SPOUSES ARCANGEL GENOBLAZO AND ELISA NANTES AND ARELI DE FIESTA, PETITIONERS, VS. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE NATIVIDAD G. ADURRU­SANTILLAN, AS THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRAN…

Petitioners assail the decision of the Court of Appeals (1)
dismissing their petition for, certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction and (2) upholding the order of the respondent Judge Natividad G. Adurru-Santillan of
the Regional Trial Court denying petitioners’ motion for a writ of preliminary
injunction.

The antecedent facts, as found by the respondent court, are as
follows:

* * *

Civil Case No. 84-26196 was filed by plaintiffs (petitioners
herein) on a claim of ownership by extraordinary acquisitive prescription of
lots no. 2520 and 2512 located at Felix Huertas St., Sta Cruz, Manila, and the improvements thereon.  The plaintiffs also sought to enjoin the
defendants (private respondents herein) from further demolishing or destroying
the remnants of the structures built on the land, and sought recovery of
actual, moral and exemplary damages, and determination
of the issue of ownership over the land. 
The defendants claimed absolute ownership of the lots in question as
evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 160694 of the Register of Deeds
of Manila, and relied on the regularity and lawful issuance of the Demolition
Order No. 014 S-1984 dated June 11,
1984 issued by the City Engineers’ Office, Lands and Building
Official.  Defendants made a counter-claim
for moral damages and attorney’s fees.

Upon motion of the plaintiffs, the respondent Judge issued on December 1, 1984 a restraining order
to prevent defendants from the commission of acts that will dispossess
plaintiffs of their temporary shelter, and enjoining plaintiffs from
introducing additional improvements on the land and/or expanding the facilities
existing thereon.

On January 2, 1985,
defendant Reyeses,
manifesting that the aforesaid Order has been violated by plaintiffs through
expansion of the makeshift “barong-barong” by about two (2) meters of
its frontage, moved to cite plaintiffs in contempt of court.  Plaintiffs’ did not challenge the merit of
the motion, but instead filed an urgent motion on January 10, 1985 for immediate issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction in reiteration of their prayer in the complaint.  A hearing was conducted, at which the parties
orally argued their respective positions and sought for the filing of
respective memoranda after which the case shall be deemed submitted for
resolution.  The respondent Judge in an
Order dated July 1, 1985,
found that the evidence submitted by plaintiffs to support the claim of
continuous and uninterrupted residence in the premises since 1947 could not be
given probative value, and upheld the claim of defendant on the basis of a
Torrens Certificate of Title in its favor.

On the issue of physical possession, the Court held that defendant City
Engineer and Building Official of the City of Manila
had acted within the scope of his authority under the National Building Code
and the applicable.  Ordinances of the
City of Manila ordering the
demolition of structures found to be dangerous or ruinous and detrimental to
the life, health and safety of the community and its members.

The respondent Judge ruled that the ownership of the defendants
over the lots in question as proven by the Transfer Certificate of Title No.
160964 of the Registry of Deeds for Manila “is hereby confirmed”, the
issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction is denied, and the case set for
pre-trial on the unresolved issues on the physical possession of the questioned
lots, and the claim for damages and attorney’s fees.

Plaintiffs did not file any motion for reconsideration of the said
order, but instead filed on August 16,
1985 an urgent ex-parte motion for
disqualification on the ground of partiality, bias and prejudice, preference
and pre-judgment against plaintiffs.  On September 15, 1985, plaintiffs filed
a manifestation that until after the question of disqualification shall have
been finally determined, petitioners shall not attend
any hearing or trial.

On November 11, 1985, petitioners filed the instant petition,
claiming that respondent court acted arbitrarily and capriciously and with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to want or excess of jurisdiction when it
(1) issued the Order of July 1, 1985 “without      any evidence, documentary or testimonial, formally offered, had
virtually decided the case leaving only the question of damages and attorney’s
fees unresolved”; and (2) issued its subsequent orders setting the case.
For pre-trial despite two motions for disqualification filed against her; and
(3) ignored the two motions for inhibition.

*  *  *

[CA Decision, pp.  1-3; Rollo,
pp. 11-12-A.]

As earlier stated, the respondent Court of Appeals dismissed the
special civil action filed by petitioners and held that (1) any error committed
by the trial court in its factual or legal findings is correctible by appeal
and not by certiorari; (2) the trial court committed no whimsical or
capricious error in arriving at the legal conclusion that the city engineer
acted within the scope of his authority in issuing the demolition order; and
(3) the failure of the judge of the trial court to resolve the motion for her
disqualification did not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to continue
hearing the case.

As petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied, recourse
was sought in this Court.  The instant
petition for review specifically points out the following as errors allegedly
committed by the respondent court:

I

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE
CONSPIRACY BETWEEN THE MANILA CITY ENGINEER AND PRIVATE RESPONDENTS TO DESTROY
AND DEMOLISH PETITIONERS’ HOUSES, CARRIED OUT IN BAD FAITH, DECEIT, AND IN
UTTER DEPRIVATION OF DUE PROCESS– ALL THESE BY DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ORDER OF DEMOLITION
AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION WERE LEGAL AND PROPER.

III

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT CERTIORARI IS
NOT THE PROPER REMEDY IN THIS CASE.

IV

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE INHIBITION OF
RESPONDENT JUDGE WAS NOT CALLED FOR UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE.  [Rollo, pp. 87-88.]

I.  On the first assigned
error, petitioners contend that there was a conspiracy between the public respondents City
Engineer and Building Official of Manila and the private respondents Carmen Vda. de Reyes and Jaime de los Reyes, who are mother and son, as shown by the alleged
deceptions committed by the latter in: 
1) making it appear that private respondents Carmen Vda.
de Reyes and Jaime de los Reyes were the owners not
only of the lots but also of the houses; 2) sending the order of demolition
not  to the petitioners who claim to be
the owners of the houses but to “Jaime de los
Reyes, et al.” [Rollo, p. 4.]; and, 3) alleging
in their answer to the complaint for recovery of ownership and possession of
the disputed properties that Petitioners were legally and validly given notices
to vacate the premises in view of the demolition order.  Petitioners insist that because of the
failure of private respondents to notify them of the order of demolition, they
were rendered “helpless and unknowing of what was going on about
them” and they were not able to resort to the remedies accorded to them by
the National Building Code Rules and Regulations [Rollo,
p. 5.]

Petitioners’ contention of a conspiracy between the private
respondents and the Manila City Engineer to demolish their houses involves a factual matter.  The
well-established rule is that findings of facts of the trial court are entitled
to great respect and will not be disturbed except for strong and cogent reasons
[Mendoza v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-45898, December 18, 1987, 156 SCRA 597; Vda. de Roxas v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 64728, July
22, 1986, 143 SCRA 77; Republic v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No.
70594, October 10, 1986, 144 SCRA 705.] Here, the petitioners’ claim that
private respondents committed deception in failing to notify them of the order
of demolition was not given any credence by the trial court which found that
“what happened was their houses had been demolished’ through their
inaction” (Rollo, p. 47.] This is borne out by
the evidence on record.  Hence, although the demolition order was addressed to “Mr.
Jaime de los Reyes, et al.” as
owner of the property, the affected tenants including, the petitioners were
duly furnished with a copy of said order (See Original Records, p. 77.]
Since the demolition order which was dated June 11, 1984 was carried out only on July 9, 1984, petitioners therefore had ample time
to contest the said order and resort to the remedies available to them under
the National Building Code (Presidential Decree No. 1096) but this they failed
to do.  The Court therefore finds no
compelling reason to warrant setting aside the trial court’s findings, which
were affirmed by the appellate court.

II.  The
next issue revolves around the order of demolition dated June 11, 1984 issued by the respondent City
Engineer and Building Official of Manila on the subject buildings or structures
standing on the lots now in dispute, which were condemned as not fit for human
habitation.  According to petitioners,
the demolition order was illegal since the Building Official was not authorized
to issue the same.  Petitioners’ position
is that since the houses were also considered as nuisances, it is the district
health officer, not the Building Official who decides on the propriety of
abatement or demolition in view of the provision of Article 702 of the Civil
Code which states:

Article 702.  The district health officer shall determine
whether or not abatement, without judicial proceedings, is the best remedy
against a public nuisance.

This contention is untenable. 
The issue presented before the court, a quo is not really
whether the structures can be considered a nuisance under the Civil Code but
whether there has been a violation of the National Building Code so as to
warrant an order for the demolition of said structure.  Here, the Building Official was authorized to
issue the questioned demolition order in view of his finding that the disputed
structures are dangerous buildings and structures within the meaning of the
National Building Code (See Rule VII, Section 3, Implementing Rules and
Regulations of the National Building Code.] This factual finding will not be
disturbed by the court absent a showing of a clear, manifest and grave abuse of
discretion amounting to want of jurisdiction [Sagun et
al. v. People’s Homesite and Housing
Corporation, G.R. No. 44738, June 22,
1988.]

Contrary to petitioners’ position, the fact that the buildings in
question could also constitute nuisances under the Civil Code does not preclude
the Building Official from issuing the assailed demolition order.  Indeed, the National Building Code itself
provides that:

When any building or structure is found or declared to be dangerous
or ruinous, the Building Official shall order its repair, vacation or demolition
depending upon the degree of danger to life, health or safety.  This is without prejudice
to further action that may be taken
under the provisions of Articles 482 and
484 to 707 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines [Second paragraph of Section 214.]

III.  The
third issue deals with the propriety of certiorari as the remedy
resorted to by the petitioners from the questioned order of the trial judge.
Petitioners brought a special civil action for certiorari to the
appellate court on the ground that the respondent trial judge committed grave
abuse of discretion in issuing the order denying the writ of preliminary
injunction prayed for.

It must be borne in mind that the action of the court a quo
in denying the writ was premised on the failure of the petitioners to show that
they have a right to be protected and preserved during the pendency
of the case.  The trial court found
without any probative value the evidence adduced by petitioners to support
their claim of ownership by acquisitive prescription through continuous and
uninterrupted residence in the premises. 
On the other hand, the trial court found private respondents’ claim of
ownership based on a deed of sale executed in their favor on February 22, 1984 by Pilipinas Bank tenable [See Rollo,
p. 15 et seq.] In the aforesaid contract of sale, Pilipinas Bank conveyed to private respondents the
ownership of the disputed lots, Lot Nos. 2520 and 2512, among other lots, and
“all the buildings and improvements existing thereon and belonging to the
VENDOR” [Id. at p. 17.] Accordingly, the trial court held that:

 Rather, it is defendants
(private respondents herein) who have demonstrated the attribute of ownership
through the registration of the deed of conveyance over the lots and subsequent
issuance of transfer certificate of title in favor of defendants which could
not have been made without first paying the real estate taxes by them.  The jus disponendi
as an element of ownership was never questioned by the plaintiffs.  These negate the claim of plaintiffs that
their possession of the lots would ripen into ownership by prescription.  The title of defendants obtained under the
Torrens System is indefeasible and no title to registered land in derogation to
that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse
possession.

*   *   *

[Order of the RTC; Rollo,
p. 46.]

Petitioners however insist that
the following allegations in the answer (to the complaint) dated September 26,
1984, prepared and filed by the same counsel for the private respondents, Atty.
Manuel M. Maramba, constitute “judicial
admissions” [Section 2, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court) and
therefore do not require proof:

*   *   *

2.  That defendants hereby
specifically deny the allegations in paragraph III of the complaint,
the truth of the matter is that plaintiffs’ structures
are not of strong materials as alleged x x x.  (page 1, lines 31-34; underscors
supplied).

*  *  *

[Brief for the Petitioners, p. 8; Rollo, p. 94.]

Petitioners’ contention is untenable.  The phraseology used by the respondents does
not at all connote that they are acknowledging the petitioners as owners of the
demolished structures.  On the other
hand, petitioners, as tenants of the former owner of the property which was Pilipinas Bank, cannot deny the title of the private
respondents which passed to the latter by virtue of the deed of absolute sale
dated February 22, 1984
[Rule 131, Section 3 (b), Revised Rules of Court.]
Contrary to petitioners’ stand, the negation and avoidance of warranty
contained in said deed does not refer to ownership but only to physical
possession as can be gleaned from its clear terms:

The VENDOR does not warrant absolute and complete physical possession
of the premises.  It is understood and
agreed that the VENDEES accept the premises subject to any and all lease
contracts, verbal and otherwise, which may be outstanding.  . . . 
A list of tenants or persons staying on the premises is hereto attached
and marked Annex “A” and made part hereof;

*  *  *

[Rollo, p. 17;
Underscoring supplied.]

Among the tenants listed in said annex to the deed are
petitioners Elisa Nantes, wife of Arcangel Genoblazo and Areli de
Fiesta.  A review of the records shows
that petitioners were formally notified by Pilipinas
Bank of the change of ownership of the subject premises in a letter which
states:

*  *  *

We wish to inform you that the property which you are presently
occupying is now owned by Mr. Jaime de los Reyes and
Carmen Vda. de Reyes in view
of the Deed of Absolute Sale which the Bank executed in favor of the new
owners.

Your rentals on the premises due and/or to become due beginning
February 1984 shall therefore now be paid directly to the new owners. . .

*  *  *

[Record, p. 157.]

Clearly, petitioners’ claim of ownership over the subject
premises was totally unfounded.

It is a settled rule that the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction as an ancillary or preventive remedy to secure the rights of a party
in a pending case rests upon the sound discretion of the court taking
cognizance of the case.  The exercise of
sound judicial discretion by the lower court in injunctive matters should not
be interfered with except in case of manifest abuse [Yaptinchay
v. Torres, G.R. No. L-26462, June 9, 1969, 28 SCRA 489.] Consequently, since the petitioners failed
to make a clear showing that the trial judge gravely abused that discretion in
denying the writ on the basis of her findings, the appellate court correctly
denied the petition for certiorari before it [Rule 65, Section 1 of the
Revised Rules of Court; Tabil v. Ong,
G.R. No. L-46773, July 16, 1979,
91 SCRA 451.]

IV.  Finally, petitioners’ contention that
the respondent trial judge was disqualified from proceeding with the trial of
case is not well taken.  The sole ground
for disqualification of the respondent trial judge invoked by petitioners, i.e.,
the alleged partiality and prejudgment of the merits of the complaint is not
among the legal grounds for disqualification enumerated under Section 1 of Rule
137 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides:

Section 1. 
Disqualification of judges.
– No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife
or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee,
creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the
sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth
degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has
been an executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he
has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject
of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by
them and entered upon the record.

A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify
himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those
mentioned above.

While it is true that partiality and prejudgment may constitute a
just or valid reason for the trial judge to voluntarily inhibit himself from
hearing the case, it is not enough that the same be merely alleged.  It is now settled that mere suspicion that a
judge is partial to one of the parties to the case is not enough; there should
be evidence to prove the charge [Beltran V. Garcia, G.R. No. L-30868,
September 31,
1971, 41 SCRA 158.] In this case,
no such proof of partiality and prejudgment has been adduced.

Moreover, the trial judge acted correctly in proceeding with the
case by setting it for pre-trial since it is within her sound discretion, after
her decision in favor of her own competency, to either proceed with the trial
or refrain from acting on the case until determination of the issue of her
disqualification by the appellate court [Section 2 of Rule 137 of the Revised
Rules of Court; De la Paz v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra, at
76.]

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the respondent Court
of Appeals being in conformity with settled law and jurisprudence,
is AFFIRMED and the instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for
lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, and
Bidin, JJ., concur.

Fernan, C.J., no part, respondent Del Rosario is related to me.