CATALINA B. VDA. DE ALVIR, ANTONIO MA. B. ALVIR, RENE MA. B. ALVIR, ROBERTO B. ALVIR AND DOUGLAS B. ALVIR, PETITIONERS, VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND HOWARD J. WEBER, R…

The property subject of this petition is about 250 square meters
with a one-story, two-room house constructed thereon.  It is a portion of a bigger parcel of land
situated in San Juan, Metro Manila,
formerly covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 29457 registered in the
name of Antonio D. Alvir who is now deceased.

In November, 1961, petitioners, except Douglas B. Alvir, who was then
a minor, executed a deed of sale in favor of private respondent, an American
citizen, of whatever rights and interest they may have over the aforementioned
lot for and in consideration of P5,000.00, the terms and conditions of which
provides, among others:

“The consideration of P5,000.00 shall be payable as follows:

1.       P1,500.00 upon
signing of this document.

2.       P1,500.00 upon
payment and full settlement  of the
encumbrance of the said lot with the Philippine National Banks; and

3.  The balance of (P2,000.00
shall be) payable from whatever commissions the VENDEE stands to receive from
the VENDOR as commissions and/or fees in consideration for his successful
negotiation for investment of their Romblon Marble
claims, San Juan and Ipo properties and the Limestone
claims at Teresa, Rizal.  Provided, however, that if within two (2)
years from the signing of this document the VENDEE should not be entitled to any aforesaid commissions and/or
fees then the balance of P2,000.00 should be payable thirty (30) days from and
after the expiration of the said two years; further, should VENDEE not pay the aforesaid balance
within 30 days from and after the expiration of the 2-year period then all past
payments made and whatever improvements that may be constructed on the said lot
shall be forfeited in favor of the VENDORS.”^[1]

Private respondent paid the initial amount of P3,000.00 and
constructed a house thereon.

Meanwhile, in Special Proceedings No. 3899 covering the intestate
estate of Antonio B. Alvir in the Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Rizal, petitioner Catalina B. Vda. de Alvir, as administratrix, submitted the report and project of
partition of the estate^[2]
which was approved by the trial court on December 28, 1968. 
The trial court authorized the administratrix
to distribute and deliver to the heirs their respective shares.^[3]
Petitioners held a raffle among themselves and the portion which corresponds to
the subject property was drawn by petitioner Douglas Alvir.  Transfer Certificate of Title No. 328543 was
thus issued in his name for this portion by the Register of Deeds of Rizal.

Inasmuch as the said house and lot was occupied by the
parents-in-law of private respondent, petitioner Douglas Alvir
filed a complaint for ejectment against said occupants in the Municipal Court of
San Juan on February 12, 1973.  It was, however, dismissed for failure to implead private respondent who was a necessary party.

On March 29, 1974,
private respondent filed a complaint for specific performance and damages
against petitioners in the CFI of Rizal.  The case was docketed as Civil Case No.
19159.  After the presentation of
evidence by private respondent, petitioners elected to file a motion to dismiss
instead of presenting evidence.  This was
denied in an order dated December 8,
1978.  On March 14, 1979, the case was deemed
submitted for decision.  On August 8, 1978, the trial court
promulgated its decision, the dispositive part of
which reads as follows:

“IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE CONSIDERATIONS, this Court renders Judgment directing defendants, namely: Catalina Vda. de Alvir, Antonio Ma. B. Alvir, Rene
Ma. B. Alvir and Roberto B. Alvir
to pay plaintiff Howard J. Weber the amount of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00)
with annual interest at 6% from November 1, 1961 until fully paid, ONE HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00) as moral damages, FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P50,000.00) as exemplary damages, FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) as
attorney’s fees and the costs of suit.

Defendant Douglas Alvir is granted the
option to appropriate the residential house on the land subject of this case
upon payment of SEVENTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P70,000.00) to the plaintiff or to sell to plaintiff the parcel of land
subject of this case for P5,000.00 and
should defendant fail to exercise the option within 30 days from notice hereof,
parties shall enter into a contract
of lease of the property the terms of which shall be fixed by this Court
in the event of disagreement, unless
plaintiff chooses to remove the improvement and restore the land to its
former condition.

SO ORDERED.”^[4]

Dissatisfied therewith, petitioners appealed to the then
Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) wherein in due course a decision was
rendered on September 17, 1984
affirming in toto the
appealed decision with costs against petitioners.^[5] A
motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioners and on December 6, 1984 they asked leave to submit
evidence.  Over the opposition of private
respondent, the appellate court allowed petitioners to present evidence in the
interest of justice.  Hearings were
conducted where petitioner Roberto Alvir testified.
Thereafter, the motion for reconsideration was nevertheless denied on January 25, 1988.^[6]

Hence, this petition for review wherein the petitioners raise the
following errors allegedly committed by the appellate court:

“A.     THE RESPONDENT COURT
OF APPEALS ERRED IN SANCTIONING A DIRECT VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
PROHIBITION AGAINST ALIENS ACQUIRING OR OWNING PRIVATE AGRICULTURAL (INCLUDING
RESIDENTIAL) LANDS IN THE PHILIPPINES.

B.      THE RESPONDENT COURT
OF APPEALS ERRED IN ALLOWING EVIDENCE TO BE INTRODUCED BEFORE IT AND THEN,
WITHOUT EXPUNGING THE SAME FROM ITS RECORDS, COMPLETELY IGNORING THE SAID
EVIDENCE AND THEREAFTER ISSUING A RESOLUTION WITHOUT CLEARLY STATING THE BASIS
THEREFOR, IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE TO DO SO.

C.      THE RESPONDENT COURT
OF APPEALS ERRED IN SANCTIONING A GROSSLY- ERRONEOUS INTERPRETATION OF THE LAW
ON PRESCRIPTION OF ACTIONS.

D.      THE RESPONDENT COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN ALLOWING A DRASTIC AND RADICAL CHANGE IN THE NATURE OF THE
PRIVATE RESPONDENT WEBER’S CAUSE OF ACTION (FROM SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE TO
DAMAGES) AND THEREAFTER AWARDING EXCESSIVE DAMAGES WHICH WERE NOT EVEN PRAYED
FOR SPECIFICALLY IN HIS COMPLAINT.”^[7]

The Court finds that the third assigned error as to whether or
not the cause of action of private respondent has prescribed deserves prior
attention.

In disposing of this issue, the appellate court held that
prescription had not yet set in by holding –

“2.     Defendants-appellants
also contend that plaintiff-appellees claim is barred
by prescription, inasmuch as the Deed of Sale sued upon was executed in November 1961, while plaintiff-appellee’s complaint was filed only on March 29, 1974 (thereafter), or more than ten
years, in violation of Article 1144 of the Civil Code.

Article 1144 of the Civil Code
provides that an action upon a written contract must be brought within 10 years
from the time the right of action accrues. 
In order to have a good cause of action, the following essential
elements must coexist: legal right in the plaintiff, with a corresponding legal
duty in the defendant, and a violation or breach of that right or duty with
consequential injury or damage to the plaintiff, for which he may maintain an
action for appropriate relief (Ma-ao Sugar Central
Co. vs. Barrios, 79 Phil. 666).  There is
no actionable wrong, that is, no cause of action, unless there has been a
breach of such duty either by means of the defendant’s failure to perform some
contractual obligation which he has undertaken, or by means of some tortious or illegal act which violates or infringes some
right of the plaintiff with respect to which a duty or obligation is owing,
resulting in an injury to plaintiff (1 Am. Jur. p.
420).  The right of action accrues from the moment there occurs a breach of right
or duty, for from that moment the action can be legally instituted; from that
moment, therefore, the period of prescription of action begins to run.

In the case at bar, the Deed of Sale of November 1961, Exh. ‘A’,
provides that defendants-appellants agree to transfer, cede and convey unto
HOWARD WEBER whatever rights and interests we may have over 250 square meters
of land located at San Juan, Rizal and being a portion of Lot No. 7 and
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 29457 issued by the Register of
Deeds for Rizal. 
It is clear therefore that plaintiff-appellee
has no legal right to demand the transfer, cession or conveyance of a portion
of 250 square meters of Lot 7 until defendants-appellants’ rights and interests thereto shall have been
definitely determined.  Said rights were
definitely determined only upon the termination of the Intestate proceedings,
No. 3899 of Br.
I, CFI of Rizal, of the deceased Antonio Alvir, Sr., which, according to Atty. Sotelo,
was on December 28, 1968 (TSN, Aug. 13, 1976, p. 100).  Plaintiff-appellee’s
cause of action, therefore, did not accrue in November 1961, as contended by
defendants-appellants, but not earlier than December 28, 1968. 
Plaintiff-appellee’s complaint filed on March
29, 1974 was not barred by prescription.

Moreover, defendants-appellants are estopped,
under the facts of this case, to plead the limitation of action as a defense.

The record shows that defendants-appellants assured repeatedly
plaintiff-appelleee that they would work for the
segregation of the subject lot and transfer the same to plaintiff-appellee’s name as soon as the estate of the late Antonio Alvir, Sr. was settled; That there would be no trouble
segregating the lot; that a claim or suit by plaintiff would only delay the proceedings and consequentially
the segregation of the lot; and that they allowed plaintiff to occupy the lot
and build his house therein are the things that lulled plaintiff into not
filing a claim in the intestate proceedings or a separate action in court;
plaintiff being then a friend and business associate of defendants.

Plaintiff-appellee relied and acted in
good faith on these misrepresentations. 
A defendant who intentionally or negligently misleads a plaintiff by his
misrepresentations, and causes him to delay suing until the statutory bar has
fallen, will be estopped from pleading the statute of
limitations.  (Tucker v. Owen, (CA4) 94 F
2d 49; Missouri P.R. Co. v. Davis, 186 Ark.
401, 53 SW 2d 851; Neff v. New York L. Ins. Co., 30 Cal. 2d 165, 180 P2nd 900,
171 ALR 563; Holman v. Omaha C.R.R. & Bridgs Co.,
117 Iowa 268, 90 NW 833; Missouri, K. & T.R. Co. V. Pratt, 73 Kan. 210, 83 P 114; State ex rel.
Oliver v. United States Fidelity & G. Co., 176 NC 598, 97 SE 490; Empire Gas. & Fuel Co. v. Lindersmith, 131 Okla.,
183, 268, p. 218; Sadler v. Marsden, 160 Va.
392, 168 SE 357, 51 Am. Jur. 2d p. 912).”^[8]

We disagree.

It is true that under Article 1144 of the Civil Code an action
upon a written contract must be
brought within 10 years from the time the cause of action accrues.  Under the terms of the contract in this case, the balance of
P2,000.00 for the sale must be paid by private respondent within 30 days from
and after the expiration of the 2-year period from the signing thereof.  Private respondent asserts that he paid this
balance on July 25, 1963.  Thus, the obligation of petitioners, except
Douglas Alvir, “to transfer, cede and
convey” to private respondent “whatever rights and interests”
petitioners may have over the property accrued when private respondent
completed payment of the consideration of the sale.

The opinion of the appellate court is that the cause of action
accrued only when the rights and interest of said petitioners had been
definitely determined.  The terms of the
contract do not support this conclusion. 
What it simply provides is that upon full payment of the consideration,
said petitioners are bound to transfer, cede and convey to private respondent
whatever rights and interest they have over the property, no more no less.

Thus, private respondent’s cause of action is barred by
prescription.  The cause of action
accrued on July 25, 1963,
while the complaint was filed only on March
29, 1974.

The Court is not persuaded that it was due to alleged
misrepresentation of petitioners that private respondent failed to file the
complaint on time.  Private respondent
himself asserts that on February 12,
1973, petitioner Douglas Alvir instituted
an unlawful detainer case against his in-laws over
the property, and this was the time he learned what happened to the intestate proceedings
of the late Antonio Alvir.^[9]
He could have filed the action immediately thereafter and well within the reglementary period. 
But he tarried and failed to do so on time.  He has only
himself to blame if he lost the right to seek relief from the courts.

In the light of the foregoing disposition, the other issues
raised need not be resolved.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Intermediate Appellate
Court dated September 12, 1984
and the Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated January 25, 1988 are set aside and another judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the
complaint.  No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, (Chairman), Cruz, Griño-Aquino, and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Annex A to petition; pages 42 and 43, Rollo.

^[2]
Annex B to petition; pages 44-56, Rollo.

^[3]
Annex C to petition; page 57, Rollo.

^[4]
Annex J to petition; page 83, Rollo.

^[5]
Justice Porfirio V. Sison
was the ponente, with Justices Abdulwahid A. Bidin and Marcelino Veloso concurring.

^[6]
Justice Alfredo Marigomen
was ponente, with Justices Serafin
A. Camilon and Arturo B. Buena concurring.

^[7]
Page 21, Rollo.

^[8]
Pages 142 and 143, Rollo.

^[9]
Comment of private respondent; pages 163-165, Rollo.