G.R. No. 78339. September 29, 1989
WENCESLAO D. MONSERRATE, IGNACIO D. MONSERRATE, JOSE D. MONSERRATE AND HEIRS OF MARIA MONSERRATE VDA. DE CAILES, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ERVIN O. POMPA AND HON. …
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the
annulment of the January 29, 1987
decision of the Court of Appeals* in
CA-G.R. SP No. 02686 “Wenceslao D. Monserrate, et al. vs. Ervin O. Pompa,
et al.”: and the April 23, 1987
resolution of the same Court denying herein petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration.
The facts of this case, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
“On September 7, 1981, a verified petition for the adoption of
Ervin O. Pompa who, at the time was alleged to be
married to Dorothea Albovia, 32 years of age, and a resident of Nagcarlan,
Laguna, was filed with the then Court of First Instance of Laguna and docketed
with said Court as Special Proceedings No. SC-377, the petitioner purports to
be Nieves Suiza, 77 years old, widow, and a resident
also of Nagcarlan, Laguna and bears the written
consent of the spouse of the person to be adopted.
The petition alleged among others:
“x x x x x x x x x
“5. That the Adopted’s real mother,
AURELIA OSUNA, now deceased, was the daughter of MELECIO OSUNA’s
brother whom they also cared for and reared until her marriage to SILVESTRE
POMPA, also deceased, who in turn was
the first cousin of herein petitioner.
“6. That the
petitioner has taken care at said Adopted from the time the latter became an
orphan when he was still a minor and up to the present time, treating and rearing
the same as her own true son and giving the attention and love of a mother ever since then:
“7. That the
petitioner does not fall under the disqualification of adoption as provided for
by law and that the same will serve the best interests and well being of both
the Adopter and the Adopted;
“8. That the probable
value of the Adopted’s property and estate is more or
less P15,000.00;
“9. That petitioner
in order to obviate or to forestall possible difficulties in the matter of
succession to her estate and that of her late spouse believes that adoption is
the best solution to such difficulties;
“On September 14, 1971, Judge Maximo
A. Maceren, as presiding Judge of the Court, issued
an order setting the petition for hearing on October 28, 1971, at 9:00 o’clock in the morning, and the publication thereof
in the Bayanihan, a newspaper of general circulation in the
province, once a week for three successive weeks, pursuant to section 4, Rule 39, of the Rules of Court.
“The order setting the case for hearing was accordingly published
on the September 23, 30 and October 7,
1971 issues of the Bayanihan (Exhs. B, B-3) and there being no opposition, the Deputy
Clerk of Court was appointed Commissioner to receive the evidence of the
petitioner and thereafter to submit the same for the consideration of the Court
(Exh. 4).
“The records show that on October 29, 1971, Artemio Diawan, as Commissioner, submitted his REPORT TO COURT
consisting of the evidence presented by the petitioner in the above-entitled
case, both testimonial and documentary, which may be gleaned from the minutes
and the transcript of stenographic notes taken by stenographer, Mr. Marcial Mendoza, during the reception of the evidence on
October 28, 1971 for its consideration. (Records, p. 14)
“The minutes likewise attached to the records of the court
show that the stenographer in attendance
was Mr. Marcial Mendoza and that the evidence for the
petitioner consists of –
“Witnesses:
1. Nieves Suiza – 78 years old – widow –
housekeeper – Nagcarlan, Laguna.
2. Ervin O. Pompa – 32
yrs. old – married – proprietor – Nagcarlan, Laguna.
3. Dorothea B. Albovias – 32 years old – married – employee of the Central
Bank – Nagcarlan Laguna.
“Exhibits:
“x x x x x x x x x
(Exh. 4-B)
‘Attached to the records of the case are handwritten notes of the
proceedings (Records, pp. 20-21) and stenographic notes consisting of five
yellow pages (Records, pp. 22-26).
“On November 12,
1971, Judge Maceren issued the following
order:
“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment
is hereby rendered declaring that henceforth the person of Ervin O. Pompa is for all legal intents and purposes the son of the
herein petitioner Nieves Suiza in accordance with
law.
“Let a copy of this order be immediately furnished the Local
Civil Registrar of NagcarIan, Laguna for record purposes.” (Records,
p. 19; Order, p. 2)
“On July 31, 1982,
Nieves Suiza died intestate without any issue (Exh. C).
“On February 14, 1984,
plaintiffs commenced the present action with this Court claiming that the
adoption proceedings, as well as the order of adoption, were null and void and
of no legal force and effect x x x.
“The complaint was amended on order of this Court to implead the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court
which superseded the defunct CFI as party defendant.
Respondent Court of Appeals, in a decision promulgated on January 29, 1987 (Rollo,
pp. 6-15), dismissed the complaint. The decretal portion of the said decision, reads:
“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing plaintiffs’
complaint with costs against the plaintiffs.
“Defendant’s counterclaim for damages arising from the filing
of the present complaint is hereby likewise dismissed for insufficiency of
evidence and pursuant to the public
policy of prohibiting the imposition of any penalty on the right to litigate
there being no evidence that in filing the present case plaintiffs acted in
evident bad faith.
“SO ORDERED.”
A Motion for Reconsideration was filed (Ibid., pp.
60-82), but the same was denied in a resolution promulgated on April 23, 1987 (Ibid., p. 83). Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioners raised three (3) issues, to wit:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE DEFUNCT COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF LAGUNA HAD
ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE QUESTIONED ADOPTION CASE, NOTWITHSTANDING THAT
THE SOLICITOR GENERAL WAS NOT NOTIFIED OR REPRESENTED IN SUCH ADOPTION.
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE CHALLENGED ADOPTION PROCEEDINGS AND ORDER OF
ADOPTION ARE VITIATED WITH NULLITY FOR LACK OF STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH STATUTORY
REQUIREMENTS AS PRESCRIBED BY LAWS GOVERNING ADOPTION; AND
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE QUESTIONED PROCEEDINGS AND ORDER OF ADOPTION
SHOULD BE NULLIFIED BY REASON OF EXTRINSIC FRAUD.
As to the first
issue, it is petitioners’ contention that the Solicitor General, not having
been notified so as to make the State a party thereto, the then Court of First
Instance of Laguna did not acquire jurisdiction over the questioned adoption
case. To support this contention, they
claimed that there is no dispute that the State has an interest in the
adoption, particularly in securing the observance of our laws concerning the
qualifications and disqualifications of both the adopted and adopter designed to conserve the best interests
of society and the State. In addition,
quoting the ruling in Ansaldo vs. Republic (102 Phil.
1046), they alleged that in the
said case, it is explicit that the State must
be made a party to an action involving changes in the civil status,
nationality or citizenship of a
person; and from the standpoint of the effects of adoption, the same involve
changes in the personal and civil status of an adopted.
Petitioners’ contention is untenable. As aptly ruled by respondent Court of
Appeals, no existing law or rule has been pointed out requiring notice to the
Solicitor General as a condition precedent or as a jurisdictional pre-requisite
for the valid exercise of the court’s jurisdiction in an adoption case. Indeed, petitioners can not point any law or
rule since a perusal of the provisions of the Civil Code on adoption (Chapter
5, Articles 334-348) and the provisions of the Rules of Court (Rule 99) fail to
show such requirement. As to the ruling
in the Ansaldo case, quoted by petitioners to support
their contention, a mere reading of the same will readily show that it is not
applicable in the instant case, since it involves the correction of entries in
the civil registry.
Anent the second issue, petitioners claim that the statutory
requirements, in three instances, were not strictly carried out in the questioned adoption
case. It is their contention that
pursuant to Republic Act No. 644, the questioned adoption case should have been
filed with the Municipal Court of Nagcarlan, Laguna,
where the supposed adopter, Nieves Suiza, was then
residing; that Section 5 of Rule 99, which requires the presentation of satisfactory
proof in open court, was not strictly followed since (1) the reception of proof
of compliance with the jurisdictional requirement was delegated to the Deputy
Clerk of Court and not done by the presiding judge himself, and (2) the
Deputy Clerk of Court likewise received the evidence for the supposed adoption
in support of the allegations of the petition for adoption. Moreover, the stenographic notes attached to the records of the
case were not transcribed and that the stenographer concerned took said notes outside the premises of the court on
January 24, 1983, or eleven (11) years after the date of issuance of the
questioned order of adoption, for the purpose of transcribing the same; and
that there was the non-compliance with the statutory commands regarding the
registration and/or recording of the order of adoption.
These contentions of
petitioners are without merit. Republic
Act No. 644 gave to the justices of the peace and judges of municipal
courts concurrent jurisdiction on adoption cases with the then Courts of First
Instance. In other words, adoption cases
could be filed in any of the said courts.
Hence, Republic Act No. 644 can not and did not in any way affect the herein questioned petition
for adoption which was filed with the then Court of First Instance of Laguna,
which unquestionably had territorial jurisdiction over Nagcarlan,
Laguna, and had jurisdiction over the nature of the petition (Sec. 1, Rule 99,
Rules of Court). As to the alleged
delegation to the Deputy Clerk of Court, suffice it to say that this Court, in
the case of Laluan vs. Malpaya
(65 SCRA 495, 499-500 /1975/; cited in the case of National Housing
Authority vs. Court of Appeals, 121 SCRA 777 /1983/, ruled:
“No provision of law or principle of public policy prohibits a
court from authorizing its clerk of court to receive the evidence of a party
litigant. After all, the reception of
evidence by the clerk of court constitutes but a ministerial task – the taking
down of the testimony of the witnesses and the marking of the pieces of
documentary evidence, if any, adduced by the party present. This task of receiving evidence precludes, on
the part of the clerk of court, the exercise of judicial discretion usually
called for when the other party who is present objects to questions propounded and to the admission of the
documentary evidence proffered. More
importantly, the duty to render judgment on the merits of the case still rests
with the judge who is obliged to personally and directly prepare the decision
based upon the evidence reported.”
As to the allegation that the
stenographic notes were not transcribed, etc., the reason given by respondent
Court of Appeals in this regard can not be faulted –
“The Certification issued on March 8, 1983 by Deputy Clerk
of Court Rosauro M. Magcalas
that there was no transcribed stenographic
notes of the former stenographer Mr. Marcial Mendoza;
taken by him on October 28, 1971 in connection with Special Proceedings Case
No. SC-377 which is attached to the record of said case (Exh.
E), does not necessarily prove that there is no transcript of stenographic notes.
That stenographic notes of the proceeding were taken is firmly borne out
by the records of the case and the aforementioned certification. That no transcript was attached to the
records is not proof that there is no such transcript. After spending so much for publication, there
is no reason for the notes not to be transcribed which will cost only a few
pesos given the brevity of the proceedings.
In fact it appears from the REPORT TO COURT that the commissioner
submitted to the Court ‘the transcript of the stenographic notes taken by
stenographer Mr. Marcial Mendoza during the reception
of the evidence on October 28,
1971 for its consideration.’
(Records, p. 14). Since the transcript
is prepared subsequent to the proceedings to be transcribed, this must have
been handed to the Presiding Judge separately from the records of the case and,
for this reason, it was not attached by the Clerk to the records of the
case. Any experienced trial judge is
familiar with this practice. The failure
to subsequently attach the transcript to the records due to oversight is not
altogether unlikely, and is not sufficient to vitiate what otherwise is a valid
proceedings.
“It is to be
presumed that Judge Maximo Maceren
received and read the transcript of stenographic notes before he issued the
challenged order. There is, in fact, no
pretense that the findings of Judge Maceren in his
order are not in accordance with the evidence which must have been culled by
him from the transcript of stenographic
notes.”
As to the allegation of non-registration,
this has no factual basis. It will be
recalled that on November 12, 1971,
Judge Maceren issued the following order:
“x x x x x x x x x.
“Let a copy of this order be immediately furnished the Local
Civil Registrar of Nagcarlan, Laguna for
record purposes.“ (Records,
p. 19; Order, p. 2).
and pursuant to the same, as stated by respondent
Court of Appeals, the order of adoption was recorded in the Local Civil
Registry of Nagcarlan, Laguna, where the adopter and
adopted reside and are better known, as early as November 17, 1971.
As to the third issue,
petitioners impute grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Court of
Appeals simply because it did not give weight to petitioners’ evidence,
particularly their documentary evidence (Exhs.
A to A-30) which they claim to have been admitted
by private respondent. They submit that
the clinical/medical records of the Nieves Suiza (Exhs. A to A-30) and the testimony of Dr. Adulfo Baviera are sufficient to
prove that said patient was not physically able to attend the hearing
and testify before the Court of First Instance in Sta. Cruz, Laguna on October
28, 1971; and that respondent Court of Appeals failed to consider the fact that
private respondent admitted all their proffered documentary exhibits (Exhs. A to A-30).
Petitioners’ contention is untenable. It must be stated that even granting that
private respondent admitted petitioners’ proffered documentary evidence, the
Court of Appeals, nevertheless, has the discretionary power to look into
related matters of record having some bearing on specific issues raised before
it, stressing the paramount aim of promoting the ends of justice (Miraflor vs. Court of Appeals, 142 SCRA 18 /1986/; citing
the cases of Hernandez vs. Andal, 78 Phil. 196, and Baquiran vs. Court of Appeals, 2 SCRA 873). Having such power, it considered as
infirmities on petitioners’ evidence, the defense raised by private respondent
that petitioners’ documentary evidence, Exhibits “A” to
“A-30”, were false and falsified because the said medical records are
those of one Ursula Nazario and not of Nieves Suiza; that Exhibit “A-3” is cited as an example
which shows that the name of Ursula Nazario was erased, and superimposed on it is the
name of Nieves Suiza; and that it is pointed out that
Case No. 246552 as appearing in Nieves Suiza’s
admission card, when traced in the admission log books of the Quezon Institute, will give the patient’s name as one
Ursula Nazario (Exhs. 1 and
1-A), while another admission card with patient Case No. 246552 is also in the
name of Ursula Nazario (Exh.
3). With said infirmities, and as aptly
stated by the Court of Appeals, petitioners’ claim imputes the commission of a
criminal offense of falsification committed in the course of judicial
proceedings, and as such, requires a strong, clear, and convincing if not
indubitable evidence; petitioners’ adduced evidence could not be said as
strong, clear and convincing to warrant the annulment of what strongly appears
to be a valid and regular proceedings.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED
for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman),
Padilla, Sarmiento, and
Regalado, JJ., concur.
* Fourth Division, Penned by
Associate Justice Oscar M. Herrera and concurred in by Associate Justices
Carolina Grino-Aquino and Antonio M. Martinez.