PEPSI COLA BOTTLING COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. JOB GUANZON AND NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (THIRD DIVISION), RESPONDENTS.

Petitioner Pepsi Cola Bottling Company of the Philippines
(hereinafter referred to as PEPSI) seeks the reversal of the decision of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC-RAB CASE No. 0474-84
entitled “Job Guanzon vs. Pepsi Cola Bottling
Co. of the Philippines, Inc.” promulgated on August 12, 1987, wherein the
NLRC held that private respondent Job Guanzon was illegally dismissed by petitioner and
accordingly, ordered the payment of his backwages and
separation pay.

As shown in the records, the facts are as follows:

On September 12, 1965
petitioner PEPSI hired private respondent Job Guanzon
as a “route salesman”. 
Sometime in June 1979 he was “grounded” or suspended for his
alleged violation of company rules and regulations.  During an administrative investigation
conducted by PEPSI, Guanzon was found guilty of
misappropriating money collected from customers and of falsifying invoices and
reports [Decision of Labor Arbiter, p. 5; Rollo, p.
30.]    On July 6, 1979 private respondent was served by petitioner
with a letter informing him of the termination of his employment effective July 17, 1979 [“Annex A” to
the Petition; Rollo, p. 17.]

A criminal complaint for Estafa Through Falsification of Commercial Documents was also filed
by PEPSI against Guanzon with the Office of the City
Fiscal of Bacolod City.  However, the case was dismissed on May 25, 1984 based on the finding
that a charge invoice is not a commercial document.  The investigating fiscal also found that the
financial liability of Guanzon to PEPSI was already paid by him
[Decision of Labor Arbiter, p. 6; Rollo, p. 31.]

On November 14, 1984
private respondent filed with the
office of the Labor Arbiter in Bacolod City
a complaint for reinstatement and payment of backwages
and damages.  In his complaint, private
respondent claimed that he was grounded as a route salesman due to “fabricated
and malicious dishonesty charge by the local agents of petitioner”
[Paragraph 3, Complaint, p. 1; Rollo, p. 18.]

The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint on the ground that the
claims of private respondent had prescribed pursuant to Article 292 (now
Article 291) of the Labor Code which provides for a three-year prescriptive period for
all money claims arising from       an
employer-employee relationship.  The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
DISMISSING all the claims of the complainant against respondent company for having been barred by prescription.

SO ORDERED.

[NLRC Decision, p. 9; Rollo,
p. 34.)

On appeal, respondent NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor
Arbiter and held that Article 292 of the Labor Code is not applicable since Guanzon’s complaint is not strictly one for recovery of
money claims but is principally an action for illegal dismissal and
reinstatement.  The applicable law,
according to the NLRC, is Article 1146 of the Civil Code which provides for a four-year prescriptive period in
cases of violation of or injury to the rights of the plaintiff.  The NLRC considered May 25, 1984, the date of
the dismissal of the criminal case against private respondent, as the reckoning date for computing
the prescriptive period, and accordingly held that when Guanzon
filed the complaint for illegal dismissal on November 14, 1984 the four-year
prescriptive period has not lapsed.  The
NLRC also found that the dismissal of Guanzon was
without just cause and that the investigation conducted by PEPSI suffered from “patent
procedural infirmities,” and therefore, violative
of the requirements of due process [Decision of NLRC, pp. 4-5; Rollo, pp. 39-40.] Considering that reinstatement was no
longer feasible or practical in view of the length of time that had elapsed
since private respondent’s dismissal, the NLRC ordered petitioner to pay
private respondent three (3) years backwages and
separation pay, in lieu of reinstatement [Decision of NLRC, p. 6; Rollo, p. 41.]

Hence, the instant petition.

The
main issue to be resolved in this petition is whether or not private
respondent’s action for illegal dismissal with claims for reinstatement and backwages had prescribed.

The
Court sustains the petitioner’s contention that private respondent’s action for
illegal dismissal is already barred by prescription.

It
is undisputed in the instant case that private respondent’s complaint for
illegal dismissal was filed only on November 14, 1984 or more than
five years from the time private respondent’s
cause of action arising from his alleged
illegal dismissal accrued on July 17, 1979, the effective
date of the termination of his employment with petitioner.  The complaint was, therefore, filed beyond
the prescriptive period provided for in both the Labor Code and Article 1146 of
the Civil Code (Cf. Articles 290-291,
Labor Code; Callanta v. Carnation Philippines, Inc.,
G.R. No. 70615, October 28, 1986, 145 SCRA 268; Pan-Fil
Co.Inc. v. Agujar, G.R. No.
81948, November 9, 1988.]

In maintaining that private respondent’s cause of action against
petitioner had not yet prescribed, respondent NLRC claims that private
respondent was
never terminated by petitioner but was only “grounded” or
preventively suspended until the final resolution of the criminal case against
him [Comment of NLRC, p. 4; Rollo, p. 84.]

This is untenable.

In the first place, there was nothing in the termination letter which
implies that petitioner PEPSI was merely suspending respondent Guanzon.  The intent
to terminate private respondent is evident in the tenor of the letter which
states that:

In view of these series of flagrant violations of company rules and
regulations, we are, therefore, constrained to terminate you
effective July 17,
1979.  [Annex
“A” to the Petition; Rollo, p. 17.]

Moreover, private respondent himself claimed that he was
“unlawfully dismissed” by petitioner. 
Paragraph 6 of private respondent’s complaint reads:

*           *           *

(6)     That from June 20,
1979 up to the present, he [respondent Guanzon] has
been grounded and this fact
amounts to unlawful dismissal because he has been
denied any salary, allowances, 15 days sick leave with pay, 15 days
vacation leave with pay, Christmas bonus and his route allowances per month.  [Complaint, p. 2; Rollo,
p. 19; Underscoring supplied.]

Equally untenable is private respondent’s claim that he never received
a notice of termination [Memorandum of Respondent p. 1; Rollo, p. 117.] The records clearly
show that private respondent received the termination letter on July 6, 1979 as
shown by his signature at the lower right hand portion thereof [Annex
“A” to the Petition; Rollo, p. 17.] Private
respondent never claimed that his signature was forged or made without his
authority.  He merely insists that he
never received a notice of termination. 
It was error on the part of the NLRC to give weight to the unsupported
denial of private respondent in the
light of the clear documentary evidence to the contrary.

On the question of when private respondent’s cause of action accrued, the Court does not
agree with the NLRC’s position that “the date of
dismissal of the criminal case against private respondent on May 25, 1984 is
the reckoning date when the prescriptive period of the action for illegal
dismissal should commence.”

In an illegal dismissal case, the cause of action accrues from
the time the employee was unjustly terminated [See Ramos v. Our Lady of Peace
School, G.R. No. 55950, December 26, 1984, 133 SCRA
741.]  In this case private respondent’s
cause of action arising from his alleged illegal
dismissal accrued on July 17, 1979, the effective date of the termination of
his employment.

The Court cannot sustain NLRC’s
argument that it was only when PEPSI refused to reinstate private respondent to
his former position, after the dismissal of the criminal case on May 25, 1984, that the latter’s cause
of action accrued.  Guanzon was
dismissed by PEPSI way back in
1979.  He could have immediately
challenged his dismissal without waiting for the outcome of the criminal
case.  His right to file an action for illegal dismissal is now
barred by prescription precisely because he chose to
wait for the dismissal of the criminal case before filing his complaint.

Nor is there any merit to private respondent’s claim that had he
“filed a [complaint for illegal dismissal] while the criminal case was
pending, it would have been without any
basis” as it “would be premature” [Memorandum for Respondent, p. 3; Rollo, p. 119.] Private respondent’s right to file an action for illegal
dismissal was not dependent upon the outcome of the criminal case against
him.  The fact that the alleged violations
of the company rules and regulations were the same cause for the filing of the criminal case
against him is of no moment.  Private
respondent’s guilt or innocence in the criminal case is not determinative of
the existence of a just or authorized cause for his dismissal [National
Organization of Laborers and Employees v. Roldan, 95
Phil. 727 (1954); Phil. Education Co., Inc. v. Union of Phil. Education
Employees and CIR, 107 Phil. 1003 (1960); Gatmaitan v. MRR Co., 128 Phil. 208 (1967); Philippine Geothermal,
Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. Nos. 55249-50, October 19,
1982, 117 SCRA 692; Dole Philippines Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Commission, G.R. No. 55413, July 25, 1983, 123 SCRA 673; Philippine Long
Distance Telephone Co. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 63191,
April 30, 1984, 129 SCRA 163.] The filing of the criminal case against private
respondent did not have the effect of suspending or interrupting the
prescriptive period for the
filing of the action for illegal dismissal. 
An action for illegal dismissal is an administrative case which is
entirely separate and distinct from a criminal
action for estafa. 
Each may proceed independently of the other [Manikad
v. Tanodbayan, G.R. No. 65097, February 20, 1984, 127 SCRA 729.]

Finally, private respondent contends that, granting arguendo that his cause of action had prescribed,
petitioner is estopped from setting up the defense of
prescription since it failed to file its motion to dismiss on time.  He claims that when petitioner PEPSI was
served with summons, it did not file an answer nor any
pleading to challenge the complaint [Memorandum for Respondent, p. 5; Rollo, p. 121.] It was only when the case was set for
hearing on February 27, 1985 that counsel for petitioner requested for time to
submit responsive pleading and subsequently filed the motion to dismiss
[Comment of NLRC, p. 5; Rollo, p. 85.]

Petitioner, on the other hand, argues that there was no waiver of
the defense of prescription since it was only after February 4, 1985 that a
copy of the complaint and notice of hearing were served upon its counsel as
shown by the postmark appearing on the
cover letter thereof [Petitioner’s Reply, pp. 1-2; Rollo,
pp. 88-89.]

In its Comment to the instant petition, the respondent NLRC
sustains the contention of private respondent that the motion to dismiss was
filed out of time.  It is the position of
respondent Commission that the motion to dismiss should have been filed by the
petitioner “at least ten (10) days from the time the copy of the complaint
was served upon it” [NLRC’s Comment, p. 5; Rollo, p. 85.]

The Court, after considering the foregoing arguments and the
applicable laws on the matter, finds that there was no waiver of the defense of
prescription.  As correctly pointed out
by the petitioner, the Labor Code and the NLRC Rules do not provide for a
specific period within which to file a motion to dismiss [Petitioner’s Reply,
p. 3; Rollo, p. 90.] Section 14, Rule VII of the Revised Rules of the NLRC, provides
only that:

Section 14.  Motion to dismiss.–Any motion to dismiss a
complaint or petition on the ground that . . . the cause of action is barred .
. . by prescription, shall be immediately acted upon by the Labor Arbiter if the acts strongly indicate dismissal.  Any motion to dismiss with no such indication shall be disposed of only in the final determination of
the case and shall not be allowed to interrupt or delay the proceedings.

Nowhere is it provided that the motion to dismiss should be filed
with the Labor Arbiter within ten (10) days from receipt of the complaint.

And even if we apply the technical rules of procedure obtaining
in ordinary civil actions, the dismissal of the private respondent’s complaint
was still proper since it is
apparent from its face that the action has prescribed.  Private respondent himself alleged in the
complaint that he was unlawfully dismissed in 1979 [Complaint, p. 2; Rollo, p. 19] while the complaint was filed only on November 14, 1984.  This Court has held in a number of cases that
the rule on waiver of defenses by failure to plead in the answer or motion to
dismiss does not apply when the plaintiff’s own allegations in the complaint
shows clearly that the action has prescribed [Philippine National Bank v.
Perez, G.R. No. L-20412, February 28, 1966, 16 SCRA 270; Philippine National Bank v. Pacific Commercial
House, G.R. No. L-22675, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 766; Ferrer v. Ericta, G.R. No. L-41767, August 23, 1978, 84 SCRA 705; Garcia v. Mathis, G.R. No. L-48577,
September 30,
1980, 100 SCRA 250.] In such a case the court may motu proprio dismiss the case on the ground of
prescription [PNB v. Perez, supra.] Thus, even assuming that
petitioner’s motion to dismiss was filed out of time, there was nothing to
prevent the Labor Arbiter from dismissing the complaint on the ground of
prescription.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is hereby
GRANTED.  The Decision of the National
Labor Relations Commission is SET ASIDE
and the Decision of the Labor Arbiter is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr.,
Feliciano, and Bidin,
JJ., concur.