ARCADIA VISTAL, PETITIONER, VS. EMPLOYEES’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION, GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE & SPORTS), RESPONDENTS.

This petition seeks to reverse the decision dated January 7, 1987
of the Employees’ Compensation Commission in ECC Case No. 2679 entitled Arcadia
Vistal v. Government Service Insurance System (Ministry of Education, Culture
and Sports) which dismissed petitioner’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction, the
same having been filed beyond the ten-year prescriptive period for filing.  The pertinent ruling of the ECC is herein
quoted, to wit:

“In the case at bar, appellant contracted her ailments early 1973
long before the Decree came into effect in 1975.  Hence, her case is covered by the old
workmen’s compensation law.  Nonetheless,
she could not pursue her case under the old law
because her cause of action had already prescribed, because she filed her claim
on September 9, 1983 ten
(10) years after her cause of action accrued.” (ECC Decision, p. 2; Rollo, p. 17)

Vistal was an elementary grades teacher
of the MECS Division of Bohol who retired on June 3, 1974 at the age of 61.  On September
9, 1983, she filed a claim for
disability benefits under the present employees’ compensation law for her PTB,
essential hypertension and rheumatoid arthritis which she allegedly contracted
sometime in 1973.
The respondent GSIS denied her claim as follows:

“Our records show that you have retired from the government service
effective June 3, 1974.  We wish to inform you that the GSIS as an
administering agency of the Employees’ Compensation Program under the
aforementioned Decree, has jurisdiction only for
claims of government employees who were still in the service on or after January 1, 1975.” (ECC
Decision, p. 2; supra.)

Vistal filed the present petition for certiorari
principally based on the grounds that her cause of action is covered by the
Workmen’s Compensation Act (Act 3428) and that her ailments are
compensable.  The Solicitor General, the
GSIS and the ECC all agree with petitioner that her claim is governed by the
Workmen’s Compensation Act.  Indeed, the
governing law is determined by
the date on which the claimant contracted his illness.  Thus, where an ailment supervened before the
new employees’ compensation law took effect, the governing law is the old
Workmen’s Compensation Act.  On the other
hand, where an ailment occurred after January
1, 1975, the new law on employees’ compensation applies.  This is so provided in Article 208 of P.D.
442, as amended by P.D. 626 and Section 1(c), Rule 111 of the Rules
implementing P.D. 626, which are herein quoted:

“Art. 208.  Applicability. –
This Title shall apply only to injury, sickness, disability or death occurring
on or after January 1, 1975
(P.D. 626, as Amended).

“Only injury or sickness that occurred on or after January, 1975
and the resulting disability or death shall be compensable under these Rules.”
(Sec. 1(c), Rule 111, Amended Rules on Employees
Compensation)

Whether or not petitioner’s claim has already prescribed, the
Solicitor General is of the view that the same had been filed well within the
ten-year prescriptive period.  The law
and jurisprudence limit the period of filing of any cause of action under the
Workmen’s Compensation Act (WCA) to ten (10) years.  This is so because any claim under the WCA
creates an obligation.  Pursuant to
Article 1144 of the Civil Code, an action upon an obligation created by law
must be brought within ten years from the time such right of action
accrues.  Even the respondent ECC admits
that it erred in applying the provisions of Article 1144 of the Civil Code on
prescriptive period.

Respondents’ record shows that petitioner’s ailments accrued in
1973 without any specific date being stated therein.  Accordingly, under the time-honored doctrine
that any doubt must be resolved in favor of the worker, petitioner’s claim for
compensation, filed on September 9,
1983, must be construed as having been filed within the allowable
period of ten (10) years from accrual of cause of action.

Whether or not petitioner’s claim is compensable or not, the
Solicitor General likewise maintained the same view as that of petitioner.  He argues that since there is no dispute that
petitioner contracted pulmonary tuberculosis, essential hypertension and
rheumatoid arthritis during her employment as a teacher, the same being
admitted in the ECC decision of January 7, 1987, it may be concluded that such
ailments, having been contracted while employed are caused directly or
indirectly by the nature of the duties of a teacher or that the risk of
contracting the same is aggravated by the working habits necessitated by the
demands of job efficiency.

Under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, an employee is entitled to compensation benefits when he
contracts an illness directly caused by such employment, or aggravated by or
the result of the nature of such employment (Section 2, Act No. 3428, amended).  Moreover, the principle of presumption of
compensability, although rebuttable by substantial
evidence to the contrary, obtained under said law (Section 44, Act 3428, as
amended).

In any event, it has been held that tuberculosis may be
considered an occupational disease or work-connected in such occupations as
that of a teacher, laborer, driver, land inspector and other similar
occupations; hence compensable (See Laginlin v.
Workmen’s Compensation Commission, G.R. L-45785, March 21, 1988, 159 SCRA 91).

Noteworthy also is the case of Reyes v. Republic of the Philippines,
G.R. L-48122, February
21, 1989 wherein petitioner’s claim for
compensation was denied by the Workmen’s Compensation Commission on the
ground that rheumatoid arthritis combined with essential hypertension had not
disabled her from working.  In reversing
the decision, this Court held that the retirement
of a public school teacher on the ground of disability could not have
been approved had she not complied with the conditions for optional retirement
that she is physically incapacitated to render efficient service.  Optional retirement of claimant for
disability benefits is an indication of physical incapacity to render efficient
service.  In the case at bar, petitioner
also retired at the age of 61.  It is
clear, therefore, that petitioner’s ailments are compensable.

As to who should be legally bound to pay the claim, respondent
GSIS avers that its jurisdiction covers only claims governed by the new
employees’ compensation law (P.D. 442, as amended by P.D. 626) in view of the explicit provision of Article 208 of said law
that the same “shall apply only to injury, sickness, disability or death
occurring on or after January 1, 1975.” Inasmuch as the case had been adjudged
compensable under Workmen’s Compensation Act, under which law the employers
themselves are the ones primarily and principally liable to pay the claims of
their own employees, this Court held in Corales v. ECC,
G.R. L-44063, November 29, 1983, 126 SCRA 136 as follows:

“In the light of the foregoing, in the cases of Corales,
Villones, Caneja and Barga and other similar cases where the decisions had
already become final and executory, the GSIS shall
remain liable to pay the respective petitioners-claimants the decreed awards in
the said cases, without prejudice to the right of the Government Service
Insurance System to reimbursement from the respective employers of the
claimants or petitioners, because said cases were adjudged compensable pursuant
to the Workmen’s Compensation Act as they cover ailments initially contracted
prior to the effectivity
of the New Labor Code, even if
said cases were filed after the effectivity of said Code.

In all other cases where the
decisions decreed awards under the Workmen’s Compensation Act for ailments initially contracted prior to
the effectivity of the New Labor Code, although the
claims were filed thereafter, but said decisions have not yet become final, the awards shall be paid
by the respective employers of the claimants.”

In Mallari v. Employees’ Compensation
Commission and Government Service Insurance, G.R. 88204, February 26, 1990,
Third Division (Minute Resolution) this Court upheld the position of the GSIS
when it ordered the employer of petitioner therein, the Integrated National
Police, to pay the permanent total disability benefits, the medical and
hospital expenses duly supported by proper receipts, the attorney’s fees and
the administrative costs, petitioner’s ailment being compensable under the old
Workmen’s Compensation Act.

ACCORDINGLY, this petition for certiorari is hereby
GRANTED and the decision of the Employees Compensation Commission is hereby SET
ASIDE.  The Department of Education,
Culture and Sports is hereby ORDERED:

1. To pay
petitioner the sum of SIX THOUSAND (P6,000.00) PESOS
as maximum compensation under the law;

2. To pay petitioner P600.00 as attorney’s fees; and

3. To pay the administrative costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, (Chairman), Cruz, Gancayco, and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.