SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA NG LIBERTY COMMERCIAL CENTER ORGANIZED LABOR ASSOCIATION IN LINE INDUSTRIES AND AGRICULTURE (SMLCC-OLALIA) EDITHA BORROMEO, ET AL., PETITIONERS, VS. HON. JUD…

Petitioners seek to enjoin the Regional Trial Court, Fifth
Judicial Region, Branch 17, Tabaco, Albay, from hearing Civil Case No. T-1287, entitled
“Liberty Commercial Center, Inc. vs. Esperanza Bantigue,
et al.” and to set aside and annul its order dated May 27, 1987, denying defendants’ (petitioners
herein) Motion to Dismiss and issuing a writ of preliminary injunction ordering
defendants to refrain from illegally picketing the plaintiff’s
establishment.  On June 22, 1987, the Court issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining respondents from implementing the order of May 27, 1987 and from further taking
action or cognizance of Civil Case No. T-1287.

It is alleged that on April 2, 1987, petitioner labor-union filed
with the Regional Office No. 5, Department of Labor and Employment, Legaspi City, a petition for direct certification among the
regular rank and file employees of the Liberty Commercial Center, docketed as
LRD No. 1205-41-87, and a notice of strike for union busting and other alleged
labor practices, and staged a peaceful picket in front of the premises of
private respondent’s store at Legaspi City; that on
the occasion of such picket, some members of the union, as well as some
innocent bystanders, were arrested; that on May 8, 1987, private respondent
filed with the respondent Regional Trial Court a complaint for damages, with
preliminary mandatory injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. T-1287, against
petitioner Editha Borromeo,
along with 84 persons, the main purpose of which was to disperse the picketing
of the members of the petitioner union; that petitioners filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint on the ground that the respondent court has no
jurisdiction over labor disputes; and that
respondent court, on May 27, 1987, issued an order denying the motion to
dismiss and enjoining the picketing.

In its comment, respondent corporation maintains that as a fundamental principle, what
determines jurisdiction is the allegations embodied in the complaint; that the
complainant in this case alleged that defendants are complete strangers to the
plaintiff, and were composed mostly of slum dwellers, urban poor and former resigned
employees of plaintiff, including defendant Editha Borromeo, who was a supervisor terminated by plaintiff on
March 30, 1987; that the mere allegations of employer-employee relationship
does not automatically deprive the court of its jurisdiction and that even the
subsequent filing of charges of unfair labor practices, as an afterthought,
does not deprive the regional trial court of its jurisdiction; that the notice
of strike and petition for direct certification does not give rise to a labor
dispute; and that no labor dispute exist in the case because the respondent
corporation has existing collective bargaining agreements, valid until December
1989, with labor unions which did not file a notice of strike or charge unfair
labor practices; that the petition for direct certification filed by petitioner
with the Regional Office No. 5, Department of Labor and Employment, Legaspi City, was dismissed by the Labor Arbiter; and that
the picketing and the notice of strike filed by petitioners were clearly illegal,
for which reason injunction would lie.

The respondent court, in its questioned order, sustained the
position of the plaintiff (private respondent herein) and denied petitioners’
motion to dismiss and issued a writ of preliminary injunction, on the theory
that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint; that the facts, as established by
the evidence, showed that no employer-employee relationship existed between the
plaintiff and the defendants who were either dismissed or resigned employees of
the plaintiff; and that the petition for direct certification filed by
petitioners was already dismissed by the Labor Arbiter.  Said the respondent court:

“At this point in time, considering the admissions of the
defendants that they are not connected with the plaintiff’s establishments as
employees, and that their allegations as to their having been terminated,
resigned or abandoned their work constitute unfair labor practices, such
allegations must be proven first before the proper forum, but the fact remains
at this time that there exist no labor dispute between the parties and they are
not employees anymore when they staged picketing at the plaintiff’s
establishment on May 3, 4, 24 and 25, 1987 up to the present.

A notice of strike does not
necessarily mean that there is a labor dispute, for a notice of strike
can be filed by any labor organization, or by anyone
at all.

Even if there is a complaint for unfair labor practice filed by the
defendants, or some of them, it does not prove a labor relationship.  This was the gist in the decision of the
Supreme Court in the case of TUPAS Local Chapter No. 1158 vs. Coscuella, Jr. L-71959, November 28, 1985 Vol. 140 SCRA.

It is worthwhile also to mention that the conclusions arrived at by
this Court has been strengthened by the fact that when the defendants staged
the picketing and other activities in the premises of the plaintiff’s
establishment, they have not filed yet any unfair labor practices before the
proper forum, which is the Ministry of Labor, now Department of Labor or the
National Labor Relations Commission.

Even granting for the sake of argument, that they did file later
on, but that would be considered only as an afterthought of the defendants to
cure the defects of their position, for if there is no such complaint now
existing with the National Labor Relations Commission, then there is no labor
dispute to speak of.

Another factor that helped this Court, is the fact that at the time
the instant action was filed by the plaintiff there is no Collective Bargaining
Agreement between the defendants and the plaintiff, and that it was only on
April 2, 1987 that the defendants attempted to secure a certification for them,
to be considered as a bargaining union or employees of the plaintiff, only to
be dismissed.

In other words, the Court is really not only in serious doubts, but
is of the considered belief that at the time the action complained of were
committed by the defendants, there was no labor dispute yet between the
defendants and the plaintiff.

It may be argued that the defendants have filed after the staging
of the picket, unfair labor practices against the plaintiff, and therefore,
this Court would then be without jurisdiction over the case.  The Court has to disagree from this, for once
jurisdiction has been vested at it, it remains on the Court where it is, until
such time as the same is legally taken away from it.”

We find the petition
meritorious.  The concerted action taken
by petitioners in picketing the premises of the department store of private
respondent, no matter how illegal, cannot be regarded as acts not arising from
a labor dispute over which the Regional Trial Courts may exercise
jurisdiction.  The Labor Code (P.D. No.
442, as amended) confers original and exclusive jurisdiction on Labor Arbiters
to hear and decide the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or nonagricultural:

“1.  Unfair labor practice cases;

2.      
Those that workers may file involving wages,
hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment;

3.      
All money claims of workers, including those
based on nonpayment or underpayment of wages, overtime compensation, separation
pay and other benefits provided by law or appropriate agreement, except claims
for employees’ compensation, social security, medicare
and maternity benefits.

4.      
Cases involving household services; and

5.      
Cases arising from any violation of Article 265
of this Code, including questions involving the legality of strikes and
lockouts.”

We cannot agree with the
view of respondent court that until allegations of unfair labor practice are
proven before the proper forum, there exists no labor dispute to speak of and
therefore the regular courts may assume jurisdiction over the case, and that once jurisdiction is assumed by the courts,
they cannot be deprived of such jurisdiction. 
To sustain such a view will be to promote conflict of jurisdiction and
would render meaningless the provision of the Labor Code conferring upon the
administrative agency the “original and exclusive jurisdiction” to
hear and decide labor cases.

In holding the respondent court to be without
jurisdiction to hear the instant case (Civil Case No. T-1287) and to
issue the writ of preliminary injunction, we do not thereby condone illegal
strikes or illegal picketing by workers or picketing which seek to block free
ingress or egress to and from business establishments.  We have time and again condemned such
practices, but we have done so in cases properly ventilated before the right
forum.

Accordingly, the order of respondent court, dated May 27, 1987, is set aside and
annulled, and the temporary restraining order issued on June 22, 1987 is hereby made permanent.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, Paras,
Padilla, and Sarmiento,
JJ., concur.