SABENA BELGIAN WORLD AIRLINES, PETITIONER, VS. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (SEVENTH DIVISION) CONCEPCION, OCTAVIO, ESTRELLA AND GEMMA, ALL SURNAMED FULE, RESPONDENTS.

The only issue in this case is whether or not the petitioner,
Sabena Belgian World Airlines, is liable to the respondents for damages arising
from breach of contract of carriage.

The antecedent facts were summarized by the res­pondent Court of
Appeals as follows:

“On March 27, 1979, the plaintiff-appellee Concepcion F. Fule
purchased three round trip tickets for herself and two children, Estrella and
Gemma, from the defendant-appellant Sabena World Airlines for the routes covering Manila-Brussels-Barcelona-Madrid
(Exhs. A, B and C) On March 29, 1979, she and her children took the Sabena
flight No.274, arriving in Brussels, Belgium at 6:00 o’clock in the morning of
March 30, 1979. Just before the flight
arrived in Brussels, it was announced that the city would be cloudy and rainy
and in fact when the plane arrived there was a slight drizzle. (TSN, pp. 5-6, April 17, 1980) Before
disembarking, the plaintiff-appellees put on their sweaters and winter coats
but did not cover their heads. Mrs.
Fule thought there would be a shuttle bus or a ground steward with umbrella to
bring them to the terminal building. How­ever, there was none and the plaintiff-appellees had to walk towards
the terminal building which was about 20 to 30 meters from the plane. As a result, their winter coats got wet, as
did the front portion of Mrs. Fule’s dress as she could not hold her
coat to keep it from opening. (Id.,
pp. 7-8; 10-12)

“The plaintiff-appellees waited for about 5 hours in the
transit area of the airport terminal for their connecting flight to Barcelona,
Spain. When their flight was announced,
they had to walk again in the rain without head covers. (Id., pp. 17-18) In Barcelona, while
the luggages of her children were recovered, Mrs. Fule’s luggage was mis­sing. She went to Sabena office but found it
closed. After 40 minutes of waiting a
Sabena personnel arrived and advised her to wait for the next flight from
Brussels be­cause her luggage might be in it. But when the flight arrived it was not among those which were carried. (TSN, pp. 19-22, Jan. 16, 1980) So, she
returned to Sabena office put it was already closed. She then went to Iberia Airlines Office where she was asked to
prepare a reclamation letter and advised to go to her hotel and wait for a
call. (Id., pp. 22-24, 30)

“Plaintiff-appellees checked in at Hotel Dante (Id., p.
31) As Mrs. Fule wanted to change her clothes, she bought a dress and a
nightgown at a department store, El Corte Ingles, for which she paid 5,000
pesetas (Exhs. D to D-2; TSN, pp. 32-33, Jan. 16, 1980). Afterwards, she made an overseas call to her
daughter in Manila, who was working at Air France, to find out whether her
luggage had not been left in Manila. For the telephone call she paid 2,775 pesetas. (Exh. E)

“Then at 10:30 in the evening, Iberia Airlines called and
informed her that her luggage had arrived. (TSN, p. 5, March 5, 1980) She, therefore, took a cab to the airport and
the round trip taxi fare amounted to 920 pesetas. (Id., p. 9; Exh. F)

“At the hotel, Mrs. Fule asked for a doctor because she felt
sick, lost her voice and had an attack
of asthma. Her children developed fever
due to colds, attributed to the rainy weather condition upon their
arrival and departure from Brussels. The doctor gave them injections
and prescribed medicines for them. (Id.,
pp. 12-14) Plaintiff­-appellees incurred medical expenses amount­ing to 3,000
pesetas (Exhs. G, H and I). Plaintiff-appellees also incurred hotel expenses amounting to 14,320
pesetas. (Exh. J)

“After reaching Madrid, Mrs. Fule made a letter-complaint to
the Sabena office which she gave to Angel Yancha who told her that the letter
would be forwarded to Brussels, as the Madrid office could not do anything
about it (Exh. K) The total claim for actual damages was 26,015 pesetas.

“A few weeks later, Yancha informed her that the Madrid office
would pay about half of what she was asking, and the balance would be paid in
Manila. She received a check amounting
to 8,620 pesetas and signed a document (Exh. L) written in French, a lan­guage
she did not understand. (Id., pp.
21-26) Yancha did not explain the contents of the document to her and it was
only upon her return to Manila that she learned that the document was a
quitclaim. Her daughter, who spoke
French, explained its content to her. The plaintiff-appellee made a demand on the Manila office of
Sabena for the balance of their claim for 26,015 pesetas and P200,000.00 as
moral damages. (Exh. M)

“During the trial, the defendant-appellant airline company
presented Angel Yancha as its witness. Yancha confirmed that Mrs. Fule had talked to him about the problem she
and her children had encountered in Brussels and Barcelona and that she wanted
to make a claim against Sabena for the ex­penses she had incurred. Upon Yancha’s advice, Fule wrote a demand
letter to the airline. This letter was
given to Alejandro Abeledo, the Madrid office sales manager, who sent it to the
airlines general manager. Sabena’s Madrid office got a reply from
Brussels, directing it to pay Mrs. Fule about 8,000 pesetas. Yancha gave the check and a letter to Mrs.
Fule, telling her that she was being paid only such amount and not the total
amount of her claim. He asked Mrs. Fule
to sign the letter, writ­ten in French (which turned out to be a quitclaim), to
serve as a receipt for the amount paid to her. (TSN, pp. 3-10, Nov. 27, 1980) Yancha said he did not ask Mrs. Fule
whether she understood French. The
letter was not translated to her. He
also told Mrs. Fule to contact the Manila office for information about the difference
in her claim. (Id., pp. 21 and
23)

“On the basis of these facts, the lower court found the
defendant-appellant liable. The
dispositive portion of its decision states:

“‘WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, this Court
sentences defendant Sabena World Airlines to pay plaintiffs the following
amounts:

“‘a. P1,981.21 – as
actual damage representing the 17,395 pesetas balance of plain­tiff’s claim
that was not settled in Madrid.

“‘b. P50,000.00 – as
moral damages for the serious anxiety and fright caused plaintiffs’ incident in Mrs. Fule’s missing maleta
and the trouble she was placed in retrieving the same late at night in
Barcelona.

“‘c. P50,000.00 – as exemplary damages
for defendant’s callous indifference in protecting plaintiffs from the inclement
weather when disembarking from and embarking on its airplane in Brussels when
the nose-loader could not be used and for its bad faith in deceiving Mrs. Fule
sign­ing a document in French that purportedly was merely a receipt that was in
rea­lity a quitclaim.

“‘d. P10,000.00 – by
way of attor­ney’s fees under the provisions of subparagraphs (1), (2) , and
(11) , Art. 2208 of the Civil Code.

“‘e. Pay the costs of
suit.'” (pp. 31-34, Rollo)

On appeal to the respondent Court of Appeals, the decision was
modified. The appellate court reduced
the amount of moral and exemplary damages from P50,000.00 to P25,000.00
each. In all other respects, the
appealed decision was affirmed.

On March 30, 1988, the petitioner went to this Court on petition
for review on certiorari presenting its alleged pivotal issues, namely:

1.    WHETHER THE DOCUMENT (EXHIBIT “L”
AND EXHIBIT “1”) ACCOMPANYING THE CHECK IS JUST A RECEIPT, OR A VALID
QUITCLAIM WHICH FORECLOSES PRIVATE RESPONDENTS’ CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST THE
PETITIONER.

2.    WHETHER THE PETITIONER COMMITTED AN ACT OF
DUPLICITY AND BAD FAITH IN LETTING PRIVATE RESPONDENT CONCEPCION FULE SIGN THE
DOCUMENT (EXHIBIT “L” AND EXHIBIT “1”) WHEN SHE RECEIVED
THE CHECK.

3.     
HAVING RULED THAT THE AWARD FOR MORAL DAMAGES IS NOT PROPER
AND UNJUSTIFIED, WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT HON. COURT OF APPEALS (SEVENTH
DIVISION) SERIOUSLY ERRED FOR STILL AWARDING MORAL DAMAGES BY SIMPLY MODIFYING
THE AWARD FOR MORAL DAMAGES PREVIOUSLY MADE BY THE TRIAL COURT.

4.     
HAVING RULED THAT THE AWARD FOR EXEMPLARY DAMAGES IS NOT
PROPER AND UNJUSTIFIED, WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT HON. COURT OF APPEALS
(SEVENTH DIVISION) GRAVELY ERRED FOR STILL AWARDING EXEMPLARY DAMAGES BY SIMPLY
MODIFYING THE AWARD FOR EXEMPLARY DAMAGES PREVIOUSLY MADE BY THE TRIAL COURT. (pp. 15-16, Rollo)

We affirm the appealed decision.

A perusal of the first two issues mentioned above shows that the same
are factual. After going over the
various arguments of the petitioner on these issues, we reiterate the
established rule that this Court is not a trier of facts (Korean Airlines, Ltd.
v. Court of Appeals, 154 SCRA 211 [1987]). The conclusions and findings of fact by the trial court are entitled to
great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed unless for strong and cogent
reasons. The fact that the appellate
court adopted the findings of the trial court make the same binding upon this
Court for the factual findings of the appellate court are generally binding on the Supreme Court. The findings of
the Court of Appeals when supported by substantial evidence are almost always
beyond the power of review by the Supreme Court. (Rebuleda v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 155 SCRA 520 [1987])
The petitioner has failed to show that its case should be an exception to these
established principles.

To be sure, however, the
examination of the provi­sions of the document in question revealed that the
appellate court did not err in considering that while it may have been also a
quitclaim, Mrs. Fule did not know that she was made to sign a quitclaim. The document, in its English translation
which the petitioner insists is the binding translation for lack of opposition
from the respondents, states the following:

“I, the undersigned, Mrs. Concepcion
Foronda de Fule, (address) declare to have received from Sabena (Societe
Anonymo Belgo d’ Exploi­tation de la Navigation Aerienne) the sum of Pesetas 8,620.00 (Eight thousand six hundred
twenty)

as settlement on account of all claims whe­ther
legally founded or not, which may have been introduced, will be introduced or
will have been introduced in the future, in rela­tion to:

various expenses incurred in Brussels,

and guarantees to Sabena, its
co-transporters, its agents and its managers against any re­course which may be
introduced against them directly or indirectly, and I will undertake to absorb any expenses which may arise from
this.

This payment is effected without any burden
or responsibility on the part of Sabena, its co-transporters, its agents and
in-charge.

In case this payment is effected to compen­sate
for loss of goods, Sabena has the right to retain said goods if found, until an
agreement is reached as to the amount
involved.

I declare to subrogate Sabena, up to the
above-agreed amount, from all rights whatso­ever, vis-a-vis and authorize the
use of my name for the appropriate means of valuing said rights and I will
undertake to furnish all necessary documents and information to this purpose.

The present release subrogation is
effective only when the above-mentioned sum is released to Mrs. Concepcion Foronda de Fule

in the following manner: Cheque
Bank of Santander No. C- 536.690.

Place & Date: Madrid, 31 May 1979

Signature: Signed by Mrs.
C. F. de Fule” (p. 78, Rollo)

The foregoing provisions
clearly show that the docu­ment is both a receipt and a quitclaim as it settles
upon receipt of the mentioned sum of money “all claims whether legally
founded or not, which may have been introduced, will be introduced or will have
been introduced in the future, in relation to various expenses incurred in Brussels
x x x.”

The issue, however, is
not what was written in French in the document but what Yancha represented to
Mrs. Fule when he induced her to sign it. As stated by the Court of Appeals, citing Air France v.
Carrascoso (18 SCRA 155 [1966]), the misconduct on the part of the
carrier’s employees toward a passenger gives the latter an action for damages
against the carrier.

We also note that
in its appeal to the Court of Appeals, the petitioner alleged in its brief the
fol­lowing assignment of error: “The
trial court erred in not holding that by the quitclaim (Exh. L; Exhs. 1 and
1-a) the plaintiff-appellees have no cause of action against the
defendant-appellant for moral and exemplary damages and in not sustaining the validity of the said quitclaim.” (p.
52, Rollo) In its discussion, the petitioner insisted that the trial court
erred in concluding that Exhibit L is only a receipt and that the respondent
understood it as such. It argued that
the rest of the document recites a quitclaim and the respondent under­stood
French because she received her schooling in Spain where French is taught. In the present petition, however, the
petitioner alleges that it is both a receipt and a quitclaim but it does not
foreclose the respondents’ right to collect the balance of her claim. It is obvious that the petitioner is taking inconsis­tent positions
which this Court may not allow.

In the last two issues, the petitioner argues that the appellate
court erred in still awarding moral and exemplary damages inspite of its
express declaration that the petitioner did not act in bad faith. This allegation is misleading because the Court of
Appeals did not declare the petitioner entirely faultless. The appellate court held:

“But we do not think the award of moral damages for the
trouble which Mrs. Fule had gone through as a result of the delay in the
delivery of her luggage in Barcelona is justi­fied. In cases of breach of contracts, moral damages can be awarded
only where the defendant has acted fraudulently or in bad faith. (Civil Code, art. 2220, Fores v. Miranda,
105 Phil. 266 [1959]; Necesito v. Paras, 104 Phil. 75 [1957]) Mere negligence,
even if thereby the plaintiff suffers mental anguish or serious fright is not a
ground for awarding moral damages. In
Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. v. Cornista, 11 SCRA 181 [1964]), cited by the
plaintiff-appellees to justify the award to them of moral damages, the failure
of the carrier to cover the side of its bus as a result of which, and the bus
driver’s reckless operation of the bus, a passenger fell, was held to be not
mere negligence but a ‘misconduct’, warrant­ing the award of moral
damages. So was the neglect of the
airline in Air France v. Carrascoso, 18 SCRA 155 [1966]), the other case cited
by the plaintiff-appellees, simple negligence but a ‘malfeasance’ whereby a
first class passenger was downgraded into a third class passenger on the onward
flight of an airline, just so as a ‘white man’ could be accommodated. The case at bar cannot be analogized to
these cases.

“Indeed, the flaw in the trial court’s decision is its
assumption that every case of mental anguish or fright or serious an­xiety
calls for the award of moral damages. While the enumeration of cases in Art. 2219 is not exclusive, the
defendant’s act must be wrongful or wanton or done in bad faith to justify the
imposition of moral damages. Here,
there is no finding that the carrier’s delay in delivering Mrs. Fule’s luggage
was wrongful or due to bad faith.

“Nonetheless, an award of P25,000.00 for the airline’s bad
faith in making Mrs. Fule sign a quitclaim without informing her of its contents, which were written in French,
is in our opinion justified.

“With respect to the award for exemplary damages, the amount
of P50,000.00 must be reduced by half. The trial court gave this award for (1) the defendant-appellant’s
‘callous indifference in protecting plain­tiffs from the inclement weather when
disembarking from and embarking on its plane in Brussels’ and (2) for deceiving
Mrs. Fule into signing a quitclaim by represent­ing it to be merely a receipt
for partial payment of her claims.

“While we hold that the failure of the defendant-appellant to
protect the plaintiff-appellees from the rain in disembarking from the plane
for the stopover in Brussels and again in reboarding it for the onward flight
to Barcelona constitutes a neglect of its duty to its passengers, we do not
think that its neglect was so gross as to amount to bad faith or
wantonness. (Civil Code, Art. 2232) The
award of exemplary damages cannot be justified. In the Airlines Cases in which the Supreme Court awarded moral
and exemplary damages, the airlines concerned were found guilty of either gross
neglect or malfeasance or even malice. In contrast, what is involved in this case was simple negligence,
considering that the rain through which the plaintiff-appellees had to walk was
a ‘slight drizzle.’ If it was driving rain or heavy snow, perhaps there would
be basis for find­ing the defendant-appellant guilty of gross negligence, in
light of the duty of air carriers to observe ‘utmost or extraordinary
diligence.’ (Zulueta v. Pan American World Airway, Inc., 49 SCRA 1, 14 [1973]).

“With respect to the award of exemplary damages for alleged duplicity
of the airlines employee, we hold that the trial court’s decision is
correct. Accordingly, the award of
P50,000.00 must be reduced to P25,000.00.” (pp. 40-41, Rollo)

We find no reversible error in the foregoing conclu­sions. The appellate court’s finding that the
negligence in this case does not
amount to bad faith finds support in
a recent decision of this Court. In the case of China Airlines, Ltd. v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, et al. (G. R. No. 73835, January 17, 1989), this Court passed upon the issue of damages
brought about by the airlines’ failure to carry out a promised immediate flight
connection from San Francisco, U.S.A. to Los Angeles, U.S.A. due to
inefficient means of communication. The
Court ruled that “while petitioner may have been remiss in its total reliance upon the telex
communications and therefore considered negligent in view of the degree of
diligence required of it as a common carrier, such neg­ligence cannot under the
circumstances be said to be so gross as to amount to bad faith.” (Ibid, at
p. 10) In the same case, however, the Court ruled that “[W]ith respect to
moral damages, the rule is that the same are recoverable in a damage suit
predicated upon a breach of contract of carriage only where (1) the mishap
results in the death of a passenger and (2) it is proved that the carrier was
guilty of fraud and bad faith, even if death does not result.” (Ibid, at
p. 13) As the appellate court found the petitioner guilty of bad faith in
letting the respondent sign a quitclaim
without her knowledge or understanding and contrary to what she was planning to
do, the reduced award of moral and exemplary damages is proper and legal.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the peti­tion is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The
appealed decision is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin, and Cortes, JJ., concur.