EDGAR JARANTILLA, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND JOSE KUAN SING, RESPONDENTS.

The records show that private respondent Jose Kuan Sing was “sideswiped by a vehicle in
the evening of July 7,
1971 in Iznart Street, Iloilo
City”.^[1] The respondent Court of Appeals concurred in the findings of the court a quo that the said vehicle
which figured in the mishap, a Volkswagen (Beetle type) car, was then
driven by petitioner Edgar Jarantilla along said street toward the direction of the
provincial capitol, and that private respondent sustained physical injuries as a consequence.^[2]

Petitioner was accordingly
charged before the then City Court of Iloilo for serious physical injuries thru
reckless jurisprudence in Criminal Case
No. 47207 thereof.^[3]
Private respondent, as the
complaining witness therein, did
not reserve his right to institute a separate civil action and he intervened in the prosecution of said criminal case through a private prosecutor.^[4] Petitioner was acquitted in said criminal case on reasonable doubt.^[5]

On October 30, 1974,
private respondent filed a complaint
against the petitioner in this former Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Branch IV,^[6]
docketed therein as Civil Case No. 9976,
and which civil action involved the same subject matter and act complained of in Criminal Case No. 47027.^[7]
In his answer filed therein, the petitioner alleged as special and affirmative
defenses that the private respondent had no cause of action and, additionally, that the latter’s cause of action, if any, is
barred by the prior judgment in Criminal Case No. 47207 inasmuch as when said
criminal case was instituted the civil liability was also deemed instituted since therein plaintiff failed to
reserve the civil aspect and actively participated in the criminal case.^[8]

Thereafter, acting on a motion to dismiss of therein defendant, the trial court issued on April 3, 1975 an order of denial, with the suggestion that “(t)o enrich our jurisprudence, it is suggested that the defendant brings (sic) this ruling to the Supreme Court by certiorari
or other appropriate remedy, to review
the ruling of the court”.^[9]

On June 17, 1975,
petitioner filed in this Court a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus, which was docketed as G.R. No. L-40992,^[10]
assailing the aforesaid order of the trial court.  Said petition was dismissed for lack of merit in the Court’s resolution of July 23, 1975, and a motion for
reconsideration thereof was denied for the same reason in a resolution
of October 28, 1975.^[11]

After trial, the court
below rendered judgment on May 23, 1977 in favor of the herein private
respondent and ordering herein petitioner to pay the former the sum of
P6,920.00 for hospitalization, medicines and so forth, P2,000.00 for other
actual expenses, P25,000.00 for moral damages, P5,000.00 for attorney’s fees,
and costs.^[12]

On July 29, 1987, the
respondent Court of Appeals^[13] affirmed the decision of the lower court
except as to the award for moral damages which it reduced from P25,000.00 to P18,000.00. 
A motion for reconsideration was denied by respondent court on September
18, 1987.^[14]

The main issue for resolution by Us in the present recourse is
whether the private respondent, who was the complainant in the criminal action
for physical injuries thru reckless imprudence
and who participated in the prosecution thereof without reserving the civil
action arising from the act or omission complained of, can file a separate
action for civil liability arising from the same act or omission where the
herein petitioner was acquitted in the criminal action on reasonable doubt and
no civil liability was adjudicated or awarded in the judgment of acquittal.

Prefatorily, We note that
petitioner raises a collateral issue by faulting the respondent court for
refusing to resolve an assignment of error in his appeal therein, said
respondent court holding that the main issue had been passed upon by this Court in G.R. No. L-40992 hereinbefore mentioned.  It
is petitioner’s position that
the aforesaid two resolutions of the Court in said case, the first dismissing
the petition and the second denying the motion for reconsideration, do not constitute the “law of the case” which would control the subsequent
proceedings in this controversy.

1.  We incline favorably to
petitioner’s submission on this score.

The “doctrine of the law of the case” has no application at the aforesaid posture of the
proceedings when the two resolutions were handed down.  While it may be true that G.R. No. L-40992 may have involved some
of the issues which were thereafter submitted for resolution on the merits by
the two lower courts, the proceedings involved there was one for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
assailing an interlocutory order of the court a quo,
specifically, its order denying
therein defendant’s motion to dismiss. 
This Court, without rendering a specific opinion or explanation as
to the legal and factual bases on which its two resolutions were predicated,
simply dismissed the special civil action on that incident for lack of
merit.  It may very well be that such
resolution was premised on the fact that the Court, at that stage and on the
basis of the facts then presented, did not consider that the denial order of
the court a quo was tainted with grave abuse of discretion.^[15]
To repeat, no rationale for such resolutions having been expounded on the
merits of that action, no law of the case may be said to have been laid down in
G.R. No. L-40992 to justify the respondent court’s refusal to
consider petitioner’s claim that his former acquittal barred the separate
action.

“‘Law of the case’ has been defined as the opinion delivered
on a former appeal.  More
specifically, it means that whatever is once irrevocably established, as the controlling legal rule of decision between the same parties in the same
case continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on general principles
or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to
be the facts of the case before the court (21 C.J.S. 330).” (Underscoring
supplied).^[16]

“It need not be stated that the Supreme Court being the court
of last resort, is the final arbiter of all legal questions properly brought
before it and that its decision in any given case constitutes the law
of that particular case.  x x x”
(Emphasis supplied).^[17]

“It is a rule of general application that the decision of an
appellate court in a case is the law of the case on the points presented
throughout all the subsequent proceedings in the case in both the trial and the
appellate courts, and no question necessarily involved and decided on that
appeal will be considered on a second appeal or writ of error in the same case,
provided the facts and issues are substantially the same as those on which the first question rested and,
according to some authorities, provided the decision is on the merits.  x x x“^[18]

2. With the foregoing
ancillary issue out of the way, We now consider the principal plaint of petitioner.

Apropos to such resolution is the settled rule that the same act
or omission (in this case, the negligent
sideswiping of private respondent) can create two kinds of liability on
the part of the offender, that is, civil liability ex delicto and civil liability ex quasi delicto.  Since the same negligence can give rise
either to a delict or crime or to a quasi-delict or tort, either of these two types of civil
liability may be enforced against the culprit, subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code
that the offended party cannot recover damages under both types of liability.^[19]

We also note the reminder of petitioner that in Roa vs.
De la Cruz, et al.,^[20]
it was held that where the offended party elected to claim damages
arising from the offense charged in the criminal case through her intervention
as a private prosecutor, the final judgment rendered therein constituted a bar
to the subsequent civil action based upon the same cause.  It is meet, however, not to lose sight of the
fact that the criminal action involved therein was for serious oral defamation which, while within the
contemplation of an independent civil action under Article 33 of the Civil
Code, constitutes only a penal offense and cannot otherwise be considered as a
quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana
under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code. 
And while petitioner draws attention to the supposed reiteration of the Roa doctrine in the later case of Azucena vs. Potenciano, et al.,^[21]
this time involving damage to
property through negligence as to make out
a case of quasi-delict under Articles 2176 and
2180 of the Civil Code, such
secondary reliance is misplaced since the therein plaintiff Azucena
did not intervene in the criminal action against defendant Potenciano.  The citation of Roa
in the later case of Azucena was, therefore,
clearly obiter and affords no comfort to petitioner.

These are aside from the fact that there have been doctrinal, and
even statutory,^[22]
changes on the matter of civil action arising from criminal offenses and quasi-delicts.  We will reserve our discussion on the statutory aspects for another case and
time and, for the nonce, We will consider the
doctrinal developments on this issue.

In the case under
consideration, private respondent participated and intervened in the prosecution of the criminal
suit against petitioner.  Under the present jurisprudential
milieu, where the trial court acquits
the accused on reasonable doubt, it could very well make a
pronouncement on the civil liability of
the accused^[23]
and the complainant could file a
petition for mandamus
to compel the trial court to include such civil liability in the judgment of
acquittal.^[24]

Private respondent, as already stated, filed a separate civil
action after such acquittal.  This is
allowed under Article 29 of the Civil Code. 
We have ruled in the relatively recent case of Lontoc
vs. MD Transit & Taxi Co., Inc., et al.^[25]
that:

“In view of the fact that the defendant- appellee
de la Cruz was acquitted on the ground that ‘his guilt was not proven beyond
reasonable doubt’ the plaintiff-appellant
has the right to institute a separate civil action to recover damages from the
defendants-appellants (See Mendoza vs. Arrieta, 91
SCRA 113).  The well-settled doctrine is
that a person, while not criminally liable may still be civilly liable.  ‘The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the
civil liability of the accused only when it includes a declaration that the
facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist’.  (Padilla vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 558 cited in People vs. Rogelio Ligon y Tria, et
al., G.R. No. 74041, July 29, 1987; Filomeno Urbano vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 72964,
January 7, 1988).  The ruling is based on
Article 29 of the Civil Code which provides:

‘When the accused in a criminal
prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not
been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages
for the same act or omission may be instituted. 
Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence.’ x x x“^[26]

Another consideration in favor of private respondent is the
doctrine that the failure of the court to make any pronouncement, favorable or unfavorable, as to the civil
liability of the accused amounts to a reservation of the right to have the
civil liability litigated and determined in a separate action.  The rules nowhere provide that if the court
fails to determine the civil liability it becomes no longer enforceable.^[27]

Furthermore, in the present case the civil liability sought to be
recovered through the application of Article 29 is no longer that based on or
arising from the criminal offense.  There
is persuasive logic in the view that,
under such circumstances, the acquittal of the accused foreclosed the civil
liability based on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code which presupposes the existence of criminal liability or
requires a conviction of the offense charged. 
Divested of its penal element by such acquittal, the causative act or
omission becomes in effect a quasi-delict, hence only a civil action based thereon may be
instituted or prosecuted thereafter, which action can be proved by mere
preponderance of evidence.^[28]
Complementary to such considerations, Article 29 enunciates the rule, as
already stated, that a civil action for damages is not precluded by an
acquittal on reasonable doubt for the same criminal act or omission.

The allegations of the complaint filed by the
private respondent supports and is constitutive of a case for a quasi-­delict committed by the petitioner, thus:

“3.  That in the evening of July 7, 1971 at about
7:00 o’clock, the plaintiff crossed Iznart Street
from his restaurant situated at 220 Iznart St.,
Iloilo City, Philippines, on his way to a meeting of the Cantonese Club at Aldeguer Street, Iloilo City and while he was standing on
the middle of the street as there were vehicles coming from the Provincial
Building towards Plazoleta Gay, Iloilo City, he was
bumped and sideswiped by Volkswagen car with plate No. B-25-08 W which was on its way from Plazoleta Gay towards the Provincial Capitol, Iloilo City,
which car was being driven by the defendant in a reckless and negligent manner,
at an excessive rate of speed and in violation of the provisions of the Revised
Motor Vehicle (sic) as amended, in relation to the Land Transportation and
Traffic Code as well as in violation of existing city ordinances, and by reason
of his inexcusable lack of precaution and failure to act with due negligence
and by failing to take into cinsideration (sic) his
degree of intelligence, the atmospheric conditions of the place as well as the
width, traffic, visibility and other conditions of Iznart
Street;”^[29]

Since this action is based
on a quasi-delict, the failure of the respondent to
reserve his right to file a separate civil case and his intervention in the
criminal case did not bar him from filing such separate civil action for
damages.^[30]
The Court has also heretofore ruled in Elcano
vs. Hill^[31]
that

“x x x a
separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act whether or
not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that
the offended party is not allowed, if he is also actually charged criminally,
to recover damages on both scores; and would be entitled in such eventuality
only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases
vary.  In other words, the extinction of
civil liability referred to in Par. (c) of Sec. 3 Rule 111, refers exclusively
to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; whereas
the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a
crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the
criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the
accused.  x x x“

The aforecited case of Lontoc vs. MD Transit & Taxi Co., Inc., et al.
involved virtually the same factual situation. 
The Court, in arriving at the conclusion hereinbefore quoted, expressly declared that the failure of the
therein plaintiff to reserve his right to file a separate civil case is not fatal; that his intervention in the
criminal case did not bar him
from filing a separate civil action for damages, especially considering that the accused therein
was acquitted because his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt; that
the two cases were anchored on two different causes of action, the criminal
case being on a violation of Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code while the
subsequent complaint for damages was based on a quasi-delict;
and that in the judgment in the criminal case the aspect of civil liability was not passed upon and resolved.  Consequently, said civil case may proceed as authorized by Article 29 of the
Civil Code.

Our initial adverse observation on a portion of the decision of
respondent court aside, We hold that on the issues
decisive of this case it did not err in sustaining the decision a quo.

WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is hereby DENIED and the decision of the respondent Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED, without costs.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, Paras,
Padilla, and Sarmiento,
JJ., concur.

^[1]
Rollo, 24.

^[2]
Ibid., 22-23.

^[3]
Ibid., 41.

^[4]
Ibid., 23-24.

^[5]
Ibid., 49.

^[6]
Presided over by Judge Valerio V. Rovira.

^[7]
Rollo, 5-6, 50.

^[8]
Ibid., 6, 51.

^[9]
Ibid., 51.

^[10]
Edgar Jarantilla, Petitioner, vs. Honorable Valerio v. Rovira, et al.,
Respondents.

^[11]
Rollo, 52.

^[12]
Ibid., 57.

^[13]
Fourteenth Division, Justice Jesus M. Elbinias,
ponente, Justices Fidel P. Purisima
and Emeterio C. Cui, concurring.

^[14]
Rollo, 32, 34-36.

^[15]
See Moreno vs. Macadaeg, 7 SCRA 700 (1963); Espiritu,
et al vs. Solidum,
et al., 52 SCRA 131 (1973).

^[16]
People vs. Olarte, 19 SCRA 494 (1967), citing
People vs. Pinuila, 55 O.G. 4228 (1958).

^[17]
Kabigting vs.
Acting Director of Prisons, G.R. No. L-15548, Oct. 20, 1962, cited in Gokongwei, Jr. vs. Securities and Exchange
Commission, et al., 89 SCRA 336 (1979).

^[18]
Trinidad vs. Roman Catholic Archbishop
of Manila, 63 Phil. 881, 913 (1924), citing
4 C.J. 1093-1096, sec. 8075.

^[19]
Berredo vs.
Garcia, et al., 73 Phil. 607
(1942); Mendoza vs. Arrieta, 91 SCRA 113 (1979); Padilla vs. Court of Appeals, et al. 129 SCRA 558 (1984).

^[20]
107 Phil. 8 (1960).

^[21]
5 SCRA 468 (1962).

^[22]
The original provisions thereon
in Sec. 1, Rule 107 of the 1940 Rules of Court were revised in Secs. 1 to 5, Rule 111 of the
1964 Rules of Court. 
Amendments were thereafter
introduced by Secs. 1 to 6, Rule Ill of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which
were further amended in 1988 (see
Footnote 26, infra).

^[23]
Padilla vs. Court of Appeals, et al., supra;
People vs. Jalandoni, 131 SCRA 454 (1984); Maximo
vs. Gerochi, Jr., 144 SCRA 325 (1986).

^[24]
Maximo vs. Gerochi,
Jr. supra; see also Sec. 2, Rule 120, Rules
of Court.

^[25]
G.R. No. L-48949, April 15, 1988.

^[26]
The same rule was provided in Sec.
3(c) Rule 111 of the 1964 Rules of Court, reproduced in Sec. 3(b), Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure,
and is now found in Sec. 2(b), Rule 111, under the amendments last approved in
the resolution of the Court on July 7, 1988.

^[27]
Bachrach
Motors Co. vs. Gamboa, 101 Phil. 1219 (1957); Bernaldez vs. Bohol Land
Transportation Co., 7 SCRA 276 (1963).

^[28]
See Sangco, Philippine Law on Torts and Damages, 1984
Ed., 555.

^[29]
Record on Appeal, 1-2.

^[30]
Dula, et al. vs. Dianala, et al., 132 SCRA 245 (1984).

^[31]
77 SCRA 98 (1977).