GRACIA R. JOVEN, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MANUEL A. PATRON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE RTC, BRANCH 59, LUCENA CITY, ROBERTO PAGUIA & FERNANDO LASALA…

The petitioner was the registered owner of three parcels of land
which she mortgaged in favor of the Development Bank of the Philippines. Upon the extrajudicial foreclosure of the
mortgage due to her failure to pay her loan, the properties were sold at public
auction to DBP as the highest
bidder. A certificate of sale was
issued and annotated on the certificate of title on November 17, 1982.

After the expiration of the redemption period, no redemption
having been made by the petitioner, DBP sold the subject properties to Roberto
Paguia, one of the herein private respondents, through a deed of sale executed
on December 17, 1985. On January 30,
1986, Paguia took possession of the properties through his representative,
Fernando Lasala, the other private respondent.

Earlier, the petitioner had filed on December 3, 1985, an action
before the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City (raffled later to Branch 55) for
the annulment of the mortgage and its foreclosure. Named as defendants were DBP and the private respondents. Later, when her application for preliminary
injunction and restraining order was denied, she lodged with the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court of Lucban-Sampaloc a
complaint against the private respondents for forcible entry with a
prayer for writ of mandatory injunction. This was docketed as Civil Case No. 155.

In a decision dated May 14, 1986, the case was dismissed for lack
of jurisdiction. But on May 29, 1986,
the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was
granted. In a resolution dated July 11, 1986,^[1] the
private respondents were ordered to: 1)
immediately restore and deliver possession of the subject properties to the
petitioner; 2) render to the petitioner an accounting of all the fruits and
products gathered from said property from the time they took possession thereof
until they vacate the same; and 3) reimburse the petitioner the total cost of
such accounting.

This resolution was reversed on appeal by the Regional Trial
Court of Lucena City, Branch 59,^[2] which
held that the court a quo had no jurisdiction over the ejectment
case because of the issue of ownership raised therein and that, assuming such
jurisdiction, the decision had already become final and executory when the
resolution dated July 11, 1986, was rendered. The petitioner elevated the case to the respondent Court of Appeals,
which sustained the assailed decision in toto.^[3]

She is now before us in this petition for review on certiorari,
contending that the Municipal Circuit Trial Court had jurisdiction over the
ejectment case and that the private respondents were guilty of forcible entry
on the subject premises for occupying the same without judicial authorization.

The petition has merit:

The respondents argue that the Municipal Circuit Trial Court had
no jurisdiction over the action for forcible entry on the principal ground that
a question of ownership was involved therein. This view does not jibe with the following observations from Chief
Justice Moran based on a consistent line of decisions from this Court:^[4]

It would be a mistake to suppose that an action involves a question
of title merely because the plaintiff may allege in his complaint that he is
the owner of the land. Just as the
plaintiff may introduce proof of his title in order to show the character of
his (sic) prior possession, so he may allege ownership in himself as a material
and relevant fact in the case, and the insertion of such an allegation in the
complaint cannot by any possibility place the cause beyond the jurisdiction of
the magistrate’s court, provided it otherwise sufficiently appears that what
the plaintiff really seeks is the restoration of possession as against an
intruder who has seized the property within the period of one year. Much less can the defendant in such an
action defeat the jurisdiction of the magistrate’s court by setting up title in
himself. In this connection it should
be borne in mind that the factor which defeats the jurisdiction of the court of
the justice of the peace is the necessity to adjudicate the question of
title. The circumstance that proof of
title is introduced at the hearing or that a claim of ownership is made by
either or both of the parties is not material.

This ruling is embodied in Sec. 33, (2), Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,
which vests municipal courts with:

Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and
unlawful detainer; Provided, that when, in such cases, the defendant raises the
question of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be
resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership should
be resolved only to determine the issue of possession.

It is true that before the petitioner instituted the action for
forcible entry in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Lucban-Sampaloc, the case
for annulment of the mortgage and foreclosure sale, which necessarily involves
recovery of ownership, was already being litigated in the Regional Trial Court
of Lucena City. Even so, the municipal court could, pending
final adjudication of that case, exercise its jurisdiction to determine the
right of possession (only) over the subject properties in the ejectment case.

The private respondents also contend that the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court had no jurisdiction over the complaint for forcible entry because: a) under Section 19 par. (2) of BP 129, as
amended, the Regional Trial Court has exclusive original jurisdiction over all
civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property or
any interest therein; and b) under Section 1, par. A (1) of the Rule on Summary
Procedure, cases of forcible entry and detainer involving the question of
ownership are expressly excluded from the summary jurisdiction of the
municipal court.

Curiously, however, they also insist that an action for forcible
entry and unlawful detainer shall be governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure
pursuant to Section 36 of BP 129 and that the petitioner is now estopped from
assailing the applicability of that Rule.

There is no question that under Section 1, par. A (1), of the
said Rule, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts have jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and
unlawful detainer except where the question of ownership is involved or where
the damages or unpaid rentals sought to be recovered by the plaintiff exceed
P20,000.00 at the time of the filing of the complaint.*

However, it is incorrect to say that the question of ownership
was involved in the ejectment case filed by the petitioner simply because she alleged
in her complaint that she was the original owner of the subject
properties. That the petitioner
instituted a separate action for the annulment
of the mortgage is not a valid reason either for defeating the summary
remedy of ejectment. On the contrary,
it only bolsters the conclusion that the ejectment case did not involve the
question of title as this was
the subject of the annulment case before the Regional Trial Court of Lucena
City. The Rule on Summary Procedure was
clearly applicable because the ejectment case involved only the restoration of
possession of the subject land and not its ownership.

The respondent court also sustained the ruling of the Regional
Trial Court that the motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner with
the Municipal Circuit Trial Court did not stop the running of the reglementary
period to appeal because such motion was a
prohibited pleading under Section 15 (c)* of the
Rule on Summary Procedure. Its
conclusion was that the Municipal Circuit Trial Court had already lost
jurisdiction to issue the resolution dated July 11, 1986, because the decision
sought to be reconsidered had then become already final and executory.

We do not agree. The
Municipal Circuit Trial Court did not err in holding that the motion for reconsideration was not covered by the prohibition
under Section 15 (c). The motion
prohibited by this section is that
which seeks reconsideration of the judgment rendered by the court after trial
on the merits of the case.^[5] The
decision dismissing the petitioner’s ejectment case for lack of jurisdiction
was not an adjudication on the merits. Review thereof could therefore be sought by the petitioner through her
motion for reconsideration and this motion, which was not pro forma,
had the effect of suspending the running of the period to appeal.

Now, on the issue of possession:

Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118, provides
that in case of extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage, the court* may issue as a
matter of course a writ of possession in favor of the purchaser even
during the redemption period, provided that a proper motion has been filed, a bond is approved, and no third
person is involved.

Section 6 of the Act provides that where an extrajudicial sale is
made, “redemption shall be governed by the provisions of sections four
hundred and sixty-four to four hundred and sixty-six, inclusive, of the Code of
Civil Procedure, in so far as these are not inconsistent with the provisions of
this Act.”

Sections 464-466 of the Code of Civil Procedure were superseded
by Sections 25-27 and Section 31 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which in
turn were replaced by Sections 29 to 31 and Section 35 of Rule 39 of the
Revised Rules of Court.

Section 35 provides that “if no redemption be made within
twelve (12) months after the sale, the purchaser, or his assignee, is entitled
to a conveyance and the possession of property, x x x. The possession of the property shall be
given to the purchaser or last redemptioner by the same officer unless a third
party is actually holding the property adversely to the judgment debtor.”

To give effect to his right of possession, the purchaser must
invoke the aid of the courts and ask for a
writ of possession. He cannot
simply take the law into his own hands and enter the property without judicial
authorization.^[6]
We have consistently held that he need not bring a separate and independent suit for this purpose.^[7]
Nevertheless, it is essential that he ask for and be granted a writ of
possession in order that he may be legally installed in the property he has
bought.

Section 63 (b) of P.D. 1529, otherwise known as the Property
Registration Decree, requires that in case of non-redemption, the purchaser at
a foreclosure sale shall file with the Register of Deeds either a final deed of sale executed by the
person authorized by virtue of the power of attorney embodied in the deed of
mortgage or his sworn statement attesting to the fact of non-redemption. The Register of Deeds shall thereupon issue
a new certificate in favor of the purchaser after the owner’s duplicate
certificate shall have been previously delivered and canceled.

In F. David Enterprises vs. Insular Bank of Asia and America,^[8]
this Court held:

It is settled that the buyer in
a foreclosure sale becomes the absolute owner of the property purchased
if it is not redeemed during the period of one year after the registration of
the sale. As such, he is entitled to
the possession of the said property and can demand it at any time following
the consolidation of ownership in his name and the issuance to him of a new
transfer certificate of title. The
buyer can in fact demand possession of the land even during the redemption
period except that he has to post a bond in accordance with Section 7 of Act
No. 3135 as amended. No such bond is
required after the redemption period if the property is not redeemed. Possession of the land then becomes an
absolute right of the purchaser as confirmed owner. Upon proper application and proof of title, the issuance of
the writ of possession becomes a ministerial duty of the court. (Emphasis supplied).

In the case at bar, there is no showing that after the lapse of
the redemption period without the petitioner having redeemed the lands, DBP executed an affidavit of
consolidation of ownership of the subject properties. Neither has it filed with the Register of Deeds a final deed of
sale or a sworn statement attesting to the fact of non-redemption. The circumstance that the properties are
still in the name of the petitioner shows that DBP has also not yet obtained a
new certificate of title in its name. And neither does it appear that DBP,
on the basis of its purchase of the lands at the foreclosure sale, ever
secured a writ of possession to authorize its entry into the said lands.

Not having done any of these, DBP had as yet not acquired any perfected right of possession that it
could transfer to the private respondents. And as the petitioner continued in actual possession of the subject
premises, she could undoubtedly maintain an action for forcible entry against
the private respondents when, not being armed with a court order or a writ of possession, they simply
entered and took possession of the subject lands.

The only issue in an action for forcible entry is the physical or
material possession of real property, that is, possession de facto
and not possession de jure. The philosophy underlying this remedy is that irrespective of the actual
condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet possession
shall not be turned out by strong hand, violence or terror. In affording this remedy of restitution, the
statute seeks to prevent breaches of the peace and criminal disorder which
might ensue from the withdrawal of the remedy. Another purpose is to discourage those
persons who, believing themselves entitled to the possession of the
property, resort to force rather than to some appropriate action in the courts
to assert their claims.^[9]

Under Section 1, Rule 70, of the Rules of Court, there is
forcible entry when one in physical possession of a land or building is deprived of that possession by another
through force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. The words “by force, intimidation,
threat, strategy or stealth” include every situation or condition under
which one person can wrongfully enter upon real property and exclude another,
who has had prior possession thereof. To constitute the use of “force” as contemplated in the above-mentioned provision, the trespasser
does not have to institute a state of war. Nor is it even necessary
that he use violence against the person of the party in possession. The act of going on the property and
excluding the lawful possessor therefrom necessarily implies the exertion of
force over the property, and this is all that is necessary.^[10]

It is noted that
the petitioner instituted the action for annulment of mortgage on December 3,
1985, while the deed of sale in favor of the private respondent was executed on
December 17, 1985. Paguia cannot say
that when he took possession of the subject land on January 30, 1986, he was
acting in good faith. Neither can he
claim that he had no knowledge of the pendency of that litigation because he
was in fact one of the defendants in that case. In any event, the fact that the titles were still in the name of
the petitioner should have warned him of the need to ascertain the status of
the properties before he took possession of them.

The private respondents also assert that the institution of the
ejectment case resulted in the splitting of a single cause of action into two, one for the recovery of
ownership and possession and the other for recovery of possession de facto.

In Drilon vs. Gaurana,^[11] this Court held:

It is true that a party may not institute more than one suit for a
single cause of action (Rule 2, Sec. 3, Revised Rules of Court) and if two or
more complaints are brought for different parts of a single cause of action,
the filing of the first may be pleaded in abatement of the other (Rule 2, Sec.
4 Revised Rules of Court). However, a
forcible entry or unlawful detainer action has an entirely different subject
from that of an action for reconveyance of title. What is involved in a forcible entry case is merely the issue of
material possession or possession de facto; whereas in an action for
reconveyance, ownership is the issue. So much so that the pendency of an
action for reconveyance of title over the same property does not divest
the city or municipal court of its jurisdiction to try the forcible entry or
unlawful detainer case, nor will it preclude or bar execution of judgment in
the ejectment case where the only issue involved is material possession or
possession de facto (De la Cruz v. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA 520 [1984]).

While there may be identity of parties and subject matter in the
two actions, the issues involved and the reliefs prayed for are not the
same. In the annulment suit, the issue
is the validity of the mortgage and the subsequent foreclosure sale whereas the issue in the ejectment
case is whether, assuming the mortgage and foreclosure sale to be valid, the
private respondents have the right to take possession of the property. In the former case, the relief prayed for is
recovery of ownership of the subject land while in the latter it is restoration
of possession thereof to the petitioner. Hence, the municipal court had jurisdiction to try the ejectment case
while the annulment suit was being litigated in the regional trial court.

The contention that the petitioner was forum-shopping must also
be rejected. As an injunction cannot be
a substitute for the other suits
for recovery of possession,^[12] such
as an action for forcible entry
or unlawful detainer and accion publiciana, denial of the
injunction did not bar the petitioner from availing herself of the more
appropriate remedy, to wit, the action for forcible entry.^[13]

In sum, the respondent court erred when it affirmed the decision
of the Regional Trial Court declaring that the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
had no jurisdiction over the ejectment case filed by the petitioner. We find that it had.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED and the resolution of
the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Lucban, Sampaloc dated July 11, 1986, in
Civil Case No. 155 is REINSTATED. Costs
against the private respondents.

SO ORDERED.

Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, and
Bellosillo, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Decided by Judge Vivencio G. Lirio of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Lucban, Sampaloc; Rollo, p. 24.

^[2]
Thru Judge Manuel A. Patron; Rollo, p. 26.

^[3]
Penned by Kapunan, J. with Puno and Marigomen, JJ. concurring; Rollo, p. 29.

^[4]
Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1980 Ed., Vol. 3, p. 317 citing Mediran v.
Villanueva, 37 Phil. 752, 759-760. Also
Medel v. Militante, 41 Phil. 526; Villaroman v. Esmundo, 58 Phil.
937; unpub; Fuentes v. Justice of the Peace of Pila, 67 Phil. 364; Lizo v.
Carandang, 73 Phil. 649; Fabie v. Gutierrez David, 75 Phil. 736;
Baguioro v. Barrios, 77 Phil. 120; Facundo v. Santos, 77 Phil.
736; Teodoro v. Balatbat, 50 O.G. 601; Subano v. Vallecer, et
al., L-11867, March 24, 1959; Bakit v. Asperin, L-15700, April 26, 1961;
Torralba, et al. v. Rosales, et al., L-21972, April 29, 1966; Clemente v.
Court of Appeals, L-18686, Jan. 24, 1967, 19 SCRA 74.

* All types of ejectment cases are
now covered by the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure.

* Now Sec. 19 (c) of the Revised
Rule on Summary Procedure, effective Nov. 15, 1991.

^[5]
Justice Leo D. Medialdea, Outline-Rule on Summary Procedure in Special Cases
and Jurisdiction of Courts.

* The Court of First Instance
(now, Regional Trial Court) of the province or place where the property or any
part thereof is situated.

^[6]
Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1990 Ed., Vol. 1, p. 68 citing 6 Von
Tuhr, 294-299, I-II Ennecceus Kipp & Wolff 546.

^[7]
F. David Enterprises vs. Insular Bank of Asia and America, 191 SCRA 516;
1FC Service Leasing and
Acceptance, Corp. vs. Nera, 125 Phil. 595; Barrameda v. Gontang,
et al., 15 SCRA 787; Tan Soo Huat vs. Ongwico, 63 Phil. 746; Rivera vs.
CF1 of Nueva Ecija and Rupac, 61
Phil. 201.

^[8]
Supra.

^[9]
Drilon vs. Gaurana, 149 SCRA 342.

^[10]
Mediran vs. Villanueva 37 Phil. 752, cited in Moran, Comments on the
Rules of Court, Vol. 3, 1980 Ed. p. 322-323; Martin, Rules of Court in the
Philippines, 1986 Ed., Vol. 3, p. 366.

^[11]
Supra.

^[12]
PNB vs. Adil, 118 SCRA
110; Pio vs. Marcos, 56 SCRA 726; Devesa vs. Arbos, 13 Phil. 273.

^[13]
Garen vs. Pilar, 17 Phil. 138.