SPOUSES ELIGIO GUNDAYAO AND CRESENCIA BALUYUT, SPOUSES PORFIRIO BALUYUT AND NATIVIDAD TUMANG, SPOUSES CARLOS FLORENTINO AND FLORENCIA BALUYUT, AND DIRECTOR OF LANDS, PETITIONERS…

Gundayao versus Heirs of Pompelo Baluyut

The Case

This is a petition for review on certiorari brought by the spouses Eligio Gundayao and Cresencia Baluyut, the spouses Porfirio Baluyut and Natividad Tumang, the spouses Carlos Florentino and Florencia Baluyut, and the Director of Lands against the Heirs of Pompelo Baluyut. The petitioners ask the Supreme Court to set aside the resolution of the Court of Appeals which denied their motion for new trial on the ground that judgment had already been entered. The action below was one for declaration of ownership and nullity of free patents and original certificates of title over a parcel of land in Capas, Tarlac. The case matters because it teaches when the service of a court order on the wrong counsel may be excused, and when a party's own inaction forecloses relief.

Procedural History

The heirs of Pompelo Baluyut sued the private petitioners and the Director of Lands in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac, and the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. It declared Ricardo Baluyut, Anicia Baluyut and Gloria Baluyut the true owners of the land, declared the four original certificates of title null and void, ordered their cancellation, and ordered the private defendants to vacate the portions they occupied. The private defendants appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court, later the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court in toto in a decision promulgated on November 19, 1985. Counsel for petitioners received a copy of that decision on November 25, 1985. On December 10, 1985, the last day of the reglementary period, Atty. Arturo Serrano filed a motion to enter his appearance and a motion for reconsideration. The appellate court denied reconsideration, but sent the denial to the former counsel, Atty. Augusto Castañeda. On November 10, 1986, petitioners filed a motion for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence. The Court of Appeals denied it because an entry of judgment had already been made. Petitioners then came to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari.

Facts

The land was originally a single parcel of two and one half hectares in Barrio Aranguren, Capas, Tarlac, covered by a tax declaration in the name of Pompelo Baluyut. The plaintiffs claimed that Pompelo bought it from Celestino de Lara in January 1930, possessed it until his death in May 1942, and that his widow and children inherited it and paid the taxes. The private defendants claimed instead that the land was inherited by their father, Aquilino Baluyut, from Celestino de Lara, and that upon Aquilino's death in 1916 the private defendants and their brother Pompelo took possession and shared in paying the taxes.

In 1963 the entire parcel was subdivided by a surveyor into four lots. In October 1968, Cresencia Baluyut, Natividad Tumang, Florencia Baluyut and Ricardo Baluyut applied for free patents, and original certificates of title were eventually issued in their names. The plaintiffs averred that they never knew of or consented to the partition and the survey, and that Ricardo had been made to sign blank forms by one Eusebio Pasamonte. The Deputy Public Lands Inspector testified that he did not verify who the declared owner was, did not actually inspect the land, and did not send the required notice one week before his investigation.

The trial court ruled for the plaintiffs, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. What followed is the heart of this case. After the appellate decision, petitioners changed counsel, and the resolution denying their motion for reconsideration was served on the old counsel. Yet petitioners received, as early as August 1986, the order of the trial court directing the issuance of a writ of execution. They moved for reconsideration in the trial court, then withdrew that motion. For forty two days they did nothing to question the writ. Only on November 10, 1986 did they file a motion for new trial, which the appellate court denied because judgment had already been entered.

Issues

• Whether or not the entry of judgment was null and void because the resolution denying the motion for reconsideration was served on the former counsel instead of the counsel of record.
• Whether or not the denial of the motion for new trial was valid, considering that the decision had already become final and executory.

Applicable Provisions

Section 1 of Rule 53 of the Rules of Court provides:

Before a final order or judgment rendered by the Court of Appeals becomes executory, a motion for a new trial may be filed on the ground of newly discovered evidence.

This fixes the window within which a motion for new trial may be filed, and it had already closed when petitioners filed theirs.

Section 2 of Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, cited by the Court, governs service of notices upon the attorney of record, and it is the rule the Court applies, subject to the qualifications it lays down.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court acknowledged the general rule that where a party appears by attorney, all notices must be given to the attorney of record, and service on any other person is not legally effective and does not start the reglementary period. But the Court held that peculiar aspects of this case precluded its unqualified application. Petitioners had received the motion for execution and the order directing the issuance of the writ. From those, they knew the decision was final. The Court reasoned that even assuming the period did not start to run because of the wrong service, it should be deemed to have commenced when they received the order for execution, which served the same purpose as notice that reconsideration had been denied. To hold otherwise, the Court said, would sacrifice substance for form upon the altar of technicalities.

On the second issue, the Court held that the motion for new trial was correctly denied. The rule allows such a motion only before the judgment becomes executory, and here judgment had already been entered. Petitioners also failed to oppose the motion for execution, failed to move to quash the writ, and failed to file a petition for certiorari. Their own inaction, not the technical defect in service, sealed their fate.

Doctrine

First, as a general rule, service of a court order on a person other than the counsel of record is not legally effective and does not start the reglementary period. Second, that rule yields where the party had actual notice of the finality of the judgment through other official acts, such as the issuance of a writ of execution, which serves the same purpose as notice of denial. Third, a motion for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence must be filed before the judgment becomes executory; once judgment is entered, the remedy is lost. Fourth, a party who sleeps on his rights and fails to seasonably question a writ of execution cannot later be heard to complain of the consequences.

Disposition

The petition was denied, the challenged resolution was affirmed, and the temporary restraining order was lifted, with judgment immediately executory.

Remember This

Memorize this line: substance prevails over form, and actual notice of finality through a writ of execution starts the period even if service was made on the wrong counsel. Examiners use this case to test the rule on service upon counsel of record and its exceptions, and the deadline for a motion for new trial.