SPOUSES ANTONIO MARTINEZ AND BENEDICTA BALATBAT-­MARTINEZ, PETITIONERS, VS. THE HONORABLE JUDGE EUFROCINIO S. DE LA MERCED, BIENVENIDO U. JUAN AND SACRED HEART SCHOOL MALABON, I…

Raised in this petition for review on certiorari is a
novel issue in procedural law.  More particularly,
the question posed by petitioners is whether or not the preliminary
conference under the Rules on Summary Procedure^[1]
can be waived, albeit impliedly, by failing to object to its non-observance in the
proceedings had before the inferior court.

The subject provision is contained in Section 6 of the
above-mentioned rule which states:

“SEC. 6. 
Preliminary Conference.- Not later than
thirty (30) days after the last answer is filed, the case shall be calendared
for a preliminary conference.  Among other matters, should the parties fail
to arrive at an amicable settlement, the court must
clarify and define the issues of the case, which must be clearly and distinctly
set forth in the order to be issued immediately after such preliminary
conference, together with other matters taken up during the same.”

The facts of the case as found by the Court of Appeals are as
follows:^[2]
On August 24, 1979, petitioners instituted before the Metropolitan Trial Court
an unlawful detainer case against the herein private respondents Bienvenido Juan and Sacred Heart School of Malabon, Inc., for the recovery of possession of the
premises being used by the latter as school building.  For their causes of action, they claimed that
the contract of lease has expired, and the terms and conditions of the contract
of lease were violated.

Private respondents filed their answer to the complaint alleging,
among others, that the period of the contract of lease is for 25 years from November 8, 1973 which has not
expired, and that its terms have not been violated.

On December 13, 1979,
private respondents filed a motion to suspend proceedings because of the pendency of their interpleader
case, Civil Case No. C-8046, with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, against the petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest, the
estates of Ricardo and Soledad Balatbat, who were all claiming to be the owners of the
leased premises.  This motion was
granted.

About five years thereafter or on August 17, 1984, petitioners filed a motion to lift the
said order of suspension alleging therein that the pendency
of the interpleader case is not a bar to its trial.  Private
respondents opposed the motion by asserting that the petitioners in Civil Case
No. C-8046 were ordered to recover (sic) the titles of the leased premises to the
estates of Ricardo and Soledad Balatbat.  Consequently, the motion was denied by
the court.

On June 5,
1985, petitioners
filed a Second Motion to Lift Order of Suspension invoking the same
ground.  This time, however, the court,
in an order dated July 11, 1985, lifted the suspension in view of the absence of any opposition and that there was no showing as to the
progress of Civil Case No. C-8046.

On October 24, 1985,
the Metropolitan Trial Court denied the motion for reconsideration and set the
case for trial on the merits.  On November 23, 1985, private
respondents filed a motion to implead necessary and/or indispensable parties inasmuch
as the estates of Ricardo and Soledad Balatbat or
their lawful heirs have an interest over the leased premises.

In its order dated March
31, 1986, the Metropolitan Trial
Court denied the motion.  In the same
order, the court ordered the case to be
tried under the Rules on Summary Procedure and, without setting the case
for pre-trial conference, required the
parties to submit the affidavits of their witnesses with supporting documents
and position papers within ten (10) days from receipt thereof.

On April 23, 1986,
private respondents filed a motion for extension of time to file the required
pleadings for the reason that their counsel was still recuperating from a
recent major operation.  The motion was
granted in another order dated April
23, 1986, which reads as follows:

“As prayed for in the ‘Motion for Extension of time to file
Defendant’s Position Paper’ xxx the same is hereby granted and the said counsel is hereby given an extension of
twenty (20) days from April 24, 1986 xxx provided that he submit before
this court a medical certificate from the hospital attesting to the fact that
he has recently
underwent a major surgical
operation. 
(Underscoring supplied.)

SO ORDERED.”^[3]

On May 14, 1986
or within the given period, private respondents filed their position
paper.  However, the required medical
certificate was posted by registered mail only on May 18, 1986 and received by the court on May 21, 1986.

Earlier, on May 20, 1986,
the court issued the following order:

“Considering that no hospital record whatsoever xxx was
submitted by counsel for the defendants when he filed their position paper and
counter-affidavit xxx, a condition given (by) the court when it granted
defendants’ Motion for Extension of Time to File Defendants’ Position Paper, the said petition paper and counter-affidavits of the defendant Bienvenido
U. Juan which constitutes their evidence should be, as they are hereby,
ordered stricken off the record
as they were clearly filed out
of time, the last day of the filing the same being on April 24, 1986 (sic).

xxx———————————————————–xxx

WHEREFORE, this case is now submitted
for decision and let a judgment be rendered in accordance with Section 6
of the Rules on Summary Procedure based on evidence submitted by the
plaintiff.

IT IS SO ORDERED.”^[4]
(Underscoring supplied.)

On the basis of petitioners’ evidence, on May 26, 1986, the lower court rendered an ex
parte decision in favor of the petitioners,
the dispositive part of which reads as follows:

“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiffs,
ordering the defendants and all those
claiming right under them, to:

1.  vacate
the premises in question and restore complete and peaceful possession thereof to the plaintiffs;

2.  pay
the plaintiffs the sum of P10,000.00 as 
and by way of attorney’s fees; and

3.  pay
the costs of the suit.

IT IS SO ORDERED.”^[5]

This decision was appealed to the Regional Trial Court presided by respondent Judge Eufrocinio de la Merced. 
On August 13, 1986,
said respondent judge rendered a decision declaring the judgment of the
inferior court “null and void” on the ground that a preliminary
conference under the Rules on Summary Procedure is a jurisdictional
requirement, the non-observance of which constitutes reversible error.^[6]

From this appealed decision, a petition for review was filed with
the Court of Appeals.  In a decision
promulgated on November 25, 1987,^[7]
the appellate court affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court on two
grounds:  first, that the preliminary
conference under the Rule on Summary Procedure is mandatory and jurisdictional
and second, that the order of the Metropolitan Trial Court dated May 20, 1986, ordering private
respondents’ evidence expunged from the record, illegally denied them their day
in court.^[8]

The petition is impressed
with merit.

The Rules on Summary Procedure in Special Cases are designed
primarily to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive determination of particular
cases to which it applies.  To achieve this goal, the Rules adopted,
among others, simplified procedures without regard to technical rules;
abbreviated periods of time to file responsive pleadings; certain pleadings and
motions are expressly prohibited from its application; and the Rules likewise
provide for a “preliminary conference” by which parties are
admonished to settle their dispute amicably, and if this is not possible, to
narrow, clarify and define the issues of the case.^[9]

At the outset, the issue appears simple.

Petitioners claim that the failure of private respondents to
raise the matter of lack of preliminary conference during the proceedings in
the lower court effectively estops them from raising the same on appeal.^[10]

On the other hand the respondents seek the dismissal of the petition on the
ground that both the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals, correctly
ruled that the proceedings in the inferior
court are illegal and, therefore, null
and void, there being no preliminary conference conducted.^[11]

While the Court of Appeals
is correct in its view that
Section 6 of the Rules on Summary Procedure is made mandatory by the use of the
auxiliary verbs “shall” and “must” instead of the
permissive “may,” it does not, however, logically follow that the absence of a preliminary conference
would necessarily render nugatory the proceedings had in the court below.^[12]

While termed a
“preliminary conference,” a closer look thereat would reveal that the
provision is akin and similar to the provision on “pre-trial” under
Rule 20 of the Revised Rules of Court.^[13] Both provisions are essentially designed to
promote amicable settlement or to avoid or simplify the trial.

An analysis of existing jurisprudence on the matter reveals that
proceedings undertaken without first conducting a pre-trial or with a legally
defective pre-trial is voided because either of the parties thereto suffered
substantial prejudice thereby or they were denied their right to due process.^[14]
Be that as it may, petitioners cite as exceptions
to the foregoing rule Santamaria vs.
Court of Appeals,^[15];
Insurance Company of North America vs. Republic,^[16];
and Trocio vs. Labayo.^[17]
Notable in these cases is the fact that
the issue of pre-trial did not affect the trial court’s jurisdiction because no
injury was caused to any party therein. 
Additionally, facts and circumstances dictate that to conduct another
pre-trial would only be a superfluity, its purpose of expediting the
proceedings having been attained otherwise.

Thus, unless there is a
showing of substantial prejudice caused to a party, the trial court’s
inadvertent failure to calendar the case for a pre-trial or a preliminary
conference cannot render the proceedings illegal or void ab
initio.  A party’s failure to
object to the absence of a pre-trial is deemed a waiver of his right
thereto.  This observation holds with
more reason in the case at hand where private respondents have already
submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court.

As pointed out by petitioners, private respondents had at least
three opportunities to raise the question of lack of preliminary conference
first, when private respondents filed a motion for extension of time to file
their position paper; second, at the time when they actually filed their
position paper in which they sought affirmative relief from the Metropolitan
Trial Court; and third, when they filed a
motion for reconsideration of the order of the Metropolitan Trial Court expunging from the records the
position paper of private respondents, in which motion private respondents even
urged the court to sustain their
position paper.  And yet, in none of
these instances was the issue of lack of preliminary conference
raised or even hinted at by private respondents.^[18] In fine, these are acts amounting to a waiver
of the irregularity of the proceedings. 
For it has been consistently held by this Court that while lack of
jurisdiction may be assailed at any stage, a party’s active participation in
the proceedings before a court without jurisdiction will estop
such party from assailing such lack of jurisdiction.^[19]

Private respondents claim that their failure to raise the issue
at hand before the Metropolitan Trial Court is by reason of a legal
impediment.  They argue that they could
not raise the issue in the said court because a motion for reconsideration is one of the prohibited
motions under Sec. 15 of the Rules on Summary Procedure.^[20] This argument is specious.  Private respondents filed a motion for
extension of time to file their position paper and a motion for reconsideration
of the order expunging from the record their position paper.  These two
pleadings are also disallowed in summary proceedings.^[21]
Obviously, the failure of private respondent to raise the issue was occasioned
by negligence on their part, if not a belief that it was not vital for their
cause, and not because filing a motion for reconsideration invoking this ground
was prohibited by the rules.

The Court of Appeals observed that private respondents were
illegally denied their day in court. 
Thus, it set aside the order of the Metropolitan Trial Court expunging
from the records the position paper of private respondents.

This is erroneous.  The
order of the Metropolitan Trial Court dated April 23, 1988 granting private respondents’ motion for
extension of time to file position paper is conditioned upon the timely submission of the medical certificate
to support the motion.  We see no
reversible error in the order of the Metropolitan Trial Court in ordering
private respondents’ position paper stricken from the record for their failure
to submit the medical certificate with the position paper.

Nevertheless, while we hold in this case that the right to a preliminary conference under the Rules
on Summary Procedure is deemed waived by a party’s failure to invoke the same
before the trial court, this is not in the least to suggest that the trial
courts may dispense with such a preliminary conference.  Courts
should make full use of the pre-trial proceedings primarily so that all issues necessary to the early disposition
of a cause are properly determined and
to explore all avenues towards a compromise
or settlement of the case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED.  The appealed decision is hereby SET ASIDE and the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court dated May 26, 1986 in Civil Case No. 4526
is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.  No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, (Chairman), Cruz, Griño-Aquino, and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

^[1] Supreme Court Resolution, June 15,
1983.

^[2] Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 10059, Nov. 25, 1987.

^[3] Page 47, Rollo.

^[4] Page 48, Rollo.

^[5] Page 49, Rollo.

^[6] Page 50, Rollo.

^[7] Pages 45-55, Rollo.

^[8] Pages 7-9, Decision of the Court of Appeals;
Pages 51-54, Rollo.

^[9] Sections 4, 5, 7 and 15,
Rules on Summary Procedure in Special Cases.

^[10] Page 10, Rollo.

^[11] Page 100, Rollo.

^[12] Page 51, Rollo.

^[13] Section 1, Rule 20 of the Rules of Court provides as follows:  “SEC. 2. Pre-trial mandatory. – In any action,
after the last pleading has been filed, the court shall direct the parties and
their attorneys to appear before it for a conference to consider:

(a) The possibility of an amicable settlement or of a submission to arbitration;

(b) The simplification of the
issues;

xxx——————————————-xxx

(g) Such other
matters as may aid in the prompt disposition of the action.”

^[14] Sagarino vs.
Pelayo, 77 SCRA 402 (1977); Patalinjug
vs. Peralta, 90 SCRA 50 (1979); Loquias vs.
Rodriguez, 65 SCRA 659 (1975); People’s Realty Brokerage Corp. vs. Lustre, 85 SCRA 545 (1978).

^[15] 45 SCRA 596 (1972).

^[16] 21 SCRA 887 (1967).

^[17] 53 SCRA 97 (1973).

^[18] Pages 70-71, Rollo.

^[19] Tajonera vs. Lamoroza, (1981) 110 SCRA 438; Nieta
vs. Manila Banking Corporation, (1983) 124 SCRA 455.

^[20] Page
101, Rollo.

^[21] Section 15(e), Rules on
Summary Procedure.