CANDIDA MARIANO, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, AND COURT OF APPEALS, RESPONDENTS.

The accused Candida Mariano
brought this petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals which
affirmed her conviction by the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan of the crime of
estafa in Criminal Case No. 2966-M.

The information which
charges the accused with conversion of pieces of jewelry belonging to Antonia
Santos alleges:

“That on or about the 22nd day of September 1978, in the
municipality of Bocaue, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused Candida Mariano, by
means of false pretenses and fraudulent manifestations, received from the
complaining witness Antonia M. Santos several pieces of jewelry amounting to
P38,500.00, for the purpose of selling the same on commission with express
obligation of turning over the proceeds thereof, if sold or to return the said
pieces of jewelry if not sold, but the said accused, once in possession of the
said pieces of jewelry and far from complying with her aforesaid obligation and
in spite of repeated demands to return the same, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with grave abuse of confidence and with deceit, missappropriate,
misapply and convert to her personal use and benefit the pieces of jewelry in
the amount of P38,500.00, belonging to the said Antonia M. Santos, to the
damage and prejudice of the said owner in the said amount of P38,500.00.”
(Rollo, p. 17)

A document dated
September 22, 1978 (Exhibit “A”) was introduced as the evidence for the
receipt by the accused Mariano of the jewelries with the obligation to sell and
turn over the proceeds therefor, or return the same jewelries. A demand letter (Exhibit “B”)
against accused-petitioner indicating, however, that the complainant was
referring to a transaction dated September 30, 1978 was also offered in
evidence. (See Original Records, p.
405) The findings of facts of the lower court were culled from the testimonies
of the complainant Antonia Santos – the lone prosecution witness, and of the
accused-petitioner Mariano – the lone defense witness.

The antecedent facts are
summarized by the Court of Appeals from the evidence on record. The prosecution’s narration as abstracted
are:

x x x  x x x        x x x

“The evidence for the prosecution shows that appellant Candida
Mariano is an acquaintance of complaining witness Antonia M. Santos, they being
townmates in Bocaue, Bulacan, besides being classmates in 1948. The appellant was also a regular customer of
the private respondent complainant for about two years in the latter’s business
of selling clothing materials in Divisoria, Manila.

“On September 22, 1978, at about 8:00 o’clock in the
morning, before complainant Antonia Santos could leave her residence in Biñan
1st, Bocaue, Bulacan, to attend to her business in Divisoria, appellant Candida
Mariano came to her house to see the jewelries which complainant was intending
to sell. Complainant showed the
appellant the following jewelries and their corresponding prices:

‘1
Sinsing solo 2 ½ k. brillante                 P31,000

1
paris Hikaw dangling                        3,000

1
Singsing panglalaki 2 big stone            4,500

P38,500′

“Thereupon, appellant Candida Mariano told complainant
Antonia Santos that she (appellant) was interested to sell the said jewelries
and that she had a buyer. The complainant,
having full trust and confidence in the appellant, entrusted the said jewelries
to the latter who signed a ‘Katibayan’ or Receipt therefor, with the following
agreed conditions:

‘x x x. To be sold in
CASH ONLY within 3 days from date of signing this receipt; if I could not sell,
I shall return all the jewelry within the period mentioned above; if I would be
able to sell, I shall immediately deliver and account the whole proceeds of
sale thereof to the owner of jewelries, my compensation or commission shall be
the over­price on the value of each jewelry on the above; I am prohibited to
sell any jewelry on credit or by installment, deposit, give for safekeeping,
lend, pledge or give as security or guaranty under any circumstance or manner,
any jewelry to other persons or person.

‘I sign my name this 22nd day of September, 1979.

‘(SGD.) CANDIDA MARIANO.’

“Three days
after the appellant received the jewelries, the complainant went to see her,
and the latter, instead of turning over the proceeds of the sale or delivering
back the jewelries if unsold, pleaded that she (appellant) be given one (1)
week more to comply with her obligation. The complainant acceded.

“Five days thereafter, or before the one week extended
period expired, the appellant went to the complainant and informed her that the
jewelries were already sold but that the cash was not yet available. The appellant, however, assured the
complainant that she (appellant) would turn over the proceeds of the sale
within that week.

“But the appellant did not show up anymore. Having got tired of going to the residence
of the appellant, the complainant consulted her lawyer who then prepared and
sent, in her behalf, a formal demand letter dated October 2, 1978, to the
appellant. Despite her receipt of the
demand letter on October 7, 1978, thru her authorized representative, the
appellant ignored the same and did not deliver the proceeds of the sale or
return the jewelries.” (Rollo, pp. 37-38)

Meanwhile, the version of
the defense is as follows:

“On the other hand, appellant Candida Mariano, while
admitting in her testimony that she received from complainant Antonia Santos
the subject three (3) jewelries and signed a receipt or ‘Katibayan’ (Exhibit
“A”) therefor on September
22, 1978, puts
up the defense that the said jewelries ‘are one and the same jewelries’ which
are already in the possession of one Amelia Bote who, on September 30, 1978, executed a separate written agreement
(Exhibit “4”) with
the complainant. This agreement was
executed in the handwriting of Amelia Bote herself and signed by her certifying
that on September 30, 1978 she received from private complainant two (2) jewelries, namely: ‘isang sinsing pambabae brillante (2 karat),’ worth P29,000.00, and ‘isang sinsing panlalake,
brillante may 2 bato,’ worth P3,500.00, with the agreed conditions that she (Bote) will sell the said jewelries
in cash within two (2) days from receipt thereof and immediately turn-over the
proceeds of the sale to the complainant, or return the jewelries, if unsold, on October 2, 1978. The agreed compensation or commission of Amelia Bote, according to the
agreement, shall be the overprice she makes on the value of each jewelry. It was further agreed in Exhibit
“4” that Amelia Bote cannot sell the jewelries on credit or by
installment, nor can she lend, pledge or give the same as security. At the left side margin of Exhibit
“4” is the signature of appellant Candida Mariano as ‘Guarantor,’
which signature she admitted to be her own.

“In explaining the circumstances behind the execution of
Exhibit “A” and Exhibit “4”, the appellant, a Bachelor of
Science in Education graduate and engaged in the business of making ladies’
wear, narrated that on September 22, 1978, while she was at the store of
the complainant in Divisoria to buy clothing materials, the latter offered her
a lady’s ring, telling her to sell it because she (complainant) – then a fire
victim – was in dire need of money. The
appellant told the complainant that she would refer the matter to Amelia Bote
whom she heard was looking for jewelries. The complainant then gave her the ring to show it to Amelia Bate. After having seen it, the latter expressed
her desire to buy it for P28,000.00. Amelia Bote also told the appellant to look for a man’s ring and
dangling earrings.

“On that same day of September 22 when the appellant
relayed Amelia Bote’s requests to the complainant at her store, the latter
agreed to give the lady’s ring to her (Bote) for P28,000.00 and to show her the
additional jewelries, namely: one (1)
dangling earrings (sic) and one (1) man’s ring valued at P3,000.00 and
P4,500.00, respectively. The appellant
then signed the subject receipt (Exhibit “A”), as requested by
the complainant, for the three
(3) jewelries she received. The
appellant insisted, though, that she did not read the contents of said receipt
when she signed it.

“Still on that same day of September 22, 1978, the
appellant went to see Amelia Bote and offered her the man’s ring and dangling
earrings. She also informed Bote that
the complainant agreed to sell the lady’s ring for P28,000.00. Amelia Bote returned the dangling earrings
only and told the appellant that she would pay on the weekend. The appellant left all the three jewelries
with Bote and then proceeded to see the complainant who, when informed of what
transpired, agreed to the transaction.

“On September 25, 1978, Amelia Bote gave the complainant a
postdated check in the amount of P20,000.00 (Exhibit 3; According to the
appellant, this check bounced when she presented it to the bank for payment
[Exhs. ‘3-B’: & ‘3-C’]) in payment for the ring with single stone. x x x

“On September 30, 1978, Amelia Bote and the
appellant went again to the complainant’s store where she (Bote) paid the
complainant another P10,000.00 in check as additional payment for the lady’s
ring and man’s ring. It was also at
this instance that Amelia Bote returned to the complainant the dangling
earrings, after which she (Bote) was made to sign the receipt (Exhibit
“4”) evidencing that the two jewelries were in her
possession. In that same receipt, the
appellant signed as ‘Guarantor’.

“In short, the appellant further explained: ‘This Exh. ‘A’ was prepared when she (the complainant) gave me the jewelries for
delivery to Amelia Bote; and this Exhibit ‘4’ was executed by Amelia Bote,
considering that the jewelries were already in the possession of Amelia Bote.’
The appellant clarified, though, that when she signed Exhibit ‘4’ as guarantor,
it was to guarantee that the jewelries were already in Amelia Bote’s
possession. The appellant also stated
that when she signed Exhibit 4 she asked the complainant where Exhibit A was,
and the latter told her that she (appellant) had nothing to do with it.

“Moreover, the appellant admitted in her testimony having
received the demand letter sent to her by the complainant’s lawyer relative to
the three (3) jewelries which she got from the complainant on September 22,
1978, and that after such receipt she immediately went to see Amelia Bote to
ask the latter about the demand letter but failed to see her. The appellant did not see the complainant
anymore because her (appellant’s) mother was then seriously ill and had no
companion at home.” (Rollo, pp. 38­-41)

After trial the lower
court inferred that the documents, Exhibit “A” and Exhibit
“4” had no relation to each other and that these do not support the
defense of continuity between the accused-petitioner’s transactions with
complainant initiated on September 22, 1978 in which she signed as agent and on
September 30, 1978 in which she signed as guarantor to the obligation assumed
by Mrs. Bote to sell in behalf of the complainant. Finding that the jewelries contained in Exhibits “A”
and “4” are distinct from each other, it held accused-petitioner
guilty of estafa for failure to return the jewelries stated in Exhibit
“A”. The trial court stated
that the defense failed to controvert the prosecution evidence, on the
following facts: (1) that the
accused-petitioner was entrusted with the jewelries with an express obligation
to sell them within three (3) days and to turn over the proceeds thereof and/or
to return them if not sold; (2) that the accused-appellant denied such receipt; (3) that accused-petitioner
converted the entrusted jewelries for her personal use by her failure to return
them or to turn over the proceeds of the sale; (4) that the complainant was
damaged in the amount of P38,500.00; and (5) that complainant demanded
compliance from accused-petitioner who still failed to comply.

The dispositive portion
of the trial court decision reads:

“WHEREFORE, this Court finds accused Candida Mariano GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa, defined and penalized under
Subsection (b), paragraph 1, Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, and hereby
sentences her:

1. –   To suffer the penalty of from FOUR (4) YEARS,
TWO (2) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional as minimum, to NINE (9)
YEARS of prision mayor as maximum;

2. – To indemnify Antonia M. Santos, the private
complainant, the amount of P38,500.00;

3. – To
indemnify Antonia M. Santos the amounts of:

(a) P2,000.00 for attorney’s fees; and

(b) P5,000.00 for litigation expenses; and

4. – To pay the costs of
the suit.” (Original Records, pp. 514-515)

On appeal, the conviction
for estafa was affirmed in toto. Hence, this petition in which the accused-petitioner raised the
following issues:

“WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS IS CORRECT IN EXTENDING
LIABILITY OF A PRINCIPAL TO THAT OF GUARANTOR.

“WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS IS CORRECT IN ITS
APPRECIATION OF THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD.

“ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT ACCUSED IS GUILTY, WHETHER THE
COURT OF APPEALS APPLIED THE PROPER PENALTY TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES.” (Rollo, p. 10)

The accused-petitioner
basically hinges the present petition on the assertion that the appellate court
erred in the appreciation of the evidence. The accused-petitioner gives emphasis to the fact that Exhibit
“A” was superseded and novated by Exhibit “4”, which
contained precisely the same items of jewelry mentioned in the former document
and which “though conspicuously coaxed (should be couched) in terms
slightly different, depict accurately the transition of events and the real
relationship between petitioner and private complainant.” (Memorandum for
Petitioner in Rollo, p. 127) This being so, the accused-petitioner intimates
that Exhibit “A” ceased to have effect seven days after its execution
when the same subject matter of the contract of agency in Exhibit “A”
became the object of a new contract of agency, this time, between Mrs. Bote as
agent and complainant as principal vendor, together with the accused-petitioner
as guarantor.

As if nearly but not actually resigned to the assumption that the
finding of her guilt would be affirmed, the accused-petitioner prays that her
lack of familiarity with or her ignorance in the jewelry business, which
accounted for her imprudence in appreciating the import of Exhibit
“A”, be considered as a mitigating circumstance in her favor.

This Court has on several occasions applied the well-established
rule that the findings of fact of the lower court shall not be disturbed but
will be accorded great weight and respect, because the trial judge had the
first hand opportunity to hear the witnesses and to observe their deportment
and manner of testifying during trial in order that a decision may be properly
arrived at. (People v. Delfin Molina
and Adolfo Molina, G.R. No. 59436, August 28, 1992)

Moreover, the findings of the Court of Appeals are also given the
same treatment on appeal before us because it has at its disposal the power to
review whether or not the conclusions of the trial court are in accordance with
the facts and the relevant laws. (Adolfo
Caubang v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 62634, June 26, 1992)

The above rulings, albeit often applied, admit, however, of the
exception where “substantial errors have been committed or determinative
facts have been overlooked and which otherwise would have dictated a different
conclusion or verdict.” (People v. Roger Montilla, et al., G.R. No. 95048,
July 3, 1992)

In the case at bar, we find compelling reasons to review the
facts on record, it appearing that there were significant matters that were
overlooked and disregarded, but which rivet the attention of the Court and
dictate a contrary conclusion as to the sufficiency of the evidence to prove
the guilt of the accused.

The crime of estafa with
unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence as defined in Article 315, par. 1 (b) is
committed:

x x x     x x x                           x
x x

“(b) By
misappropriating or converting to the prejudice of another, money, goods, or
any other personal property received by the offender in trust or on commission
or for administration, or under any obligation involving the duty to make
delivery of or to return the same, even though such obligation be totally or
partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received such money,
goods, or other property.

x x x     x x x                           x x x

From the above provision, the following elements concur: (1) receipt of items in trust or under an
obligation to return them or the proceeds of an authorized transaction; (2)
misappropriation, conversion for
personal benefit or denial of such receipt; (3) entrustor or owner was
prejudiced; and (4) demand was made by the offended party.

The facts show that the accused-petitioner admitted having
received the three pieces of jewelry mentioned in Exhibit “A” on
September 22, 1978 under an obligation to look for a buyer for the
complainant. (TSN, July 3, 1984, p. 3;
October 8, 1982, pp. 5 & 8) Thus, there is no truth to the finding of the
trial court as affirmed on appeal that accused-petitioner denied her receipt of
the same items as well as her assumption of a responsibility as agent under
Exhibit “A”.

Meanwhile, the
complainant did not repudiate the fact that she knew that the
accused-petitioner had already delivered the jewelries to a prospective buyer
within the three (3) day period from September 22, 1978. This bolsters the defense testimony that
accused-petitioner did inform the complainant that she left the lady’s ring
with Mrs. Bote who bargained to take it at P28,000.00 prior to her delivery of
the two other pieces of jewelry but, without demanding a receipt. (TSN, October 8, 1982, pp. 7-8; September
24, 1984, pp. 17-18)

The complainant testified
that on September 25, 1978, when she demanded the payment of the jewelries or
their return, the accused-petitioner told her that they were already in the
possession of the buyer but the cash was not yet available. She said she was assured by the
accused-petitioner of payment by the buyer on or before October 2, 1978 (TSN,
October 24, 1979, pp. 14-15), which was one week from September 25, 1978.

Her testimony also shows
that the complainant had two transactions with the accused-petitioner in
September, 1978.

x x x                             x x x                        x
x x

Q. Now
Mrs. Santos, as businesswoman at Divisoria for the last 14 years, is it not a
fact that after the alleged transaction on September 22, 1978 as embodied in Exhibit “A”,
you had another transaction with
Candida Mariano on September 30, 1978?

A.    Yes sir.

x x x                           x x x                                    x
x x

Q.    x x x. How many transactions have you had with Candida Mariano?

A.    “2”, Sir.

Q.    You are sure of that?

A.    Yes, sir.

(TSN, October 24, 1978, pp. 16-17; Underscoring ours)

The introduction by the
accused-petitioner of Amelia Francisco Bote to complainant on September 30,
1978 is also undisputed. This is
revealed in the cross-examination of complainant Santos.

Q.    x x x Now, do you know Amelia Francisco
Bote?

A.    I do not know her very well, Sir.

Q.    But
you have met her once in your lifetime?

A.    Yes,
Sir.

Q.    When did you meet her for the first time?

A.    She
was with Candida Mariano, Sir.

Q.    When was that?

A.    September
30, Sir.

COURT:

Q.    What
year?

A.    1978,
Your Honor. (TSN, March 12, 1980, pp.
12-13; Underscoring ours)

The contents of Exhibit
“2” which was admitted by the trial court and which is a transcript
of stenographic notes on complainant’s testimony in Criminal Case No. 2957-M
for estafa (simultaneously filed against the same accused-appellant based on
the undertaking dated September 30, 1978) were not rebutted by the complainant.

In the September 30, 1978
transaction, accused Mariano guaranteed the trustworthiness of Amelia Francisco
Bote, who committed to sell one lady’s ring with two (2) karats costing
P29,000.00 and one man’s ring with two (2) stones worth P3,500.00. (See Original Records, pp. 372-401) The
complainant admitted during the trial that she had earlier testified in
Criminal Case No. 2957-M as to the occurrence and nature of the September 30,
1978 transaction. (TSN, March 12, 1980,
pp. 9-11) Proof of this second transaction entered into between complainant on
the one hand and accused-petitioner and Ms. Bote on the other hand on September
30, 1978 was admitted in evidence by the court a quo in the
present case as Exhibit “4”.

When further asked on cross-examination in the present case, the
complainant confessed that she and the accused-petitioner had preliminary talks
on September 25, 1978 (the day when she inquired from the accused-petitioner
about the sale of the three (3) pieces of jewelry entrusted on September 22,
1978) before they executed Exhibit “4” which contained a new contract
of agency to sell with Ms. Bote as agent and accused-petitioner as
guarantor. (TSN, March 12, 1980, p. 21)

The records also show that as of September 25, 1978, the
complainant had not yet lost the confidence she reposed on the
accused-petitioner on the date she entrusted the sale of her personal
jewelries. (Ibid.) Hence, we can safely
surmise that from the very first agreement with the accused on September 22,
1978, the complainant had persevered in waiting for the final disposal by way
of sale of her jewelries and the consequent liquidation into cash which she needed
to use as capital for her textile business.

The Court notes the testimony of the prosecution witness to the
effect that she was not engaged in the business of selling jewelries. This can only mean that she was at that time
selling her own limited personal collection of valuables on account of an
urgent need for cash. We find it hard
to believe, absent any proof to
the contrary, that what the complainant offered to the accused-petitioner in
Exhibit “A” for sale to third persons and those offered to Ms. Amelia
Francisco Bote with the accused-petitioner as guarantor in Exhibit
“4”, also for sale to third persons could entirely be distinct from
each other.

It is the contention of the defense that Exhibit “4”
deals with precisely the same pieces of jewelry, save for the minor
discrepancies in the sketchy descriptions, as well as the exclusion of the
dangling earrings that were alleged by the accused-petitioner to have been personally returned by Ms. Bote to
the complainant. The prosecution
was, thus, faced with the challenge of proving the difference between the items
in Exhibit “A” and those in Exhibit “4”. However, the prosecution did not bother to
establish whether or not Exhibit “A” was indeed an isolated
undertaking which the accused-petitioner allegedly had violated.

The Court, therefore, rules that the transaction on which the present action is based was
continued in the transaction with Amelia Francisco Bote. If it was true that the complainant wanted
to hold the accused criminally liable under the first transaction for her
failure to deliver the proceeds of the expected sale of jewelries or to return
the jewelries, why did she have to wait until October 2, 1978, which was past
the three (3) day period agreed upon in Exhibit “A”, before sending a
formal demand? There can be no logical
explanation for this delay other than that the complainant actually hoped that
the accused-petitioner could do something for her until October 2, 1978 or
until seven (7) more days after the accused-petitioner’s deadline on September
25, 1978 to ultimately dispose of her jewelry in exchange for cash. It was unfortunate that her hopes were met
by a sudden and unexpected turn of events, i.e., the fraudulent payment by Ms.
Bote with two (2) post-dated checks, one of which when encashed showed that she
had no funds at all. With the virtual
failure of Ms. Bote to comply with the obligation guaranteed by the
accused-petitioner, the complainant thought it wise to resort to the filing of
two separate criminal actions for estafa against the accused-petitioner. The action from which this petition arose
was based on the September 22, 1978 transaction while the other one was based
on the September 30, 1978 transaction.

With the above facts taken from the records, the Court is constrained
to rule that the evidence for the prosecution failed to pass the test of
credibility. It is incongruous to rule
that with the subsequent transaction confirmed by the complainant herself
regarding the sale of the same jewelries (except the pair of dangling
earrings), the first document, Exhibit “A” remained effective and
unchanged. In the second transaction,
the role of one of the parties was changed. Henceforth, it was Ms. Bote who became the agent of complainant Santos
while the accused-petitioner was made not a primary party to the contract but
merely a guarantor in case Ms. Bote failed to deliver the price or return the
jewelries if not sold. As guarantor,
the accused-petitioner was released from her former obligation. In case a civil action was filed against her
based on the second contract, she could claim the benefit of excussion. (Article 2058, Civil Code) If sued on an
alleged criminal liability for estafa, there must be clear proof of conspiracy
with Ms. Bote.

There was effectively a novation of the September 22, 1978
agreement wherein petitioner Candida Mariano was initially obliged to sell in
behalf of the complainant. The
complainant was shown to have acceded instead to the new arrangement in which
Ms. Bote would be her agent.

The novation occurred through a substitution of the person of the
agent and the assumption by the accused of an obligation of a guarantor. (Article 1291, New Civil Code) Incidentally,
the corresponding change in the cost of each of the jewelries offered to the
new agent according to this novation provides the explanation for the
discrepancy in the amounts contained in the two contracts. The obligation of the accused under the
September 22, 1978 transaction was extinguished by the September 30,
1978 transaction which substituted the first since the two contracts are shown
to have been on every point incompatible with each other. (Article 1292, Civil Code) The novation
prevented the rise of liability under the old contract. Upon this novation, the first obligation had
lost all its force and effect and only the subsequent obligation can be the
basis of any action. (De Borja v.
Mariano, 66 Phil. 393 [1938])

Therefore, the
complainant cannot stubbornly contradict her own decision to alter her
relationship with the accused-petitioner by arguing that Exhibit “A”
still subsists. The accused-petitioner
could no longer be prosecuted for violation of the contract evidenced by
Exhibit “A,” on which the present criminal action was based. It is an elementary rule that no action may
be filed on a contract which has no more force and effect. There can be no cause of action upon an
inexistent contract. No criminal or
civil liability may arise from an extinguished contract such as Exhibit
“A.”

The prosecution evidence is certainly bereft of the required
quantum sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused. The element of misappropriation or conversion which is the
essence of estafa punished under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the Revised Penal
Code, was not at all established. The
Court has defined the most vital terms in that provision, thus:

“The words ‘convert’ and ‘misappropriated’ connote an act
of using or disposing of another’s property as if it were one’s own, or of
devoting it to a purpose or use different from that agreed upon. To misappropriate for one’s own use
includes, not only conversion to one’s personal advantage, but every attempt to
dispose of the property of another without right (U.S. v. Panes, 37 Phil.
118).” (Amorsolo v. People, 154 SCRA 556 [1987])

In the present case, the complainant delivered her jewelries to
the accused-petitioner, who was a former schoolmate in their younger days and a
close associate in the textile business, trusting that the latter will help her
find a buyer. When the
accused-petitioner offered the jewelries for sale to Ms. Bote, who later
negotiated as to the price of the lady’s ring and decided to take the lady’s
ring and the man’s ring only, the accused-petitioner acted in accordance with
the authority and trust reposed on her. The accused-petitioner did not
commit an abuse of confidence. That
complainant was repeatedly informed of the delivery of the items to Ms. Bote
and was asked as to the last price she was willing to charge the latter, negates
the allegations made by the prosecution that the accused-petitioner
appropriated the jewelries to her own benefit, use and enjoyment and that she
exercised without authority a right of ownership over the same items to the
exclusion of the owner’s rights. (Saddul, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 192 SCRA 277 [1990])

This Court has ruled that estafa thru misappropriation, and the
conspiracy to commit the same is not established by the mere receipt of the
jewelries from the complainant. There
must be further evidence of intentional commission or participation in the
transaction in question. (Gomez v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 135 SCRA 620 [1985])

If the accused really converted the jewelries for some purpose
other than that for which they were intended, the question may be asked: why did complainant have to deal with the
accused for the second time in another transaction which the complainant
admitted to have entered into?

In view of our findings after an in-depth scrutiny into the
records, the Court finds reversible error in the conclusion of the trial court
as affirmed on appeal that the defense failed to destroy the prosecution
evidence. We reiterate that Exhibit
“A” was no longer actionable at the time the instant case (Criminal
Case No. 2966-M) was filed. No other
evidence could strengthen the proposition of guilt of the accused of estafa
based on a document that has lost its value in court under the substantive and
evidentiary rules.

The prosecution actually failed to show a single proof strong enough
to establish the commission by the accused of the crime charged. Indeed, there was no prosecution evidence
that the defense needed to destroy. There exists a huge cloud of doubt upon the theory of guilt which
triggers the Court’s skepticism as to the real motive of the complainant in
filing a baseless accusation.

The Court has time and
again upheld the basic rule that an accused must be presumed innocent until his
guilt is established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. (Section 2, Rule 133, Revised Rules of
Court) Since accusation is not synonymous with guilt, the verdict should be
guided by this requirement:

“x x x Only if the judge below and the appellate tribunal
could arrive at a conclusion that the crime had been committed precisely by the
person on trial under such an exacting test should the sentence be one of
conviction. It is thus required that
every circumstance favoring his innocence be duly taken into account. The proof against him must survive the test
of reason; the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment. The conscience must be satisfied that on the
defendant could be laid the responsibility for the offense charged, that not
only did he perpetrate the act but that it amounted to a crime. What is required then is moral
certainty.” (People v. Dramayo, 42 SCRA 59 [1971]; See also People v.
Bania, 134 SCRA 347 [1985]; People v. Lucero, 197 SCRA 717 [1991]; People v.
Teresita del Mar, et al., G.R. No. 95542, June 26, 1992)

The burden of proving the
guilt of an accused lies on the prosecution. It is not for the accused to prove the fact of his innocence. Conviction must rest on the strength of the
prosecution evidence rather than on the weakness of the defense. (People v. Capilitan, 182 SCRA 313 [1990];
People v. Lim, 190 SCRA 706 [1990])

There being facts that
were ignored or disregarded by the trial court and the appellate court that
would substantially alter the judgment, the Court finds that the
accused-petitioner cannot be held liable for violating the agreement under
Exhibit “A”.

The Court is convinced
that the obligation of the accused under the said document has been
removed. If at all, any other liability
whether criminal or civil arising from the subsequent transaction can be
properly determined only in another proceeding where such other transaction is
made the basis of a cause of action.

It is not for this Court to discuss nor review in this decision
the determination already made by another court in Criminal Case No. 2957-M in which the same accused-petitioner
was charged and acquitted of estafa on the basis of the September 30, 1978
transaction.

WHEREFORE, the decision sought to be reviewed is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE and the accused-petitioner CANDIDA MARIANO is hereby ACQUITTED on
the ground that no crime has arisen from a contract which has lost its force
and effect through novation.

SO ORDERED.

Bidin, Davide, Jr., Romero, and
Melo, JJ., concur.