VICTORINO C. FRANCISCO, PETITIONER, VS. WINAI PERMSKUL, AND THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, RESPONDENTS.

An important constitutional question has been injected in this
case, which started out as an ordinary complaint for a sum of money.  The question squarely presented to the Court
is the validity of the memorandum decision authorized under Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129 in the light of Article VIII, Section 14 of the
Constitution.

On May 21, 1984,
the petitioner leased his apartment in Makati
to the private respondent for a period of one year for the stipulated rental of
P3,000.00 a month. 
Pursuant to the lease contract, the private respondent deposited with the petitioner the amount of
P9,000.00 to answer for unpaid rentals or any damage
to the leased premises except when caused by reasonable wear and tear.  On May 31, 1985, the private respondent vacated the
property.  He thereafter requested the
refund of his deposit minus the sum of P1,000.00,
representing the rental for the additional ten days of his occupancy after the
expiration of the lease.  The petitioner
rejected this request.  He said the
lessee still owed him for other charges, including the electricity and water
bills and the sum of P2,500.00 for repainting of the
leased premises to restore them to their original condition.^[1]

The private respondent sued in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati.  After the
submission of position papers by the parties, a summary judgment was rendered
on October 11, 1985,
sustaining the complainant and holding that
the repainting was not chargeable to
him.  The defendant was ordered to pay
the plaintiff the amount of P7,750.00, representing
the balance of the deposit after deducting the water and electricity
charges.  The plaintiff was also awarded
the sum of P1,250.00 as attorney’s fees, plus the costs.^[2]

This decision was appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Makati and was affirmed by Judge Jose C. de la Rama on January
14, 1987.  This was done in a
memorandum decision reading in full as follows:

MEMORANDUM DECISION

After a careful and thorough perusal, evaluation and study of the
records of this case, this Court hereby adopts by reference the findings of
fact and conclusions of law contained in the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila, Branch 63
and finds that there is no cogent reason to disturb the same.

WHEREFORE, judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed in toto.^[3]

When the defendant went to the Court of Appeals, his petition for
review was denied on September 29, 1987, as so too was his motion for
reconsideration, on December 1, 1987.^[4]
He is now before us to fault the respondent court, principally for sustaining the memorandum decision of the
regional trial court.  His contention is
that it violates Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution.

This provision reads as
follows:

Sec. 14. 
No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.

No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision
of the court shall be refused due course or denied without stating the legal
basis therefor.

Except for the second paragraph, which was introduced only in the present charter, Section 14 has
been in force since the Constitution of
1935.  The provision was recast in
affirmative terms in the 1973 Constitution but has been virtually restored to
its original form in the Constitution
of 1987, to apply to all courts, including the municipal courts.  The purpose has always been the same, viz.,
to inform the person reading the decision, and especially the parties, of how
it was reached by the court after consideration of the pertinent facts and
examination of the applicable laws.

The parties are entitled to no less than this explanation if only
to assure them that the court rendering the decision actually studied the case
before pronouncing its judgment.  But
there are more substantial reasons.  For
one thing, the losing party must be given an opportunity to analyze the
decision so that, if permitted, he may elevate what he may consider its errors
for review by a higher tribunal.  For
another, the decision, if well-presented and reasoned, may convince the losing
party of its merits and persuade
it to accept the verdict in good grace instead of prolonging the litigation
with a useless appeal.  A third reason is
that decisions with a full exposition of the facts and the law on which they
are based, especially those coming from the Supreme Court, will constitute a
valuable body of case law that can
serve as useful references and even as precedents in the resolution of future
controversies.  As the Court said in
Rosales v. Court of First Instance:^[5]

Precedents are helpful in deciding cases when they are on all fours
or at least substantially identical with previous litigations.  Argumentum a simili valet in lege.  Earlier decisions are guideposts that can
lead us in the right direction as we tread
the highways and byways of the law in the search
for truth and justice.  These
pronouncements represent the wisdom of the past.  They are the voice of vanished judges talking
to the future.  Except where there is a need to reverse them because of an emergent viewpoint or an altered
situation, they urge us strongly that, indeed, the trodden path is best.

According to the petitioner, the memorandum decision rendered by
the regional trial court should
be revoked for non-compliance with the above-quoted constitutional mandate.  He asks that the case be remanded to the regional trial court for a
full-blown hearing on the merits, to be followed by a decision stating therein clearly and distinctly the facts
and the law on which it is based.  For
his part, the private respondent demurs.  He justifies the memorandum decision as
authorized by B.P. Blg. 129 and invokes the ruling of
this Court in Romero v. Court of Appeals,^[6] which sustained the said law.

Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129 reads as follows:

Sec. 40. 
Form of decision in appealed cases. – Every decision or final
resolution of a court in appealed cases shall clearly and distinctly state the findings of fact
and the conclusions of law on which it is based which may be contained in the
decision or final resolution itself, or adopted by reference from those set forth
in the decision, order or resolution appealed from.

The above section was applied in the Romero case, together with a
similar rule embodied in Section 18 of P.D. No. 946, providing that:

All cases of the Court of Agrarian Relations now pending before the
Court of Appeals shall remain in the Division to which they have been assigned,
and shall be decided within sixty (60) days from the effectivity
of this Decree; Provided, however, That
if the decision or order be an affirmance in toto of the dispositive
conclusion of the judgment appealed from, then the Court of Appeals may,
instead of rendering an extended opinion, indicate clearly the trial court’s
findings of fact and pronouncements of law which have been adopted as basis for
the affirmance.

In the said case, Justice Jose Y. Feria, speaking for a
unanimous Court, declared:

As previously stated, the decision of the Court of Agrarian
Relations consisted of thirteen pages, single space.  The above-quoted decision of the respondent
Court of Appeals consists of four pages, three of which contains verbatim the dispositive portion of the decision appealed from.  The remaining page is devoted to an
explanation of why “for judicial convenience and expediency, therefore, We
hereby adopt, by way of reference, the findings of facts and conclusions of the
court a quo spread in its decision, as integral part of this Our decision.” The said decision
may be considered as substantial compliance with the above-quoted provisions in
Section 18 of P.D. No. 946 and Section 40 of B.P. Blg.
129.

Nevertheless, he was quick to add a tenable misgiving and to
express the following reservation:

The authority given the appellate court to adopt by reference the
findings of fact and conclusions of law from those set forth in the appealed
decisions should be exercised with caution and prudence, because the tendency
would be to follow the line of least resistance by just adopting the findings and conclusions of the lower court
without thoroughly studying the appealed case.

This caveat was necessary because, as he correctly
observed:

It cannot be too strongly emphasized that just as important as the
intrinsic validity of a decision is the perception by the parties-litigants that
they have been accorded a fair
opportunity to be heard by a fair and responsible magistrate before judgment is
rendered.  It is this perception, coupled with a clear
conscience, which enables the members of the judiciary to discharge the awesome
responsibility of sitting in judgment on their fellowmen.

There is no question that
the purpose of the law in
authorizing the memorandum decision is to expedite the termination of
litigations for the benefit of the parties as well as the courts themselves.

Concerned with the mounting problem of delay in the
administration of justice, the Constitution now contains a number of provisions
aimed at correcting this serious difficulty that has caused much disaffection
among the people.  Thus, Section 16 of the Bill of Rights reiterates the original provision in the 1973
Constitution guaranteeing to all persons “the right to a speedy
disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial or
administrative bodies.” Section 14(2) of the same Article III retains the rule
that the accused shall be entitled to a trial that shall not only be public and
impartial but also speedy.  In Article VIII, Section 5(3), the Supreme Court is expressly permitted to
temporarily assign a judge from one station to another when the public
interest so requires, as when there is a necessity for a less occupied judge to help a busier
colleague dispose of his cases.  In
paragraph 5 of the same section, it is stressed that the rules of court to be
promulgated by the Supreme Court “shall provide a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases.” In Section 15
of the same article, maximum periods
are prescribed for the decision or resolution of cases, to wit, twenty-four
months in the case of Supreme Court and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court,
twelve months for all lower collegiate courts and three months for all other
lower courts.

The courts of justice are really hard put at coping with the
tremendous number of cases in their dockets which, to make matters worse, continues
to grow by the day despite the efforts being taken to reduce it.  In the Supreme Court alone, an average of 400
cases is received every month as against the average of 300 cases disposed of
during the same month, leaving a difference of 100 cases monthly that is added
to some 5,000 still unresolved cases that have accumulated during the last two
decades or so.  At this rate, the backlog will increase
by 1,200 cases every year on top of the earlier balance, much of which, despite
its age, is still viable and have still to be resolved.  Considering that the Court spends four days
of the week for studying and deliberating on these cases in its en banc and
division sessions, one can appreciate the limited time allowed its members for
the actual writing of its decisions.  (This particular decision, while extended,
happens fortunately to be less complicated than many of the other cases
submitted to it, which require more time to write, not to mention the
antecedent research that may have to be made.)

Viewed in the light of these practical considerations, the
memorandum decision can be welcomed indeed as an acceptable method of dealing
expeditiously with the case load of the courts of justice.  But expediency alone, no matter how
compelling, cannot excuse non-compliance with the Constitution; or to put it
more familiarly, the end does not justify the means.  It is plain
that if Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129 is
unconstitutional, it must be struck down.

In the case at bar, we find that a judgment was made by the
metropolitan trial court in compliance with the rule on summary procedure.  The decision consisted of three typewritten
pages, single space, and stated clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on
which it was based.  It was a concise and
well-written decision, and a correct one to boot, for which Judge Paciano B. Balita is to be
commended.

The problem, though, as the petitioner sees it, is that in affirming this judgment, the regional
trial court of Makati rendered a mere memorandum
decision that simply adopted by reference the findings of fact and law made by
Judge Balita and then concluded, without saying more,
that “there (was) no cogent reason to disturb the same.” It is
claimed that as Judge de la Rama did not make his own
statement of the facts and the law as required by the Constitution, his
memorandum decision was a total nullity. 
Worse, when the appeal was taken to the respondent court, what it
reviewed was not the memorandum decision of the regional trial court but the
decision rendered by the metropolitan trial court which, legally speaking, was not before the appellate court.

It is not really correct to say that the Court of Appeals did not
review the memorandum decision of the regional trial court which was the
subject of the petition for review.  A
reading of its own decision will show that it dealt extensively with the
memorandum decision and discussed it at some length in the light of the
observations – and reservations – of this Court in the Romero case.  Moreover, in reviewing the decision of the metropolitan trial court, the Court of
Appeals was actually reviewing the decision of the regional trial court, which
had incorporated by reference the earlier decision rendered by Judge Balita.

The question, of course, is whether such incorporation by
reference was a valid act that effectively elevated the decision of the
metropolitan trial court for examination by the Court of Appeals.

To be fair, let it be said that when Judge de la Rama availed himself of the convenience offered by Section
40 of B.P. Blg. 129, he was only acting in accordance
with the ruling announced in Romero permitting the use of the memorandum decision. 
It must also be observed that even if the respondent court appeared to
be partial to the reservation rather than the rule in the said case, it
nevertheless had the duty – which it discharged – to abide by the doctrine
announced therein by the highest tribunal of the land.  The respondent court could not have acted
otherwise.

This Court is not hampered by such inhibitions.  As we may re-examine our own rulings and
modify or reverse them whenever warranted, we take a second look at the
memorandum decision and the Romero case and test them on the touchstone of the
Constitution.

The law does not define the memorandum decision and simply
suggests that the court may adopt by reference the findings of fact and the
conclusions of law stated in the decision, order or resolution on appeal before
it.  No particular form is prescribed; the conditions for its
use are not indicated.  In fact, B.P. Blg. 129 does not even employ the term “memorandum
decision” in Section 40 or elsewhere in the rest of the statute.  This phrase appears to have been introduced
in this jurisdiction not by that law but by Section 24 of the Interim Rules and
Guidelines, reading as follows:

Sec. 24. 
Memorandum decisions.  – The judgment or final resolution of a court
in appealed cases may adopt by reference the findings of fact and conclusions
of law contained in the decision or
final order appealed from.

It is clear that where the decision of the appellate court
actually reproduces the findings of fact or the conclusions of law of the court
below, it is not a memorandum decision as envisioned in the above provision.  The distinctive features of the memorandum
decision are, first, it is rendered by an appellate court, and second, it
incorporates by reference the findings of fact or the conclusions of law contained
in the decision, order or ruling under review. 
Most likely, the purpose is to affirm the decision, although it is not
impossible that the approval of the findings of fact by the lower court may lead to a different conclusion of law by the
higher court.  At any rate, the reason
for allowing the incorporation by reference is evidently to avoid the cumbersome
reproduction of the decision of the lower court, or portions thereof, in
the decision of the higher
court.  The idea is to avoid having to
repeat in the body of the latter decision the findings or conclusions of the
lower court since they are being approved or adopted anyway.

Parenthetically, the memorandum decision is also allowed in the United
States, but its form (at least) differs from
the one under consideration in this case.  Such a
decision is rendered in that country upon a previous determination by the judge that
there is no need for a published opinion and that it will have no precedential effect. 
The judgment is usually limited to the dispositive
portion but a
memorandum is attached containing a brief statement of the facts and the law
involved, mainly for the information of the parties to the case.

When a law is questioned before the Court, we employ the
presumption in favor of its constitutionality. 
As we said in Peralta v. Commission of Elections, “to justify the
nullification of a law, there must be a ‘clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative implication.'”^[7]
Courts will bend over backward to sustain that presumption.  In case of doubt, it is the duty of the
judiciary to exert every effort to prevent the invalidation of the law and the
nullification of the will of the legislature that enacted it and the executive
that approved it.  This norm is based on
a becoming respect that the judiciary is expected to accord the political
departments of the government which, it must be assumed in fairness, thoroughly
studied the measure under challenge and assured themselves of its
constitutionality before agreeing to enact it.

The Court has deliberated extensively on the challenge posed
against the memorandum decision as now authorized by law.  Taking into account the salutary purpose for
which it is allowed, and bearing in mind the above-discussed restraint we must
observe when a law is challenged before us, we have come to the conclusion that
Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129, as we shall interpret it here, is not
unconstitutional.

What is questioned about the law is the permission it gives for
the appellate court to merely adopt by reference in its own decision the
judgment of the lower court on appeal. 
It is easy to understand that this device may feed the suspicion feared
by Justice Feria that the court has not given the
appeal the attention it deserved and thus deprived the parties of due
process.  True or not, this impression is likely to undermine popular faith
in the judiciary as an impartial forum which hears before it decides and bases
its decision on the established facts and the applicable law.

No less objectionable is the inconvenience
involved in having to search for the decision referred to, which, having been incorporated
by reference only, does not have to be
attached to the memorandum decision.  The Court had occasion earlier
to complain about this difficulty in the case of Gindoy
v. Tapucar,^[8] where we said:

x x x True it
is that the Court of First Instance may adopt in toto either expressly or
impliedly the findings and conclusions of the inferior court, and as a rule, such adoption would amount
to a substantial compliance with the
constitutional mandate discussed herein, but where, as in this case, the specific
arguments presented against the decision of the inferior court are of such
nature that a blanket affirmance of said decision
does not in fact adequately dispose of the strictures against it, it is but
proper, if only to facilitate the action to be taken by the appellate court on
the petition for review, that the concrete bases of the impugned decision
should appear on its face, instead of the appellate court having to dig into
the records to find out how the inferior court resolved the issues of the case.

As to this problem, the Solicitor General correctly points out
that it does not exist in the
case at bar because the decision of the Court of Appeals extensively quoted
from the decision of the metropolitan trial court.  Although
only incorporated by reference in the memorandum decision of the regional trial
court, Judge Balita’s decision was nevertheless
available to the Court of Appeals.  It is
this circumstance, or even happenstance, if you will, that has validated the
memorandum decision challenged in this case and spared it from constitutional
infirmity.

That same circumstance is what will move us now to lay down the
following requirement, as a condition for the proper application of Section 40
of B.P. Blg. 129. 
The memorandum decision, to be
valid, cannot incorporate the findings of fact and the conclusions of law of
the lower court only by remote reference, which is to say that the
challenged decision is not easily and immediately available to the person
reading the memorandum decision.  For the incorporation by reference to be
allowed, it must provide for direct access to the facts and the law
being adopted, which must be contained in a statement attached to the said decision.  In other words, the memorandum decision
authorized under Section 40 of B.P Blg. 129 should
actually embody the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the lower court
in an annex attached to and made an indispensable part of the decision.

It is expected that this requirement will allay the suspicion
that no study was made of the decision of the lower court and that its decision
was merely affirmed without a proper examination of the facts and the law on
which it was based.  The proximity
at least of the annexed statement should suggest that such an examination has
been undertaken.  It is, of course, also
understood that the decision being adopted should, to begin with, comply with
Article VIII, Section 14 as no amount of incorporation or adoption will rectify its violation.

The Court finds it necessary to emphasize that the memorandum
decision should be sparingly used lest it become an addictive excuse for
judicial sloth.  It is an additional
condition for its validity that this kind of decision may be resorted to only
in cases where the facts are in the
main accepted by both parties or easily determinable by the judge and there are
no doctrinal complications involved that will require an extended discussion of
the laws involved.  The memorandum
decision may be employed in simple litigations only, such as ordinary
collection cases, where the appeal is obviously groundless and deserves no more
than the time needed to dismiss it.

Despite the convenience afforded by the memorandum decision, it
is still desirable that the appellate judge exert some effort in restating in
his own words the findings of fact of the lower court and presenting his own
interpretation of the law instead of merely parroting the language of the court a
quo as if he cannot do any better. 
There must be less intellectual indolence and more pride of authorship
in the writing of a decision, especially if it comes from an appellate court.

It ill becomes an appellate judge to write his rulings with a
pair of scissors and a pot of paste as if he were a mere researcher.  He is an innovator, not an echo.  The case usually becomes progressively
simpler as it passes through the various levels of appeal and many issues
become unimportant or moot and drop along the way.  The appellate judge should prune the
cluttered record to make the issues clearer.  He cannot usually do this by simply mimicking
the lower court.  He must use his own
perceptiveness in unraveling the rollo
and his own discernment in discovering the law. 
No less importantly, he must use his own language in laying down his
judgment.  And in doing so, he should
also guard against torpidity lest his pronouncements excite no more
fascination than a technical tract on the values of horse manure as a
fertilizer.  A little style will help liven the opinion trapped in the tortuous lexicon of the law
with all its whereases and wherefores.  A judicial decision does not have to be a bore.

The interpretation we make today will not apply retroactively to
the memorandum decision rendered by the regional trial court in the case at
bar, or to the decision of the respondent court affirming such decision on the
strength of Romero v. Court of Appeals. 
As earlier observed, there was substantial compliance with Section 40
because of the direct availability and actual review of the decision of Judge Balita
incorporated by reference in the memorandum decision of Judge de la Rama.  The memorandum
decision as then understood under the Romero decision was a valid act at the
time it was rendered by Judge de la Rama and produced
binding legal effect.  We also affirm the
finding of the respondent court that the summary judgment without a formal
trial was in accord with the Rule on Summary Procedure and that the award of
attorney’s fees is not improper.

Henceforth, all memorandum decisions shall comply with the requirements
herein set forth both as to the form prescribed and the occasions when they may
be rendered.  Any deviation will summon
the strict enforcement of Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution and
strike down the flawed judgment as a lawless disobedience.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the
petitioner.  This decision is immediately
executory.  It
is so ordered.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa,
Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras,
Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., no part.

^[1] Rollo, pp. 33-34.

^[2] Ibid., pp. 37-39.

^[3] Id.,
p. 46.

^[4] Id., pp. 58-66, 67.  By
Herrera, O., J., ponente, and Luciano and Torres, JJ.,
concurring.

^[5] G.R. No. 62577, September 21, 1987.

^[6] 147 SCRA 183.

^[7] 82 SCRA 30.

^[8] 75 SCRA 31.