LEONARDO B. LUCENA, PETITIONER, VS. PAN-TRADE, INC. AND/OR MR. RAMON TY HOAN CHAY, AND NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, RESPONDENTS.

The decisions of the National Labor Relations Commission are reviewable by this Court only in a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which means that we can reverse them only
upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction on the part of the respondent agency.  Absent such a showing, even this Court is
bound by such decisions as representing a correct appreciation of the pertinent
laws by the entity entrusted to enforce them.

This rule  is predicated on the well-settled
principle that this Court is not a trier of
facts and on the respect to be accorded the determinations made by
administrative bodies in general on matters falling within their respective
fields of specialization.  This respect is based in turn on a
recognition of the expertise that is supposed to be initially possessed, or at
least eventually developed, by these administrative bodies in the solution of
the problems addressed to them under the relevant law.

With these considerations in mind, the Court will first affirm
such of the factual findings of the respondent NLRC as are supported by the
evidence of record.  We accept that the
petitioner was illegally dismissed. 
It has been satisfactorily shown that as a result of a
disagreement with the cashier of Pan Trade, Inc., who is a niece of
the President, Ramon Ty Hoan
Chay, the latter asked Leonardo B. Lucena to resign as salesman of the said company.  That was sometime in November of 1983.  The petitioner refused to do so and continued
reporting for work and in fact was able to make, several sales afterwards.  But all of them were disapproved by Ty, resulting in the petitioner’s loss of the corresponding commissions.  In the end, his name was removed from the
payroll effective 1 January 1984.^[1]

About a year later, Lucena sued Pan Trade,
Inc. and Ty for illegal dismissal and demanded
reinstatement with back wages.  Lucena also alleged that
as a result of his dismissal, he was reduced to penury and had to
subsist on loans from relatives and
friends.  His children had to stop
schooling.  He himself was unable to get
another employment because of Ty’s negative influence
and it was only later that he was hired by another company, but only as a
free-lance salesman.  For all this, he claimed moral damages.^[2]

The labor arbiter ruled in his favor, and ordered as follows:

WHEREFORE, respondents PAN-TRADE, INC. and Mr. RAMON TY HOAN CHAY,
are hereby ordered to reinstate complainant to his former position with full
back wages without loss of seniority rights and benefits including monthly commissions of P8,839.31 until actually
reinstated and to pay him P50,000.00 as moral damages.^[3]

On appeal, however, the decision was modified by the National
Labor Relations Commission, which held:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, the decision
appealed from is hereby MODIFIED, ordering the respondents to pay complainant
separation pay equivalent to one month’s salary for every year of service,
computed on the basis of his last month salary, a fraction of at least six (6)
months to be considered as one
whole year.^[4]

Lucena came to this Court asking for
reversal of the decision of the NLRC and the revival of the earlier decision of
the labor arbiter.  After considering his
petition, we dismissed the same for failure to show that the NLRC had committed
grave abuse of discretion in rendering the challenged decision.^[5]
The petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration on which comments from
both the Solicitor General and the respondent NLRC were submitted as
required.  We shall now resolve this
motion.

We hold first that the complaint for illegal dismissal which the
petitioner filed on 21 November 1984
was not tardy, as suggested by the private respondents.  Between that date and his actual separation
on 1 January 1984, only a
period of less than eleven months had intervened.  It may be that during that interregnum the
petitioner was deliberating on what course to take or perhaps even hoping for
some development that would reconcile him with his former employer.  In any event, neither prescription, nor laches had operated against him when, after that period, he
decided to initiate his complaint.

The petitioner contends that after his illegal dismissal, he
continued representing the respondent company and succeeded in negotiating
sales with the Metro Manila Commission, the U.P. Institute of Physics, and the
Land Bank.  These were all disapproved by
Ty, however, resulting in loss of substantial
commissions that the petitioner could otherwise have collected.  His claim is that the disapprovals were
intended to spite him.

We find this difficult to accept. 
The respondent company is in the business of selling for profit, not for
the benefit solely of its salesmen.  It
is inconceivable that it will refuse any purchase simply to prevent a salesman
from earning his commission and in the process forfeit its own profits.  That is not how a business operates.  We therefore accept the private respondents
more believable contention that the sales were disapproved because certain of
its policy conditions, particularly with respect to credit and collection, were
not complied with.  As for the
commissions due the petitioner for the servicing of the equipment leased to the
GSIS, we are also satisfied with the explanation that such servicing had been
terminated and with it the petitioner’s commission.

It is curious that while faulting the private respondents for
their unfair dealings with him, the petitioner nevertheless insists that he
should be reinstated.  The NLRC had ruled that he should instead be
given separation pay, but he disagrees, protesting that there are no strained
relations between him and the private respondents.  It may be that as far as he is concerned, he has no
ill will toward the company or Ty and is eager to resume
his employment.  The trouble is that his
employers are not similarly disposed. 
They will not have anything more to do with him and feel that his return
will have a disruptive influence in the company.

We agree with the private respondents.  As employers, it is their prerogative to
maintain the proper atmosphere in the office. 
Indeed, the decision of the NLRC was
conducive to industrial peace as it would discontinue the irritations that are
not unlikely to recur where an unwanted employee has to be tolerated by the
reluctant employer.  Imposing the
petitioner’s position in the company where he is no longer welcome would only poison their relations to their mutual prejudice.

The petitioner’s situation is different from the employees
involved in the case of City Service Corporation Workers Union v. City Service
Corporation,^[6]
for their relations with the employer as its janitors were more or less impersonal.  In the petitioner’s case, his dealings with
the company and Ty are more direct and involve a higher
degree of trust than the relations of janitors with management.  Laborers in general perform mainly manual
functions and the trust required is in their competence to perform such
functions.  The position of salesman, on
the other hand, requires a more personal relationship with management that once
impaired is likely to prejudice the operations of the company.

It is really hard to understand why the petitioner should want to
stay in a company that has rejected him, as if there were no other options
available to him and no other employment he could find or want.  He is like a one-woman man with an impossible
love.  Although there is much to say
about his loyalty, his attitude becomes especially perplexing when viewed in
the light of the manner of his dismissal by the private respondents.

That dismissal was undoubtedly arbitrary.  Because of a simple disagreement with his niece,
Ty immediately demanded the petitioner’s resignation
on pain of outright dismissal.  The cause
of the disagreement was not even serious and involved only the manner of
offsetting the petitioner’s obligations
with the company against his commissions. 
The record does not indicate the details of the quarrel or show that the
petitioner was disrespectful or used obscene language or employed physical
force against the cashier.  There, is no showing
of moral turpitude or corruption or
other improper conduct.  Even the private
respondents do not make any such allegations. 
Yet, as a result of their misunderstanding, Ty
was quick to impose punishment by demanding the petitioner’s immediate
resignation.  When the petitioner refused
to resign, he was dropped from the payroll without any formal previous written
notice.

The private respondents now claim that the petitioner had not
been dismissed but had abandoned his work by obtaining employment in a rival
company.  This is obviously untrue.  The petitioner had been with the company for
all of five years when he was separated and was making good in his work.  There was no reason why he should leave his employment.  In fact, he still wants to be reinstated even now. As
for hit working with another company, this was a survival measure he had to
take precisely because of his dismissal by the private respondents.  His employment with E.Y. Enterprises was from
1 March 1984
to 31 July 1985,
and only as a free-lance salesman, according to the certification of its
president and general manager.  Lucena was dismissed by the private respondents effective 1 January
1984.

In view of these circumstances, we are reconsidering our original
ruling sustaining the NLRC in holding that the petitioner is not entitled to moral damages.  We now hold that he is, because Ty
acted in an oppressive manner in depriving him of his employment for the
relatively minor cause of quarreling with the cashier, who happened to be his
niece.  This is a clear case of relatives
ganging up on a
subordinate and punishing him with dismissal because he had the temerity
to disagree with them.

The days when the employer had the destiny and livelihood of his
employee in the palm of his hand are over, and they will not be allowed to
return in this enlightened age.

The petitioner avers that as a result of his dismissal, his
finances were suddenly dislocated and his family had to subsist on loans from
relatives and friends.  His children had
to stop their studies.  He also claims
that his efforts to obtain other employment were frustrated by Ty, who had a great deal of influence among his
colleagues in the business.  He blames
all these reverses on the private respondents and so justifies the original
award of moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00.

While agreeing that damages are due him, we do not believe that
the whole amount is warranted as his own claims of injury are not entirely
credible.  At least he has not proved
them to our satisfaction.  It may be that
he was discomfited for a time and had to rely on the help of others, but he
cannot blame the private respondents if he is unable to recover for the rest of his life, as he seems to be
suggesting.  As for his allegation that Ty has blocked his employment elsewhere, that is a serious
charge that must be established with definite proof and not mere wounded
averments.  For these reasons, exercising
our sound discretion, we hereby, award moral damages to the petitioner but in
the reduced amount of P25,000.00.

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is partially
GRANTED with the award of moral damages to the petitioner in the amount of
P25,000.00.  The rest of the challenged
decision is AFFIRMED, without any pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, (Chairman), Gancayco, Griño-Aquino, and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

^[1] Rollo, p. 47.

^[2] Ibid., pp. 5-6.

^[3] Id.,
p. 45.

^[4] Id.,
p. 51.

^[5] Rollo, pp. 46-51.

^[6] 135 SCRA 564.