ROMEO S. CHUA, PETITIONER, VS. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, DENNIS CANOY, AND ALEX DE LEON, RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court
assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 7, 1987 which nullified
the orders dated April 18, 1986 and May 19, 1986 of the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu City Branch VIII.

The facts of the case are not disputed. On April 12, 1986, Judge Lauro V. Francisco of the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu City Branch XIII, after examining 2Lt. Dennis P. Canoy and two
(2) other witnesses, issued a
search warrant directing the immediate search of the premises of R.R.
Construction located at M.J. Cuenco Avenue, Cebu City, and the seizure of an
Isuzu dump truck with plate number GAP-175. At twelve noon of the same date, respondent Canoy seized the aforesaid
vehicle and took custody thereof.

On April 14, 1986, a civil action for Replevin/Sum of Money for
the recovery of possession of the same Isuzu dump truck was filed by petitioner
against respondent Canoy and one “John Doe” in the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu City Branch VIII, presided by Judge Leonardo B. Cañares and
docketed thereat as Civil Case No. CEB 4384 alleging among other things,
petitioner’s lawful ownership and possession of the subject vehicle; that he
has not sold the subject vehicle to anyone; that he has not stolen nor
carnapped it, and that he has never been charged of the crime of carnapping or
any other crime for that matter. Further, petitioner questioned the validity of the search warrant and
the subsequent seizure of the subject vehicle on the strength of the aforesaid
search warrant.

On the same date, April 14, 1986, Judge Cañares of the Regional
Trial Court of Cebu City Branch VIII directed the issuance of a writ of replevin
upon the posting of a bond in the amount of one hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00). The writ of replevin was
also issued on the same date, and the subject vehicle was seized on 15 April
1986 by Deputy Sheriff Galicano V. Fuentes.

On April 16, 1986, respondent Canoy filed a motion for the
dismissal of the complaint and for the quashal of the writ of replevin. The motion was opposed by petitioner. The motion to dismiss and to quash the writ
of replevin was denied in an Order dated April 18, 1986. A motion for reconsideration of the
aforementioned Order was filed and was opposed by petitioner. In an order dated May 19, 1986, the Regional
Trial Court of Cebu Branch VIII denied the motion for reconsideration and
directed the delivery of the subject vehicle to petitioner. Not
satisfied, herein private respondents filed with the Court of Appeals a
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition praying for the nullification of
the orders dated April 18, 1986 and May 19, 1986.

Meanwhile, a case for Carnapping docketed as I.S. No. 86-185,
entitled “Alex De Leon, Complainant, vs. Romeo Chua, Respondent”
pending preliminary investigation before the Office of the City Fiscal of Cebu
City was provisionally dismissed upon motion of Romeo Chua with the following reservation: “without prejudice to its reopening
once the issue of ownership is resolved”, (Rollo, p. 62).

In a decision dated May 7, 1987, the Court of Appeals reversed
the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City Branch VIII, and nullified the questioned
orders. The appellate court ordered the
dismissal of the Replevin action, and directed that possession of the subject
vehicle be restored to Canoy. It
applied the ruling in the case of Pagkalinawan vs. Gomez
(21 SCRA 1275 [1967]) which held:

“Once a Court of First Instance has been informed that a
search warrant has been issued by another court of first instance, it cannot
require a sheriff or any proper officer of the court to take the property subject of
the replevin action, if theretofore it came into custody of another public
officer by virtue of a search warrant. Only the court of first instance that issued such a search warrant may
order its release.”

Furthermore, it was also pointed out in the same case that the
validity of a search warrant may only be questioned in the same court that
issued it.

Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the decision, but the
respondent court denied the same. Thus,
petitioner filed this appeal by certiorari. The parties submitted their respective memoranda, and thereafter
the case was deemed submitted for decision.

The issue presented before the Court is whether or not the
validity of a seizure made pursuant to a search warrant issued by a court can
be questioned in another branch of the same court, where the criminal action
filed in connection with which the search warrant was issued, had been
dismissed provisionally.

At the outset, it must be pointed out that the ruling made by the
Office of the City Fiscal in the complaint for carnapping was erroneous. It held: “x x x the preliminary investigation of that case is premature
until such time that the issue of ownership will be resolved by the Court of
Appeals, so that the instant case is hereby dismissed provisionally without
prejudice to its reopening once the issue
of ownership is resolved in favor of
complainant,” (underscoring supplied).

A criminal prosecution for carnapping need not establish the fact
that complainant therein is the absolute owner of the motor vehicle. What is material is the existence of
evidence which would show that respondent took the motor vehicle belonging to
another. The Anti-Carnapping Law or
Republic Act No. 6539 punishes as carnapping the taking with intent to gain, of
a motor vehicle belonging to another person, without the latter’s consent or by means of
violence or intimidation of person or by using force upon things.

Another aspect which needs to be stressed is the fact that since
a preliminary investigation is not part of the trial, the dismissal of a case
by the fiscal will not constitute double jeopardy and hence there is no bar to
the filing of another complaint for the same offense (People vs. Medted, 68
Phil 435).

We find no merit in the main issue presented before Us. Petitioner seeks a reversal of a decision of
the Court of Appeals which relied on the decision in Pagkalinawan vs.
Gomez (supra).

The principle followed among courts in the dispensation of
justice is that a judge who presides in a branch of a court cannot modify or
annul the orders issued by another branch of the same court, since the two (2)
courts are of the same rank, and act independently but coordinately (Montesa vs.
Manila Cordage Co., 92 Phil 25 [1952]).

It is a basic tenet of civil procedure that replevin will not lie
for property in custodia legis. A thing is in custodia legis when it is shown that it has
been and is subjected to the official custody of a judicial executive officer
in pursuance of his execution of a legal writ (Bagalihog vs. Fernandez, 198
SCRA 614 [1991]). The reason posited
for this principle is that if it was otherwise, there would be interference
with the possession before the function of the law had been performed as to the
process under which the property was taken. Thus, a defendant in an execution or attachment cannot replevy goods in
the possession of an officer under a valid process, although after the levy is
discharged, an action to recover possession will lie (Francisco, Revised Rules
of Court in the Philippines: Provisional Remedies, p. 402 [1985]).

The Court had occasion to rule on this issue in the case of Vlasons Enterprises
Corporation vs. Court of Appeals (155 SCRA
186 [1987]). In the aforementioned
case, two (2) propeller pieces were seized on the strength of a search warrant
issued by the Court of First Instance of Manila Branch XVIII. After the seizure, criminal complaints were filed against the
alleged thieves. However, the
complaints were later on dismissed. Five (5) months later, a civil action for the recovery of the possession
of the propellers were filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila Branch XXIX. The latter court granted the motion for
repossession of the propellers. On
appeal this Court held:

“The proceeding for the seizure of the property in virtue of a
search warrant does not end with the actual taking of the property x x x and
its delivery x x x, to the court x x x. It is merely the first step in the process to determine the character of
the seized property. That determination
is done in the criminal action involving the crime or crimes in connection with
which the search warrant was issued. Hence, such a criminal action should be prosecuted, or commenced if not yet instituted, and
prosecuted. The outcome of the criminal
action will dictate the disposition of the seized property.” (Vlasons
Enterprises Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, supra.

In the Vlasons case, the Court differentiated the case
brought before it therein, from the Pagkalinawan case. It stated that in the Pagkalinawan case,
there was a conflict
in jurisdiction. On the other hand, in
the Vlasons case, it was certain that no criminal case would
ensue subsequent to or in connection with the search warrant, hence no conflict
in jurisdiction or in the ultimate disposition of the property could
arise. Thus, where personal property is
seized under a search warrant and it appears that the seizure will not be
followed by the filing of any criminal action, but there are conflicting claims
asserted over the seized property, the appropriate remedy is the institution of
an ordinary civil action by any interested party, or of an interpleader action
by the Government itself, in the proper competent court to which the seizing
court shall transfer custody of the articles. Another branch of the same court, in an action to recover said property
and during the pendency thereof, cannot order the delivery of said personal
property to therein plaintiff pendente lite.

Construing the Pagkalinawan case together with the Vlasons
case, we rule that where personal property is seized under a search
warrant and there is reason to believe that the seizure will not anymore be
followed by the filing of a criminal action, and there are conflicting claims
over the seized property, the proper remedy is the filing of an action for
replevin, or an interpleader filed by the Government in the proper court, not
necessarily the same one which issued the search warrant; however, where there
is still a probability that the seizure will be followed by the filing of a
criminal action, as in the case at bar where the case for carnapping was “dismissed
provisionally, without prejudice to its reopening
once the issue of ownership is resolved
in favor of complainant” (underscoring
supplied), or the criminal information has actually been commenced, or filed,
and actually prosecuted, and there are conflicting claims over the property
seized, the proper remedy is to question the validity of the search warrant in
the same court which issued it and not in any other branch of the said court.

Thus, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu Branch VIII erred when it
ordered the transfer of possession of the property seized to petitioner when
the latter filed the action for replevin. It should have dismissed the case since by virtue of the
“provisional dismissal” of the carnapping case there is still a
probability that a criminal case would be filed, hence a conflict in
jurisdiction could still arise. The
basic principle that a judge who presides in one court cannot annul or modify
the orders issued by another branch of the same court because they are co-equal
and independent bodies acting coordinately, must always be adhered to.

WHEREFORE, the petition is denied. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated
May 7, 1987 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Feliciano, (Chairman), Davide, Jr., Romero, and Melo, JJ., concur.