VICTORINO E. DAY, PETITIONER, VS. THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ZAMBOANGA CITY, BRANCH XIII, PRESIDED BY HON. JUDGE CARLITO A. EISMA, AND GO CHU, RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition to review the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Zamboanga City, Branch XIII dated July 8,
1986 setting aside the decision of the Municipal Trial Court of Zamboanga City, Branch II in Civil Case No. 3717 (169-11).

The following, in brief, are the facts of the case:

Herein petitioner Victorino Day is the
registered owner of a parcel of land covered by Original Certificate of Title
No. P-2667 and situated at Tomas Claudio St.,
Zamboanga City.  Private respondent Go Chu
is the owner of a building constructed on the said lot occupying an area of 101 square meters.

Private respondent was asked by petitioner to peacefully vacate
and remove that portion of the former’s building standing on the latter’s lot.  Due to private respondent’s refusal to vacate
the premises, on April 17, 1982,
petitioner instituted a formal complaint against respondent with the Office of
the Barangay Chairman, Zone I, Zamboanga City.  As no amicable settlement could be reached in
the case, the Barangay Chairman, on April 20, 1982, issued a
certification that conciliation of the dispute at the barangay level had failed.  (MTC Decision, Annex “A”, Petition, pp. 1-2; Rollo,
p. 25).

The dispute was continuously discussed by the parties through
1982, 1983, and 1984.  On October 16, 1984, petitioner agreed
to accept P1,000.00 from private respondent as rental
for the use of his lot from 1979 to
December 1984.  As petitioner had received the P1,000.00 as compensation for respondent’s use of his land,
respondent claimed the existence of a lease contract between them.  Respondent Go Chu,
however, failed to prove the existence of a formal or even verbal contract of
lease.

On January 15, 1985,
petitioner again made another demand on private respondent to remove the
building.  Because of private respondent‘s adamant and
continued refusal to vacate the disputed lot, petitioner filed on March 25,
1985 an action for unlawful detainer with application
for a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction.  Apparently,
petitioner Day did not use the former Barangay
Certification in commencing the said suit against private respondent.  On April
15, 1986, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner Day, the dispositive
portion reading as follows:

“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing findings of facts
judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant
to remove that portion of his building which stands on the 101 square meters
over plaintiff’s property; to pay plaintiff the amount of P950.00 monthly compensation
from January 1986 until defendant
vacates the premises; to pay attorney’s fees in the sum of P5,000.00 and to pay the costs of the
action.  Defendant’s compulsory
counterclaims are hereby ordered dismissed.” (Rollo,
p. 27)

On April 23, 1986,
without having first filed a motion for reconsideration, private respondent Go Chu filed an original action for certiorari with
respondent court, against Judge Cabato and petitioner
Victorino Day. 
Pending hearing of the application for preliminary injunction, respondent
court issued a temporary restraining order in the case.

On May 12, 1986,
petitioner filed his Answer and
Opposition to the Petition, to which private respondent filed a reply.

At the hearing of the application for preliminary injunction, the
parties waived further oral arguments and submitted the case based on their
pleadings and documents.

On May 27, 1986,
respondent court issued an order resolving all the matters and issues in the
petition in favor of herein petitioner Day, that the
petition on its main is “lacking in merit except that there are still certain
matters which the respondent court would like
to resolve after hearing thereon.” (Rollo,
p. 3).  The application for
preliminary injunction was likewise denied and the hearing of the main petition
was set on June 24, 1986.  At
the said hearing, respondent court gave the parties opportunity to adduce
additional arguments on the merits of the case. 
They, however, submitted the case for decision without further
arguments, relying therefore on the pleadings and documents on record.

On July 8, 1986,
however, respondent court issued another order granting the petition for certiorari
and setting aside the decision of Judge Cabato of the
Municipal Trial Court.  In connection
therewith, the parties were directed to submit their dispute
before the Lupong Tagapayapa
pursuant to the requirements of PD 1508. 
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied on June 25,
1987.

Hence, this petition.

The following issues are presented for the court’s determination:

1)      Whether or not the
respondent court may modify or reverse its own order (of May 27, 1986) after the lapse of 15 days from its
issuance;

2)      Whether or not B.P.
129 allows the plaintiff in an unlawful detainer case
to apply for a writ of preliminary injunction;

3)      Whether or not prior
conciliation proceedings pursuant to P. D. 1508 is applicable to petitioner’s
suit in the Municipal Trial Court;

4)      Whether or not
respondent court may entertain the petition for review on certiorari when the proper remedy is ordinary appeal;

5)      Whether or not
respondent court, in a petition for certiorari,
may entertain procedural questions or questions of facts or substance already
decided by the lower court; and

6)      Whether or not
respondent court may grant a Writ of Certiorari
on grounds other than those specified under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court.

On the first issue, petitioner maintains that the respondent
court had no jurisdiction to reverse its own order
after the lapse of 15 days from its issuance because the May 27, 1986 order was a final order, all issues in the main petition having been
resolved therein.  Said controversial
order reads as follows:

“Although the primary objective of this order is the determination
of whether or not to issue a writ of preliminary injunction in the instant
case, yet in the consideration thereof,
the Court finds the main petition for certiorari as it appears on the
pleadings to be LACKING IN
MERIT.  Hence, it follows that where the petitioner is
not entitled to the primary relief
demanded, he cannot likewise be entitled to the ancilliary
remedy of injunction, because injunction is not to protect contingent or future
right or enforce an abstract right (EMILIA VS. RADO,
23 SCRA 1983) or to protect a right not in esse.  (DIZON VS. YATCO, 13
SCRA 167).  However, there are STILL CERTAIN MATTERS in the main petition that can only be completely resolved after a hearing
thereon.” (underlining ours) And the Petition was
set for hearing on June 24, 1986.”
(Rollo, p. 4-A)

According to petitioner, since the respondent court resolved no
new or other matter in its July 8, 1986
order, the May 27, 1986
order should be considered as already a final one insofar as the issues
resolved therein are concerned.  To quote
the petitioner, “this phrase ‘certain matters’ referred to by the
respondent court did not touch or dwell on ‘certain matters’ not yet passed
upon by it, but reversed itself on the same matters already resolved by it
earlier after the lapse of the 15-day
period without any motion for reconsideration ever asked by herein private
respondent Go Chu.” (Petition, p. 4)

Private respondent, on the other hand, argues that the order of
May 27, 1986, was merely an interlocutory order that did not finally dispose of
the action and that the dispositive portion thereof
dealt only with the preliminary injunction incident; that the denial of the
issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction and the setting of further
hearing on the main petition was the highlight of the said order and that since
the order was interlocutory in nature, nothing precluded respondent judge from
further hearing the case after the issuance of the May 27, 1986 order and
deciding it on its merits on July 8, 1986.

We find the contention of the    petitioner meritorious.  In the case of de Ocampo
v. Republic, L-19533, Oct. 13, 1963, 9 SCRA 440, this
Court said.  “The test to ascertain whether an order is interlocutory or final is:  does it leave something to be done in the court
with respect to the merits of the case? 
If it does, it is interlocutory: 
if it does not, it is final.” In
the instant case, it is evident that
the respondent court resolved no new or other matter in the order of July 8, 1986.  Such being the case, it necessarily follows
that the order of May 27, 1986
should be deemed as a final order in so far as the issues resolved therein are concerned. 
An order which decides an issue or issues in a complaint is final and appealable, although the other issue or issues have not
been resolved, if the latter issues are distinct and separate from the others.  Thus, the respondent court was without
jurisdiction to modify or reverse the earlier order after the expiration of fifteen (15) days from and after
receipt thereof by the parties, considering that there was no motion for
reconsideration filed by then private respondent Go Chu.

As regards the second issue, We agree with
petitioner that Section 33 of B.P. 129 allows the plaintiff in an unlawful detainer action to apply for a writ of preliminary
injunction.  With the
advent of B.P.129, Art. 539 of the New Civil Code, Sec. 88 of the
Judiciary Act of 1948, and Sec. 3, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court have
been substantially modified.  B.P.
129 provides:  “provided the main action is within its jurisdiction, an
inferior court can appoint a receiver
and it has jurisdiction to issue a writ of preliminary injunction in either
forcible entry or unlawful detainer cases.” (Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium,
Second Revised Edition, p. 33). 
“Under the present law, an inferior court has jurisdiction to grant
provisional remedies in proper cases. 
These proper cases would be:

1) Preliminary
attachment under Rule 57, provided the principal action is within its
jurisdiction such as an action for recovery of personal property valued at not
more than P20,000.00; an action for recovery of a sum of money not exceeding
P20,000.00; an action of forcible entry and unlawful detainer.

2)  Preliminary injunction under Rule 58 in both
forcible entry and unlawful detainer also in cases
mentioned in the preceding paragraph.” (Dean Jose Y. Feria, Phil. Legal Studies, Series No. 1, the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, 1981 edition, pp. 43-44).

The third issue centers on the applicability of prior
conciliation proceedings pursuant to P.D. 1508, section 6 of which reads as
follows:

“Sec. 6.  Conciliation, pre-condition
to filing of complaint.  – No
complaint, petition, action or proceeding involving any matter within the authority
of the Lupon as provided
in Sec. 2 hereof shall be filed or instituted in court or any other government
office for adjudication unless there has been a confrontation of the parties
before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat
and no conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified by the Lupon Secretary or the Pangkat
Secretary, attested by the Lupon or Pangkat Chairman, or unless the settlement has been
repudiated.  However, the parties may go
directly to court in the following cases:

(1)  where
the accused is under detention;

(2)  where
a person has otherwise been deprived of
personal liberty calling for habeas
corpus proceedings;

(3) actions coupled with provisional remedies such as preliminary
injunction, attachment, delivery of personal property and support pendente lite; and

(4)  where
the action may otherwise be barred by the Statute of Limitations.

It is clear from the foregoing that prior conciliation
proceedings as mandated by P.D. 1508 were
inapplicable to the petitioner’s suit before the Municipal
Trial Court of Zamboanga City, the action being for ejectment with application for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction.  P.D. 1508
provides that an action “coupled with provisional remedies such as preliminary injunction,” etc. does
not require conciliation
proceedings as a pre-condition for filing an action in court.  The case of petitioner being an exception to the requirement of prior
conciliation by P.D. 1508, it was not necessary for petitioner to first secure
the necessary certification to file action from the proper barangay
court.  Even assuming that petitioner’s
complaint for ejectment in the Municipal Trial Court
did not fall within the exceptions enumerated in Sec. 6 of P.D. 1508, the lower court in its decision ruled that
the April 1982 certification to file action issued by the proper Barangay Court was sufficient
compliance with P.D. 1508.

As to the fourth issue, private respondent is of the firm belief
that the action he filed before
the respondent Regional Trial Court was both an original action for certiorari and a petition for certiorari as a mode of appeal.  We disagree. 
Applying Sec. 22 of
B.P. 129 (governing law in the matter of appeals from the inferior
courts to the Regional Trial
Courts), decisions of inferior courts
may be elevated to the Regional Trial Court only by ordinary appeal, that is, by filing a Notice of Appeal
with the inferior court.  The said proviso does not admit of any other mode of elevating decisions
of inferior courts to the Regional Trial Court presumably to carry out the purpose of B.P. 129 which
is to simplify judicial procedure
to effect a speedy administration of justice.

Anent the fifth issue, We hold that
respondent court has no jurisdiction in a certiorari case to entertain procedural questions
or questions of facts or substance already passed upon by the lower court.  The barangay
certificate of 1982 was admitted and found to be sufficient by the Municipal
Trial Court, Branch II, Zamboanga City,
after considering the circumstances surrounding its issuance.  This is a
procedural question or a question
of fact which cannot be raised or corrected in a certiorari case,
but should be assigned as error and reviewed in the appeal properly taken from
the decision rendered by the trial court on the merits of the case.  (Lamagan v. de la Cruz, 40 SCRA 101).  It should be remembered that except for the lower court’s admission
in evidence of the Barangay Certification of 1982 and
the said court’s appreciation of the said
Certification as
sufficient compliance with P.D. 1508, the respondent court’s order
(RTC), which is herein sought to be nullified,
resolved all the matters raised by private respondent in his petition, against
the latter.  Admissibility of evidence is
a matter that is addressed to the
sound discretion of the trial court (the lower court in this case).  Such being the case, no potent reason existed
to justify respondent court’s
substitution of the lower court’s judgment with its own judgment.

“Errors in the appreciation of evidence may not be reviewed by certiorari because they do not involve any jurisdictional question.” (Mujer v.
CFI of Laguna, 35 O.G. 1384; Abig v. Constantino, L-12460, May 31, 1961).

Further, in an original action
for certiorari, questions of fact cannot be raised much less
passed upon by the respondent court. 
Thus, it has been ruled that:

“Questions of fact cannot be raised in an original action for certiorari.  Only established or admitted facts can be considered.” (Rubio vs. Reyes, et al., L-24581, May 27, 1968)

It is therefore clear that respondent court erred in reversing the lower court’s findings regarding the sufficiency of the Barangay Certificate of 1982.  It was an error for the respondent court to rule upon a
question of fact or procedural question already decided by the lower court.

Finally, the question on whether
or not the respondent court can grant
a writ of certiorari
on grounds other than those specified under Sec. 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court.  Our answer is in the negative.

In an original action for certiorari under Sec. 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the grounds for the issuance of the Writ
of Certiorari are as follows, to wit:

(a) Lack of jurisdiction;

(b) Grave abuse of discretion; and

(c) When the court acts without or in excess of jurisdiction.

We
have consistently adhered to the principle that only errors of jurisdiction are correctible by certiorari.  As
early as in the case of
Herrera vs. Barreto, 25 Phil 245, 271, the Supreme court
ruled:  “The office of the Writ of Certiorari has been reduced to the correction of defects of jurisdiction solely and cannot
legally be used for any other purpose.”

Clearly, the only grounds which may serve as the basis for the
respondent court to raise the writ of certiorari are lack of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion by the inferior court or that the said inferior court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in its
appreciation of the barangay certification as
constituting sufficient compliance with P.D. 1508.

In the ejectment suit filed by petitioner against private
respondent, the lower court undoubtedly acquired jurisdiction over the subject
matter and over the person of then defendant (now private respondent) by the
filing of the complaint and service of summons upon then defendant (now private
respondent) and the filing by the latter of his answer.  Thus, it cannot be said that the lower court
had no jurisdiction to render the decision set aside by respondent court.  Assuming that the lower court committed a
mistake on the merits of the case, it was in
the exercise of such jurisdiction. 
The error, if at all, is
at most one of judgment and not of jurisdiction, which cannot be the object of
a petition for certiorari.  The
proper remedy in such case was appeal. 
Errors in the application of the law and the appreciation of evidence
committed by a court after it
has acquired jurisdiction over a case, are correctible only by appeal (So Chu vs. Nepomuceno, 29 Phil. 208; Valencia
vs. Victoriano, 50 O.G. 5815, Dec. 1954 (CA) citing
Herrera v. Barreto,
et al., 26 Phil. 245).

Neither can it be said that the lower court committed a grave
abuse of discretion or exceeded its jurisdiction
when it appreciated the barangay certification as sufficient compliance with P.D.
1508.  In the petition for certiorari
filed by private respondent before the respondent court, he did not allege that
the lower court’s decision was outside or in excess of its jurisdiction, or was
issued in grave abuse of discretion. 
Private respondent merely alleged that the lower court “erroneously”: 
appreciated facts and evidence, issued interlocutory orders, and
appreciated the issues.  He also
challenged the soundness of the decision. 
These do not constitute excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion.  It must be remembered that
there is “excess of
jurisdiction” where the court has jurisdiction but has transcended the same or acted without any statutory
authority.  (Soriano
vs. del Rosario, 55 Phil. 924).  There is “grave abuse of
discretion” when there is a
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
amounting to lack of jurisdiction or
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reasons of passion or personal
hostility, and it is so patent and gross as to amount to an invasion of
positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined or
to act at all in
contemplation of law.  (Tavera-Luna, Inc.
vs. Nable, 67 Phil. 341).  We
find no such grave abuse of
discretion committed by the lower court in appreciating the barangay certification to be sufficient compliance with P.
D. 1508.  In fact, the respondent court
categorically ruled that there was no grave abuse of discretion or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the lower court when it held that:

“The foregoing recital and discussions
of each particular questioned act of the respondent judge would plainly show
that no grave abuse of discretion has been committed by him.  If any, they could have been assigned as
errors in an ordinary appeal, which to the mind of the Court should have been
the remedy resorted to by the herein petitioner.” (Paragaph 2, Page
5 of the Order of the Respondent Court dated May 27, 1986.) (Rollo, p. 142)

WHEREFORE, finding merit in the appeal of petitioner, the
assailed order of the respondent court is hereby SET ASIDE and the order of the
Municipal Trial Court of Zamboanga City, Branch II in
Civil Case No. 3717 (169-11) is hereby
REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman),
Padilla, Sarmiento, and
Regalado, JJ., concur.