FILCON MANUFACTURING CORPORATION AND EDWARDSON MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, PETITIONERS, VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND CONFEDERATION OF FREE LABORERS (CFL), RESPONDE…

Assailed in this petition for certiorari is the resolution
of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) promulgated on March 13, 1987
dismissing for having been filed two (2) days late the appeal and petition for
relief from judgment of the May 15, 1985 Decision of Labor Arbiter Cornelio Linsangan, the decretal portion
of which reads:

“WHEREFORE, respondents corporations
are hereby ordered to reinstate all the complainants and to pay them full backwages reckoned from November 7, 1983 up to actual reinstatement and to pay
them their vacation and sick leave pay for 1983.

“SO ORDERED.”

The facts are as follows:

Petitioner Edwardson Manufacturing Corporation
(EDWARDSON) is a private corporation duly organized and existing as of November 20, 1959 per certificate of
registration with the Securities and Exchange
Commission, (p. 36, Rollo).  It was engaged in the business of
manufacturing, buying, selling, importing, exporting or otherwise dealing in
wholesale quantities, shoes, slippers, bags, belts and all kinds of leather
goods or manufactures.  Its incorporators
are:  Antonio K. Paredes,
Hipolito de la Cruz, Benjamin de la Cruz, Santos de
la Cruz and Rosita C. Paredes (Articles of
Incorporation, p. 32, Rollo).

Petitioner Filcon Manufacturing
Corporation (FILCON) is likewise a private corporation registered with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August
10, 1983 (Annex “B”, Petition).  Its incorporators are:  Tan Ti Bun, Tan That, Lorenzo O. Tan, Sy Hok, Sy Tiong Bon, Charles Yu and Liao
Hong Bun @ Robert Liao (Articles of Incorporation,
Annex “A”, Petition).

Saddled with threats of foreclosure of its mortgaged properties
consisting of real estates covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos.
68884, 68885, 68878, 68886, 68887, 68883, 68882, 68881, 68879 of the Registry
of Deeds of Rizal and chattel mortgage on various
machineries and equipment with the Prudential Bank (Annex “T”),
petitioner Edwardson sold to Tan Ti Bun the various machineries and equipment and the
buildings and improvements found on its lots to Ramon Ong
both on April 18, 1983, subject to six
(6) months retention of the properties from date of sale to enable EDWARDSON to
wind up its business and operations (Annexes “D” and “E”,
Deed of Absolute Sale).

Private respondents Raymundo Pamisa, Monica Severino, Rodolfo Cadiente, Raymundo Anyaya, Jagget Singh, Atanacio Arle, Anastacia Etiong, Susan Morada, Angeles Dacuya, Alexander
Sinlao, Ester Jacinto, and Juana Fulgencio
who are members of the Confederation of
Free Laborers (CFL) are former employees of EDWARDSON (Sama-Samang Sinumpaang Salaysay (Joint
Affidavit dated February 24, 1984, pp. 201-204, Rollo;
Complainant’s Joint Affidavit dated February 1985, pp. 206-208, Rollo).

On October 1, 1983,
EDWARDSON notified in writing its employees including the herein twelve (12)
individual complainants by means of a memorandum of the intended closure, a copy of which was received by their Union President
Rogelio Bangco, and another copy was posted in the
company Bulletin Board (Allegedly Annexes “3-Edwardson” and
“3-A-Edwardson” but not found in the records).

On October 27, 1983, EDWARDSON filed a Notice of Business Closure
with the Municipal Government of Marikina, Metro
Manila and its Municipal License or Permit was surrendered (Allegedly Annexes
“4-Edwardson” and “4-A-Edwardson”), and likewise filed the same kind of notice with the Social
Security System (Allegedly Annex “5-Edwardson”).

EDWARDSON closed its business operations, terminated the services
of all its employees including Pamisa and eleven (11)
others and paid them separation pay (Annexes “F” to “S-1”
inclusive, Satisfaction of Receipts of Separation Pay and/or Releases and
Quitclaims, Petition).

EDWARDSON likewise paid Pamisa and
eleven (11) others, their respective 13th month pay, sick and vacation leave
pay and incentive pay all for the year 1983 (Allegedly Annex “18-Edwardson” & several documents).

Private respondent Confederation of Free Laborers (CFL) on behalf
of the twelve (12) individual complainants filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal and non-payment of their vacation and sick leave for 1983 against
petitioners FILCON and EDWARDSON and on April
10, 1984, Labor Arbiter Cornelio L. Linsangan
rendered a decision, the dispositive part of which
reads:

“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the
respondent companies to reinstate complainants and to pay full backwages.  Further,
the respondents are directed to pay complainants their earned vacation and sick
leave benefits for 1983.” (Writ of Execution, p. 132, Rollo).

On appeal to the NLRC, the case was remanded to the same labor
arbiter since the petitioners were denied
due process when their position paper was not considered in the resolution
thereof (Decision, p. 74, Rollo).

Upon re-evaluation of the evidence, the labor arbiter gave
credence to the joint affidavit executed by the twelve (12) complainants
alleging that:  (1) the franchise of
EDWARDSON was sold to FILCON to evade liability for retirement benefits due
complainants who are at the retirable age; (2) after
the sale, complainants were made to chose between acceptance of 45% of total
separation pay and shall remain permanent or regular employees of FILCON or to
receive 100% separation pay and shall be considered resigned; (3) the 12
complainants chose the first option and in fact worked with FILCON since April,
1983 up to November 7, 1983 when their services were terminated; (4) the
complainants deny the contents of the Releases and Quitclaims signed by them as
they have not waived their rights to claim the balance of separation pay from the agreed 45% and for having signed the
same in blank and believing in good faith that petitioners would make good their
promise from which petitioners later on reneged (p. 75, Rollo).

However, petitioners’ documents and the individual affidavits of
Ramon Ong and Gasentin Chan
representing FILCON and EDWARDSON, respectively, denying the sale of EDWARDSON’s franchise to FILCON; liability to pay the twelve (12) complainants’ separation pay,
vacation and sick leave pay inasmuch as the same have already been fully
satisfied as shown in the Releases and Quitclaims; and purported proposals made
upon the union members in order to become regular employees of FILCON were
merely discredited.

The labor arbiter thus concluded:

“We take pains in ascertaining the candidness and persistence
of complainants in pursuing this case. 
We find complainants belonging to that breed of common folk whose
temerity to lie cannot in the least be traced (o)n
their faces.  On the contrary, they are
indicative of truth and sincerity.  As a
matter of fact, there is no denial by respondents of the
agreement to pay them only 45%
as separation pay
and be retained as regular
employees of Filcon Manufacturing Corporation,
from which agreement respondents reneged
and still, complainants did
not receive 45% as agreed upon.  Apparently,
there was only a change of name of respondent Edwardson
to Filcon
Manufacturing Corporation.  Respondent Edwardson was engaged
in the manufacture of shoes as Filcon is so engaged.

“What is significant and decisive of the issue is the
certification of the Securities and Exchange Commission to wit:  ‘To date, no papers/documents has been submitted to this Office showing its dissolution or
cessation of business activity’, (See
certification) and yet respondent Edwardson
Manufacturing wants us to believe it has ceased operations.  An allegation must be proved, not simply
averred.

“It is also evident that complainants have worked with
respondent Filcon Manufacturing Corporation up to November 7, 1983 when they were
terminated.  These established facts must be destroyed for respondents to escape
liability to complainants.  The evidence
of respondents does not satisfy. 
Consequently, there is no necessity to alter our earlier decision.

“WHEREFORE, respondents corporations
are hereby ordered to reinstate all the complainants and to pay them full backwages reckoned from November 7, 1983 up to actual reinstatement and to pay
them their vacation and sick leave pay for 1983.

“SO ORDERED.

“Manila, Philippines,
15 May 1985.”

(Decision, pp. 76-77, Rollo, emphasis supplied).

Petitioners’ counsel received a copy of the aforecited
decision on May 17, 1985
and interposed their appeal on May 29,
1985, or two (2) days beyond the 10-day period within which to file
an appeal.

Thereafter, a petition for relief from judgment and/or appeal was
likewise filed by counsel for petitioners on July 16, 1985.

Both appeal and petition for relief from judgment were dismissed
by the NLRC on March 13, 1987
as the appeal was filed two (2) days late and rejecting illness of counsel as
an excuse for such delay (pp. 78-79, Rollo).

Hence, the present petition.

An urgent motion for issuance of a temporary restraining order
was filed by petitioners’ counsel on July
7, 1987 to enjoin and prevent respondent Labor Arbiter from
enforcing the writ of execution issued on June 26, 1987 (p. 136, Rollo).  On July
8, 1987, a Temporary Restraining Order was issued by this Court.

Considering the allegations contained, the issues raised and the
arguments adduced in the petition for certiorari, as well as the
comments of the respondents thereon, and the reply, consolidated reply and
supplemental reply of counsel for petitioners to said comments, the petition
was given due course.

Petitioners advance the following assignment of errors:

I

Public respondent National Labor Relations Commission acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
dismissed herein petitioners’ appeal interposed from the decision of public
respondent Labor Arbiter Cornelio L. Linsangan in
NLRC-NCR No. 11-5214-83 and when it denied petitioners’ petition for relief
from judgment on flimsy grounds and
that grave abuse of discretion was magnified when the said public respondent
also denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of its resolution
dismissing petitioners’ appeal and denying the petition
for relief from judgment.

II

Public respondents Labor Arbiter Cornelia L. Linsangan
and Carmelo V. Cachero also
acted with grave abuse of
discretion when they respectively issued the writ of execution and tried to
implement the same immediately without holding a conference as what is usually
done by the National Labor Relations Commission through its labor arbiters.

III

Disposing cases based on the merits rather than on mere
technicalities is more favored by our courts of justice as its
ends is better served.

IV

The case of the petitioners is quite meritorious and to disregard
the same would be tantamount to willfully closing our eyes in order to avoid
seeing and realizing the naked truth.

The crucial issue in this case is whether or not the NLRC committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of or in excess of
jurisdiction when it dismissed petitioners’ appeal and petition for relief from
judgment of the labor arbiter’s decision, the said appeal having been filed two
(2) days late.

Petitioners contend, inter
alia,
that respondent NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in arbitrarily dismissing petitioners’ appeal on a
technicality.  It invokes the Rules of
Court provision on liberal construction of the rules in the interest of
substantial justice.  Moreover, they pray
for a similar judgment had in NLRC-NCR Case No. 11-4876-83 entitled Virginia de
Jesus, et al. vs. Edwardson Manufacturing Corporation
and Filcon Manufacturing Corporation, et al.
promulgated by the NLRC on July 29, 1986 completely absolving petitioner FILCON
of any and all claims of individual complainants therein and which ruling has been affirmed by this Court in G.R.
No. 72238 entitled “Virginia de Jesus, et al. vs. NLRC, et al.” in
the resolution of May 12, 1986.

Respondents maintain that the labor arbiter’s decision of May 13, 1985 could no longer be
annulled since the petitioners failed to perfect their appeal within the 10-day
reglementary period provided in the Labor Code.

Article 223 of the Labor Code provides that decisions, awards or orders of the Labor Arbiter or
compulsory arbitrators are final and executory unless
appealed to the NLRC by any or both of the parties within ten (10) days from
receipt of such awards, orders, or decisions.

Admittedly, the petitioners’ counsel received a copy of the labor
arbiter’s decision dated May 13, 1985
on May 17, 1985.  Reckoned from said date of receipt,
petitioners had a period of ten (10) calendar days within which to file their
appeal to the NLRC.  The appeal should
have been filed on May 27, 1985.  Unfortunately, due to alleged illness of
counsel, petitioners’ appeal was filed on May 29, 1985 or two (2) days late.

The decision of the labor arbiter sought to be annulled has
become final and executory upon the lapse of the
10-day reglementary period within which to
appeal.  This is so as perfection of an
appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by law is not only
mandatory but jurisdictional, and failure to perfect an appeal as required by the
Rules has the effect of rendering the judgment final and executory
(Narag vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 155
SCRA 200 [1987]).

Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.  The abuse of discretion must be grave as
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility and must be so patent and gross as to amount to
an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law (Producers Bank of the
Philippines v. NLRC, 165 SCRA 281 [1988]).

The National Labor Relations Commission did not commit grave
abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioners’ appeal which was filed way
beyond the period of appeal.

A judgment which has become final and executory
can no longer be amended or corrected by the court except for clerical errors
or mistakes.  Likewise, an executory and final decision cannot be lawfully altered or
modified even by the court which rendered the same,
especially where the alteration or modification is material or
substantial.  In such a situation, the
trial court loses jurisdiction over the case except for execution of the final
judgment.  Any amendment or alteration
made which substantially affects the final and executory
judgment is null and void for lack of jurisdiction, including the entire
proceedings held for that purpose (Marcopper Mining
Corp. v. Liwanag Paras Briones, et al., 165 SCRA 464 [1988]).

The doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on fundamental
considerations of public policy and
sound practice that at the risk of occasional errors, the judgments of courts
must become final on some
definite date fixed by law.  Once a judgment becomes final, the
prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to a writ of execution, the
issuance of which is the trial court’s ministerial duty (Torno
v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 166 SCRA 742 [1988]).  Ostentibly, liberal
construction of the Rules is not provided in the Revised Rules of the NLRC but
in the Rules of Court (Rizal Empire Insurance Group v. NLRC, 150 SCRA 565
[1987]).  As the decision of the labor
arbiter had become final and executory, it can no
longer be appealed to the NLRC.

Petitioners could not invoke the same judgment had in G.R. No.
72238 since the group of employees who were private complainants therein differ
from the twelve (12) individual complainants in the case at bar.  It is a well-settled rule that there is no res judicata if there is no identity of parties (David v. Bandin,
149 SCRA 140 [1987]).

WHEREFORE, the petition is
DISMISSED for lack of merit and the judgment appealed from AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., (Chairman), Gutierrez,
Jr., Feliciano, and Davide,
Jr., JJ., concur.