TURIANO M. SAN ANDRES, DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE TRADENA??? AND STYLE TRANSWORLD ENTERPRISE, PETITIONER, VS. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, PADMAR ENGINEERING WORKS AND ORLANDO ALCAN…

Petitioner seeks in his petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus to annul and set aside the resolution of the
respondent Intermediate Appellate Court dated May 26, 1986^[1], in
AC-G.R. No. CV 5312 dismissing the appeal “for failure of the
defendant-appellant to pay docket fee” and the resolution of the same
court dated September 18, 1986^[2]
issuing the “corresponding entry of judgment” and remanding the
records to the court of origin “for execution of judgment”, for
having been issued with grave abuse of discretion on the part of the appellate
court and that petitioner has no appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.

The facts as summarized in petitioner’s memorandum are not
disputed except the allegation that private respondent received a notice of
change of address of petitioner’s counsel, which are as follows:

“1.      In a complaint
dated 14 October 1978 and filed on 16 October 1978, respondent Padmar
Engineering Works (private respondent) sued petitioner for recovery of the
principal sum of P18,464.10, representing cost of repair and machining work
done on petitioner’s machineries. The
complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 118961 and raffled to Branch VI of the
then Court of First Instance, now Regional Trial Court of Manila (Annex ‘A’,
Petition).

“2.      On 14 November 1978, petitioner filed his answer to the
complaint. The answer was filed by petitioner’s
counsel, Ledesma, Saludo & Associates, with offices at 3rd Floor, LTR
Building, 5548 South Superhighway, Makati, Metro Manila. The answer admitted the obligation sued upon
in the complaint, but interposed the defense of ‘set-off’, petitioner alleging
that private respondent was obligated to him in the total amount of P24,000.00,
representing the value of ‘rollers’ that petitioner sold to private respondent.

“3.      Issues having been
joined, proceedings were held in the trial court. In the course of the trial, or on 23 April 1980, undersigned
counsel filed his appearance as counsel for the petitioner ‘in collaboration
with Ledesma, Saludo & Associates’. Counsel’s office address then was at
‘63 Timog Avenue, Quezon City.’

“4.      On 02 September 1981,
the lower court rendered judgement, the dispositive portion of which reads:

‘IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court is of the
opinion and so holds that the offsetting of the obligation of the defendant
with the plaintiff cannot be given any weight, as the plaintiff had not known
nor had knowledge of the acts of the two job solicitors Cruz and Ortiz, and
considering further that the defendant admitted their total obligation with the
plaintiff in the total amount of P18,464.10, which cannot be offset by the
value of the rollers, defendant is hereby ordered to pay plaintiff the sum of
P18,464.10 plus 14% per annum from the date of the corresponding invoices
covering the defendant’s account, and the further sum of 25% of the total
obligation due plaintiff as for and
by way of attorney’s fees and to pay the cost of suit. (Annex ‘D”, Petition)’

“5.     From this decision, petitioner interposed his appeal within the
period and under the requirements then prescribed by the Rules of Court.

“6.     On 02 March 1982, the lower court issued an order approving the
record on appeal and directing that all testimonial and documentary evidence be
forwarded to the Court of Appeals for purposes of appeal.

“7.      Sometime in March,
1983, undersigned counsel moved his law offices from ‘63 Timog Avenue, Quezon
City, to No. 4 Pangilinan Drive,
Project 8, Quezon City’. On 13 March
1983, counsel filed with the Court of Appeals and served on counsel for private
respondent the corresponding notice of change of address. (Annex ‘F’, Petition)

“8.      On 11 February 1985,
the lower court issued an order dismissing the appeal on the ground that ‘upon
a judicious scrutiny of the record. . . (the Court). . .found out that the defendant failed to prosecute his
appeal within the period provided by Section 3 of Rule 46 of the Rules of
Court’ (Annex ‘G’, Petition).

9.       On 06 March 1985,
petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of 11 February 1985
principally on the ground that the delay in the prosecution of the appeal was
caused by the failure of the personnel of the lower court to transmit the
records of the case to the appellate court (Annex ‘H’, Petition).

“10.    On 07 March 1985,
respondent Court of Appeals issued the following resolution in AC-G.R. No. CV
5312 UDK:

‘Acting on the Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss Defendant’s Appeal filed on January 3, 1985 by
counsel for the plaintiff and considering that copy of the Resolution of
January 10, 1985, requiring the appellant to comment within 10 days from notice
addressed to appellant’s counsel
was returned to sender with notation ‘no longer connected’ and considering
further that notice to appellant himself cannot be effected for lack of
available records, the Court RESOLVED to deny the same.

‘The Court RESOLVED FURTHER, to order the Clerk of Court a quo and
the Branch Clerk of Court to elevate the entire records of this case if an
appeal had been interposed, within ten days from notice hereof, on pain of
being held in contempt. (Annex ‘I’,
Petition)

“11.    Copy of the aforesaid resolution
was sent to counsel at his former address (63 Timog Avenue, Quezon City). Counsel, therefore, did not receive and
could not have received the notice. However, on 19 April 1985, while going over the expediente of the case
in the court below in the course of the hearing of petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration of 5 March 1985,
counsel took note and got hold of the copy of the resolution of respondent
Court of Appeals. This prompted counsel
to file on 23 April 1985 a manifestation with respondent Court of Appeals that
clearly indicated counsel’s new address: 4 PANGILINAN DRIVE PROJECT 8, QUEZON CITY (Annex ‘J’).

“12.    Respondent Court of
Appeals took note of counsel’s new address, and caused to be sent to him at the
new address a copy of the resolution of 11 April 1985 under which it ‘RESOLVED
to remand the, records of this case to the court a quo for retaking of the
proceedings’ after the Branch Clerk of Court filed a Manifestation to the
effect that the ‘transcript’ of stenographic notes of Stenographers Araceli
Alcantara and Ester de Mandanas are still lacking and cannot be transcribed
anymore’ (Annex ‘K’, Petition).

“13.    Meanwhile, on 19 April
1985, the lower court issued an order that reads:

‘Acting on the motion
for reconsideration filed by Atty. Oscar Diokno Perez, counsel for the
defendant, and for the reasons therein contained having been well taken, the
order of this court dated 11 February 1985 is hereby set aside and the appeal
interposed by the defendant is given due course.’ (Annex ‘L’, Petition)

“14.    On 30 May 1985,
petitioner submitted to the lower court four (4) sets of the complete
transcript of stenographic notes taken during the trial of the case. Petitioner
did this with a view to expediting the appeal and doing away with the ‘retaking
of the proceedings’ (Annex ‘M’, Petition).

“15.    On 08 November 1985,
respondent Court of Appeals issued the corresponding notice that the original
records in the case had been received by that Court and that petitioner was
required to pay within fifteen (15) days from receipt the docketing fee of
P96.00 and an additional amount of P20.00 under Republic Act 3870. However, the notice was sent again to
counsel’s old address at 63 Timog Avenue, Quezon City, notwithstanding
counsel’s notice of change of address, a fact that respondent Court of Appeals
had already taken note of (par. 12, above). Counsel did not receive and could not have received the notice for obvious reasons.

“16.    On 26 May 1986,
respondent Court of Appeals issued one of the questioned resolutions: it
dismissed petitioner’s appeal ‘for failure of the defendant?appellant to
pay docket fee and considering that the last day to pay the same was on April 11, 1986’ (Annex ‘O’). Notice of this resolution was again sent to
counsel’s old address.

“17.    On 18 September 1986,
respondent Court of Appeals issued the second questioned resolution making a
final entry of judgment and remanding the records to the court of origin for
execution of judgment, copy of which it insisted on sending to counsel’s old
address. (Annex ‘P’, Petition).

“18.    On 23 March 1987, the
lower court issued a writ of execution of the decision of 02 September 1981
(Annex ‘Q’, Petition).

“19.    On 08 May 1987, respondent
Deputy Sheriff attached several properties inside petitioner’s compound at 155
Kamias Road, Quezon City and posted a notice that the levied items would be
sold at auction on 19 May 1987 (Annex ‘R’, Petition).

“20.    In a resolution issued
on 25 May 1987, the Honorable Court temporarily restrained the respondents from
implementing the writ of execution dated 23 March 1987, specifically from
proceeding with the auction sale scheduled on 19 May 1987.”^[3]

We find the petition meritorious.

Obviously, the appellate court acted with grave abuse of
discretion when it dismissed petitioner’s appeal and thereafter issued an entry
of judgment and remanded the records of the case to the lower court for
execution of judgment.

The basis for the dismissal is the alleged failure of petitioners
to pay the docket fee, but the failure to pay said fee is not petitioner’s own
doing but that of the appellate court.

It sent the notice to pay docket fee to counsel’s wrong address
at 63 Timog Avenue, Quezon City^[4]
instead of to No. 4, Pangilinan Drive, Project 8, Quezon City, per Notice of
Change of Address dated March 15, 1983^[5] filed
with the appellate court.

Respondent court could not say that it did not receive said Notice of Change of Address for
its Resolution of April 11, 1985, was sent
to counsel’s new and correct address at No. 4 Pangilinan Drive, Project 8,
Quezon City.

While the records show that a copy of the Resolution of May 26,
1986^[6]
dismissing the appeal was also sent to petitioner himself at 3969 R. Magsaysay,
Blvd., Sta. Mesa, Manila, the service was ineffective, as petitioner has long
ceased to hold office at said address.

There was, therefore, a total lack of notice to counsel or to
petitioner himself, an omission brought about not by the latter but solely by
the error and/or negligence of the responsible officials of respondent
court.

Notice is an indispensable requisite of due process.^[7]
Notice and hearing are preliminary steps essential to the passing of an
enforceable judgment, and together with the tribunal having jurisdiction of the
case, constitute basic elements of the constitutional requirement of due
process of law.^[8]

Nor could private respondent invoke the doctrine of
“estoppel by laches” against petitioner to justify the validity of
the questioned resolutions.

Estoppel by laches is a rule of equity that bars claimant from
presenting his claim when, by reason of abandonment and negligence, he allowed
a long time to elapse without presenting it.^[9]

The environmental facts of this case do not show its applicability. Petitioner never thought of abandoning his
appeal. On the contrary, he filed his
notice of appeal, appeal bond and record on appeal within the reglementary
period of the then existing rules. Petitioner even caused the reproduction of copies of the complete set of
stenographic notes for transmission to the appellate court when it became
evident that the original notes are no longer available.

While there was indeed delay in the disposition of the case on
appeal, the delay was not of petitioner’s own making but primarily, due to the
failure of the lower court to transmit the records to the appellate court and
the failure of the court stenographers to transcribe their notes.

Be that as it may, failure to pay the docketing fee does not
automatically result in the dismissal of the appeal. Dismissal is discretionary with the appellate court^[10]
and discretion must be exercised wisely and prudently, never capriciously, with
a view to substantial justice.^[11]

At any rate as held in Reyes v. Subido,^[12]
due process in the end, is the embodiment
of the sporting idea of fair play.

WHEREFORE, there being grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the respondent court, the Resolution of May 26, 1986^[13]
dismissing defendant-appellant’s appeal and the Resolution of September 18,
1986^[14]
issuing an entry of judgment and remanding the records to the of court of
origin for execution of judgment are hereby declared null and void and of no effect.

Respondent Intermediate Appellate Court and now the Court of
Appeals is hereby directed to reinstate petitioner’s appeal in AC-G.R. CV
No.5312-UDK after proper notice to petitioner to pay the docketing fee.

The writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the respondents from
implementing the writ of execution dated March 23, 1987, specifically from
proceeding with the auction sale in Civil Case No. 118961, issued by the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 6, is hereby made permanent. Costs de officio.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Padilla, and
Regalado, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Annex “O”, Petition, p. 30, Rollo, Resolution of the Second
Civil Cases Division, composed of Justices Crisolito Pascual, Serafin E.
Camilon and Desiderio Jurado.

^[2] Annex “P”, Petition, p. 31, Id.

^[3]
Petitioner’s Memorandum, pp. 2-7.

^[4]
Annex “N”, Petition, p. 29, Id.

^[5]
Annex “F”, Petition, p. 21, Id.

^[6]
Annex “O”, Petition, Id.

^[7]
Perkins v. Dizon, 69 Phil. 186.

^[8]
Banco Español v. Palanca, 37
Phil. 927.

^[9]
Pamplona v. Mareto, L-33187, March 31, 1980.

^[10]
NAWASA v. Sec. of Public Works and
Communications, 16 SCRA 536, 539 (1966).

^[11]
Cucio v. Court of Appeals, 57
SCRA 401 (1974).

^[12]
L-27916, Aug. 21, 1975.

^[13]
Annex “O”, Petition, Id.

^[14]
Annex “P”, Petition, Id.