DIRECTOR J. ANTONIO M. CARPIO OF THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONERS, VS. JUDGE ROMEO G. MAGLALANG OF REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 2 …

Carpio versus Maglalang

The Case

This is a special civil action for certiorari brought by Director J. Antonio M. Carpio of the National Bureau of Investigation, later joined by the People of the Philippines, against Judge Romeo G. Maglalang of the Regional Trial Court of Bataan. The Director charges the judge with grave abuse of discretion for granting bail to Benjamin Escaño, an accused in the ambush-slaying of Mayor Jose Payumo of Dinalupihan, Bataan, and for taking the Director to task over his refusal to surrender the accused to the provincial warden. The case matters because it fixes the constitutional and procedural framework for bail in capital and reclusion perpetua offenses, and because it reminds courts that discretion over bail is never uncontrolled.

Procedural History

An information for murder was filed against Escaño and ten unidentified persons before the Regional Trial Court of Bataan at Balanga, and the Acting Executive Judge issued an order of arrest recommending no bail. Escaño later filed an application for bail. Over the prosecution's opposition, the trial court granted the application, fixed bail at 30,000 pesos, and in a separate order required the Director to justify in writing why he should not be punished for contempt. Before the contempt motion could be resolved, another branch of the Regional Trial Court at Olongapo City approved the bail bond, and the National Bureau of Investigation released Escaño. The Director then filed this special civil action for certiorari before the Supreme Court, which required that the People be formally impleaded and represented by the Solicitor General.

Facts

On August 20, 1986, Mayor Payumo was ambushed and killed. On December 7, 1986, Escaño executed a sworn statement before National Bureau of Investigation agents admitting that he was one of seven persons who gunned down the Mayor, naming some companions, and pointing to a political rival as the one who summoned him and gave him 500 pesos before the ambush. An information for murder was filed in January 1987, and an order of arrest recommending no bail followed. Escaño was arrested and detained at the National Bureau of Investigation detention cell. The Balanga police reported that the Bureau refused to turn over custody because the accused was still under investigation.

Escaño then moved for commitment at the provincial jail, and the trial court ordered the Director to deliver him to the provincial warden within five days. The Director moved for reconsideration, citing the continuing investigation and security concerns. Escaño later executed a second sworn statement affirming his confession and expressing preference for detention at the Bureau for his personal safety, and he wrote the court disavowing the lawyer who had sought his transfer.

Escaño then applied for bail, alleging warrantless arrest and search, torture, and absence of counsel during custodial investigation. The prosecution opposed, insisting the offense was capital and the evidence strong. After hearings, the trial court granted bail at 30,000 pesos, reasoning that the evidence of guilt was not sufficiently strong, and also required the Director to explain why he should not be held in contempt. Escaño was released on the Olongapo bond, later jumped bail, and the bond was eventually forfeited.

Issues

• Whether or not the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in granting bail to Escaño without a summary of the evidence for the prosecution.
• Whether or not the trial court correctly applied the Constitution and the Rules of Court in resolving the bail application after the abolition of the death penalty.
• Whether or not the trial court's order taking the Director to task for contempt was issued in grave abuse of discretion.

Applicable Provisions

Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides:

All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law.

This is the constitutional standard the trial court should have applied, replacing the phrase capital offenses with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua.

Section 4 of Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure defines a capital offense as:

an offense which, under the law existing at the time of its commission and at the time of the application to be admitted to bail, may be punished with death.

The definition requires that the crime be punishable by death at both points of time, which the Court used to test the trial court's premise.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the trial court was remiss in its duty. In a summary proceeding on a motion for bail, the prosecution must be given the opportunity to present evidence, and the court must spell out at least a resume of the evidence on which its order is based; otherwise the order is defective and voidable. Quoting People versus San Diego, the Court stressed that the order must contain a summary of the evidence for the prosecution followed by its conclusion whether the evidence of guilt is strong. The April 2 order merely stated the number of prosecution witnesses without their testimonies, so it was invalidated on this ground alone.

On the second issue, the Court held that the trial court's premise was invalid. The crime was committed in August 1986 under the 1973 Constitution, and the bail application was made in March 1987 under the 1987 Constitution, which abolished the death penalty. But the trial court did not need to invoke the abolition of the death penalty and the lack of restoring legislation. It should simply have resolved the application under Section 13, Article III, determining whether the evidence of guilt was strong, since crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong, are the exceptions to the right to bail.

On the third issue, the Court held that the trial court displayed an uncharacteristic propensity to prejudge. While the Bureau had its own shortcomings in failing to give immediate attention to the court's orders, the court should have taken into account the distance between the court and the Bureau and the fact that both were working toward the same end. The manner by which the Director was taken to task and warned was totally uncalled for.

Doctrine

First, the right to bail is principally for the benefit of the accused, but the prosecution must be afforded procedural due process in its determination; the court must summarize the evidence for the prosecution and state its conclusion whether the evidence of guilt is strong, failing which the order is defective and voidable. Second, under Section 13, Article III of the Constitution, the exception to the right to bail covers persons charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, and the court must resolve the application under that provision rather than on the premise that the abolition of the death penalty opened the door to bail. Third, the court's discretion in bail is controlled by the Constitution, the Rules, and principles of equity and justice.

Disposition

The Court declared the orders of April 2 and April 20, 1987 void for grave abuse of discretion, transferred the criminal case to the Regional Trial Court in Dinalupihan, Bataan, and directed that court to issue a warrant for the rearrest of Escaño and proceed with dispatch.

Remember This

Memorize this line: in a bail application for a capital or reclusion perpetua offense, the court must summarize the prosecution's evidence and conclude whether guilt is strong, or the order is voidable. Examiners use this case to test the procedural due process owed to the prosecution in bail hearings and the correct constitutional standard after the abolition of the death penalty.