SAN MIGUEL VILLAGE SCHOOL, PETITIONER, VS. HONORABLE AMIR PUKUNUM D. PUNDOGAR AND CHRISTINA TRIÑO, RESPONDENTS.

San Miguel Village School versus Pundogar

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition brought by San Miguel Village School against Judge Amir Pukunum D. Pundogar and Christina Triño. The School asks the Supreme Court to annul the orders of Judge Pundogar that set aside a default judgment the School had won against Triño, a teacher who abandoned her post mid-semester. The case matters because it settles two enduring procedural rules: that the barangay conciliation requirement under Presidential Decree Number 1508 is not jurisdictional, and that a defendant cannot escape a judgment by invoking a requirement she herself frustrated through her own default.

Procedural History

San Miguel Village School filed a complaint for breach of contract with damages against Christina Triño before the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte, Branch 3, presided over by Judge Magadapa Rasuman. Triño failed to answer, and the trial court declared her in default, designating the Branch Clerk of Court to receive the School's evidence. On 26 January 1986, Judge Rasuman rendered judgment in favor of the School, ordering Triño to pay compensatory damages, moral damages, attorney's fees, and costs.

Four months later, Triño filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment, arguing that the trial court had no jurisdiction because the School failed to comply with the mandatory conciliation procedure under Presidential Decree Number 1508. Nearly a year later, on 6 April 1987, Judge Pundogar, now presiding over the same court, issued an order setting aside the judgment of 26 January 1986, holding that the trial court acted without jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter. The School's Motion for Reconsideration was denied on 15 June 1987. The School then elevated the matter to the Supreme Court by petition for certiorari and prohibition.

Facts

On 9 May 1985, San Miguel Village School, an accredited private school in Barangay Palao, Iligan City, entered into a contract of services with Christina Triño. Under the contract, Triño would teach Grade VI in the Intermediate Department for school year 1985 to 1986, commencing in June 1985 and ending in March 1986. The contract required any party wishing to terminate it before expiration to give the other at least one month written notice.

Sometime in August 1985, while the contract was in full force and during a final examination period, Triño suddenly stopped teaching without giving any notice of termination, causing considerable difficulty for the School. The School immediately sought the assistance of the Barangay Captain of Palao and commenced conciliation proceedings. This attempt failed because Triño could not be contacted; she had left Iligan City and secured a better-paying job at the Philippine Refugee Center in Manila. A Certificate to File Action dated 17 September 1985, signed by the Barangay Captain and bearing the notation that the respondent could not be contacted, was filed with the complaint.

Summons was served on Triño through her husband. When she failed to answer within the reglementary period, the trial court declared her in default. After receiving the School's evidence, Judge Rasuman rendered judgment against her on 26 January 1986. Triño later claimed she resided not in Barangay Palao but in Barangay Tomas Cabili, suggesting she never received notice to appear before the Lupon.

Issues

• Whether or not the trial court had jurisdiction to render its decision of 26 January 1986 despite the plaintiff's alleged failure to comply with the conciliation requirements of Presidential Decree Number 1508.
• Whether or not the Certificate to File Action issued by the Barangay Captain of Palao substantially satisfied the requirements of Presidential Decree Number 1508.
• Whether or not the private respondent waived the defense of non-compliance with the conciliation procedure by failing to raise it at the first available opportunity.

Applicable Provisions

The decision discusses the conciliation requirement of Presidential Decree Number 1508, which the Court characterizes as follows:

The conciliation procedure required under P.D. No. 1508 is not a jurisdictional requirement in the sense that failure to have prior recourse to such procedure would not deprive a court of its jurisdiction either over the subject matter or over the person of the defendant.

This governs the first issue: if the requirement is not jurisdictional, the trial court's judgment cannot be voided on that ground.

The decision also refers to Section 2 of Rule 38 of the Revised Rules of Court, which lists the grounds for relief from judgment:

fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence

This bears on the case because Judge Pundogar granted relief not on any of these grounds but on a supposed lack of jurisdiction, which the Court found to be palpable error.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court ruled that the trial court had jurisdiction. Failure of a plaintiff to comply with Presidential Decree Number 1508 does not affect the court's jurisdiction; it merely affects the sufficiency, maturity, or ripeness of the cause of action, making the complaint vulnerable to a motion to dismiss for want of cause of action or for prematurity, not for lack of jurisdiction. Judge Pundogar therefore erred in holding his predecessor without jurisdiction.

On the second issue, the Court held that the Certificate to File Action substantially complied with the law. Where a defendant fails to respond to a notice to appear before the Lupon, the requirement is deemed satisfied by the plaintiff. The Court presumed that the barangay authorities performed their official duties regularly and sent notice to Triño, otherwise they could not have stated that she could not be contacted. As the Court put it:

A defendant cannot be allowed to frustrate the requirements of the statute by her own refusal or failure to appear before the Lupon and then later to assail a judgment rendered in such action by setting up the very ground of non-compliance with P.D. No. 1508.

On the third issue, the Court ruled that Triño waived the defense. The failure to comply with the conciliation requirement must be raised at the first available opportunity, by timely motion to dismiss or in the answer; otherwise, the defense is waived. Since Triño was declared in default and that order was never set aside, she waived not only the defense but also her right to appear and file an answer. It was simply too late to demand conciliation after a judgment on the merits, albeit by default, had become final and executory.

Doctrine

First, the barangay conciliation requirement under Presidential Decree Number 1508 is not jurisdictional. Non-compliance does not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter or over the person of the defendant; it affects only the sufficiency or ripeness of the cause of action and is a ground for dismissal for want of cause of action or prematurity.

Second, a defendant who fails or refuses to appear before the Lupon cannot later invoke non-compliance with the conciliation requirement to annul the judgment. A defendant cannot profit by her own default.

Third, the defense of non-compliance with the conciliation procedure must be raised at the first available opportunity, in a timely motion to dismiss or in the answer; failure to do so constitutes waiver.

Disposition

The Supreme Court granted the petition, reversed and set aside the orders of Judge Pundogar dated 6 April 1987 and 15 June 1987, reinstated the decision of Judge Rasuman dated 26 January 1986, and ordered costs against the private respondent.

Remember This

Memorize this line: the barangay conciliation requirement is not jurisdictional, and a defendant cannot profit by her own default. Examiners use this case to test the distinction between lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a cause of action, and to test waiver of defenses under the Rules of Court.