Petitioner’s plea for acquittal on the ground that the evidence
for the prosecution shows the absence of criminal intent on his part must be
denied. While this Court has declared
good faith as a valid defense to falsification
of public documents by making untruthful statements in a narration of
facts [U.S. v. San Jose, 7 Phil. 604 (1907)], such defense cannot serve to
exonerate the petitioner since the element of good faith has not
clearly been shown to exist in the case at bar.

Under the applicable law at the time, petitioner, as municipal
mayor of Angadanan, Isabela presides at all meetings of the municipal council
[Section 2621 (d), Revised Administrative Code] and signs all ordinances and
resolutions passed by the municipal council [Section 2624 (c), Revised
Administrative Code.] He was thus aware that (1) for failure to enact a budget
for the Fiscal Year 1975?1976, Ordinance No. V of the Municipal Council
of Angadanan, Isabela which was the Municipal Annual Budget of Angadanan,
Isabela for Fiscal Year 1974-1975 was re-enacted and (2) that under the
Municipal Plantilla of Personnel for that fiscal year, there were no funds
appropriated for the position of clerk to the municipal secretary. His knowledge of these facts is shown by the
fact that he even affixed his signature in attestation to the correctness of
these documents; i.e. Ordinance No. V and Municipal Plantilla of
Personnel [See Exhs. “H-1” and “H-2”, Folder of
Exhibits, pp. 27-32s.] He cannot claim good faith in issuing a certification of
the availability of funds for the questioned position since at the time he
issued such certification on July 1, 1975, the fiscal year 1975-1976 had
already commenced and no new ordinance creating the new position to which he
appointed Jesusa Carreon had been enacted by the municipal council.

In view of the foregoing considerations, petitioner must be held
criminally liable for his act of issuing the absolutely false certification as
to the availability of funds for the subject position. The law considers his act criminal since it
amounts to an untruthful statement in a narration of facts in a public document
[Article 171 (4), Revised Penal Code.] Criminal intent and the will to commit a
crime are presumed to exist on the part of the person who executes an act which
the law punishes, unless the contrary shall appear [United States v. Apostol,
14 Phil. 92 (1909).] In this case, the presumption that petitioner committed
the act with criminal intention, which arose from proof of his commission of
the unlawful act, stands unrebutted.

Petitioner’s claim that there was no showing that he took
advantage of his official position in falsifying the document should likewise
be rejected. This essential element of
falsification of a public document by public officer requires that the offender
“abuse his office or use the influence, prestige or
ascendancy which his office gives him, in committing the crime” [U.S. v.
Rodriguez, 19 Phil. 150 (1911).] Abuse of public office is considered present
when the offender falsifies a document in connection with the duties of his
office which consist of either making or preparing or otherwise intervening in
the preparation of a document [U.S. v. Inosanto, 20 Phil. 376 (1911); People v.
Santiago Uy, 101 Phil. 159 (1957)], as in the case of petitioner who was
charged with the duty of issuing the certification necessary for the
appointment of Jesusa Carreon.

Finally, the alleged denial of due process of law committed by
the trial court when it proceeded with the trial of the case in the absence of
the petitioner despite a pending petition for change of venue with the Supreme
Court is totally unfounded. A careful and thorough review of the
record reveals that petitioner had been afforded due process when the trial
court, in view of the absence of petitioner, granted continuances to enable the
defense to present its evidence although the prosecution had rested its case as early as
December 7, 1978 [See Original Records, p. 253, et seq.]

It is a basic postulate in law that what is repugnant to due
process is not lack of previous notice but absolute lack of opportunity to be
heard [Tajonera v. Lamaroza, G.R. Nos. L-48097 & 49035, December 19, 1981, 110 SCRA 438.] Hence, this Court laid down
this criterion to determine whether an accused in a criminal case has been
properly accorded due process of law:

“x x x (I)f an accused has been heard in a court of
competent jurisdiction and proceeded against under the orderly processes of
law, and only punished after inquiry and investigation, upon notice to him, with
an opportunity to be heard, and a judgment awarded
within the authority of a constitutional law, then he has had due process of
law. x x x” [People v. Muit, G.R.
No. L-48875, October 21, 1982, 117 SCRA 696 citing People v. Castillo, 776
Phil. 73 (1946); Underscoring supplied.]

Thus, there is no denial of due process when an accused is
afforded the chance to present evidence on his behalf but due to his repeated,
unjustifiable failure to appear at the hearings, the trial court ordered the
case to be deemed submitted upon the evidence presented by the
prosecution. For under such circumstances,
he will be deemed to have waived his right to be present during the trial
[Section 1 (c), Rule 115 of the Revised Rules of Court] and his right to adduce
evidence on his behalf [People v. Angco, 103 Phil. 33 (1958).]

It is true that he filed a petition for change of venue with the Supreme
Court. However, on the date set for the
hearing of the petitioner’s urgent motion to suspend the proceedings in the
trial court due to the pendency of the petition for change of venue, he also
failed to appear (See Order dated January 18, 1985, Original Records, p.
428.] In fact, Atty. Romeo Calixto, one of the counsels for the petitioner,
manifested before the trial court that he was withdrawing as counsel for his
client for the reason that he has lost contact with the latter who already went
abroad [See Original Records, p. 435.] Hence, the trial court cannot be faulted
for rendering its decision on the basis solely of the evidence presented by the
prosecution.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision being in conformity with
law and settled jurisprudence, the same is AFFIRMED and the instant petition is
hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Feliciano, and
Bidin, JJ., concur.

Gutierrez, Jr., J., see
concurring opinion.