LUIS DE OCAMPO, JR., JOSE RODRIGO, EUGENIO ESQUEJO, VICTORINO TABERNERO, RIZALO DALIVA, FRANCISCO ACOSTA AND 87 OTHERS LISTED IN ANNEX “A” HEREOF, PETITIONERS, VS. NATIONAL LABO…

The petition seeks a reversal of the decision of the respondent
NLRC dated June 8, 1984, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED as
hereinabove indicated.  Consequently, the
application for clearance to dismiss the union officers is granted; the
employment status of the individual complainants who were project employees is
also considered severed, not on account of illegality of the strike but due to
the expiration of their employment contracts; and the respondent is ordered to
reinstate, without back wages, the individual complainants who were regular
employees except those who were officers of the union among them or paid
separation pay at their option, equivalent to one month’s pay
or one-half month’s pay for every year of service, whichever is greater.

It appears that on September 30, 1980, the services of 65
employees of private respondent Makati Development Corporation were terminated
on the ground of the expiration of their contracts; that the said employees
filed a complaint
for illegal dismissal against the MDC on October 1, 1980;* that on
October 8, 1980, as a result of
the aforementioned termination, the Philippine Transport and General Workers
Association, of which the complainants were members, filed a notice of strike
on the grounds of union-busting, subcontracting of projects which could have
been assigned to the dismissed employees, and unfair labor practice; that on
October 14, 1980, the PTGWA declared a strike and established picket lines in
the perimeter of the MDC premises; that on November 4, 1980, the MDC filed with
the Bureau of Labor Relations a motion to declare the strike illegal and
restrain the workers from continuing the strike; that on that same day and
several days thereafter the MDC filed
applications for clearance to terminate the employment of 90 of the striking
workers, whom it had meanwhile preventively suspended; that of the said
workers, 74 were project
employees under contract with the MDC with fixed terms of employment; and that
on August 31, 1982, Labor Arbiter Apolinar L. Sevilla rendered a decision^[1]
denying the applications for clearance filed by the MDC and directing it to
reinstate the individual complainants with two months back wages each.

This is the decision modified by the NLRC^[2]
which is now faulted by the petitioners for grave abuse of discretion.  The contention is that the public respondent
acted arbitrarily and erroneously in ruling that:  a) the motion for reconsideration was filed
out of time; b) the strike was illegal; and c) the separation of the project
employees was justified.

Having considered the issues and the arguments of the parties in their respective pleadings,
including the petitioners’ ex parte motion for early resolution of this
case, the Court makes the findings that follow.

On the first issue, we note that the rule on motions for
reconsideration of the decision of the NLRC is now found in Rule X of the
Revised Rules of the NLRC, providing thus:

Section 9. 
Motions for reconsideration – Motions for reconsideration of any
order, resolution or decision of the Commission shall not be entertained except
when based on palpable or patent errors, provided that the motion is under oath
and filed within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the order, resolution
or decision, with proof of service that a copy of the same has been furnished,
within the aforesaid reglementary period, the adverse party and provided
further, that only one such motion shall be entertained.

Subject to the provisions of Section 3, Rule IX of these Rules, motions for reconsideration of an
order, resolution or decision of a Division shall be resolved by the Division
of origin.

However, this section was promulgated only on November 5, 1986, and became
effective only on November 29, 1986,
after the required publication.^[3]
It was therefore not yet in force when the required resolution in the present case was rendered in 1984.

Apparently agreeing that the reglementary period then was fifteen
days, the Solicitor General argues that the petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration was nevertheless filed late on June 26, 1984, the decision of the NLRC having been
rendered on June 7, 1984, or
19 days earlier.^[4]
This is not exactly accurate.  The fact
is Annex “C” of the petition shows that a copy of the decision was received by the petitioner only on June 13, 1984, and it was from
that date that the reglementary period commenced to run.  This means that the motion for
reconsideration was filed on time, only 13 days having elapsed before the
deadline.

But this notwithstanding, we must hold that under the law then in
force, to wit, PD No. 823 as amended by PD No. 849, the strike was indeed
illegal.  In the first place, it was
based not on the ground of unresolved economic issues, which was the only
ground allowed at that time, when the policy was indeed to limit and discourage
strikes.  Secondly, the strike was declared
only after 6 days from the notice of strike and before the lapse of the 30-day
period prescribed in the said law for a cooling-off of the differences between the workers and management and a possible
avoidance of the intended strike.  That
law clearly provided:

“Sec. 1.  It is the policy of the state to encourage
free trade unionism and free collective bargaining within the framework of
compulsory and voluntary arbitration. 
Therefore all forms of strikes, picketing and lockout are hereby
strictly prohibited in vital industries such as in public utilities, including
transportation and communication, companies engaged in the manufacture or
processing as well as in the distribution of fuel gas, gasoline and fuel or lubricating
oil, in companies engaged in the production or processing of essential
commodities or products for export, and in companies engaged in banking of any
kind, as well as in hospitals and in schools and colleges.

However, any legitimate labor union may strike and any employer may
lockout in establishments not covered by General Order No. 5 only on grounds of unresolved economic issues in collective bargaining, in which
case the union or the employer shall file a notice with the Bureau of Labor
Relations at least 30 days before
the intended strike or lockout.”
(Emphasis supplied.)

It is our ruling that the
leaders of the illegal strike were correctly punished with dismissal, but their
followers (other than the contract workers) were properly ordered reinstated,
considering their lesser degree of responsibility.  The penalty imposed upon the leaders was only
proper because it was they who instigated the strike even if they knew, or
should have known, that it was illegal. 
It was also fair to rule that the reinstated strikers were not entitled to
backpay as they certainly should not be compensated for
services not rendered during the illegal strike.  In our view, this is a reasonable compromise
between the demands of the workers and the rights of the employer.

Coming now to the last question, we stress the rule in Cartagenas
v. Romago Electric Co.,^[5]
that contract workers are not considered regular employees, their services
being needed only when there are projects to be undertaken.  The rationale of this rule is that if a
project has already been completed, it would be unjust to require the employer
to maintain them in the payroll while they are doing absolutely nothing except
waiting until another project is begun, if at all.  In effect, these stand-by workers would be
enjoying the status of privileged retainers, collecting payment for work not
done, to be disbursed by the employer from profits not earned.  This is not fair by any standard and can only
lead to a coddling of labor at the expense of management.

We believe, however, that this rule is not applicable in the case
at bar, and for good reason.  The record
shows that although the contracts of the project workers had indeed expired,
the project itself was still on-going and so continued to require the workers’
services for its completion.^[6]
There is no showing that such services were unsatisfactory to justify their
termination.  This is not even alleged by
the private respondent.  One can
therefore only wonder why, in view of these circumstances, the contract workers
were not retained to finish the project they had begun and were still working
on.  This had been done in past
projects.  This arrangement had
consistently been followed before, which accounts for the long years of service
many of the workers had with the MDC.

It is obvious that the real reason for the termination of their
services – which, to repeat, were still needed – was the complaint the project
workers had filed and their participation in the strike against the private
respondent.  These were the acts that
rendered them persona non grata to the management.  Their services were discontinued by the MDC
not because of the expiration of their contracts, which had not prevented their
retention or rehiring before as long as the project they were working on had
not yet been completed.  The real purpose
of the MDC was to retaliate against the workers, to punish them for their
defiance by replacing them with more tractable employees.

Also noteworthy in this connection is Policy Instruction No. 20 of the Department of Labor, providing
that “project employees are not entitled to separation pay if they are
terminated as a
result of the completion of the project or any phase thereof in which
they are employed, regardless of the projects in which they had been employed
by a particular construction company.”^[7]
Affirmatively put, and interpreting it in
the most liberal way to favor the working class, the rule would entitle
project employees to separation pay if the projects they are working on have
not yet been completed when their
services are terminated.  And this should
be true even if their contracts have expired, on the theory that such contracts
would have been renewed anyway because their services were still needed.

Applying this rule, we hold that the project workers in the case
at bar, who were separated even before the completion of the project at the New
Alabang Village
and not really for the reason that their contracts had expired, are entitled to
separation pay.  We make this disposition
instead of ordering their reinstatement as it may be assumed that the said
project has been completed by this time. 
Considering the workers to have been separated without valid cause, we
shall compute their separation pay at the rate of one month for every year of service
of each dismissed employee, up to the time of the completion of the project.^[8]
We feel this is the most equitable way to treat their claim in light of their
cavalier dismissal by the private respondent despite their long period of
satisfactory service with it.

It is the policy of the Constitution to afford protection to
labor in recognition of its role in the improvement of our welfare and the
strengthening of our democracy.  An
exploited working class is a discontented working class.  It is a treadmill to progress and a threat to
freedom.  Knowing this, we must exert all
effort to dignify the lot of the employee, elevating him to the same plane as his
employer, that they may better work together as equal
partners in the quest for a better life. 
This is a symbiotic relationship we must maintain if such a quest is to
succeed.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the NLRC is AFFIRMED
but with the modification that the contract workers are hereby declared to have
been illegally separated before the expiration of the project they were working
on and so are entitled to separation pay equivalent to one month salary for
every year of service.  No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, (Chairman), Gancayco, and
Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Griño-Aquino, J., on leave.

* On April 14, 1983, a compromise agreement subsequently
approved by the NLRC en banc provided for the reinstatement of the workers and payment to
them of one year backwage and
separation pay by the MDC.

^[1]
Rollo, pp. 53-61.

^[2]
Rollo, pp. 45-52.

^[3]
Daily Express, dated November 13 and 14, 1986.

^[4]
Rollo, p. 115.

^[5]
G.R. No. 82973, September 15, 1989.

^[6]
Rollo, p. 60.

^[7]
Dated February 15, 1977.

^[8]
Art. 283, Labor Code.