PURE FOODS CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, REMIGIO CLAVIO, ANDRES CATUBAY, VIRGILIO UMALI, ORLANDO REY AND JORGE DEL ROSARIO, RESPONDENTS.

Petitioner corporation seeks, in this special civil action for certiorari,
the annulment of the following:

(1)  Decision^[1]
of the respondent National Labor Relations Commission in Case No.
NCR-4-1947-81, promulgated on March 23, 1987, which modified the decision of
the labor arbiter by ordering petitioner to reinstate private respondents Virgilio Umali, Jorge del
Rosario, Orlando Rey and Andres Catubay
to their former positions without loss of seniority rights and to pay their backwages equivalent to three years each without
qualifications and deductions,^[2]
and its resolution of May 20, 1987 denying petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration:  and

(2)  Decision of the labor arbiter, Raymundo R. Valenzuela, in NLRC-NCR Case No. 11-5333-83-A,
dated May 16, 1986, insofar
as it ordered the reinstatement of private respondent Remigio
Clavio and the payment of his backwages
of one and a half years.^[3]

The facts as stated in the Comment of the Solicitor General and which appear to be supported by the
records are as follows:^[4]

Private respondents Remigio Clavio, Andres Catubay, Virgilio Umali, Orlando Rey and Jorge del Rosario were employees of petitioner Pure
Foods Corporation.

Petitioner hired private respondents Clavio
and Catubay as drivers, starting 1979 and 1976,
respectively; Umali as utility man, starting 1978; Rey as delivery man, starting 1973; and Del Rosario as
checker, starting 1978.  Despite their
specific appointments, there were times when respondents Umali
and Del Rosario were required by
their superiors to perform the duties of a dispatcher.

As drivers, the only duties of Clavio
and Catubay were to drive and take care of the trucks
assigned to them, such as making minor repairs or fixing tires.  During the
dispatching of goods from the packaging section, as drivers, they were not
allowed to hang around or wait in the area, but they had to go elsewhere
leaving their trucks behind.  During
deliveries, they had no knowledge where their goods would ultimately go and,
upon reaching their routes, they would park the trucks in certain areas where
they would wait and keep watch that nobody got the products inside the trucks
other than the delivery man.

As delivery man, the duties of respondent Rey
required him to get the original of the invoices from the table of his supervisor
and give the same to the checker, a lady guard. 
Before loading the goods on the delivery truck for delivery, he had to
detach the duplicates and triplicates of the invoices attached to the sealed
boxes and baskets which were to be loaded on the truck.  Thereafter, the checker would also count the
same boxes and baskets and, after checking, sign the blue copy of the invoice
and give the same to respondent Rey who, after
closing the delivery truck, had to bring all the invoices to the clerk in the
office.  The clerk, in turn, computed the
total load of the delivery truck on the delivery remittance report (DRR).  After such computation, respondent Rey would bring the report to the supervisor for signature
and, thereafter, the driver brings the delivery truck to the Toledo
weighing ramp.  Whenever the said
weighing ramp registers an overweight or underweight, the checker inventories
the load of the delivery truck.  After
the discrepancy is remedied or when there is no discrepancy in the total load
listed in the DRR and the weight
registered in the weighing ramp, respondent Rey and
the driver would proceed to deliver the goods to the customers.  In the course thereof, this respondent also
collected payment from the customers. 
Should he discover that there are extra goods in the package, he returns
the same to petitioner’s plant.

When assigned as dispatchers, respondents Umali
and Del Rosario had to segregate by order per route the sealed carton boxes,
coming from the packing section of the production department, which contain
packed products like hotdogs.  In making
such segregation, they had to get the topmost carton.  They were not at liberty to open these sealed
boxes unless the order is less than six (6) packages.

During the first shift of duty on March 17, 1981, respondents Umali
and Del Rosario were assigned by their superiors as dispatchers.  There were ten (10) other employees who were
assigned as dispatchers in the area during that time.

When respondent Catubay, who was
assigned to the first shift, reported for work on March 17, 1981 at around 5:00
o’clock in the morning, he saw a truck at the ramp being loaded with
products by one Donato Monteroso.  After it was loaded, he was assigned to drive the said truck and they
proceeded to the abattoir to load
fresh meat.  From the abattoir, he
noticed that his right rear tire
was deflated, so he proceeded to
the motor pool to inflate it, dropping Donato Monteroso, the delivery man, at the billing office.  Thereafter, he fetched said Monteroso and they proceeded to the Toledo
scale for weighing, from where they were allowed to go out for delivery.

On the same date during the first shift, respondent Rey reported for work at 3:41
o’clock in the morning.  At 5:00 A.M., after the truck was weighed, he
loaded the same with sealed boxes coming from the packing section with the help
of casual laborers.  After the loading,
he proceeded to the billing section while the delivery truck was parked at the
delivery parking area.  After the
receipts were finished at the billing section, he returned to the truck and saw
that the driver, respondent Clavio, was already at
the driver’s seat.

Respondent Clavio had reported for work
at 3:41 A.M. on March 17, 1981. 
When he inquired from his
supervisor, Antonio Manuel, for his truck assignment, he was told of the possible trucks that may
be assigned to him if the
corresponding driver would not be available. 
He knew of his definite
truck assignment only after the receipts at the billing section were finished.

From the delivery parking
area, respondents Rey and Clavio
brought the truck directly to the Toledo scale for weighing.  Clavio knew that
there was an overweight of 20 kilos when he was told by Rey
to go down the scale for inventory of their cargoes.  They helped the guards unload the cargoes of
the delivery truck.

Of all the employees involved from the packaging to the delivery
of the goods, only private respondents were indefinitely suspended for alleged
pilferage as early as March 18, 1981,
immediately after the aforesaid incident and without prior investigation.  Thereafter,
their suspension was continued until their dismissal without any notice to them
or clearance from the then Ministry of Labor and Employment.

The aforesaid Comment^[5] further establishes that on April 2,
1982, private
respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and unpaid wages against
petitioner.

On May 13, 1983,
an order was issued by Director Severo M. Pucan directing petitioner to reinstate private respondents
to their former position with full backwages from the
date of their dismissal until actual reinstatement, and to pay said complainants their unpaid wages prior to their
dismissal.

Petitioner appealed the
order to the Office of the then Minister, Ministry of Labor and
Employment.  Acting on said appeal,
former Deputy Minister Vicente Leogardo, Jr. issued
an order setting aside the aforesaid order of Director Pucan
and indorsing the complaint to the NLRC-NCR-Arbitration Branch for compulsory arbitration as the nature of
the case was not suited for summary proceeding, the issues involved being
evidentiary in nature
which could only be threshed out in a formal hearing.

The case was assigned to Labor Arbiter Raymundo
R. Valenzuela who conducted several hearings. 
The labor arbiter rendered a decision^[6]
on May 16, 1986, the dispositive portion of which reads:

“WHEREFORE, finding that except for Remigio
Clavio, the dismissal of the other ccmplainants to be justified, their complaint impugning the
same should be, as it is hereby DISMISSED. 
However, for failure to furnish them with a clearance application for
their termination as well as the belated filing of the same with MOLE,
respondent Pure Foods Corporation, should (sic) as it is hereby, ordered to pay
Virgilio Umali, Jorge del Rosario, Orlando Rey and Andres Catubay their
separation pay of one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of service (sic)
their respective services and to reinstate Remigio Clavio to his former position with one and half (sic)
(1-1/2) years of backwages.”

Both parties appealed to the National Labor Relations
Commission.  On March 23, 1987, public respondent NLRC rendered a
decision^[7]
unanimously holding for the private respondents, to wit:

“WHEREFORE, premises considered the Decision appealed from is,
as it is hereby modified as aforediscussed.  Consequently, respondent is hereby ordered to
reinstate VIRGILIO UMALI, JORGE DEL ROSARIO, ORLANDO REY and ANDRES CATUBAY to
their former positions without loss of seniority rights and to pay their backwages equivalent to three (3) years each without
qualifications and deductions.  Further,
respondent is directed to show proof of immediate compliance to the mandate of
this Decision after ten (10) days from receipt thereof.”

As pointed out by public
respondent,^[8] based on its records the aforesaid decision
was received on April 15, 1987 by the respective counsels of both
parties.  It became final without any
motion for reconsideration or any other remedy having been filed or taken by
petitioner.

On April
28, 1987, private
respondents moved for the issuance of a writ of execution with a copy of the motion furnished counsel for petitioner on the same
date.

On April 30, 1987,
petitioner opposed the above motion,
filing at the same its motion for reconsideration.  On May 18, 1987, public respondent issued a resolution
denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration for having been filed out of
time and for lack of merit.

Thus has spawned the present petition.

Petitioner contends that respondent
commission committed a grave abuse of discretion in totally reversing the
findings of facts of the labor arbiter.

On the other hand,
respondents preemptively contend that the questioned decision of the public
respondent has long become final and executory, for
failure of petitioner to file its motion for reconsideration within the 10-day reglementary period, hence the same is no longer legally
susceptible of any amendment, alteration and/or modification.  Respondents consequently pray for the dismissal
of this special civil action for certiorari.

We find merit in
respondents’ contentions.

Presidential Decree No.
442, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines, formerly granted, under Article 223
thereof, an aggrieved party the remedy of appeal from a decision of the
National Labor Relations Commission to the Secretary of Labor.  Presidential Decree No. 1391, however,
amended said Article 223 and abolished appeals to the Secretary of Labor.

But, the losing party is
not without recourse.  Under the New
Rules of the National Labor Relations Commission, a party is allowed to file a
motion for reconsideration of any order, resolution or decision of the
commission based on palpable or patent errors, provided that the motion is under oath and filed
within ten (10) calendar days
from receipt of the order, resolution or decision.^[9] In
addition, the party may also
seasonably avail of the special civil action for certiorari, where the
tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions has acted without or
in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, and praying
that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings, as the law
requires, of such tribunal, board or officer.^[10]

In the case at bar, a motion for reconsideration was belatedly filed by petitioner by
reason of which the motion was denied by public respondent.  In a futile attempt to elide and gloss over
an obvious mistake or fatal omission, petitioner then filed this special civil
action for certiorari by imputing to public respondent a supposed grave
abuse of discretion in reversing the findings of facts of the labor arbiter.

This procedural maneuver
is fatally flawed and unavailing on both counts.  The unquestioned rule in this jurisdiction is
that certiorari will lie only if there is no appeal or any other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law against the acts of
respondent.  In the present case, the
plain and adequate remedy expressly provided by law was a motion for
reconsideration of the assailed decision and the resolution thereof, which was
not only expected to be but would actually have provided adequate and more
speedy remedy than the present petition for certiorari.^[11] This remedy was actually sought to be
availed of by petitioner when it filed a motion for reconsideration albeit
beyond the 10-day reglementary period.  For all intents and purposes, petitioner
cannot now be heard to say that there was no plain, speedy and adequate remedy
available to it and that it must, therefore, be allowed to seek relief by certiorari.  This contention is not only untenable but
would even place a premium on a party’s negligence or indifference in availing
of procedural remedies afforded by law.

The filing of such a
motion is intended to afford public respondent an opportunity to correct any
actual or fancied error
attributed to it by way of a re-examination of the legal and factual aspects of
the case.  Petitioner’s inaction or
negligence under the circumstances is tantamount to a deprivation of the right and opportunity of the respondent
commission to cleanse itself of an error unwittingly committed or to vindicate
itself of an act unfairly imputed.  An
improvident resort to certiorari cannot be used as a tool to circumvent
the right of public respondent to review and purge its decision of an
oversight, if any.  Neither should this
special civil action be resorted to as a shield from the adverse consequences
of petitioner’s own negligence or error in the choice of remedies.  Having allowed the decision to become final
and executory, petitioner cannot by an overdue
strategy question the correctness of the decision of the respondent commission
when a timely motion for reconsideration was the legal remedy indicated.

Petitioner further argues that public respondent committed a
grave abuse of discretion in reversing the findings of facts of the labor
arbiter.  Assuming ex gratia argumenti
that this is true, its petition can neither prosper nor subserve
its purpose.

In asserting that there was grave abuse of discretion, petitioner
adverts to alleged variances in the factual findings of the labor arbiter and
the respondent comission.  This is inapt and erroneous.  Firstly, errors of judgment, as distinguished
from errors of jurisdiction, are not within the province of a special civil
action for certiorari.  Secondly,
a careful perusal of the records of
this case readily reveals that if there is any error by public
respondent in its analysis of the facts and its evaluation of the evidence, it
is not of such a degree as may be stigmatized as a grave abuse of
discretion.  By grave abuse of discretion
is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise
of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction^[12], and it must be shown that the discretion
was exercised arbitrarily or despotically.^[13] For certiorari to lie, there must be
a capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power, the very antithesis of
the judicial prerogative in accordance with
centuries of both civil law and common law traditions.^[14]

It is settled to the
point of being elementary that the only question involved in certiorari
is jurisdiction, either the want or excess thereof, and abuse of discretion
warrants the issuance of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari only
when the same is so grave, as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary
or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal hostility, and
it must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty, or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined, or to act at all, in contemplation of law,^[15] as to be equivalent to having acted without jurisdiction.

It is, therefore, incumbent upon petitioner to adduce a
sufficiently strong demonstration that the respondent commission acted whimsically
in total disregard of evidence material to and even decisive of the controversy,
before certiorari will lie.  In
this, petitioner has failed.

It must emphatically be reiterated, since so often is it
overlooked, that the special civil action for certiorari is a remedy
designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of
judgment.^[16]
The reason for the rule is simple.  When
a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does
not deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error is
committed.  If it did, every error
committed by a court would deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous
judgment would be a void judgment.  This
cannot be allowed.  The administration of
justice would not survive such a rule. 
Consequently, an error of judgment that the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is
not correctible through the original civil action of certiorari.^[17]

At any rate, in rejecting
the decision of the labor arbiter and in finding that there was no pilferage
committed, respondent commission held that:

“After painstaking
scrutiny and diligent review of the record of the instant case giving due consideration to the
points raised by the complainants in relation to the supporting documents
submitted and relied upon by the respondent, it is Our considered view that the
Labor Arbiter below was careless, short of being remiss in his duty, for his
failure to analyze and appreciate the import of the evidence on record
specially so that in the resolution of the issue of whether complainants are
guilty of the charge of pilferage or not hinges on mere affidavits of the
Security guards as well as the Lady Security guard-checkers.  x x x“^[18]

Respondent commission noted serious discrepancies in the affidavits of the witnesses presented
by herein petitioner,^[19] to wit:

Lorna Manriquez
a lady guard, alleged that the truck with Plate No. 757 of respondent Andres Catubay was stopped at the gate and found with an excess of
12 bags of hotdogs; whereas, Crispulo Migano, another guard, alleged that the truck with Plate
No. 757 was parked at the motor pool; while Capt. Gonzales, of the security detachment, stated that the truck driven by respondent Catubay had left the company premises.

The two lady security guard-checkers,
Lorna Manriquez      and
Fe Somera, and security guard Crispulo
Magano stated in their affidavits that upon
discovering the suspicious activities of herein private respondents, they
reported the matter to the security detachment. 
Respondent commission’s factual finding is that their reporting to the
security detachment was orchestrated.  It
is noteworthy that the affidavits of said lady security guard-checkers
are identical in their allegations regarding the incident except as to the
names of those involved, their places of assignment, and truck plate numbers.

Security guard Crispulo Magano stated that he
saw several persons bringing down a package at the motor pool, whereas the
investigation conducted by the security detachment revealed that respondent Catubay was the only person who went to the motor pool.

As pointedly commented by
the Solicitor General, “to sustain the petitioner would lead the court to
speculate on the possibilities of the commission of pilferage by private respondents
as a ground for their dismissal.  There
is no clear, positive and convincing evidence to point that private respondents were guilty as charged.”^[20]

The foregoing considerations convince Us that the decision and resolution complained of
should not be disturbed.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED.  The decision
of Labor Arbiter Raymundo R. Valenzuela, dated May
16, 1986, insofar as it orders the
reinstatement of private
respondent Remigio Clavio
and the payment of his backwages of one and a half
years is AFFIRMED.  The
decision of respondent National Labor Relations Commission of March 23, 1987
and its resolution of May 20, 1987 are likewise AFFIRMED.

Should the reinstatement
of the private respondents to their previous or substantially equivalent
positions without loss of seniority rights as herein ordered be rendered
impossible by the supervention of circumstances which
prevent the same, the petitioner is further ordered to pay private respondents
separation pay equivalent to one (1) month’s salary for every year of service
rendered by them to petitioner, computed at the rate of their respective
salaries on March 18, 1981.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman), Paras, and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

Padilla, J., no part in the deliberations.

^[1]
Penned by Comm. Domingo H. Zapanta and concurred in
by Presiding Comm. Daniel M. Lucas, Jr. and Comm. Oscar AbeIla.

^[2]
Rollo, 23-24

^[3]
Ibid., 36-47.

^[4]
Ibid., 90-95.

^[5]
Ibid., 87-90.

^[6]
Ibid., 36-47.

^[7]
Ibid., 23-34.

^[8]
Ibid., 90.

^[9]
Sec. 9, Rule X, New Rules of the National Labor Relations Commission.

^[10]
Sec. 1, Rule 65, Rules of Court.

^[11]
Plaza, et al. vs. Mencias, et al., 6 SCRA 562
(1962).

^[12]
Imutan vs. Court of Appeals, 102 SCRA 286
(1981).

^[13]
Francisco vs. Mandi, 152 SCRA 711 (1987).

^[14]
Gamboa vs. Hon. Alfredo Cruz, G.R. No.
56291, June 27, 1988.

^[15]
F.S. Divinagracia
Agro-Commercial, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 104 SCRA 180 (1981);
Arguelles vs. Young, et al., 153 SCRA 690 (1987); Franklin Baker Company
of the Philippines vs. Trajano,
157 SCRA 416 (1987).

^[16]
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. vs. Galauran
& Pilares Construction Co., 118 SCRA 664 (1982).

^[17]
Mercado, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al. G.R. No. 44001, June 10, 1988.

^[18]
Rollo, 28.

^[19]
Ibid., 29-32.

^[20]
Ibid., 99.