CRESENCIANA ATUN ESQUIVEL, AND LAMBERTO ESQUIVEL, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. ANGEL M. ALEGRE, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH II, 5TH JUDICIAL REGION, LEGASPI CITY AND …

This is a petition for certiorari
seeking to set aside, nullify and declare invalid the order of respondent Judge
in Civil Case No. 4883, dated July 21, 1987 denying petitioners’ motion dated
July 3, 1987 and the order of August 6, 1987 denying petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration of the order of July 21, 1987.

The questioned order of July 21,
1987 (Rollo,
p. 10) reads, as follows:

“For utter lack of factual and legal basis, and considering
further that this case was already terminated and decided against the
plaintiffs-movants by the affirming decision of the Supreme Court, the motion of plaintiffs-movants
dated July 3, 1987 is hereby DENIED.

The dispositive portion of the
questioned order of August 6,1987 (Rollo, p. 11) also reads as follows:

“WHEREAS, for lack of merit, the motion
for reconsideration is hereby DENIED.  This shall be a final Order on the same
incident.”

The antecedents of the case are taken from G.R. No. L-38826 which
was promulgated by the Court on June
27, 1975 (Rollo, p. 46) and are quoted as
follows:

“It appears that in the action of ejectment
(Civil Case. No.  990 of the City Court
of Legaspi City), petitioners secured a judgment
ordering respondents to vacate a
parcel of land, with an area of 205 square meters situated in Legaspi Port, Legaspi City
and known as Lot No. 57
of Plan MSI-V-11535-D of
the Cadastral Survey of said City.  ln said ejectment case, respondents claimed
prior and continued possession of the land in question, and with respect to Original Certificate of Title
No. 28 of the Register of Deeds of Legaspi City on which petitioners based their action, respondents alleged that
the same was secured through fraud.  Upon this decision being
appealed to the Court of
First Instance, the same was affirmed, the court holding that the evidence of prior possession in favor of petitioners was so strong that the action for annulment of petitioner’s (Teotimo
Alaurin) title (Civil Case No. 4602 filed by the Republic of the Philippines at the instance of respondents) was ‘only a mere weak attempt to
annul an existing
certificate of title in favor
of which the presumption of law is clearly on its side.’ Eventually, this
decision of the Court of
First Instance was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, said appellate court
holding that Civil Case
No. 4602 is ‘a
contingency which may not be
taken into consideration
in deciding the issue of who has prior possession.’ Respondents attempt to have the case appealed to the
Supreme Court did not prosper, and so, the ejectment
decision became final and executory.”

The judgment having
become final and executory on July 25, 1973, the City Court of Legaspi
ordered the issuance of a writ of execution for the enforcement of its judgment
(Rollo, p. 123).  However,
before the decision could be executed, petitioners, the spouses Cresenciana Atun and Lamberto
Esquivel filed against respondents Teotimo Alaurin and Visitacion Magno and the City Sheriff, Civil Case No.
4883 on August 24, 1973,
for reconveyance with nullity of judgment, damages
and preliminary injunction, before the Court of First Instance of Albay, Branch I, (Respondents’ Memorandum, Rollo, p. 245).  The issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction having been granted by the court a quo (Rollo, p. 104), the
respondent spouses and Teotimo Alaurin
and Visitacion Magno, filed
a petition for certiorari with the Court to set aside the order granting the writ, docketed as G.R.
No. L-38826 (Respondents’
Memorandum, Rollo, p. 246).  Meantime,
on July 1, 1974,
Civil Case No. 4602, the case
filed by Republic against private respondent Teotimo Alaurin, was dismissed (Rollo, p. 47).

During the hearing of the
petition, the parties agreed to file with the Court a Joint Manifestation which
when filed was embodied in the
decision of the Court promulgated on June 27, 1975
(Rollo, p. 46), as follows:

“The PARTIES assisted by their respective counsel, unto the
Honorable Supreme Court respectfully set forth:

“1.     That during the hearing of the
above-entitled case on November 25, 1974, the parties agreed to the suspension of
the consideration of the petition for certiorari.  Instead the parties agreed to have Civil Case
No. 4883 entitled Cresenciana
Atun, et. al,
versus Teotimo Alaurln, et.
al., before the Court of First Instance of Albay,
tried on the merits.

“2.     That after a decision is rendered in Civil
Case No. 4883, the winning party shall possess the land in litigation – that
is, if the plaintiffs win (private respondents herein) they shall be entitled
to the writ of preliminary injunction issued the Court of First Instance of Albay, otherwise, plaintiffs shall immediately vacate the
premises and the defendants (petitioners herein) restored to the possession of
the land in litigation.

“3.     That the parties pray that a directive be
issued by the Honorable Supreme Court to Branch II, Court of First Instance of Albay (Branch I of the same Court where Civil Case No. 4883
was assigned for hearing has no presiding Judge) to expedite the trial of Civil
Case No. 4883, preferably to hear and decide the case within ninety (90)
days from notice.”

In view of the joint
manifesto, the Court dismissed the case and ordered the trial court to expedite
the trial of Civil Case No. 4883 and to try and decide the same within ninety
(90) days from notice.  The Court also
ordered the transfer of the case from Branch I of the Court of First instance
of Albay which had no presiding Judge then to Branch II, enjoining the judge therein to
comply with the decision, and the parties, to observe the agreement embodied in
the aforequoted joint manifesto (Rollo, p. 49).

On October
29, 1975, the Court
of First Instance of Albay, Branch II, rendered a
decision in Civil Case No. 4883
dismissing the case and dissolving the preliminary injunction issued earlier (Rollo, p. 107), the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

“WHEREFORE, the above-entitled case is hereby dismissed.  Accordingly, the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore
issued is hereby dissolved.”

On January
19, 1976, herein
petitioners filed a notice of appeal. 
The record of appeal was filed in due time (Rollo,
p. 30).  They were, however, directed to amend their
record on appeal in an order dated April 14, 1978 but before they filed their
amended record on appeal, on May 10, 1978 petitioners filed a motion for permission to serve supplemental
complaint impleading the spouses Wilfredo
Encinas and Patrocinia Dasmarinas, the two other private respondents herein (Rollo, p. 30). 
The amended record on appeal was only filed on August
24, 1978 after
several extensions granted by the court a quo.  On July 20, 1979, private respondents filed a notice to
disapprove the record on appeal and for execution of judgment which was denied
by the court a quo, in its order of August 15, 1979 (Rollo, p. 31).

The supplemental
complaint was admitted by the court a quo in its order dated January
12, 1979 and on
motion of respondents herein in that supplemental complaint, supplemental
defendants were declared in default (Rollo, p. 17).

On July 31,
1979, the court a
quo rendered a decision on the supplemental complaint declaring the
supplemental defendants as successors-in-interest of herein private respondents
Teotimo Alaurin and Visitacion Magna, such that whatever is the result of the appealed case shall be
legally binding upon them (Rollo, p. 17).  This dispositive
portion of the decision reads, as
follows:

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered declaring that Wilfredo Encinas
and Patrocinia
Dasmarinas are successors-in-interest of defendants Teotimo
Alaurin and Visitacion Magno such that whatever is the result of the appealed case
shall be legally binding upon
them, with costs against
supplemental defendants.”

Not satisfied with the
trial court’s decision in the supplemental complaint declaring private
respondents Wilfredo Encinas
and Patrocinia Dasmarinas as successors-in-interest of private respondents Teotimo
Alaurin and Visitacion Magno, said private respondents filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals
praying that: (1) the petition
be given due course; (2) after hearing on the merits, the decision in Civil
Case No. 4883 entitled Cresenciana Atun, et al.
v. Alaurin, et. al., be declared final and executory; and (3) the decision against supplemental defendant spouses Wilfredo Encinas and Patrocinia Dasmarinas he
declared null and void (Rollo, p. 29).

The appellate court dismissed
the petition in a decision
promulgated on November 18, 1982.  The dispositive portion of the decision (Rollo, p. 29),
states:

“WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED with
costs.”

The decision became final and executory
on December 20, 1982 (Rollo, p. 36).

On the other hand, the
appeal of herein petitioners of the decision of the trial court promulgated on
October 29, 1975 in the original complaint for reconveyance
with nullity of judgment, damages and preliminary injunction was docketed in
the appellate court as AC-G.R. CV No. 01896. 
On March 10, 1986 the appellate court rendered a decision (Rollo, G.R. No. 74339, p. 47) affirming the
appealed decision, as follows:

“WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED
with costs against plaintiffs-appellants.”

The motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioners herein was denied by the appellate court
in a resolution dated April 14, 1986, for lack of merit (Rollo, G.R. No. 74339, P.
52).  Consequently, the case was raised to the Court for the second time in
G.R. No. 74339 in a petition for certiorari, also filed by petitioners
herein (Rollo, G.R. No. 74339, p. 11).

On July 2, 1986, the Court resolved to deny the petition for
lack of merit (Rollo, G.R. No. 74339, p.
58).  The motion for reconsideration filed
by petitioner herein (Rollo, G.R No. 74339,
p. 63) was also denied by the Court
in a resolution dated September 17, 1986 wherein the Court resolved “to
DENY the Motion for lack of merit, and this denial is FINAL” (Rollo, G.R.  No.
74339, p. 102).  The decision of the Court became final and executory on October 6, 1986 (Rollo,
G.R. No. 74339, p. 100).

On October 16,  1986, petitioners herein moved for the
issuance of a writ of execution of respondent court’s supplemental decision as
affirmed by the appellate court in CA-G.R. No. 09754-P (Rollo, p. 39) which
was granted by the trial court in its order of October 2, 1986 (December
2, 1986 according to petitioners, Rollo, p. 54),
“it appearing further that the decision rendered in this case has already
become final and executory.” It directed the Branch Clerk of Court to
issue the corresponding writ of execution upon receipt of proof of payment of
the corresponding Sheriff’s fee (Rollo, p.
41).

Armed with the said order
of respondent court, on May 23, 1987 petitioner herein Cresenciana
Atun, claiming to be the prevailing party, took
possession of the property in question (Rollo,
pp. 15; 133).

On May 25, 1987, a motion
for contempt was filed by private respondents herein, the prevailing parties in
Civil Case No. 4883, against petitioners herein, praying among others, that
respondent court: (1) immediately order petitioners herein to appear
in court and be ordered to desist from doing the contemptuous acts complained
of in order to maintain the status quo before this contempt charge; and, (2) hold
petitioners herein contempt of court (Rollo, p. 132), but it was dismissed and
denied by respondent court in an order dated June 5, 1987 (Rollo,
p. 43).  A restraining
order was however, issued by the Court of First Instance of Legaspi
City, Branch X, on June 8, 1987 which according to the Sheriff’s return was served personally on petitioners herein who declined
to vacate the promises subject of the restraining order (Rollo, p. 62).  Upon motion of the new owners of the subject
premises (Rollo, p. 124), the same branch of the court issued its order
of June 10, 1987 ordering the Station Commander of the INP, Legaspi,
“to assign two (2) policemen to help the sheriff
implement the restraining order of this Court dated June 8, 1987, and to use force, if necessary, should
the defendants still refuse to abide by the above-mentioned Order” (Rollo, p. 61).

On July 3, 1987, petitioners herein, filed a motion with respondent court praying among others, that an order be issued: (1)
ordering private respondents herein to reconvey to movants the property in question, and directing the City Register of Deeds to cancel TCT No.
311 in the name of Encinas, for having been obtained through fraud, hence,
null and void; and (2) allowing petitioners herein to immediately take
possession of the property in question, it being in accordance with the agreement of the
parties in a manifestation submitted and approved by the court (Rollo, p. 16).  Respondent court denied the
motion in the questioned order of July 21, 1987 (Rollo, p. 10).

A motion for
reconsideration was filed by petitioners herein on August 6, 1987 (Rollo,
p. 54), which motion was likewise
denied by respondent court in its
equally questioned order of the same date which respondent court denominated as
a final order on the same incident (Rollo, p.
221).

Hence, the instant
petition filed with the Court on August 20, 1987 (Rollo, p. 4).

In the resolution of March
14, 1988 the Court
resolved: (a) to give due course to the petition; and (b) to require the
parties to submit simultaneously their respective memoranda within thirty (30)
days from notice thereof.

The sole issue is whether or not the decision rendered by a
trial court in a supplemental
complaint modified the decision of the same branch of the court in the original
complaint and amounts to an amendment of the original decision.

The question must be
answered in the negative.

The original complaint
for reconveyance with nullity of judgment, damages
and preliminary injunction in Civil Case No. 4883 decided by respondent court
on October 29, 1975 arose from Civil Case No. 990 for unlawful detainer filed by the spouses Teotimo
Alaurin and Visitacion Magno, private respondents herein, against the spouses
Cresenciana Atun and LamCerto Esquivel, petitioners herein, in the City Court of
Legaspi which rendered a decision in favor of private
respondents herein, the spouses Teotimo Alaurin and Visitacion Magno.  Said decision
was affirmed by respondent court herein, the Court of Appeals and finally by
the Supreme Court.  The question of prior
possession of the land in question
was raised and passed upon in
that case which had already become final and executory
when Civil Case No. 4883 was filed in the Court of First Instance of Albay.

In Civil Case No. 4883,
petitioners herein anchored their action for reconveyance
on their claim of prior possession but this matter had already been resolved in
favor of private respondents herein and therefore, conclusive on respondent court in Civil Case No. 4883 being res judicata as to the issue of possession de facto
(Ang Ping, et. al. v. Regional Trial Court,
154 SCRA 77 [1987].  Trial on the merits was held on all the other aspects of the case after which judgment was rendered by
respondent court which proved to be unfavorable to petitioners herein.

After their motion for reconsideration was denied,
petitioners herein filed their notice of appeal but due to the opposition of
private respondents herein, to the non-inclusion in the record on appeal of
certain pleadings, orders and decisions which they claimed are relevant to the
disposition of the appeal, petitioners herein were ordered by respondent court
to amend their record on appeal to satisfy
the objections of the private respondents who were the original defendants in
Civil Case No. 4883 (Rollo, p. 30).  In
the meantime private respondents transferred the property in question to the
spouses Wilfredo Encinas
and Patrocinia Dasmarinas,
the two other private respondents herein, evidenced by an inscription of a Deed
of Absolute Sale dated April 19, 1970 at the back of Original Certificate of Title
No. 28 on November 2, 1976 (Rollo,
p. 38).  Petitioners must have learned of the sale before they could file their amended record on appeal which
must have prompted them to file a motion for supplemental complaint against the
vendees of the property in question, the spouses Wilfredo
Encinas and Patrocinia Dasmarinas which was admitted by respondent court.  As borne by the records of the case,
respondent court ruled in favor of herein petitioners in the supplemental
complaint which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

Petitioners claim that
the decision of respondent court in the supplemental
complaint revised the decision in the original complaint tantamount to an
amendment or reversal of said original decision of respondent court penned by a previous
presiding judge therein (Petitioner’s
Memorandum, Rollo, p. 181).

The claim is without
merit.

There is a difference
between an amended judgment and a supplemental
judgment.  In an amended and
clarified judgment, the lower court makes a thorough study of the original
judgment and renders the amended and clarified judgment only after considering
all the factual and legal issues.  The
amended and clarified decision is an entirely new decision which
supersedes the original decision (Magdalena
Estate, Inc. v. Caluag 11 SCRA 333 [1964]; Sta. Romana v. Lacson, 104 SCRA 93
[1981]).  Following the Court’s differentiation of a supplemental pleading from
an amending pleading, it can be
said that a supplemental decision does not take the place or
extinguish the existence of the
original.  As its very name denotes, it only serves to bolster or adds
something to the primary decision.  A supplement exists
side by side with the original.  It does not replace that which it supplements
(Aznar III, et. al. v. Bernard, et. al.,
G.R. No. 81190, May 9, 1988).

In the instant case no restudy was made by
respondent court of the original decision but only on the issues raised in the supplemental complaint.  The
supplemental decision cannot stand alone as a judgment on the merits as there was no declaration of the respective
rights and duties of the parties.  It
only declared the supplemental defendants as successors-in-interest of the
defendants in the original complaint, “such that whatever is the result of
the appealed case shall be legally binding upon them….” (Rollo,
p. 28).

The part of the supplemental decision which petitioners claim to have revised the original, is quoted as follows:

“In the light of the foregoing testimony of the witnesses
presented by supplemental plaintiffs together with the documentary exhibits
supporting the allegations of the supplemental complaint, the court finds that
the evidence presented by the supplemental plaintiffs are
preponderantly sufficient to justify and warrant a judgment in their favor.” (Rollo, p. 28).

There can be no other
interpretation of the above statement
of respondent court than that all documentary and testimonial evidence
prescribed by supplemental plaintiffs, petitioners herein, sufficiently prove
that when supplemental defendants entered into the contract of absolute sale
with the original defendants, they already had full knowledge of the
controversy between supplemental plaintiffs and the original defendants in
Civil Case No. 4883 such that
they must be adjudged as successors-in-interest of original defendants Teotimo Alaurin and Visitacion Magno.  This interpretation is borne by the statement
of respondent court at the end of the paragraph preceeding
that which petitioners herein claim to have revised the original decision,
which states:

“. . .One thing, however, clear is that
both supplemental defendants are successors-in-interest of Teotimo
Alaurin. The
prayer for reconveyance of the property in question cannot be justified in the light of the decision of Hon. Jose C. Razo.” (Rollo, p. 28)

It must be pointed out
that the dispositive portion itself of the
supplemental decision is clear and unambiguous. 
It does not make any declaration or pronouncement that may be taken to
have revised or amended the original decision. 
All that it declares is that the supplemental defendants Wilfredo Encinas and Patrocinia Dasmarinas are successors-in-interest
of defendants Teotimo Alaurin and Visitacion Magno such that
whatever is the result of the appealed case shall be legally binding upon them.

Petitioners herein
pursued their appeal of the original decision with the Court of Appeals which
can be interpreted to mean that they themselves did not believe that the
supplemental decision had amended the original decision of respondent
court.  Unfortunately for them, the
appellate court found the appeal without merit. 
Petitioners herein then filed a petition for certiorari with the
Supreme Court questioning the decision of the appellate court which petition
likewise did not prosper.

The original decision
became final and executory on October
6, 1986.  In general, the prevailing party is entitled
as a matter of right to a writ of execution, the issuance of which is a ministerial duty compellable by mandamus
(Nunez v. Court of Appeals, 152 SCRA 197 [1987]; Borja
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 37944, June 30, 1988; Ngo Bun Tiong
v. Sayo, G.R. No. 45875, June 30, 1988).  The issuance of an order of execution is the
ministerial duty of the lower court once the judgment of a higher court is
returned to it and it is without jurisdiction to interpret or reverse the
judgment of the higher court (Ang Ping v. Regional
Trial Court, 154 SCRA 77 [1987]). 
The writ of execution must, however, conform to the judgment which is to
be executed (Gabaya v. Mendoza, 113 SCRA 400
[1982]) which in this instant case, is the dispositive portion of the original decision in Civil Case
No. 4883.

The restraining order issued by respondent court on June 8, 1987 restored the status
quo between the parties before May
23, 1987.  There was no need
for the issuance of a writ of execution. 
The respondents who won the case were already in actual possession of
the property in question (Respondents’ Memorandum, Rollo,
p. 258) in accordance with the decision rendered in Civil Case No. 4883 and
in consonance with paragraph No. 2 of the joint manifestation of the parties
embodied in the decision of the Court in G.R. No. L-38826.  As a consequence, respondent judge did not
commit any grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in
denying the motion of petitioners herein to take possession of the property in
question, in his order of July 21,
1987 and petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of aforesaid
order.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of
merit and the restraining order issued by respondent court on June 8, 1987 is made permanent.

SO
ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman),
Padilla, Sarmiento, and
Regalado, JJ., concur.