DIRECTOR OF LAND MANAGEMENT AND DIRECTOR OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT, PETITIONERS, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND MINO HILARIO, RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Court
of Appeals’ decision which affirmed the trial court’s decision ordering the
issuance of a certificate of title in the name of Mino
Hilario over a parcel of land particularly described
in survey plan PSU – 221769.

The facts of the case as stated in the Court of Appeals’ decision
are as follows:

“The land subject matter of the application for registration
is situated in the sitio of Cosaran,
Bo. Baloy,
Itogon, Benguet, Philippines.  It is within the
“Central Cordillera Forest Reserve”, established under Proclamation
No. 217 dated February 16, 1929,
the Ambuklao-Binga Watershed covered by Executive
Proclamation No. 548, dated April 19,
1969, and the Upper Agno River Basin
Multiple Use of Forest Management District created under Forestry Administrative
Order No. 518, dated March 9, 1971.

“In his application for land registration filed on March 10,
1975 with the Court of First Instance of Baguio-Benguet
(now RTC), applicant-appellee Mino
Hilario claimed ownership in fee simple over said land
by purchase from his father Hilario Molang on April 17, 1972. 
The subject land, consisting of one (1) parcel, with an area of 5,3213
hectares is situated, bounded described as shown in plan PSU-221769, the
technical description of which is attached to the application and made a part
thereof.

“The applicant seeks to register the title to the subject land
under the Land Registration Act (Act 496). 
However, as an alternative, the applicant invokes the benefits of
Chapter VIII of Act No. 2874 as superseded by Commonwealth Act 141, as well as
the provisions of Republic Act 1942 and Republic Act 3872 because the applicant
is member of the cultural minorities.

“On December 3, 1975, the Director of Bureau of Lands filed
his opposition dated July 14, 1975, alleging that neither the applicant nor his
predecessors-in-interest possess sufficient title to acquire ownership in fee
simple of the land applied for, the same not having been acquired by any of the
various types of title issued by the Spanish Government, or have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land in
question for at least thirty (30) year’s immediately preceding the filing of
the present application, and that the aforesaid property is a portion of the
public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines and is not subject
to private appropriation.   

“On March 8, 1976, the Director of the Bureau of Forest
Development filed his opposition dated March 1, 1976, to the registration of
whatever title of the applicant on the ground that the area applied for is
within the “Central Cordillera Forest Reserve” under LC Map No. 1435,
aside from the fact that it is a part of the Ambuklao-Binga
Watershed covered by Executive Proclamation No. 548 dated April 19, 1969 as
evidenced by the letter-report of Forest Ranger Antonio Chagyo,
and Engineer Carlito Banac;
that the area sought to be registered is not in the entire possession of
applicant Mino Hilario in
the concept of an owner considering that there are several houses built by
different individuals within the area in question; that the applicant does not
have any registrable title either in law or in fact
over the property; and that the area is not classified as alienable or
disposable land.

“After due trial, the
lower court rendered its decision dated May 16, 1985, which decreed the
confirmation and registration of the subject land in the name of applicant Mino Hilario, married to Sofina Hilario.

“The decision is based on the facts found by the trial court,
to wit :

 “‘The evidence  for the applicant consists of his testimony
and those of his witnesses, namely, Dionisio Capsula, 54 years old, farmer and a neighbor in the place; Hilario Molang, 55 years old, the
applicant’s father; and Eustaquio Cabson,
80 years old, and another neighbor; and documentary exhibits, Exhibits
“A” to “U”.  Also, an
ocular inspection was conducted on the premises.  From these, the Court gathers that the
applicant acquired the land subject hereof by purchase from his father, Hilario Molang on April 17, 1972;
that his said father, in turn acquired the property from the latter’s father,
and the applicant’s grandfather Shawidi; that the
applicant and his predecessors successively, continuously, publicly and
adversely occupied, possessed and worked on the land in the concept of absolute
owners since before the First World War, building supporting walls, rice
paddies where they planted rice, and planting fruit-bearing trees; that as seen
during the ocular inspection there are about 100 mango trees, three of which
are more than 100 years old, about 50 matured avocado trees, about 200 banana
trees, about 30 maguey, about 40 cheza trees, about
30 coffee trees, about 8 jackfruit trees, cassava, two bamboo groves more than
100 years old, 70 orange trees, camote patches, three
rice paddies for planting rice, about 50 pineapple plants, stone walls, fence
of German cables, around 30 scattered Kaingins, 22
young coconut trees, and about two old coconut trees; that the land is suitable
to agriculture; and that there are seven old houses made of galvanized iron
inside the area being registered.  The
property had been declared for taxation purposes in the name of Hilario Malang, and land tax therefor had been paid by him since 1945.  Since 1972 the property has been declared in
the name of the applicant and land tax has been paid by him.

“‘The evidence for the Government oppositors
consists of the testimonies of Antonio Chaggyo, a
Forest Manager of the Bureau of Forest Development, and Alfredo A. Ramirez, a
Land Investigator of the Bureau of Lands, and their respective reports
(Exhibits “1” and “2”) and the first indorsement
of the District Land Office that the land in question “appears to be
within the Central Cordillera Forest Reservation which is outside the
jurisdiction of this Office.” (Exhibit “3”).  The testimonies of these witnesses on their
respective observations when they separately investigated the land in question
and their respective reports do not refute the evidence of the applicant as to
the length, nature and manner of possession of the land subject of this case by
the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest. 
On the contrary, their testimonies, viewed in their entirety, would tend
to corroborate the evidence adduced by the applicant.  The report of the Land Investigator even
states that the other houses found within the land at issue are “owned by
his (applicant’s) relatives x x x
who swore that they are not claiming any portion of the land they occupy.

“‘The preponderance of evidence clearly shows that the
applicant, and his predecessors-in-interest before him, all of whom are members
of the national cultural minorities, have been in actual, open, public,
peaceful, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
land subject hereof which issuitable to agriculture,
under a bona fide claim of ownership since before the First World War up to the
present or at least more than sixty (60) years.'”

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s
decision.

Hence, this present petition.

The Director of Land Management and the Director of Forest
Development raise the following assignment of errors in this petition, to wit :

”1.     The Court of Appeals
gravely erred in holding that the land in question, notwithstanding that it is
within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve, is registrable
on the basis of Republic Act No. 3872; which said court misconstrued and
misapplied.

“2.     The Court of Appeals
gravely erred in holding that private respondent Mino
Hilario had acquired a private right to the land in
question prior to the issuance of Proclamation No. 217 on February 17, 1929
establishing the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve and Executive Proclamation
No. 548 on April 19, 1969 establishing the Ambuklao-Binga
Watershed, and therefore, said land is exempted from the force and effect of
those executive issuances.

“3.     The Court of
Appeals gravely erred in affirming the lower Court’s Decision which granted the
application for registration of the land in question of respondent Mino Hilario.” (Rollo, pp, 12 -13).

The petition is impressed with merit.

There can be no imperfect title to be confirmed over lands not
yet classified as disposable or alienable. 
Declassification of forest land is an express and positive act of
Government.  It cannot be presumed.  Neither should it be
ignored nor deemed waived.

 As held in the case of Republic
v. Court of appeals, [154 SCRA 476 (1987)]:

“x x x It
is already a settled rule that forest
lands or forest reserves are not capable of private appropriation and
possession thereof, however long, cannot convert them into private property (Vano v. Government of Philippine Islands, 41 Phil. 161;
Adorable v. Director of Forestry, 107 Phil. 401; Director of Forestry v. Muñoz, 23 SCRA 1183; Republic v. De la Cruz, 67 SCRA 221;
Director of Lands v. Reyes & Alinsunurin v.
Director of Lands, 68 SCRA 177; Republic. v. Court of Appeals, 89 SCRA 648; and
Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA 701] unless such lands are
reclassified and considered disposable and alienable by the Director of
Forestry, but even then, possession of the land prior to the reclassification
of the land as disposable and alienable cannot be credited as part of the
thirty-year requirement under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act (Director
of Lands v. Court of Appeals, supra).  In
this case, there is no showing that the land in question is disposable or
alienable.  This is a matter which cannot
be assumed.  It calls for proof.”

In the instant case, the subject land is within the Central
Cordillera Forest Reserve.  Private
respondent Hilario submits that even assuming that
this is so, still he may own the land situated within the forest reserve as he
is a member of the cultural minorities. 
His basis for this is Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended (Public Land
Act), sec. 48 (c) which provides :

“x x x The
following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose
titles have not been perfected, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the
province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the
issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under
the Land Registration Act, to wit :

x x x                 x x x                x x x

“(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim
of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding
the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented
by war or force majeure.  These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.

“(c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by themselves
or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of lands of the public domain
suitable to agriculture, whether disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of
ownership for at least 30 years shall be entitled to the rights granted in
subsection (b) hereof (as amended by R.A. No. 3872, section 1, approved June
18, 1964).

Respondent Hilario contends that the
phrase “whether disposable or not” should be construed to mean that a
parcel of land situated in an inalienable land may be privately-owned by a
member of the cultural minorities.

We agree with the Solicitor General’s observations, to wit :

“1.     Republic Act No.
3872 is only amendatory to Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the
Public Land Act.  The Public Land Act
applies to agricultural public lands and to no other type of land borne out by
the explicit terms of Section 2, Chapter I and Section 2, Chapter II, both
under Title I of the Public Land Act. 
Chapter I is subtitled ‘Short title of the Act,
lands to which it applies, and officers charged with its execution.’  Section 2 clearly states that the provisions
of this Act shall apply to the lands of the public domain; but timber
and mineral lands shall be governed by
special laws x x x
Section 10 provides that ‘the words ‘alienation’, ‘disposition’, or
‘concession’ as used in this Act, shall mean any of the methods authorized by
this Act for the acquisition, lease, use, or benefit of the lands of the public
domain other than timber or mineral lands
(Stress supplied).

“2.     The new
subsection (c) of Section 48 of the Public Land Act should be read together
with the provision of the preceding subsection (b) which expressly refers to ‘agricultural
lands of the public domain.’  Perforce,
the term ‘lands of the public domain suitable agriculture’ as used in the said
new subsection of Sec. 48 should mean the same thing as the term ‘agricultural
lands of public domain.’  It does not
appear that two different classes of lands were intended to be the subject
matter of one section of the same Public Land Act.  And both terms manifestly do not refer to either
timber or forest land including forest reserves.

“3.     The construction
given by respondent Court of Appeals to the particular provision of law
involved, as to include even forest reserves as susceptible to private appropriation, is to unconstitutionally apply such
provision.  For, both the 1973 and
present Constitutions do not include timber or forest lands as alienable Thus,
Section 8, Article XIV of 1973 Constitution states that ‘with the exception of
agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential and resettlement lands of
the public domain, natural resources shall not be alienated.’  The new Constitution, in its Article XII,
Section 2, also expressly states that ‘with the exception of agricultural
lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated.’

“What the law contemplates are lands that are agricultural
although not disposable, such as agricultural lands within a reservation for
fruit experiments (as the one in Baguio City
administered by the Bureau of Plant Industry, or agricultural lands reserved
for the Camarines Sur
Agricultural School in Pili, Camarines
Sur), or those reserved for a specific purpose, but
certainly not a forest reserve, a timber land, which the Constitution, the
Public Land Act itself, and jurisprudence have excluded from alienation,”
(Rollo, pp. 16 – 18).

As to the lower court’s ruling that “applicant’s
predecessor, Shawidi, had been occupying and working
on the land at the outbreak of the First World War in 1914″ long before
Proclamation No. 217 declaring the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve was
issued, this Court has had the opportunity to rule on this issue earlier.

As held in the case of Republic v. Court of
Appeals, supra :

“There is an erroneous assumption implicit in the challenged
decision of the Court of Appeals which the government oppositors
also appear to have overlooked. This is the reliance on Proclamation No. 217 of
Governor General Henry L. Stimson as the operative
act which converted the lands covered by Central Cordillera Forest Reserve into
forest lands.  This is wrong.  The land was not non-forest or agricultural
land prior to the 1929 proclamation.  It
did not earn a classification from non-forest into forest land because of the
proclamation.  The proclamation merely
declared a special forest reserve out of already existing forest lands.  The land was already forest or timber land
even before the proclamation.  The
alleged entry in 1915 of Salming Piraso
and the cultivation of 15 hectares out of a 219.7879 hectares claimed area has
no legal significance.  A person cannot
enter into forest land and by the simple act of cultivating a portion of that
land, earn credits towards an eventual confirmation of imperfect title.  The Government must first declare the forest
land to be alienable and disposable agricultural land before the year of entry,
cultivation, and exclusive and adverse possession can be counted for purposes
of an imperfect title”.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED.  The decision of the Court of Appeals
affirming the decision of the trial court which granted private respondent’s
application for registration of the land in question is reversed and set
aside.  The application for land
registration is dismissed.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Feliciano, Bidin, and Cortes, JJ., concur.