PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. PATRICK DE LUNA, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

Two main issues are raised by defendant-appellant in his appeal from
the decision of Branch 10 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu
City:  (1) Whether or not the
defendant-appellant entered a valid plea of guilty to the offense as charged in
the information; and (2) Assuming that there was a valid plea of guilty, whether
the accused may waive the presentation of evidence for the prosecution.

Charged with Murder before Branch 10 of the Regional
Trial Court of
Cebu City,
under the following information,

“That on or about the 17th day of December 1986, at about 7:00
P.M., in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused with deliberate
intent, with intent to kill and with treachery and evident premeditation, did
then and there attack, assault and use personal violence upon one Tricia by
punching and kicking her on the different parts of her body thereby inflicting
upon her the following physical injuries

“CARDIORESPIRATORY
ARREST, SECONDARY TO SEVERE MULTIPLE INJURIES, TRAUMATIC.”

and as a
consequence of said injuries Tricia died in the next day.

CONTRARY TO LAW.”^[1]

defendant-appellant
Patrick de Luna, assisted by Counsel de-Oficio Atty.
David Ompoc, when arraigned on December 23, 1986, entered a PLEA OF GUILTY with
the qualification that “hindi ko sinasadya.”^[2]

The five-page transcript of stenographic notes
taken on the day of the arraignment reveal the following:

INTERPRETER:  (TO ACCUSED)

(After reading the
Information)

Q:   Do
you understand the charge which I have just read to you?

ACCUSED DE LUNA:

A:    Yes,
I understand but I have no motive to kill her. 
I was drunk at that time.

INTERPRETER:  (TO ACCUSED)

Q:   What
do you say to this charge, are you guilty or not?

ACCUSED DE LUNA:

A:    I
am guilty but “hindi ko
sinasadya ang nangyari.” I was so drunk.

COURT:

Companero,
did the accused understand that this is a capital offense?

ATTY. OMPOC:  (Explaining to the accused)

Do you understand that
this is a capital offense?

ACCUSED DE LUNA:

A:    Yes,
but “hindi ko sinasadya ang nangyari.”

x x
x              x
x x                 x x x

COURT:

‘Under the law, the Rules
of Court, the prosecution will have to present evidence in order to determine
the culpability of the accused in this heinous charge of Murder.

(TO ACCUSED):

What does the accused
say, do we have to present evidence for the prosecution?

ACCUSED DE LUNA:

A:    No
more evidence.  No more presentation of
evidence.  I accept my fault but I want
the court to know that I have no motive to kill her.

ATTY. OMPOC:

The accused your honor
categorically stated that he does not want evidence to be presented but he accepts
his fault, but according to him, he did not intend to commit the crime, “hindi sinasadya.”

COURT: 
(TO ACCUSED)

So you admit the charge
against you?  You understood the charge
of Murder filed against you and you admit you are guilty?

ACCUSED DE LUNA:

Yes, I am guilty but I
have no intention to kill the child.^[3]

Thereupon, the court a quo rendered a decision
dated December 23, 1986 convicting defendant-appellant of the crime of Murder.  The decision reads, thus:

“When this case was called for arraignment, Atty. David G. Ompoc, appointed Counsel-de-Oficio
for the accused Patrick de Luna lengthily conferred with the accused and after
such lengthy conference with the accused, accused Patrick de Luna, upon arraignment registered his plea of Guilty to charge of Murder with the qualification
that ‘hindi niya sinasadya.’

“Being informed of the charge and having understood the said accusation, the accused waived his
right that the prosecution present its evidence in
order to determine for this court the degree of culpability of the accused
under the present charge.

Aside from the plea of Guilty, the records is [sic] replete with
evidence strongly and indubitably showing that on the 17th day of December,
1986 at about 7:00 o’clock in the evening, the accused, with deliberate intent,
with intent to kill and with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and
there attack, assault and use personal violence upon one little, small [sic]
girl named Tricia by punching and kicking her on the different parts of her body
thereby inflicting upon her the following physical injuries:”  ‘Cardiorespiratory
Arrest, Secondary to Severe Multiple Injuries, Traumatic’ and as a consequence
of said injuries, Tricia died the next day.

WHEREFORE, finding accused Patrick de Luna Guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Murder and appreciating in his favor the mitigating
circumstance of plea of guilty plus his manifestation to this court that he did
not intentionally want it to happen that way, the court hereby sentences
accused Patrick de Luna to Reclusion Perpetua (life
imprisonment) and to indemnify the heirs of Tricia the sum of P30,000.00.

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.”^[4]

Not satisfied therewith, the defendant-appellant interposed this
appeal alleging that the trial court committed the following errors:

I

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN
SENTENCING THE ACCUSED FOR MURDER WHICH WAS NOT PLEADED OR ADMITTED BY THE
ACCUSED, BECAUSE OF HIS QUALIFICATION TO HIS PLEA, THAT HE DID NOT COMMIT THE
CRIME INTENTIONALLY.

II

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN
NOT REQUIRING THE PROSECUTION TO PRESENT EVIDENCE IN ORDER TO DETERMINE THE
PROPER PENALTY FOR THE CRIME INVOLVED.

In his first assigned
error, it is the contention of appellant that the trial court misappreciated the plea of guilty made by him.  Appellant contends that what he admitted was
the commission of the crime of Homicide and not Murder because of the repeated
qualification to his plea that he did not commit the crime intentionally.  He denied the allegations of treachery and
evident premeditation in the information which are necessary to sustain a
charge and subsequent conviction for Murder. 
He questions the appreciation by the trial court that what was proved by
the qualification ‘hindi ko
sinasadya‘ was only the mitigating
circumstance of “no intention to commit so grave a wrong” recited in
paragraph 3, Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code, and claims that in truth and
in fact his plea was that of guilt of the lesser offense of Homicide, not Murder.

The essence of a plea of guilty is that the accused admits his
guilt, freely, voluntarily, and with a full knowledge of the consequences and
meaning of his act and with a clear understanding of the precise nature of the
crime charged in the complaint or information.^[5]

While it is true that a plea of guilty admits all the allegations
in the information including the aggravating and qualifying circumstances,^[6]
the repeated and emphatic qualification stated by the defendant-appellant as
regards his plea of guilty should have
drawn the attention of the trial court that the plea was made without a full
knowledge of its consequences. 
Apparently, counsel failed to advice him as to the meaning and effect of
the technical language used in the information qualifying the acts constituting
the offense.

In order to be valid, the
plea must be an unconditional admission of guilt.  It must be of such nature as to foreclose the
defendant’s right to defend himself from said charge,
thus leaving the court no alternative but to impose the penalty fixed
by law.^[7]

Under the circumstances
of this case, the appellant’s qualified plea of guilty is not a valid plea of
guilty.  Thus, this Court has ruled that:

“An accused may not enter a conditional plea of guilty in
the sense that he admits his guilt, provided that a certain penalty be imposed upon
him.  In such cases, the information
should first be amended or modified with the consent of the fiscal if the facts
so warrant, or the accused must be considered as having entered a plea of not
guilty.”^[8]

While this Court has had
the occasion to rule that it is permissible for an accused to enter a plea of
guilty to the crime charged with the reservation to prove mitigating
circumstances,^[9] considering, however, the gravity of the offense charged in the
case at bar, the more prudent course for the trial court to follow is to reject
the plea made by the appellant and direct the parties to submit their respective evidence.

Even assuming that the
plea was in fact to the lesser offense of Homicide and not Murder, as stated by
appellant in his appeal,^[10] this Court cannot sustain appellant’s
earnest request for an immediate reduction of the penalty imposed by the
trial court.  This procedure would run
contrary to the explicit provisions of Section 2, Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as
amended, which states:

“SEC. 2.  Plea of guilty to a lesser offense.’ – The accused, with the consent of the
offended party and the fiscal, may be allowed by the trial court to
plead guilty to a lesser offense, regardless of whether or not it is
necessarily included in the crime charged, or is cognizable by a court of lesser jurisdiction than the
trial court.  No amendment of the
complaint or information is
necessary.” (Emphasis supplied.)

The consent of the fiscal
and the offended party is necessary.  If
the plea of guilty to a lesser offense is made without the consent of the
fiscal and the offended party, the conviction of the accused shall not be a bar
to another prosecution for an offense which necessarily includes the
offense charged in the former information.^[11]

On the second assigned
error, it is the contention of appellant that the trial court, after a plea of
guilty to a capital offense (Murder), should have required the prosecution to
present its evidence to determine the proper penalty to be imposed.

The Court sustains the appellant on this score.

This Court has had the
opportunity to formulate this procedure as early as People vs. Apduhan, Jr.^[12]and a long line of cases thereafter.^[13]

In People vs. Camay,^[14]
this Court has ruled that:

“The procedure to be followed in a situation like this where
the accused, with assistance of counsel, voluntarily pleads guilty to a capital
offense is explicitly laid down in Sec. 3, Rule 116 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure promulgated by the
Court, and which went into effect on January
1, 1985.  This new rule
states:

‘When an accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court
shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness
and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and require the prosecution to prove his guilt
and the precise degree of culpability. 
The accused may also present evidence in his behalf.’

“The amended rule is a capsulization of
the provisions of the old rule and pertinent jurisprudence.  We had several occasions to issue the caveat
that even if the trial court is satisfied that the plea of guilty was
entered with full knowledge of its meaning and consequences, the court must
still require the introduction of evidence for the purpose of establishing the
guilt and the degree of culpability of the defendant.

x x x              x x x                 x x x

“Under the new formulation, three (3) things are enjoined of
the trial court after a plea of guilty to a capital offense has been entered by
the accused:

1.      The court must conduct a searching inquiry
into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the
consequences of his plea;

2.      The court must require the prosecution to
present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of
his culpability; and

3.      The court must ask the accused if he
desires to present evidence in his behalf and allow him to do so if he
desires.”

This rule is, therefore, mandatory.

After a plea of guilty in
capital offenses, it is imperative that the trial court requires the
presentation of evidence for the prosecution to enable itself to determine the
precise participation and the degree of culpability of the accused in the
perpetration of the capital offense charged.

In his Manifestation in
lieu of Appellee’s Brief, the Solicitor General, in
fact, made the following observation:

“Herein trial court’s recognition and admission of appellant’s
purported waiver of his right that the
prosecution present further evidence x x x is rather odd.  For
it is the duty of the trial court to take evidence in capital cases where
accused enters a plea of guilty x x x .“^[15]

Thus, notwithstanding the
waiver made by the appellant as to the presentation of evidence by the prosecution, the presentation of evidence should be required in
order to preclude any room for reasonable doubt in the mind of the
trial court, or the Supreme Court on review, as to the possibility that there
might have been some
misunderstanding on the part of
the accused as to the nature of the charge to which he pleaded guilty, and to ascertain the
circumstances attendant to the commission of the crime which justify or  require
the exercise of a greater or lesser degree of severity in the imposition of the
prescribed penalties.^[16]

WHEREFORE, the
decision of the trial court dated December 23, 1986 is hereby SET ASIDE.  The case is remanded to said court for a new
arraignment and further proceeding.  No
costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, (Chairman), Cruz, Griño-Aquino, and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Page 4, Rollo.

^[2]
Page 29, Rollo.  The phrase “hindi ko sinasadya” means “I did not mean (to do)
it.”

^[3]
TSN, December 23, 1986,
pages 2 and 3.

^[4]
Page 6, Rollo.

^[5]
United States. vs. Borlado, 42 Phil. 72 (1921); United States vs. Dineros, 18 Phil. 566 (1911);
United States vs. Jamad, 37 Phil. 305 (1917);
People vs. Ng Pek, 81 Phil. 562 (1948); People
vs. Balicasan, 17 SCRA 1119 (1966).

^[6]
People vs. Alicia, 95 SCRA 227 (1980).

^[7]
People vs. Ng Pek, supra; People vs. Serafica, 29 SCRA 123 (1969).

^[8]
People vs. Sabilul,
49 O.G. 2743.

^[9]
People vs. Racaza, 82 Phil.
623 (1949).

^[10]
Pages 24 and 25, Rollo.

^[11]
Section 7, Rule 117, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as
amended.

^[12]
24 SCRA 798 (1968).

^[13]
People vs. Lacson, 55 SCRA
589 (1974); People vs. Nismal, 114 SCRA 487
(1982); People vs. Abrea, 112 SCRA 83 (1982);
People vs. Alibasa, 118 SCRA 183 (1982).

^[14]
152 SCRA 401(1987).

^[15]
Page 48, Rollo.

^[16]
People vs. Basa, 51 SCRA 317 (1973).