THE UNITED STATES, COMPLAINANT AND APPELLANT, VS. RAMON GOMEZ RICOY, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.
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United States versus Ricoy
The Case
This is a criminal case from the early years of American rule in the Philippines. The United States, as complainant and appellant, prosecuted Ramon Gomez Ricoy for the crime of estafa, that is, swindling, under the old Spanish Penal Code. The case matters to a reviewee for two reasons. First, it is a foundational ruling on the right of an accused to a full and complete trial, because the Court of First Instance cut the trial short and acquitted the accused before the defense had presented a single witness. Second, the dissenting opinion is a compact lesson on gambling contracts, the nullity of obligations born of a crime, and the damage element in estafa. The Supreme Court did not decide guilt or innocence. It decided only that the acquittal was premature.
Procedural History
The accused was charged by information with the crime of estafa as defined and punished by articles 534 and 535, paragraph 9, of the Penal Code. The case went to trial in the Court of First Instance. The prosecution presented its evidence. On frequent occasions during the taking of that testimony, the defense was not allowed to introduce testimony in its behalf, the matter being postponed to the proper time. Before the defense could offer or introduce any testimony, and before the trial was terminated on behalf of either the prosecution or the defense, the trial court rendered a judgment of acquittal. The United States, as complainant, appealed that judgment to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, through Chief Justice Arellano, set aside the acquittal and remanded the case. Justice Willard dissented, and Justice Torres was disqualified.
Facts
In January 1900, chips and stub tickets were used for gambling games at the Spanish Casino, including monte. The chips were made of mother of pearl and were worth from 5 to 100 pesos each, while the checks represented 1,000 pesos each. They circulated as money in the Casino and at times on the Escolta, and they belonged to the Casino, to be exchanged for cash therein. Mr. Lobaton was in charge of the chips, and Ricoy, the accused, was the inspector of the games. Lobaton delivered no chips to anyone without previous orders from Ricoy, and Ricoy also signed the stub tickets used in the Casino.
At two o'clock in the afternoon of January 3, 1900, a game of monte began at the Casino and ended at seven o'clock on the morning of the fourth. By the custom observed that month, the Casino and one of the players alternated as bankers. That night Mr. Angeles was banker and was therefore entitled to all the profits of the game. Several players took part, including Ricoy himself, Sabas del Rosario, and Mapua. At the request of Ricoy and the others, Don Joaquin Lafont joined, receiving chips from Lobaton and distributing them to those at the table. Players gave their I.O.U.'s to Lobaton, who kept the account until liquidation. Ricoy gave an I.O.U. to Lafont every time he received 5,000 pesos from him.
At the end of the game a liquidation was had among all the players, on the basis of the due bills Lobaton had received from each player and his note of delivery. The result was that Angeles, the banker, had won chips and stub tickets worth 39,300 pesos. The witnesses testified that Angeles delivered all the chips and tickets to Ricoy, and that Ricoy immediately told Lobaton to draw up a note for the amount. Lobaton did so, and Ricoy signed the note and delivered it to Angeles. It does not appear whether Ricoy signed as inspector or in his individual capacity. On the eighth, Ricoy asked Angeles if he had brought the note. Angeles handed it to him, and the two went into another room, with no eyewitnesses to what occurred. Angeles returned carrying a letter from Ricoy which read, in substance, that Ricoy had long wanted to fool an Indian and took this occasion to fool him. Ricoy then disappeared. No attempt was made to recover the note.
Issues
- Whether or not the trial court erred in rendering a judgment of acquittal before the trial was terminated and before the defense had been given the opportunity to present its evidence.
- Whether or not the accused was entitled to a full and complete trial before any judgment of acquittal could be rendered in his favor.
Applicable Provisions
The information charged the crime of estafa under articles 534 and 535, paragraph 9, of the Penal Code, which the decision identifies as the provisions defining and punishing the offense charged:
The record contains an information charging the accused with the crime of estafa as defined and punished by articles 534 and 535, paragraph 9, of the Penal Code.
These are the provisions under which the accused stood charged, and they frame the question of whether the act charged constituted a crime at all.
The dissenting opinion quotes article 343 of the Penal Code on gaming houses:
The bankers and proprietors of houses where games of chance, stakes, or hazard are played shall be punished with the penalty.
The dissent uses this to show that the monte game was itself a crime, which in turn affects the enforceability of any obligation arising from it.
The dissenting opinion also quotes article 1305 of the Civil Code on contracts whose nullity arises from an illegal consideration or object:
When the nullity arises from the illegality of the consideration or the object of the contract, if the fact constitutes a crime or misdemeanor common to both contracting parties, they shall have no action against each other, and proceedings shall be instituted against them, and, furthermore, the things or sum which may have been the object of the contract shall be applied as prescribed in the Penal Code with regard to the goods or instruments of the crime or misdemeanor.
This is the dissent's core ground: the note sprang from a criminal game common to both parties, so neither could sue on it.
Ruling
On the first issue, the Court held that the act charged, as it appears to have been committed, constitutes prima facie a crime. The decision of inculpability and the judgment of acquittal were therefore premature, because the trial had not been terminated on behalf of the prosecution or the defense. The defense had not been able to offer or introduce any testimony, and on frequent occasions during the prosecution's evidence the defense was not allowed to introduce testimony in its behalf, which was postponed to the proper time.
On the second issue, the Court held that the accused was entitled to a full and complete trial. Because that right had been denied, the judgment of acquittal rendered by the Court of First Instance had to be set aside and the case remanded, with directions to continue from the point at which it was interrupted by the decision, without retaking the testimony already received, which, insofar as relevant and competent, may be considered. The evidence of the accused and any additional evidence either party may be entitled to introduce would then be taken in the manner prescribed by law.
Justice Willard dissented. In his view the evidence showed conclusively that the defendant was not guilty of estafa, and the acquittal should be affirmed. Monte was played habitually at the Casino, and the practice of letting a member alternate with the Casino as banker made the Casino a gaming house under article 343. The game was a crime, and Angeles, Ricoy, and the Casino were all principals in it. Any obligation arising from that game was therefore tainted. Under article 1305, where the nullity arises from an illegality constituting a crime common to both contracting parties, they have no action against each other. The note represented no enforceable obligation, and its destruction could not injure Angeles, for it had no value extrinsic or intrinsic. Since no damage resulted, there could be no estafa. The dissent added that Ricoy might be convicted under article 565 of the Penal Code for the burning or destruction of papers, but clearly not for estafa.
Doctrine
An accused is entitled to a full and complete trial. A judgment of acquittal rendered before the trial is terminated, and before the defense has been given the opportunity to present its evidence, is premature and will be set aside, with the case remanded for continuation from the point of interruption. The testimony already taken, insofar as relevant and competent, may be considered without being retaken.
Where the evidence shows that the act charged constitutes prima facie a crime, the trial court cannot short-circuit the proceedings by acquitting the accused mid-trial. The orderly course is to hear both sides.
As the dissent teaches, obligations arising from illegal gambling are governed by article 1305 of the Civil Code. Where the nullity arises from the illegality of the consideration or object, and the fact constitutes a crime common to both contracting parties, they have no action against each other. In estafa, damage is an essential element. If the paper destroyed represented no enforceable obligation and had no value extrinsic or intrinsic, its destruction causes no damage, and no estafa can be committed.
Disposition
The Supreme Court set aside the judgment of acquittal and remanded the case to the Court of First Instance for continuation of the trial from the point at which it was interrupted, without retaking the testimony already received.
Remember This
Memorize this line: an accused is entitled to a full and complete trial, and an acquittal rendered before the defense has been heard is premature. Examiners use this case to test the right to a complete trial and, through the dissent, the damage element in estafa and the unenforceability of obligations born of illegal gambling.