PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. DANIEL MANGUSAN Y BUTETE, JULIO TOKWABAN Y SADAKEN AND ANDY TONIS Y DANIO, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.

The accused-appellants are before this Court to question the
decision of the Regional Trial Court
of La Trinidad, Benguet, convicting them of selling
marijuana in violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act and sentencing each of them to life imprisonment and a fine of
P20,000.00.^[1]

The lower court found that the accused were apprehended as a
result of a buy-bust operation conducted by a NARCOM team on June 11, 1984, near the Mountain
State Agricultural College in Benguet.

The team was composed of five persons, with Patrolwoman Mercedes
Garcia acting as the poseur/buyer.  The
other team members were P/Pfc. Elmer Mariano, P/Cpl.
Eduardo Garcia, P/Pfc. Virgilio
Visperas, and P/Sgt. Murphy Bugtong.  All of them testified for the prosecution.

The evidence of the
People showed that, having been previously informed that there was somebody
looking for a buyer of marijuana, the team went with the informer in search of the alleged pusher at his residence near the public market
in La Trinidad.  The informer talked to the prospective
seller, who arranged to meet the buyer after lunch.  Returning at two o’clock that same afternoon, the team failed
to talk to the suspect, but they tried again at 5 p.m.  That
was when Garcia finally met the first of the accused-appellants, who was
introduced to her as Daniel Mangusan.

While the rest of the team followed unobtrusively, Mangusan led Garcia and the informant to a vacant lot near
the Benguet General
Hospital.  The three were joined a few minutes later by
Andy Tonis who, after a brief conversation with Mangusan, went to the Capitol
Building.  The three then proceeded to a waiting shed in
front of the Mountain State
Agricultural College.  When
Tonis returned at about 6 p.m., he asked that the sale be made near the Capitol Building, but Garcia refused, insisting that it be
made right where they were.  Tonis
left again and returned after
fifteen minutes carrying a plastic bag. 
He was accompanied by Julio Tokwaban, who was carrying a straw bag.  Tokwaban suggested
that the sale be made at the vacant lot. 
After examining the contents of the bag carried by Tokwaban,
Garcia agreed and walked with the sellers to the said lot.

On the way, Garcia placed her hand in her pocket – the
pre-arranged signal to the other team members that the suspects were carrying
marijuana.  The other policemen then
pounced upon the sellers and after a brief scuffle and chase were able to apprehend them. 
The two bags were confiscated. 
The suspects were taken to the Baguio City
Police Station for investigation.  The plastic
bag was found to contain 2.7 kilos, and the straw bag 1 kilo, of what were
later subjected to a field test and found to be marijuana leaves.

The above incident was narrated by Garcia and the other team
members, who corroborated each other’s testimony.^[2]
P/Lt. Carlos Figuerroa, a forensic chemist of the PC
Crime Laboratory, affirmed the results of the thin layer chromatography and doquenis levine tests he had conducted showing that the specimens taken
from the bags Tonis and Tokwaban
were carrying were positive for marijuana.^[3] The marijuana leaves were produced in court
and offered as exhibits.^[4]

After the prosecution had rested, Mangusan
filed a demurrer to the evidence, which was denied.  He was thus deemed to have waived his right
to present his defense, conformably to
the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure.^[5] For their part, Tonis
and Tokwaban testified that the bags taken from them
belonged to one Benny, who had asked them to carry the bags for
him.  While walking on the road toward
Campo Filipino, they were arrested by some men riding in a jeep, but Benny
escaped.  They claimed they were mauled
while under detention.  Both denied they
had conspired with each other or with Mangusan to
commit the crime imputed to them.  Tokwaban pleaded the additional circumstance of minority,
stressing that he was less than
eighteen years old at the time of the alleged offense.  No other witnesses were presented by the
defense.

In convicting all three accused-appellants, the trial court
disbelieved the account of the mysterious Benny as the real owner of the
marijuana found in their
possession.  It held that the facts
established showed that the three of them
were acting in concert, with Mangusan negotiating the deal with Garcia, then ordering Tonis
and, through him, Tokwaban, to get the marijuana.

There is no question that the three accused-appellants performed
their respective roles in the consummation of the sale to Garcia, from the
moment Mangusan offered to sell the marijuana to her
until the time Tonis and Tokwaban,
at Mangusan’s bidding, produced the marijuana that
was to be the subject of the sale.  It is
obvious that after the informer had approached Mangusan
and they agreed to meet later after lunch, Mangusan contacted Tonis and Tokwaban and asked them
to make ready the marijuana they were going to sell later that same day to
Garcia.  A conspiracy existed among them
because, to use the language of the law, they came to an agreement concerning the commission of the felony and decided to commit it.

The accused-appellants make much of the fact that no money was
presented in evidence as the consideration for the alleged sale and conclude therefrom that no sale in fact took place.  The
lack of such evidence did not disprove the sale in light of the positive
testimony of Garcia that she offered to buy and Mangusan
agreed to sell the marijuana and that
the sale did actually take place as
also testified to by the other
prosecution witnesses.

Regarding the alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of the
said witnesses, the Court reiterates the rule that minor disagreements among
witnesses do not necessarily reflect on their veracity if their individual
narrations are essentially consistent with each other in the important
details.  The prosecution version of the
commission of the crime is believable as a whole, particularly as it is
supported by the real evidence of the marijuana confiscated from the
accused-appellants.  By contrast, their
explanation that the marijuana belonged to the mysterious Benny, who merely
asked them to carry the bags for him, strains credibility and imagination, more
so since Benny seems to have disappeared into thin air and has never been seen
again.

It is worth noting that in the course of the trial of this case, Tokwaban withdrew his original plea of not guilty and
substituted it with guilty with the assistance of his counsel.  On that same date, he filed an application
for suspension of sentence and commitment of youthful offender under P.D. 603
as amended.  But when it was pointed out
by the trial court that his application could not be granted because the crime
charged against him was punishable with life imprisonment, he decided to
withdraw his guilty plea and to reiterate his original plea of not guilty.  This was allowed by the trial court without
objection from the prosecution.

It is now suggested in the People’s brief that although Tokwaban could not avail himself of a suspension of
sentence because of the life imprisonment imposed upon him, he should
nevertheless be entitled to a reduction of that sentence by one degree under
the Indeterminate Sentence Law.  The reason given is that he was only fifteen
years and five months old at the time of the commission of the offense and so
could claim the benefits of Articles 68 and 80 of the Revised Penal Code as a
youthful offender.

The suggestion is not well-taken. 
The privileged mitigating circumstance of minority is not available in
prosecutions under the Dangerous Drugs Act, which is a special law.

Thus, in People v. Lagasca,^[6]
where the accused was 17 years, 6 months and 21 days when he committed the
crime, we declared as follows:

x x x Ordinarily, he would be entitled to the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority under Article 68 of the Revised Penal
Code.  However, because Presidential
Decree No. 1675, amending Republic Act No. 6425 imposes “life imprisonment
to death” for sale of
prohibited drugs, he is not entitled to an indeterminate sentence.  We can only recommend that executive clemency
be extended to him.

And in People v. Beralde,^[7]
we also said of the accused who was also a minor at the time of the commission of the offense:

x x x He is
entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority under Article 68
of the Revised Penal Code.

However, he cannot be given an indeterminate sentence because
section 2 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law
provides that said law “shall not apply to persons convicted of offenses
punished with death penalty or life imprisonment.” Presidential Decree No. 1675
imposes “life imprisonment to death” on sale of prohibited drugs.

We
find therefore that the sentence pronounced on each of the accused-appellants, including Tokwaban,
was correctly imposed.

Subject only to the Bill of Rights, all efforts should be taken against the spread of drug
addiction, which has already taken a heavy toll on the lives and future of our people, especially the
youth.  The campaign must continue with relentless resolve, that the
innocent and the weak may be spared from the misery of this malignant affliction.

WHEREFORE, the appeal
is DISMISSED and the challenged decision AFFIRMED, with costs against the
accused-appellants.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, (Chairman), Gancayco, Griño-Aquino, and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Rollo, pp. 45-55; Decision penned by Judge Sulpicio D. Marquez.

^[2]
TSN, October 12, 1984, pp.
1-16; October 17, 1984,
pp. 18-31; November 29, 1984,
pp. 32-51;
December 6, 1984, pp.
53-70; December 12, 1984,
pp. 72-83; May 13, 1985,
pp. 106-123.

^[3]
TSN, February 19, 1985, pp.
84-99.

^[4]
Rollo, P. 49; Exhs.
“A” to “E.”

^[5]
Rule 119, Sec. 15.  Demurrer to
evidence. – when after the prosecution has rested its case, the accused
files a motion to dismiss the case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence,
he waives the right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on
the basis of the evidence for the prosecution.

Under the 1988 amendments to the
Rules of Court, Rule 119, Sec. 15 now reads:

Sec. 15.  Demurrer to evidence. – After the
prosecution has rested its case, the court may dismiss the case on the ground
of insufficiency of evidence:  (1) on its
own initiative after giving the prosecution an opportunity to be heard; or (2)
on motion of the accused filed with prior leave of court.

If the court denies the motion for
dismissal, the accused may adduce evidence in his defense.  Where the accused files such motion to
dismiss without express leave of court, he waives the right to present evidence
and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the
prosecution.

^[6]
148 SCRA 264.

^[7]
139 SCRA 426.