G.R. No. 78164. July 31, 1987
TERESITA TABLARIN, MA. LUZ CIRIACO, MA. NIMFA B. ROVIRA, EVANGELINA S. LABAO, IN THEIR BEHALF AND IN BEHALF OF APPLICANTS FOR ADMISSION INTO THE MEDICAL COLLEGES DURING THE SCHO…
FELICIANO, J.:
The petitioners sought
admission into colleges or schools of medicine for the school year
1987-1988. However, the petitioners
either did not take or did not successfully take the National Medical Admission
Test (NMAT) required by the Board of Medical Education, one of the public respondents,
and administered by the private respondent, the Center for Educational
Measurement (CEM).
On 5 March 1987, the petitioners filed with the Regional Trial
Court, National Capital Judicial Region, a Petition for Declaratory Judgment
and Prohibition with a prayer
for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. The petitioners sought to enjoin the
Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, the Board of Medical Education and
the Center for Educational Measurement from enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382,
as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, series of 1985, dated 23 August 1985 and
from requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as a condition for securing certificates of eligibility for
admission, from proceeding with accepting applications for taking the NMAT and
from administering the NMAT as scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the
future. After hearing on the petition
for issuance of preliminary injunction, the trial court denied said petition on
20 April 1987. The NMAT was conducted
and administered as previously scheduled.
Petitioners accordingly filed this Special Civil Action for Certiorari
with this Court to set aside the Order of the respondent judge denying the
petition for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
Republic Act 2382, as
amended by Republic Acts Nos. 4224 and 5946, known as the “Medical Act of
1959” defines its basic objectives in the following manner:
“Section 1. Objectives. – This Act provides for and shall govern (a) the
standardization and regulation of medical education; (b) the examination
for registration of physicians; and (c) the supervision, control and regulation
of the practice of medicine in the Philippines.”
(Underscoring supplied)
The statute, among other
things, created a Board of Medical Education which is composed of (a) the
Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports or his duly authorized representative,
as Chairman; (b) the Secretary of Health or his duly authorized representative;
(c) the Director of Higher Education or his duly authorized representative; (d)
the Chairman of the Medical Board or his duly authorized representative; (e) a
representative of the Philippine Medical Association; (f) the Dean of the College
of Medicine, University of the Philippines; (g) a representative of the Council
of Deans of Philippine Medical Schools; and (h) a representative of the
Association of Philippine Medical Colleges, as members. The functions of the Board
of Medical Education specified in Section 5 of the statute include the
following:
“(a) To
determine and prescribe requirements for admission into a recognized college of
medicine;
(b)
To determine and prescribe requirements for
minimum physical facilities of colleges of medicine, to wit: buildings, including hospitals, equipment and
supplies, apparatus, instruments, appliances, laboratories, bed capacity for instruction purposes, operating and
delivery rooms, facilities for outpatient services, and others, used for
didactic and practical instruction in accordance with modern trends;
(c)
To determine and prescribe the minimum number
and minimum qualifications of teaching personnel, including student-teachers
ratio;
(d)
To determine and prescribe the minimum required
curriculum leading to the degree of Doctor of Medicine;
(e)
To authorize the implementation of experimental
medical curriculum in a medical school that has exceptional faculty and instrumental
facilities. Such an experimental curriculum
may prescribe admission and graduation requirements other than those prescribed
in this Act; Provided, That only exceptional students shall be enrolled in the
experimental curiculum;
(f)
To accept applications for certification for
admission to a medical school and keep a register of those issued said
certificate; and to collect from said applicants the amount of twenty-five
pesos each which shall accrue to the operating fund of the Board of Medical
Education;
(g)
To select, determine and approve hospitals or
some departments of the hospitals for training which comply with the minimum
specific physical facilities as provided in subparagraph (b) hereof; and
(h)
To promulgate and prescribe and enforce the
necessary rules and regulations for the proper implementation of the foregoing
functions.” (Underscoring supplied)
Section 7 prescribes
certain minimum requirements for applicants to medical schools:
“Admission requirements. – The medical college may admit any
student who has not been convicted by any court of competent jurisdiction
of any offense involving moral turpitude and who presents (a) a record
of completion of a bachelor’s degree in science or arts; (b) a certificate
of eligibility for entrance to a medical school from the Board of Medical
Education; (c) a certificate of good moral character issued by two former
professors in the college of liberal arts; and (d) birth certificate.
Nothing in this act shall be construed to inhibit any college of
medicine from establishing, in addition to the preceding, other entrance
requirements that may be deemed admissible.
x
x x”
(Underscoring supplied)
MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, issued by the then Minister of
Education, Culture and Sports and dated 23 August 1985, established a uniform
admission test called the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) as an additional
requirement for issuance of a certificate
of eligibility for admission into medical schools of the Philippines, beginning
with the school year 1986-1987. This
Order goes on to state that:
“2. The
NMAT, an aptitude test, is considered as
an instrument toward upgrading the selection of applicants for admission
into the medical schools and is calculated to improve the quality of medical
education in the country. The cutoff
score for the successful applicants, based on the scores on the NMAT, shall be
determined every year by the Board of Medical Education after consultation with
the Association of Philippine Medical Colleges.
The NMAT rating of each applicant, together with the other admission
requirements as presently called for under existing rules, shall serve as a
basis for the issuance of the prescribed certificate of elegibility for
admission into the medical colleges.
3.
Subject
to the prior approval of the Board of Medical Education, each medical
college may give other tests for applicants who have been issued a corresponding certificate of
eligibility for admission that will yield information on other aspects of
the applicant’s personality to complement the information derived from the
NMAT.
x x x
8. No applicant shall be issued the requisite
Certificate of Eligibility for Admission (CEA), or admitted for enrollment as
first year student in any medical college, beginning the school year, 1986-87,
without the required NMAT qualification as called for under this Order.”
(Underscoring supplied)
Pursuant to MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, the private respondent
Center conducted NMATs for entrance to medical colleges during the school year
1986-1987. In December 1986 and in April
1987, respondent Center conducted the NMATs for admission to medical colleges during the school year 1987-1988.
Petitioners raise the
question of whether or not a writ of preliminary injunction may be issued to
enjoin the enforcement of Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as
amended, and MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, pending resolution of the issue of
constitutionality of the assailed statute and administrative order. We regard this issue as entirely peripheral
in nature. It scarcely needs
documentation that a court would issue a writ of preliminary injunction only
when the petitioner assailing a statute or administrative order has made out a
case of unconstitutionality strong enough to overcome, in the mind of the
judge, the presumption of constitutionality, aside from showing a clear legal
right to the remedy sought. The
fundamental issue is of course the constitutionality of the statute or order
assailed.
1. The petitioners invoke a number of provisions of the 1987
Constitution which are, in their assertion, violated by the continued
implementation of Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act 2381, as amended, and
MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985. The
provisions invoked read as follows:
(a)
Article II, Section 11: “The state values the dignity of every
human person and guarantees full respect of human rights.”
(b)
Article II, Section 13: “The State recognizes the vital role of
the youth in nation building and shall promote and protect their physical,
moral, spiritual, intellectual and social well being. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism
and nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public and civic
affairs.”
(c)
Article II, Section 17: “The State shall give priority to
education, science and technology, arts, culture and sports to foster
patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social progress and to promote total
human liberation and development.”
(d)
Article XIV, Section 1: “The State shall protect and promote the
right of all citizens to quality education at all levels and take appropriate
steps to make such education accessible to all.”
(e)
Article XIV, Section 5 (3): “Every citizen has a right to select a
profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable and equitable
admission and academic requirements.”
Article II of the 1987 Constitution sets forth in its second half
certain “State policies” which the government is enjoined to pursue
and promote. The petitioners here have
not seriously undertaken to demonstrate to what extent or in what manner the
statute and the administrative order they assail collide with the State
policies embodied in Sections 11, 13 and 17.
They have not, in other words, discharged the burden of proof which lies
upon them. This burden is heavy enough
where the constitutional provision invoked is relatively specific, rather than
abstract, in character and cast in behavioral or operational terms. That burden of proof becomes of necessity
heavier where the constitutional provision invoked is cast, as the second
portion of Article II is cast, in language descriptive of basic policies, or
more precisely, of basic objectives of State policy and therefore highly
generalized in tenor. The petitioners
have not made their case, even a prima facie case, and we are not
compelled to speculate and to imagine how the legislation and regulation
impugned as unconstitutional could possibly offend the constitutional
provisions pointed to by the petitioners.
Turning to Article XIV, Section 1, of the 1987 Constitution, we
note that once more, petitioners have failed to demonstrate that the statute
and regulation they assail in fact clash with that provision. On the contrary, we may note — in
anticipation of discussion infra — that the statute and the regulation
which petitioners attack are in fact designed to promote “quality
education” at the level of professional schools. When one reads Section 1 in relation to
Section 5 (3) of Article XIV, as one
must, one cannot but note that the latter phrase of Section 1 is not to be read
with absolute literalness. The State is
not really enjoined to take appropriate steps to make quality education
“accessible to all” who might for any number of reasons wish
to enroll in a professional school, but rather merely to make such education
accessible to all who qualify under “fair, reasonable and
equitable admission and academic requirements“.
2. In the trial court,
petitioners had made the argument that Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act
No. 2382, as amended, offend against the constitutional principle which forbids
the undue delegation of legislative power, by failing to establish the
necessary standard to be followed by the delegate, the Board of Medical
Education. The general principle of
non-delegation of legislative power, which both flows from and reinforces the
more fundamental rule of the separation and allocation of powers among the
three great departments of government,[1]
must be applied with circumspection in respect of statutes which, like the
Medical Act of 1959, deal with subjects as
obviously complex and technical as medical education and the practice of
medicine in our present day world. Mr.
Justice Laurel stressed this point 47 years ago in Pangasinan Transportation
Co., Inc. vs. the Public Service Commission:[2]
“One thing, however, is apparent in the development of the
principle of separation of powers and that is that the maxim of delegatus
non potest delegare or delegati potestas non potest delegare,
adopted this practice (Delegibus et Consuetudiniis Anglia edited by G.E.
Woodbine, Yale University Press, 1922, Vol. 2, p. 167) but which is also
recognized in principle in the Roman Law (d.17.18.3) has been made to adapt
itself to the complexities of modern government, giving rise to the
adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of ‘subordinate legislation’,
not only in the United States and England but in practically all modern governments. (People vs. Rosenthal and Osmena [68 Phil.
318, 1939]. Accordingly, with the
growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of
governmental regulation, and the increased difficulty of administering the
laws, there is a constantly growing tendency toward the delegation of greater
power by the legislature, and toward the approval of the practice by the courts.”[3]
The standards set for subordinate
legislation in the exercise of rule making authority by an administrative agency
like the Board of Medical Education are necessarily broad and highly abstract. As
explained by then Mr. Justice Fernando in Edu v. Ericta[4] -?
“The standard may be either expressed
or implied. If the former, the
non-delegation objection is easily met. The
standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and
purpose of the act considered as a whole.
In the Reflector Law, clearly the legislative objective is public
safety. What is sought to be attained
as in Calalang v. Williams is ‘safe transit upon the roads‘.”[5]
We believe and so hold
that the necessary standards are set forth in Section 1 of the 1959 Medical
Act: “the standardization and
regulation of medical education” and in Sections 5 (a) and 7 of the
same Act, the body of the statute itself, and that these considered together
are sufficient compliance with the requirements of the non-delegation
principle.
3. The petitioners also urge that the NMAT prescribed in MECS
Order No. 52, s. 1985, is an “unfair, unreasonable and inequitable
requirement”, which results in a denial
of due process. Again, petitioners have
failed to specify just what factors or features of the NMAT render it
“unfair” and “unreasonable” or “inequitable”. They appear to suggest that passing the NMAT
is an unnecessary requirement when added on top of the admission requirements
set out in Section 7 of the Medical Act of 1959, and other admission
requirements established by internal regulations of the various medical
schools, public or private. Petitioners’
arguments thus appear to relate to utility and wisdom or desirability of the
NMAT requirement. But constitutionality
is essentially a question of power or authority: this Court has neither commission nor
competence to pass upon questions of the desirability or wisdom or utility of
legislation or administrative regulation.
Those questions must be addressed to the political departments of the
government, not to the courts.
There is another reason why the petitioners’ arguments must
fail: the legislative and administrative
provisions impugned by them constitute, to the mind of the Court, a valid
exercise of the police power of the state.
The police power, it is
commonplace learning, is the pervasive and non-waivable power and authority of
the sovereign to secure and promote all the important interests and needs — in
a word, the public order — of the general community.[6] An important component of that public order
is the health and physical safety and well being of the population, the
securing of which no one can deny is a legitimate objective of governmental
effort and regulation.[7]
Perhaps the only issue
that needs some consideration is whether there is some reasonable relation
between the prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for admission to
medical school on the one hand, and the securing of the health and safety of
the general community, on the other hand.
This question is perhaps most usefully approached by recalling that the regulation
of the practice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as
a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the public.[8] That the power to regulate and control the
practice of medicine includes the power to regulate admission to the ranks of
those authorized to practice medicine, is also well recognized. Thus, legislation and administrative
regulations requiring those who wish to practice medicine first to take and
pass medical board examinations have long ago been recognized as valid
exercises of governmental power.[9]
Similarly, the establishment of minimum medical educational requirements
— i.e., the completion of prescribed courses in a recognized medical school
— for admission to the medical profession, has also been sustained as a
legitimate exercise of the regulatory authority of the state.[10]
What we have before us in the instant case is closely related: the regulation of access to medical
schools. MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985,
as noted earlier, articulates the rationale of regulation of this type: the improvement of the professional and
technical quality of the graduates of medical schools, by upgrading the quality
of those admitted to the student body of the medical schools. That upgrading is sought by selectivity in
the process of admission, selectivity consisting, among other things, of
limiting admission to those who exhibit in the required degree the aptitude for
medical studies and eventually for medical practice. The need to maintain, and the difficulties of
maintaining, high standards in our professional schools in general, and medical schools in particular, in the current
stage of our social and economic development, are widely known.
We believe that the government is entitled to prescribe an
admission test like the NMAT as a means for achieving its stated objective of
“upgrading the selection of applicants into [our] medical schools”
and of “improv[ing] the quality of medical education in the
country”. Given the widespread use
today of such admission tests in, for instance, medical schools in the United
States of America (the Medical College Admission Test [MCAT])[11]
and quite probably in other countries with far more developed educational
resources than our own, and taking into account the failure or inability of the
petitioners to even attempt to prove otherwise, we are entitled to hold that
the NMAT is reasonably related to the securing of the ultimate end of
legislation and regulation in this area.
That end, it is useful to recall, is the protection of the public from
the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance in those who would
undertake to treat our bodies and minds for disease or trauma.
4. Petitioners have
contended, finally, that MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, is in conflict with the
equal protection clause of the Constitution.
More specifically, petitioners assert that that portion of the MECS
Order which provides that
“the cutoff score for the
successful applicants, based on the scores on the NMAT, shall be
determined every year by the Board of Medical Education after consultation
with the Association of Philippine Medical Colleges.” (Underscoring
supplied)
infringes the requirements of equal
protection. They assert, in other words,
that students seeking admission during a given school year, e.g., 1987-1988,
when subjected to a different cutoff score than that established for an, e.g.,
earlier school year, are discriminated against and that this renders the MECS
Order “arbitrary and capricious”.
The force of this argument is more apparent than real. Different cutoff scores for different school
years may be dictated by differing conditions obtaining during those
years. Thus, the appropriate cutoff
score for a given year may be a function of such factors as the number of
students who have reached the cutoff score established the preceding year; the
number of places available in medical schools during the current year; the
average score attained during the current year; the level of difficulty of the
test given during the current year, and so forth. To establish a permanent and immutable cutoff
score regardless of changes in circumstances from year to year, may well result
in an unreasonable rigidity. The above
language in MECS Order No. 52, far from being arbitrary or capricious, leaves
the Board of Medical Education with the measure of flexibility needed to meet
circumstances as they change.
We conclude that prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain
minimum scores therein as a condition for admission to medical schools in the
Philippines, do not constitute an unconstitutional imposition.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED
and the Order of the respondent trial court denying the petition for a writ of preliminary injunction is
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera,
Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, and Cortes, JJ., concur.
[1]
See People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1937) and Pelaez v. Auditor
General, 15 SCRA 569 (1965).
[2]
70 Phil. 221 (1940).
[3]
70 Phil., at 229; underscoring supplied.
[4]
35 SCRA 481 (1970).
[5]
35 SCRA, at 497; underscoring supplied.
At this point, Mr. Justice Fernando dropped a useful footnote of the
following tenor:
“This Court has considered as
sufficient standards, ‘public welfare’, Municipality of Cardona v. Binangonan, 36 Phil. 547 (1917);
‘necessary in the interest of law and order’, Rubi v. Provincial Board,
39 Phil. 660 (1919); ‘public interest’, People v. Rosenthal, 68 Phil.
328 (1939); and ‘justice and equity and substantial merits of the case’, International Hardwood v.
Pangil Federation of Labor, 70 Phil. 602 (1940).”
In People v. Exconde,
101 Phil. 1125 (1957), Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes said:
“It is well established in
this jurisdiction that, while the making of laws is a non-delegable activity
that corresponds exclusively to Congress, nevertheless, the latter may
constitutionally delegate authority and promulgate rules and regulations to
implement a given legislation and effectuate its policies, for the reason that
the legislature often finds it impracticable (if not impossible) to anticipate
and provide for the multifarious and complex situations that may be met in
carrying the law into effect. All
that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the objects and
purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction with it, but
conform to the standards that the law prescribes —.” (101 Phil., at
1129; underscoring supplied).
[6]
E.g., U.S. v. Toribio, 15 Phil. 85 (1910); Ermita?Malate Hotel and
Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. Mayor of Manila, 20 SCRA 849 (1967)
and Morfe v. Mutuc, 22 SCRA 424 (1968).
[7]
E.g., Case v. Board of Health, 24 Phil. 256 (1913); People vs.
Witte, 146 NE 178 (1925) and Lorenzo v. Director of Health, 50 Phil. 595
(1927).
[8]
Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347
US 442, 98 L.Ed. 829, 74 SCt. 650 (1954); Louisiana State Board of Medical
Examiners v. Beatty, 220 La. 1, 55 So2d. 761 (1951) and Reisinger v.
Com., State Board of Medical Education and Licensure, et al., 399 A2d 1160 (1979).
[9]
Dent v. West Virginia, 129 US 114, 32 L.Ed. 623, 9 SCt. 231 (1889);
State v. Bair, 112 Iowa 466, 84 NW 532 (1900).
[10]
People v. Love, 298 Ill 304, 131 NE 809, 16 ALR 703 (1921); Collins v.
Texas, 223 US 288, 56 L.Ed. 439, 32 SCt. 286 (1912).
[11]
See, e.g., McDonald v. Hogness, et al., 92 Wash. 431, 598 P 2d. 707
(1979).