ACTING REGISTRARS OF LAND TITLES AND DEEDS OF PASAY CITY, PASIG AND MAKATI, METRO MANILA, PETITIONERS, VS. THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 57, IN MAKATI, METRO MANILA PRESIDED …

Acting Registrars of Land Titles and Deeds versus Regional Trial Court of Makati

The Case

This is a special civil action for certiorari brought by the Acting Registrars of Land Titles and Deeds of Pasay City, Pasig and Makati against the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 57, presided over by Judge Francisco Velez. The petitioners charge the respondent judge with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction for issuing orders that authorized the private respondent, Domingo Palomares, to perform acts of ownership over a vast parcel of land known as Hacienda de Maricaban, spread across Makati, Pasig, Taguig, Pasay City and Parañaque. The case matters because it draws a hard line between a provisional order that preserves the status quo and an order that effectively disposes of the main controversy before any trial, and because it reminds every magistrate that the judge is a neutral arbiter, not the champion of one party.

Procedural History

On November 5, 1985, Domingo Palomares, as administrator of the heirs of Delfin Casal, commenced suit before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 132, for declaratory relief, quieting of title, cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 192, and cancellation of entries upon Original Certificate of Title No. 291. Earlier, in February 1985, Palomares had come to the Supreme Court on a similar petition, also seeking a duplicate owner's copy of Original Certificate of Title No. 291; in September 1985 the Court denied that petition for lack of merit.

In the trial court, the petitioners filed their answer, and the private respondent moved to admit an amended complaint impleading the Republic and the registers of deeds. The respondent judge then issued a temporary restraining order, and later, in October 1987, issued the two orders now challenged: one authorizing Palomares to cause subdivision surveys and to sell, exchange, lease or otherwise dispose of portions of the property, and a clarificatory order affirming that authority without need of a writ of execution. The petitioners filed a notice of appeal, which the respondent judge denied on the ground that the order was interlocutory. Hence this recourse to the Supreme Court.

Facts

The private respondent claimed that on October 1, 1906, the Court of Land Registration confirmed the title of Dolores Pascual Casal y Ochoa over a parcel of 2,574 hectares, and that the Register of Deeds of Rizal issued Original Certificate of Title No. 291 in her name. Upon her death and the successive deaths of her heirs, the property allegedly devolved on her great grandchildren, the Casals. The private respondent insisted that no conveyance had ever been made, that Transfer Certificate of Title No. 192 covering the same landholding was spurious, and that the State itself had been guilty of landgrabbing by placing portions of the land under a military reservation.

The petitioners answered that the estate was not a juridical person authorized to sue, that the real parties in interest had not been joined, that Original Certificate of Title No. 291 had long been cancelled, and that the Supreme Court had already denied the Casals' earlier petition. They alleged that Dolores Casal had conveyed the property to the Government of the United States in 1906 and to the Manila Railroad Company.

Despite the absence of any trial, the respondent judge issued the order of October 12, 1987, authorizing Palomares to order subdivision surveys and to sell, exchange, lease or otherwise dispose of any portion of the land, subject only to the approval of the intestate estate court. Eleven days later he issued a clarificatory order affirming that Palomares could take whatever steps he considered appropriate without need of further orders. He then denied the Government's notice of appeal, and defended his acts in his own comment before the Supreme Court.

Issues

• Whether or not Original Certificate of Title No. 291 is still valid and subsisting.
• Whether or not the respondent judge, in issuing the orders of October 12 and October 23, 1987, committed grave abuse of discretion equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Applicable Provisions

Article 425 of the Civil Code, on property of private ownership, provides:

Article 425. Property of private ownership, besides the patrimonial property of the State, provinces, cities, and municipalities, consists of all property belonging to private persons, either individually or collectively.

The Court cites it to acknowledge that private ownership is recognized, yet holds that the Government's official assertions of ownership over the land prevail.

Section 3 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, on the grounds for a preliminary injunction, provides:

Section 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. A preliminary injunction may be granted at any time after the commencement of the action and before judgment when it is established: (a) That the plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the acts complained of, or in the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually; (b) That the commission or continuance of some act complained of during the litigation or the non-performance thereof would probably work injustice to the plaintiff; or (c) That the defendant is doing, threatens, or is about to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act probably in violation of the plaintiff's rights respecting the subject of the action, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.

The Court uses it to show that injunction is an extraordinary remedy confined to preserving the status quo, not to transferring possession or conferring dominion.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that Original Certificate of Title No. 291 is no longer valid and subsisting. It took judicial notice that the hectarage consists of Government property, persuaded by three things: the decrees of Proclamations Nos. 192 and 423, which are official assertions of ownership issued by right of sovereignty; the incontrovertible fact that the certificate had been duly cancelled; and the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming Judge Pineda's ruling, as well as the Supreme Court's own denial of the earlier petition. The Court found hard evidence that the property had been conveyed to the United States, later ceded to the Republic, and that the certificate was cancelled upon final orders of Judge Ostrand. The claim that Judge Ostrand's decree was a forgery found no support, since the presumption is that official duty has been regularly performed. The prior judgment operated as the law of the case, and res judicata barred the renewed claim.

On the second issue, the Court held that the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion. He gave away property that inalienably belongs to the Government, and he did so without notice to the actual possessors and registered owners, who are indispensable parties without whom no valid judgment could be rendered. The present holders are presumed innocent purchasers for value, against whom reconveyance does not lie. The order was issued with no benefit of trial or hearing, and the private respondent could not invoke the earlier case as its trial while repudiating its effects. It was also grave error to deny the Government's notice of appeal, because the order was in the nature of a final judgment that finally disposed of the action. The Court stressed that injunction does not lie to take property out of the possession or control of one party and place it into that of another.

Doctrine

A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy that preserves the status quo; it cannot be used to recover possession of real estate or to transfer property from one party to another. An order that authorizes a party to sell, exchange, lease or otherwise dispose of land effectively confers dominion and is, in substance, a final judgment from which an appeal lies, however it is captioned. Owners of property over which reconveyance is asserted are indispensable parties, and without notice to them the court acquires no jurisdiction to decree reconveyance. A prior final judgment denying reconstitution of a lost owner's copy because the mother title had been duly cancelled conclusively establishes that the title no longer exists, and res judicata bars its relitigation. Official acts enjoy the presumption of regularity, and a bare charge of forgery cannot overthrow it.

Disposition

The petition was granted; the challenged orders of the respondent judge were set aside, and the case was remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Makati for further proceedings, with the judge reminded to remain a neutral magistrate.

Remember This

Memorize this line: injunction does not lie to take property out of the possession or control of one party and place it into that of another. Examiners use this case to test the distinction between an interlocutory and a final order, the indispensable-party requirement in reconveyance, and the finality of a prior judgment cancelling a Torrens title.