PANTALEON DE LA PEÑA, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND HEROTIDO TAN, RESPONDENTS.

PANTALEON DE LA PEÑA, petitioner herein, claiming preferential right
to acquire ownership over a 3/4-hectare portion of Lot No. 5714-C, imputes,
fraud and misrepresentation to private respondent Herotido Tan in securing Free
Patent No. (XI-6) 1326 and OCT No. P-7923 over the same. The action for reconveyance earlier filed by
de la Peña was denied both by the trial court and the Court of Appeals. For reasons herein set forth, the present
petition must also fail.

Ciriaco Reducto was occupying a 24-hectare parcel of land in
Sulongvale, Sulop, Davao del Norte (previously Padada, Tanwalang, Davao),
designated as Lot No. 5714, for which he filed Homestead Application No. 192495
(E-100806) with the Bureau of Lands. A
certain Potenciano Nazaret likewise filed an application for the same lot. As a result, a case docketed as B. L.
Conflict No. 57 (N) arose in the Bureau of Lands wherein Nazaret’s application
and that of Ciriaco Reducto were “conflicted.” Prior thereto however,
by means of a “Deed of Relinquishment” dated 21 July 1946,^[1]
Ciriaco transferred his possessory rights over six (6) hectares (later
increased to eight [8]) of Lot 5714 to petitioner Pantaleon de la Peña who
thereafter entered his appearance in the administrative case when the portion
transferred to him remained included in the homestead applications of Ciriaco
Reducto and Potenciano Nazaret. After
it was ascertained in a field verification that petitioner had a better right
to acquire the portion claimed by him being its actual occupant and cultivator,
the Director of Lands directed petitioner to apply for the portion himself
within sixty (60) days after its survey or else “lose his preferential
right thereto.”^[2]
However, no such application was filed.

Meanwhile, on 7 March 1950, Ciriaco transferred his rights over
another 1 1/2-hectare portion of Lot 5714 to Michael Doble^[3] who
in turn sold his rights in 1956 to Ricardo Tan,^[4]
herein private respondent’s father. The
portion sold to Michael Doble, and later on acquired by Ricardo Tan, became the
western boundary of de la Peña’s land.

On 24 and 25 August 1970, a survey was conducted by Engr. Pedro
Sta. Cruz and Subdivision Plan Csd-11- 001883-D^[5] was
prepared and approved by the Bureau of Lands wherein the portion acquired by
petitioner was designated as Lot No. 5714-D, while that bought by Ricardo Tan
was identified as Lot No. 5714-C. As a
result of the survey, it was discovered that the land occupied by petitioner
was bigger by 3/4 of a hectare than what he actually bought and paid for from
Ciriaco. On the other hand, the land
ceded to Doble (later acquired by Tan) was “very much smaller” than
what he actually bought. Although the
3/4-hectare portion was part of the area acquired by Doble in 1950, it was
petitioner de la Peña who cultivated the same without objection from
Doble. However, when Ricardo Tan acquired
the lot on 2 March 1956, he built a fence to reclaim the portion, but
petitioner kept destroying it; hence, the start of a boundary dispute.

On 5 May 1975, Ricardo Tan transferred his rights over Lot 5714-C
to his son, private respondent Herotido Tan, by means of an “Affidavit of
Relinquishment.”^[6] But
the conflict over the 3/4-hectare portion continued. In an effort to resolve the conflict, a relocation survey was
agreed upon except that the parties failed to agree on a common surveyor. Consequently, each party had to hire his
own. Petitioner’s surveyor conducted a
relocation survey on 18 April 1977, while respondent’s surveyor conducted his
own five (5) days later. After it was
determined that the 3/4-hectare portion was within Lot 5714-C of private
respondent, the latter built a fence around the property to prevent petitioner
from entering. The sugarcane and
bananas planted by petitioner were destroyed in the process.

On 29 April 1977, petitioner filed a complaint for forcible entry
against Ricardo Tan in the Municipal Trial Court of Sulop.^[7] When
it was discovered that private respondent Herotido Tan was the registered owner of Lot 5714-C under OCT No. P-7923^[8] which was issued pursuant to Free Patent No. (XI-6) 1326 dated 15 September 1975, the complaint was accordingly
amended to implead him.

The MTC ruled in favor of petitioner.^[9] It
concluded that petitioner had prior possession of the disputed 3/4-hectare
portion and that he was prevented from entering the same by the fence
constructed by private respondent. Stressing that “ownership is not the issue” but “only
prior, physical and uninterrupted occupation and possession of the litigated
area,” the MTC ordered private respondent and his father, together with
all other persons claiming under them, to vacate the litigated portion and
restore possession to petitioner. The decision was affirmed on appeal
by the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Davao del
Sur.^[10]

On 18 July 1977, during the pendency of the forcible entry case,
petitioner instituted the present action for reconveyance with damages against
private respondent in the Regional Trial Court of Davao del Sur and Davao City.^[11]
Petitioner alleged that private respondent fraudulently registered the
3/4-hectare portion actually cultivated by him when the former stated in his
free patent application that “the land applied for is not claimed or
occupied by any other person.” In addition, petitioner denied that a
survey was conducted in 1970; if at all, it was merely a “table survey.”
Incidentally, it was discovered in the survey that the area of petitioner’s
actual occupation exceeded that which he bought from Ciriaco Reducto in 1946.

After trial, the court rejected petitioner’s denial of the 1970
Survey on the ground that he was already estopped from contesting it when he
offered Subdivision Plan CSD-11-001883-D in evidence. Therefore, since the disputed 3/4-hectare portion was not part of
the area bought and paid for in 1946 by petitioner, the latter was not entitled
to reconveyance. Petitioner was
declared a mere trespasser and planter in bad faith who was “enjoying
freely the use of government property” without even applying for the same
nor paying taxes thereon. His prayer
for P5,000.00 as actual damages for the sugarcane and bananas destroyed on the
disputed portion was denied. Instead,
private respondent’s counterclaim was granted and petitioner was ordered to pay
P6,000.00 in attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation, P15,000.00 for moral damages, and the costs of the proceedings.^[12]

Petitioner sought recourse to the Court of Appeals^[13]
reiterating his allegations of fraud and misrepresentation and, at the same
time, contending that the judgment in
the forcible entry case constituted res judicata on the action for reconveyance.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the appealed decision in toto^[14]
ruling that petitioner failed to substantiate his allegations of fraud and
misrepresentation. On the contrary, as
found by the lower court, the evidence showed that the requisites for the procurement
of a free patent and original certificate of title were regularly complied
with, i.e., a free patent application filed with the Bureau of Lands together
with the affidavits of the applicant and two (2) witnesses, and giving notice
of the application; the holding of an ocular inspection by the Land Examiner
from the Bureau of Lands; the latter’s recommendation for the approval of the application; and, the promulgation of the
order for the issuance of the free patent on the basis of which an original
certificate of title can be issued.

On the issue of res judicata, respondent Court of Appeals
ruled that the fact that petitioner obtained a favorable judgment in the
forcible entry case was not conclusive and did not ipso facto entitle
him to a similar favorable
judgment in the reconveyance case for the reason that while prior physical
possession was the sole issue in the forcible entry case, that of lawful
ownership or possession de jure
was the issue disputed in
the reconveyance case. Hence, the
petition before us.

We dismiss the petition and adopt as our own the conclusions
reached by the trial court and respondent Court of Appeals. In addition, we hold that petitioner
Pantaleon de la Peña has absolutely no standing to institute the present suit
for reconveyance.

It is well-settled that
reconveyance is a remedy granted only to the owner of the property alleged to
be erroneously titled in another’s name.^[15] In the case at bench, petitioner does not claim to be the owner of the disputed portion. Admittedly, what he has is only a
“preferential right” to acquire ownership thereof by virtue of his
actual occupation since January 1947.^[16] However, petitioner’s possession is
not one that could ripen into ownership. Title to alienable public lands can be established through open,
continuous, and exclusive possession for at least thirty (30) years. It must be noted that the dispute regarding
the 3/4-hectare portion started even before a free patent and an OCT could be
issued to private respondent in 1975. As early as 1956, the controversy already began between petitioner and
private respondent’s father. Hence,
petitioner’s possession falls short of the required period. Not being the owner, petitioner cannot
maintain the present suit.

Persons who have not
obtained title to public lands could not question the titles legally issued by
the State.^[17] In such cases, the real party in interest is
the Republic of the Philippines to whom the property would revert if it is ever established, after appropriate proceedings, that the free
patent issued to the grantee is indeed vulnerable to annulment on the ground
that the grantee failed to comply with the conditions imposed by the law.^[18] Not being an applicant, much less a grantee,
petitioner cannot ask for reconveyance.

However, we are inclined
to delete the award for attorney’s fees, moral damages and expenses of
litigation. As correctly argued by
petitioner, an award for attorney’s fees and moral damages on the sole basis of
an action later declared to be unfounded in the absence of a deliberate intent
to cause prejudice to the other party is improper.^[19]
The right to litigate is so precious that a penalty should not be charged on those who may exercise
it erroneously.^[20]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 21
December 1987 of respondent Court of Appeals sustaining that of the Regional
Trial Court of Davao del Sur and Davao City dated 23 April 1984 is AFFIRMED, with the sole modification
that the award for attorney’s fees, expenses of litigation, and moral damages
is DELETED.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, (Chairman), Davide, Jr., Quiason, and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Orig. Rec., p. 70.

^[2]
Id., pp. 72-73.

^[3]
See Exh. “1” (“Quitclaim Deed”), Folder of Exhibits for
Defendant.

^[4]
See Exh. “2” (“Quitclaim Deed”), Folder of Exhibits for
Defendant.

^[5]
See Folder of Exhibits for Defendant.

^[6]
See Exh. “5,” Folder of Exhibits.

^[7]
Civil Case No. 62.

^[8]
Exh. “6,” Folder of Exhibits for Defendant.

^[9]
Decision penned by Judge Rosalina L. Montejo, dated 20 February 1979.

^[10]
Decision penned by Judge Marcelino M. Francisco, dated 3 November 1980, in
Civil Case No. 1448.

^[11]
De la Peña v. Tan, Civil Case No. 1176.

^[12]
Decision penned by Judge Juan L. Montejo, dated 23 April 1984; Orig. Rec., pp.
290 – 312.

^[13]
De la Peña v. Tan, CA-G.R. CV No. 04379.

^[14]
Decision penned by Associate Justice Lorna S. Lombos-de la Fuente, concurred in
by Associate Justices Ricardo J. Francisco
and Alfredo L. Benipayo, dated 21 December 1987; Rollo, pp. 29-35.

^[15]
Tomas v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 79328, 21 May 1990, 185 SCRA 627,
633; Esconde v. Barlongay, G.R.
No. 67583, 31 July 1987, 152 SCRA 603, 611; Nebrada v. Heirs of Alivio et
al., 104 Phil. 126 (1958); Director
of Lands v. Register of Deeds of Rizal, 92 Phil. 826 (1953); Azurin
v. Quitoriano, et al., 81 Phil.
261 (1948).

^[16]
Petition, p. 11; Rollo, p. 16.

^[17]
Reyes v. Rodriguez, 62 Phil. 771, 776 (1936).

^[18]
See Sec. 101 of CA 141 (Public Land Act); Lucas v. Durian, 102 Phil. 1157, 1158
(1957); Sumail v. Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cotabato, et al., 96 Phil. 946, 953
(1955).

^[19]
Siasat v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 67889, 10 October 1985,
139 SCRA 238, 250; R & B Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, G.R. No. 64515, 22 June 1984, 129 SCRA 736, 745; Salao
v. Salao, No. L-26699, 16 March 1976, 70 SCRA 65, 86; Ramos v. Ramos, No.
L-19872, 3 December 1974, 61 SCRA 284, 306; Mercader v. Manila Polo Club, 99
Phil. 981, 985 (1956).

^[20]
Albenson Enterprises Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 88694, 11
January 1993, 217 SCRA 16, 30; Garcia v. Gonzales, No. L-48184, 12 March
1990, 183 SCRA 72, 81; Filinvest Credit Corporation v. Mendez, G.R.
No. 66419, 31 July 1987, 152 SCRA 593, 601.