ISIDRO, ZENAIDA, IRWIN, ZENDA AND DORNET, ALL SURNAMED ANIMOS, PETITIONERS, VS. PHILIPPINE VETERANS AFFAIRS OFFICE, ITS ADMINISTRATOR, JUAN L. GACAD, AND THE COURT OF APPEALS, R…

The Court grants this petition assailing the decision of the
Court of Appeals.*

The case originated from a suit for mandamus commenced by
the petitioners against the respondent, the Philippine Veterans Affairs Office,
to compel payments by the said respondent of full pension benefits, retroactive
to 1947, under Republic Act No. 65 as amended. 
The Regional Trial Court** dismissed the case on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction.  The petitioners
then appealed to the respondent, the Court of Appeals, which however rendered
an affirmance.

The antecedent facts are stated by the Solicitor General.  We quote:

lsidro Animos
is a veteran of World War II, having been a member of the USAFFE and later of
the guerilla forces during the war.

On October 18, 1946, Republic Act No. 65 was approved, providing
for a Bill of Rights for Officers and Enlisted Men of the Philippine Army,
Recognized and Deserving Guerilla Organizations, and Veterans of the Philippine
Revolution.  Section 9 thereof provides:

“SEC. 9.  The persons mentioned
in sections one and two hereof who are permanently incapacitated from work
owing to sickness, disease, or inju­ries sustained in line of duty, shall be given a life pension of fifty
pesos a month unless they are actually receiving a similar pension from other
Government funds, and shall receive, in addition, the necessary hospitalization
and medical care.”

Pursuant to the above provision, Animos
filed with the Philippine Veterans Board (now Philippine Veterans Affairs
Office, or PVAO, for short) a claim for disability pension benefit.  Upon medical examination, Animos
was found to have incurred partial physical disability due to a gunshot wound, and was awarded 25% pension benefit
effective November 18, 1947, in the amount of P12.50 a month.

On June 21, 1957, Republic Act No. 1920 was approved amending Sec.
9 of Rep. Act No. 65, which increased the life pension from P50.00 to P100.00,
plus P10.00 a month for each unmarried minor child below 18 years of age.  Subsequently, on June 22, 1969, Rep. Act No. 5373 took effect which further amended
said Sec. 9 and increased the basic monthly pension from P100.00 to P200.00,
plus P30.00 a month for the wife and P30.00 a month for each unmarried child
below 18 years.

It appears that on September 27, 1955, Animos
filed an application for dependents’ pension benefits.  The application was however disapproved on
September 4, 1956, on the ground that Animos was not
totally incapacitated.

Upon the required re-evaluation of his partial physical disability,
Animos was re-rated to be 30% disabled on November
25, 1964 and was correspondingly
granted a P30.00 monthly pension.  Again,
on August 4, 1970, Animos was re-rated to be 50%
disabled and was granted a P50.00 monthly pension.  Reassessments made on April 22, 1975 and June
11, 1982 showed that Animos’ partial disability
remained unchanged at 50%.

Animos’ numerous written requests to be granted the
maximum pension benefit as well as dependents’ pension benefits were all
disapproved.  Thus, on November 23, 1982,
Animos, his wife and children filed a petition for mandamus
with the then Court of First Instance of Albay
against the PVAO, to compel that office to increase his monthly pension,
alleging that since the rules on disability rating of the latter are contrary
to law, Animos, who was granted a lifetime pension
for his disability should be paid the maximum pension benefits, including
pension for his wife and minor children.^[1]

In dismissing the petition, the trial court held that
“should petitioner’s claim be upheld for the satisfaction of veteran’s
benefits for the years up to the presents, or a period of about 40 years, the
defendant may not be in a position, legally and budgetary-wise, to comply with
the court’s award as sufficient treasury funds therefor
could only be appropriated for that purpose by the legislature,”^[2]
and ruled that the petition was “in effect a money claim against the
government”^[3]
over which it did not have jurisdiction. 
In sustaining the trial court, the Courts of Appeals added that mandamus
does not lie to interfere with discretion, and that the petitioner had failed
to exhaust administrative remedies.

On the question of procedure, the controlling precedents are Begoso v. Chairman, Philippine Veterans Administration^[4]
and Teoxon v. Members of the Board of Administrators,
Philippine Veterans Administration,^[5]
in which we held:

1.  The fourth assignment of
error assails what it considers to be the failing of the lower court in not
holding that the complaint in this case is in effect a suit against the State
which has not given its consent thereto.  We have recently had occasion to reaffirm the
force and primacy of the doctrine of non-suability.  It does not admit of doubt, then, that if the
suit were in fact against the State, the lower court should have dismissed the
complaint.  Nor is it to be doubted that
while ostensibly an action may be against a public official, the defendant may
in reality be the government.  As a
result, it is equally well-settled that where a litigation may have adverse
consequences on the public treasury, whether in the disbursements of funds or
loss of property, the public official proceeded against not being liable in his
personal capacity, then the doctrine of non-suability may appropriately be
invoked.  It has no application, however,
where the suit against such a functionary had to be instituted because of his
failure to comply with the duty imposed by statute appropriating public funds
for the benefit of plaintiff or petitioner. 
Such is the present case.

The doctrine announced by us in Ruiz v. Cabahug
finds relevance:  “We hold that
under the facts and circumstances alleged in the amended com­plaint, which
should be taken on its face value, the suit is not one against the Government,
or a claim against it, but one against the officials to compel them to act in
accordance with the rights to be established by the contending architects, or to prevent them from
making payment and recognition until the contending architects have established
their respective rights and interests in the funds retained and in the credit
for the work done.” As a matter of fact, in an earlier case where we
sustained the power of a private citizen claiming title to and right of
possession of a certain property to sue an officer or agent of the government
alleged to be illegally withholding the same, we like­wise expressed this
caveat:  “However, and this is
important, where the judgment in such a case would result not only in the
recovery of possession of the property in favor of said citizen but also in a
charge against or finan­cial liability to the Government, then the suit should
be regarded as one against the government itself, and, consequently, it cannot
prosper or be validly entertained by the courts except with the consent of said
Government.”

2.  Nor is the third
assignment of error to the effect that the lower court did not require appellee to exhaust his administrative remedies before
coming to court any more persuasive.  An
excerpt from the leading case of Gonzales v. Hechanova,
the opinion being penned by the present Chief Justice, clearly demonstrates why appellants’ argument in this
respect is unavailing:  “Respondents
assail petitioner’s right to the reliefs prayed for
because he ‘has not exhausted all administrative remedies available to him
before coming to court.’ We have already held, however, that the princi­ple
requiring the previous exhaustion of administrative remedies is not applicable
where the question in dispute is purely a legal one, or where the controverted act is patently illegal or was performed
without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or where the respondent is a
department secretary, whose acts as an alter-ego of the President bear the
implied or assumed approval of the latter, unless actually disapproved by him,
or where there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial
intervention.” The Gonzales doctrine, it is to be noted, summarized the
views announced in earlier cases.  The
list of subsequent cases reiterating such a doctrine is quite impressive.  To be more specific, where there is a
stipulation of facts, as in this case, the question before the lower court
being solely one of law and on the face of the decision, the actuation of
appellants being patently illegal, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies certainly does not come into play.^[6]

Mandamus therefore lies, and failure to exhaust remedies
is no defense against payment.

We come to the merits.

The denial of the petitioner’s claim was predicated on the
finding that his disabilities were, based on the respondent’s “Rules on
Disability Ratings”, partial rather than total, a condition that precludes
payment of maximum pension benefits.  The
petitioner submits that the very rating system adopted by the respondent
veterans’ office is null and void.

The applicable provision is Section 9 of Republic Act No. 65, as
amended, as follows:

SEC. 9.  The persons
mentioned in sections one and two hereof who are permanently incapacitated from
work owing to sickness, disease, or injuries sustained in line of duty, shall
be given a life pension of two hundred pesos a month, and thirty pesos a month
for his wife and each of his unmarried minor children below eighteen years of
age, unless they are actually receiving a similar pension from other Government
funds, and shall receive, in addition, the necessary hospitalization and
medical care.^[7]

In Begoso, supra, as well as Teoxon, supra, this Court held that bare rules promulgated
by the Philippine Veterans Administration, now the Philippine Veterans’ Affairs
Office, cannot overrule the mandate of statute, on the fundamental principle
that “an administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress.'”^[8]
In the case at bar, there is no gainsaying the fact that the petitioner had
been enjoying pension benefits, albeit partial, pursuant to the provisions of
Section 9, supra, upon the premise that he was qualified thereto.  Hence, the Government must pay him maximum
pension benefits.  The fact that his
injuries, based on the respondent’s ratings, have been classified as “partial”
cannot erase the equal fact that he is “permanently incapacitated”
under the law.  Section 9 refers simply
to “permanent incapacity” and makes no distinctions as a condition
sine qua non to compensa­bility.  It does
not require such an incapacity to be total or partial and neither does it
authorize the PVAO to make a gradation of injuries.  It is axiomatic that where the law does not
distinguish, let no one distinguish.  The
classifications or ratings formulated by the respondent body amount to an amendment
of the law at the adminis­trative level, and to that extent, they are null and
void.

The case of Board of Administrators, PVA v. Agcaoili,^[9]
which the Solicitor General invokes does not apply.  In that case, we denied pension for the plain
reason that the applicant was not permanently incapaci­tated.  But we did not, consequently, uphold,
expressly or by implication, the PVAO’s rules in said
case, the appli­cant being disqualified in any event.  If we did, it was because their validity was
not specifically challenged.  Needless to
state, we did not abandon either Begoso or Teoxon therein.

It is pure conjecture to say that the petitioner “had no
more service-connected disability to hang on and should not have been denied
continued disability pension were it not for the compassionate regard by
respondents to the veterans of World War II.”^[10]
The fact of the matter is that the respondent had consistently paid the
petitioner pension benefits for the past forty years, meaning to say that he
was (is) entitled thereto.  It would be
an act of injustice to deny him now what, by strong constitutional
presumptions, is due him.

Neither is it a matter of charity or compassion.  The PVAO is vested with no discretion to deny
payment where payments is due and conversely, to pay when payment is not due.

“The State,” declares the Constitution (1973),
“shall establish, maintain, and ensure adequate social services in the
field of education, health, housing, employment, welfare, and social security
to guarantee the enjoyment by the people of a decent standard of living.”^[11]
Under the present Constitution, the State’s concern for war veterans finds an
even more emphatic expression:

SEC. 9.  The State shall
promote a just and dynamic social order that will ensure the prosperity and
independence of the nation and free the people from poverty through policies
that provides adequate social services,
promote full employment, a rising standard of living, and an improved quality
of life for all.^[12]

xxx                                 xxx 
                             xxx

Sec. 7.  The State shall
provide immediate and adequate care, benefit, and other forms of assistance to
war veterans and veterans of military campaigns, their surviving spouses and orphans. 
Funds shall be provided therefor and due
consideration shall be given them in the disposition of agricultural lands of
the public domain and, in appropriate cases, in the utilization of natural
resources.^[13]

In the face of clear State policy, the burden is consequently on
the Government to show that the applicant is not qualified for pension.  The applicant enjoys a presumed qualification
upon a simple demonstration that he had fought in the war and had suffered a
permanent incapacity as a result thereof.

The records show that the petitioner suffered various injuries,
in his ear arising from a bombing in Atimonan, Quezon (where elements of the Japanese Imperial Army
landed, after they had established a beachhead at Vigan,
Ilocos Sur, two days after
the Pearl Harbor bombing which commenced World War II in the Pacific area), and
other parts of his body due to bullets and bayonets.^[14]
There is no showing that his wounds have since healed.  Hence, they are “permanent” within
the intendment of the veterans’ Bill of Rights. 
As we said, the fact that they are partial rather than total is of no
moment. “Permanent incapacity”, under Republic Act No. 65,
contemplates an injury or ailment sustained in battle, permanent or incurable
in character, and such that it impedes normal work.  But the statute does not require that the
veteran be utterly unable to work by reason of the injury or ailment, or
otherwise, “totally disabled”. 
To say that it does is to reduce the law into a simple social security
measure, similar to workmen’s compensation, rather than an act of gratitude by
the State to the brave veterans of the last two wars in the country.

Further, to say that Republic Act No. 26 applies only to veterans
totally disabled for work is to make the Act the veterans’ sole source of
income (by virtue of the prohibition against multiple compensations under
Sections 9 and 10).  Certainly, P230.00 a
month^[15]
— the amount of pension under the Act — is hardly “compensation”
for any common tao, let alone a totally disabled
citizen.  This could not have been the
intent of the legislature.

The clear implication is that the PVAO may not rate disabilities
in the same manner they are evaluated under our laws on employees’
compensation.  So long as a veteran’s
incapacity is permanent, the veteran is entitled to payment.

Alleged budgetary constraints or lack of appropriation are no
obstacles to payment.  In Español v. Chairman, Philippine Veterans Administration,^[16]
we ordered “therestoration of [the petitioner’s]
monthly pension and her children’s monthly dependent’s pension provided for by
R.A. No. 65, as amended, the coverage of which Congress had already
appropriated funds [for].”^[17]
The instant case presents a similar situation. 
In asking for retroactive pension, what the petitioner in reality seeks
is the “restoration” of full pension benefits long denied him on
account of the PVAO’s improper application of
Republic Act No. 65, and the funds for which have been undoubtedly
appropriated.

To the extent that this decision is incompatible with our
decision in PVAO vs. Asterio Q. Tamayo,
promulgated on July 29, 1988, G.R. No. 74322, the latter is therefore
considered changed.

The war veterans loom as the forgotten heroes of this
generation.  This is the reality both
unfortunate and tragic.  What has been
lost on many is the fact that it was because of their bravery and sacrifice
that we are a free people today.

They stand as shining mementos of our struggle for emancipation
from the colonial yoke.  With crude boloes and primitive spears but with abundant courage in
their hearts they fought the white man’s arsenal of rifles and cannons,
overcame it, and finished a revolution. 
They fought with no anticipation of a prize, reward, or medal, but in
obedient and unquestioning response to duty to country.

It was they who, four decades later, would lead the resistance
against the Japanese invaders.  Poorly
trained, fed, and equipped but encouraged by a firmness of will, they offered
their lives and many forfeited theirs — amid superior firepower from the
enemy.  Like the revolutionaries, they
were not conscripts but volunteers.  And
like them, they fought without any expectation of laurels or citations but in
order that liberty shall dawn upon the land.

The Court strongly stresses that Republic Act No. 65, the
veterans’ Bill of Rights, was not meant to compensate alone veterans for the
wounds of war.  It is, above all, a
gesture of gratitude on the part of the State and a tribute to their gallantry
and selfless love of country.  Though
valor cannot be measured in terms of money, money is the best we can offer for
the moment.  And if we cannot do more,
let us do no less.  This case should not
have indeed reached this Court had not insensitivity gotten the better of Government
functionaries.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

The respondent, the Philippine Veterans Affairs Office, is
ORDERED to pay the petitioner, his spouse, and qualified children, full pension
benefits plus such other and further increments as may be provided for by law,
effective November 18, 1947.  No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr.,
Cruz, Paras, Gancayco,
Padilla, Bidin, Cortes, Griño-Aquino,
Medialdea, and
Regalado, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., joins
C.J., Fernan, in his
separate dissenting opinion.

Narvasa J., dissent and vote to adhere to the ruling in G.R. No. 74322 (Phil.
Veterans Affairs Office v. Tamayo, July 29, 1988).

*
CA-G.R. SP No. 10496, Eleventh Division; Francisco, Ricardo, J., Lombos-de la Fuente, Lorna and Benipayo, Alfredo, JJ., Concurring.

**
Regional Trial Court, Fifth Judicial Region, Branch VII, Legazpi City;
Hon. Domingo Reyes, Presiding Judge.

^[1] Rollo, 68-71.

^[2] Id., 18.

^[3] Id.

^[4]
No. L-25916, April 30, 1970,
32 SCRA 466.

^[5]
No. L-25619, June 30, 1970,
33 SCRA 585.

^[6] Begoso v.
Chairman, Philippine Veterans Administration, 471-474.  With respect to the defense prescription, see
Español v. Chairman, Philippine Veterans
Administration, No. L-44616, June 29, 1985, 137 SCRA 314.

^[7]
II PPGS (Rev. Ed.) 468; emphasis in original.

^[8] Teoxon v. Members of the Board of Administrators,
Philippine Veterans Administration, 589.

^[9]
No. L-38129, July 23 1974,
58 SCRA 72.

^[10] Rollo, id.,
32; emphasis in original.

^[11]
CONST. (1973), art. II, sec. 7.

^[12]
CONST. (1987), art. II, sec. 9.

^[13] Supra, art. XVI, sec. 7.

^[14] Rollo, id.,
16.

^[15]
P200.00 a month for the veteran and P30.00 a month for his spouse for each
unmarried child.

^[16] Supra

^[17] Supra, 320.

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