G.R. No. 79516. July 18, 1991
ROMEO R. ECHAUZ, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND ASSOCIATED BANK, RESPONDENTS.
PADILLA, J.:
Private respondent Associated Bank filed a collection case against petitioner Romeo Echauz
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 6, on 18 January 1983. Alleging
that the case was filed with malice and bad faith and for harassment,
petitioner filed a counterclaim and asked for damages. In a decision dated 8 September 1986, the
respondent bank’s complaint was dismissed while damages and attorney’s fees
were awarded by the court a quo in favor of the petitioner. The
latter then asked for the
immediate execution of the award, pending appeal, as private respondent bank
seemed to petitioner to be in imminent danger of insolvency based on news reports and his own observations as to
its management. Petitioner was then
seventy (70) years old and might no longer be in a position to enjoy the
award if his claim were not immediately acted upon. Execution was granted in a special order
dated 8 October 1986. On 9 October 1986
a writ of execution was issued to implement the special order and on the same
day. Deputy Sheriff Orlando Alcantara issued a written demand on respondent bank to
comply with the writ of execution.
Auction sale of respondent bank’s properties was set for 23 October
1986. On 17 October 1986, respondent
bank filed a motion to stay
execution and tendered a property bond.
Without waiting for the resolution of its motion to approve supersedeas bond in the court a quo, private respondent bank filed a petition for certiorari with
the Court of Appeals on 17 October 1986 and obtained a temporary restraining
order against the aforementioned special order, writ of execution and auction
sale.
In a decision*
promulgated on 8 June 1987, respondent Court of Appeals set aside the special
order, quashed the writ of execution pending appeal and stopped the auction
sale. It held that petitioner’s apprehensions
of respondent bank’s financial standing and solvency were insufficient grounds
to warrant immediate execution.
Petitioner argues before us in this petition for review on certiorari
that the grounds for execution pending appeal in the case at bar are
valid. Further, he claims that the
petition that respondent bank filed with the Court of Appeals was precipitate
as it still had, before the trial court, an unresolved Motion to Approve Supersedeas Bond.
Such being the case, respondent bank is guilty of forum-shopping and
double-dealing, so petitioner contends.
In the Court of Appeals, petitioner filed a motion for extension
of time to file motion for reconsideration on 30 July 1987 (the last day for filing the motion for reconsideration). Citing the Habaluyas
doctrine,[1]
reiterated in Lacsamana,[2]
the motion for extension was denied, and the motion for reconsideration filed
on 2 July 1987 was stricken off the records for late filing.[3]
Likewise denied was a second motion for reconsideration with supplemental motion for
re-raffle filed on 23 July 1987, by virtue of Sec. 6, Executive Order No. 33
which took effect on 28 July 1986 disallowing the subject motion.[4]
On 23 August 1987, the present petition was filed adducing the
following grounds:
1.
Respondent Court of Appeals erred in not finding
and holding that the lower court did not abuse its discretion, neither did it
exceed its jurisdiction in issuing Special Order dated October 8, 1986.
2. The
respondent Court of Appeals erred in not finding and holding that the Petition
filed by private respondent was pre-mature and that private respondent bank is
guilty of forum shopping and double dealing.
3.
The Decision sought to be reviewed did not make
a complete findings of facts on all issues raised by herein petitioner before
the Court of Appeals.
4.
The Decision sought to be reviewed was contrary
to the admission of facts by both the petitioner and private respondent.
5. The
findings of facts in the questioned Decision are contrary to lower court’s
findings and its conclusion overlooked matters of substance but gave credence
to private respondent’s unsupported propositions.
6. The
judgment sought to be reviewed if not reversed and set aside is contrary to
equity and will work injustice to herein petitioner who suffered and continues to suffer irreparable damage and great injury.[5]
Private respondent, in its comment, states that this petition was
filed out of time. It is alleged that
the Motion for Reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision was filed two
(2) days late, for which reason the same was stricken off the records by
respondent Court citing the ruling in Habaluyas previously cited.
Petitioner’s Reply contends that the Habaluyas
case is not squarely applicable because what is contemplated in said case is
delay that is manifest and evident, a situation not obtaining in this
case. Likewise, in the case at bar, the
factual findings and conclusions of law of respondent Court are diametrically
opposed to those of the trial court, and therefore, the findings of the Court
of Appeals are not binding on this
Court.
Is the denial of a motion for extension of time to file a motion
for reconsideration a reversible error when the appeal is purportedly not
frivolous or manifestly filed for delay?
This Petition was filed after the promulgation of Habaluyas on 30 May 1986 which clearly ruled:
“x x
x. Hence, for the guidance of Bench and Bar, the Court restates and clarifies the
rules on this point, as follows;
1.) Beginning one month after the promulgation of
this Resolution, the rule shall be strictly enforced that no motion for
extension of time to file a motion for new trial or
reconsideration may be filed with the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional
Trial Courts, and the Intermediate Appellate Court. Such a motion may be filed only in cases pending with the Supreme Court as the
court of last resort, which may in its
sound discretion either grant or deny the extension requested.”
The questioned appellate court’s decision cannot be overturned
absent any showing of reversible error.
Strict application of technical rules will be disregarded to obviate
injustice but, in point of fact, Associated Bank’s continued operation belies
petitioner’s apprehension as to its continued solvency. The Court of Appeals did not err in affirming
this fact.
Besides, as stated in Aguilos
vs. Barrios, et al.:[6]
“‘x
x x If the judgment is executed and, on
appeal, the same is reversed, although there are provisions for restitution,
oftentimes damages may arise which cannot be fully compensated. Accordingly, execution should be granted only
when these considerations are clearly outweighed by superior circumstances
demanding urgency and the provision contained in Rule 39, Section 2, requires a statement of these circumstances as a security
for their existence.’”
Then, in RCPI v. Lantin, et al.,[7]
execution pending appeal of an award of moral and exemplary damages was
disallowed because:
‘x
x x The execution of any award for moral and
exemplary damages is dependent on the outcome of the main case. Unlike actual damages for which the
petitioners may clearly be held liable if they breach a specific contract and
the amounts of which are fixed and certain,
liabilities with respect to moral and exemplary damages as well as the exact
amounts remain uncertain and indefinite pending resolution by the Intermediate
Appellate Court and eventually the Supreme Court. The existence of the factual bases of these
types of damages and their causal relation to the petitioners’ act will have to
be determined in the light of the assignments of errors on appeal. It is possible that the petitioners, after
all, while liable for actual damages may not be liable for moral and exemplary
damages. Or as in some cases elevated to
the Supreme Court, the awards may be reduced.’
Anent the issue of the propriety of a special civil action for certiorari
to assail an order for execution pending appeal, we have ruled in Jaca, et al. vs. Davao
Lumber Company, et al.[8]
that:
‘x
x x Although Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court provides that the special civil action of certiorari may only be
invoked when “there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the (ordinary) course of law,” this rule is not without exception. The availability of the ordinary course of
appeal does not constitute sufficient ground to prevent a party from making use
of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari where appeal is not an
adequate remedy or equally beneficial, speedy and sufficient. It is the inadequacy – not the mere absence –
of all other legal remedies and the danger of failure of justice without the
writ that usually determines the propriety of certiorari.’“
Private respondent’s act of filing a petition for certiorari
while its motion to approve supersedeas bond was pending before the court a quo,
cannot be a case of forum shopping or double dealing. In Valencia vs. Court of Appeals,[9]
it was held:
“x x x, that certiorari lies against an order
granting execution pending appeal where the same is not founded upon good
reasons. Also, the fact that the losing
party had appealed from the judgment does not bar the certiorari action
filed in respondent court as the appeal could not be an adequate remedy from
such premature execution.
That petitioner could have
resorted to a supersedeas bond to prevent execution
pending appeal, as suggested by the two lower courts, is not to be held against
him. The filing of such bond does not entitle him to the suspension
of execution as a matter of
right. It cannot, therefore, be
categorically considered as a plain, speedy and adequate remedy. Hence, no rule requires a losing party so
circumstanced to adopt such remedy in lieu or before availment
of other remedial options at hand.
Futhermore, a rational interpretation of
Section 3, Rule 39 should be that the requirement for a supersedeas bond presupposes that the
case presents a presumptively valid occasion for discretionary
execution. Otherwise, even if no good
reason exists to warrant advance execution, the prevailing party could unjustly
compel the losing party to post a supersedeas bond
through the simple expedient of filing a motion for, and the trial court
improvidently granting, a writ of execution pending appeal although the
situation is violative of Section 2, Rule 39. x x x“
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED; the
petition for review is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman), and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Paras, J., no part, wife concurred in CA decision.
Sarmiento, J., on leave.
* Limcaoco,
J. – ponente; Bellosillo
and Paras, JJ., concurring.
[1]
G.R. No. 70895, 30 May 1986
[2] G.R. Nos. 73146-53,
26 August 1986
[3]
CA resolution 13 July 1987
[4]
CA resolution 3 August 1987
Executive Order No. 33, Sec. 6 reads:
“Section 11 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:
x x x x x x
A motion for reconsideration of its
decision or final resolution shall be resolved by the Court within ninety (90)
days from the time it is submitted for resolution, and no second motion for
reconsideration from the same party shall be entertained.”
[5]
Rollo at 5, 7, 9, 11, 12 and 15
[6]
72 Phil. 285, reiterated in Philippine National Bank vs. Puno, 170 SCRA 236 and in Valencia vs. Court of
Appeals, 184 SCRA 568
[7]
134 SCRA 395 (1985)
[8]
113 SCRA 107(1982)
[9]
Supra.