CADWALLADER-GIBSON LUMBER COMPANY, PLAINTIFF, VS. SIMPLICIO DEL ROSARIO, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, JOSE MCMICKING, SHERIFF, AND JUAN LIWANAG, DEFENDANTS.

Cadwallader-Gibson Lumber versus Del Rosario

The Case

This is a special civil action of prohibition brought by the Cadwallader-Gibson Lumber Company against Judge Simplicio del Rosario of the Court of First Instance of Manila, its sheriff Jose McMicking, and the injured laborer Juan Liwanag. The company asks the Supreme Court to stop the trial court from enforcing an order requiring it to pay a monthly pension to Liwanag while his damages suit is pending. The case matters because it fixes two enduring rules of remedial law: a constitutional objection to due process must be raised and excepted to in the court below before it can be litigated on appeal or in prohibition, and a mere misconstruction of a statute is an error of judgment, not a defect of jurisdiction.

Procedural History

Juan Liwanag sued the Cadwallader-Gibson Lumber Company for damages in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila. While that action was pending, Liwanag filed a motion asking the court to order the company to pay him a monthly pension during the pendency of the case, or to take him back in his former position. The trial court, after hearing argument but taking no evidence because it treated the question as one of pure statutory interpretation, granted the motion and ordered the company to pay the pension monthly in advance, with the option of reemploying Liwanag at his former wages instead. The company then came directly to the Supreme Court by an original action for prohibition, alleging that the order was illegal, that the court had no jurisdiction to issue it, and that there was no adequate remedy by appeal.

Facts

On the twenty-sixth of October, 1911, Juan Liwanag was a laborer in the employ of the Cadwallader-Gibson Lumber Company. While rendering services to the company, he was injured by certain cars belonging to the company, through its negligence, so severely that his left arm had to be amputated.

On the second of April, 1912, Liwanag instituted a suit for damages against the company. On the sixteenth of April, 1912, he filed a motion praying that the company be ordered to give him a monthly pension of thirty pesos during the pendency of the case, or to take him back in his former position.

The trial judge heard only the arguments of both parties, no evidence having been offered because the question was simply one of the interpretation of Act Number 1874 of the Philippine Legislature. The court then resolved the motion by ordering the company to pay Liwanag a pension of thirty pesos monthly in advance, during one of the first five days of each month, while the action was pending, with the option of employing him at the same wages instead. The company assailed that order in this prohibition proceeding, chiefly on the ground that the statute, as interpreted, deprived it of property without due process of law.

Issues

• Whether or not the constitutionality of the statute, and the alleged denial of due process, may be raised for the first time in the Supreme Court in an action for prohibition, no objection having been made in the court below.
• Whether or not the trial court's misconstruction of the statute as to the period during which the pension should be paid raises a constitutional question or a question of jurisdiction correctible by prohibition.

Applicable Provisions

Act Number 1874 of the Philippine Legislature is the statute under which the trial court issued the pension order, and the Court treats the question as one of its interpretation:

Wherefore, plaintiff prays the honorable court to order the defendant company to give the plaintiff a monthly pension of P30 during the pendency of this case or to take him back in his former position prior to the filing of his suit.

This is the prayer of Liwanag's motion, which the trial court granted and which the company now attacks as unconstitutional.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the action is not maintainable. It observed that no question as to the constitutionality of the law was raised in the court below, and no objection was made there to the form of the motion, to the nature of the hearing, or to the fact that no trial was held to determine liability upon evidence. The first objection was interposed only when the action for prohibition was commenced. The Court laid down the governing rule:

The failure of due process of law may be cured by the consent or acquiescence of the party injured.

And it added that to raise the question of failure of due process as the basis of an appeal or of an action of prohibition, proper objections must be opportunely made in the court below and exceptions taken by the party who feels himself aggrieved.

On the second issue, the Court held that the mere misconstruction of the statute raises no constitutional question, nor does it raise a question going to the jurisdiction of the court. If anything, it is a mere error, to be corrected in the regular way. Hence prohibition will not lie.

Doctrine

First, a litigant who claims that he has been deprived of property without due process of law must object opportunely in the court below and take his exception there; the failure of due process may be cured by his consent or acquiescence, and the question cannot be raised for the first time in the Supreme Court through an appeal or an action for prohibition.

Second, the misconstruction of a statute by a trial court is an error of judgment, not a want or excess of jurisdiction; it is corrected by appeal in the regular way, not by the extraordinary writ of prohibition.

Disposition

The action for prohibition was dismissed as not maintainable, and the order of the trial court was left to stand, subject to correction in the regular way.

Remember This

Memorize the line that the failure of due process may be cured by the consent or acquiescence of the party injured, and that a mere misconstruction of a statute is an error, not a jurisdictional defect. Examiners use this case to test the timely raising of constitutional objections and the distinction between errors of judgment and defects of jurisdiction in petitions for prohibition.