DONALD DEE, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND AMELITO MUTUC, RESPONDENTS.

Petitioner assails the resolution of respondent court, dated
February 12, 1987, reinstating its decision promulgated on May 9, 1986 in
AC-G.R. CV No. 04242 wherein it affirmed the decision of the trial court
holding that the services rendered by private respondent was on a professional,
and not on a gratis et amore, basis and ordering
petitioner to pay private respondent the sum of P50,000.00
as the balance of the latter’s legal fee therefor.

The records show that sometime
in January, 1981, petitioner and his father went to the residence of private
respondent, accompanied by the latter’s cousin, to seek his advice regarding the problem of the alleged indebtedness of
petitioner’s brother, Dewey Dee, to Caesar’s Palace, a well?known
gambling casino at Las Vegas, Nevada, U.S.A. Petitioner’s father was
apprehensive over the safety of his son, Dewey, having heard of a link between
the mafia and Caesar’s Palace and the
possibility that his son may be
harmed at the instance of the latter.^[1]

Private respondent assured petitioner and his father that he
would inquire into the matter,
after which his services were reportedly contracted for P100,000.00.  From his residence, private respondent called
up Caesar’s Palace and, thereafter, several long distance telephone calls and
two trips to Las Vegas by him
elicited the information that Dewey Dee’s outstanding account was around
$1,000,000.00.  Further investigations,
however, revealed that said account had actually been incurred by Ramon Sy, with Dewey Dee merely signing for the chits.  Private respondent communicated said
information to petitioner’s father and also assured him that Caesar’s Palace
was not in any way linked to the mafia.^[2]

In June, 1981, private respondent personally talked with the
president of Caesar’s Palace at Las Vegas, Nevada.  He advised the president that for the sake and
in the interest of the casino it would be better to make Ramon Sy answer for the indebtedness.  The president told him that if he could
convince Ramon Sy to acknowledge the obligation,
Dewey Dee would be exculpated from liability for the account.  Upon private respondent’s return to Manila,
he conferred with Ramon Sy and the latter was
convinced to acknowledge the indebtedness. 
In August, 1981, private respondent brought to Caesar’s Palace the
letter of Ramon Sy owning the debt and asking for a
discount.  Thereafter, the account of
Dewey Dee was cleared and the casino never bothered him.^[3]

Having thus settled the account of petitioner’s brother, private
respondent sent several demand letters to petitioner demanding the balance of
P50,000.00 as attorney’s fees.  Petitioner, however, ignored said
letters.  On October 4, 1982, private respondent filed a complaint
against petitioner in the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Branch CXXXVI, for the collection of attorney’s fees and refund of transport
fare and other expenses.^[4]

Private respondent claimed that petitioner formally engaged his
services for a fee of P100,000.00 and that the
services he rendered were professional services which a lawyer renders to a
client.  Petitioner, however, denied the
existence of any professional relationship of attorney and client between him
and private respondent.  He admits that
he and his father visited private respondent for advice on the matter of Dewey
Dee’s gambling account.  However, he
insists that such visit was merely an informal one and that private respondent
had not been specifically contracted to handle the problem.  On the contrary, respondent Mutuc had allegedly volunteered his services “as a
friend of defendant’s family” to see what he could do about the situation.
 As for the P50,000.00 inceptively given
to private respondent, petitioner claims that it was not in the nature of
attorney’s fees but merely “pocket money” solicited by the former for
his trips to Las Vegas and the said amount of P50,000.00 was already sufficient
remuneration for his strictly voluntary services.

After trial, the court a quo rendered judgment ordering herein petitioner to pay private
respondent the sum of P50,000.00 with interest thereon
at the legal rate from the filing of the complaint on October 4, 1982 and to pay the costs.  All other claims therein of private
respondent and the counterclaim of petitioner were dismissed.^[5] On appeal, said judgment was affirmed
by the then Intermediate Appellate Court on May 9, 1986.^[6]

Petitioner, in due time, filed a motion for reconsideration
contending that the Appellate Court overlooked two important and decisive
factors, to wit:  (1) At the time private
respondent was ostensibly rendering services to petitioner and his father, he
was actually working “in the interest” and “to the
advantage” of Caesar’s Palace of which he was an agent and a consultant,
hence the interests of the casino and private respondent were united in their
objective to collect from the debtor; and (2) Private respondent is not justified
in claiming that he rendered
legal services to petitioner and his father in view of the conflicting
interests involved.

In its resolution of July
31, 1986, respondent court reconsidered its decision and held that the sum of P50,000.00 already paid
by petitioner to private respondent was commensurate to the
services he rendered, considering that at the time he was acting as counsel for
petitioner he was also acting as the
collecting agent and consultant of, and receiving compensation from, Caesar’s
Palace.^[7] However, upon a motion for reconsideration
thereafter filed by private respondent, the present respondent Court of Appeals
issued another resolution, dated February 12, 1987, reinstating the aforesaid decision of May 9,
1986.^[8]

Petitioner is now before us
seeking a writ of certiorari to overturn the latter resolution.

It is necessary, however,
to first clear the air of the questions arising from the change of stand of the First Civil Cases Division of
the former Intermediate Appellate Court when, acting on the representations in petitioner’s undated motion for
reconsideration supposedly filed on May 28, 1986, it promulgated its July 31, 1986 resolution
reconsidering the decision it had rendered in AC-G.R. CV No. 04242.  Said resolution was, as earlier noted, set
aside by the Twelfth Division of the reorganized Court of Appeals which, at the
same time, reinstated the aforesaid decision.

Because of its clarificatory relevance
to some issues belatedly raised by petitioner, which issues should have been
disregarded^[9]
but were nevertheless auspiciously discussed therein, at the risk of seeming
prolixity we quote hereunder the salient portions of the assailed resolution
which demonstrate that it was not conceived in error.

“The reason for then IAC’s action is
that it deemed the P50,000.00 plaintiff-appellee had
previously received from defendant-appellant as adequate compensation for the
services rendered by him for defendant-appellant, considering that at the time
plaintiff-appellee was acting as counsel for
defendant-appellant, he was also acting as the collecting agent and consultant
of, and receiving compensation from Caesar’s Palace in Las Vegas, Nevada, the
entity with whom defendant-appellant was having a problem and for which he had
engaged the services of plaintiff-appellee.  The crux of the matter, therefore, is whether
or not the evidence on record justifies this finding of the IAC.

“Plaintiff-appellee maintains that
his professional services to defendant-appellant were rendered between the months
of July and September of 1981, while his employment as collection agent and
consultant of Caesar’s Palace covered the period from December 1981 to October
1982.  This positive testimony of
plaintiff-appellee, however, was disregarded by the
IAC for the following reasons:

“1.  In
August 1983, plaintiff-appellee testified that he was
a representative of Caesar’s Palace in the Philippines
‘about two or three years ago.’ From this the IAC concluded that the period
covers the time plaintiff-appellee rendered
professional services to defendant-appellant.

“We do not think that IAC’s
conclusion is necessarily correct.  When
plaintiff-appellee gave the period ‘about two or
three years ago,’ he was merely stating an approximation.  Considering that plaintiff-appellee was testifying in August 1983, and his employment
with Caesar’s Palace began in December 1981, the stated difference of two years
is relatively correct.  x x x

“2.  The
plaintiff-appellee had testified that he was working
‘for the sake,’ ‘in the interest,’ and ‘to the advantage’ of Caesar’s Palace. x
x x

“We detect nothing from the above which would support IAC’s conclusion that plaintiff-appellee
was then in the employ of Caesar’s Palace. 
What is gathered is that
plaintiff-appellee was simply fulfilling a condition
which plaintiff-appellee had proposed to, and was
accepted by, Caesar’s Palace, for the release of Dewey Dee from his obligation
to Caesar’s Palace.

“3.  Caesar’s
Palace would not have listened to, and acted upon, the advice of plaintiff-appellee if he were no longer its consultant and alter ego.

“Why not?  We are witnesses to many successful
negotiations between contending parties whose representing lawyers were not and
were never in the employ of the opposite party. 
The art of negotiation is precisely one of the essential tools of a good
practitioner, and mastery of the art takes into account the circumstance that
one may be negotiating, among others, with a person who may not only be a
complete stranger but antagonistic as well. 
The fact that plaintiff-appellee was able to
secure a favorable concession from Caesar’s Palace for defendant-appellant does
not justify the conclusion that it could have been secured only because of
plaintiff-appellee’s professional relationship with
Caesar’s Palace.  It could have been
attributable more to plaintiff-appellee’s stature as
a former ambassador of the Philippines
to the United States,
his personality, and his negotiating technique.

“Assuming, however, that plaintiff-appellee
was employed by Caesar’s Palace during the time that he was rendering
professional services for defendant-appellant, this would not automatically
mean the denial of additional attorney’s fees to plaintiff-appellee.  The main reason why the IAC denied plaintiff-appellee additional compensation was because the latter was
allegedly receiving compensation from Caesar’s Palace, and, therefore, the
amount of P50,000.00 plaintiff-appellee had
previously received from defendant-appellant is ‘reasonable and commensurate.’
This conclusion, however, can only be justified if the fact and amount of
remuneration had been established.  These
were not proven at all.  No proof was
presented as to the nature of plaintiff-appellee’s
remuneration, and the mode or manner in which it was paid.  x x x ^[10]

Both the lower court and the appellate court concur in their
findings that there was a lawyer-client relationship between petitioner and
private respondent Mutuc.  We find no reason to interfere with this
factual finding.  There may be instances
when there is doubt as to whether an attorney-client relationship has been
created.  The issue may be raised in the
trial court, but once the trial
court and the Court of Appeals have found that
there was such a relationship the Supreme Court cannot disturb such finding
of fact,^[11]
absent cogent reasons therefor.

 The puerile claim is
advanced that there was no attorney-client relationship between petitioner and
private respondent for lack of a written contract to that effect.  The absence of a written contract will not
preclude the finding that there was a professional relationship which merits
attorney’s fees for professional services rendered.  Documentary formalism is not an essential
element in the employment of an attorney; the contract may be express or
implied.  To establish the relation, it
is sufficient that the advice and assistance of an attorney is sought and
received in any matter pertinent to his profession.  An acceptance of the relation is implied on
the part of the attorney from his acting on behalf of his client in pursuance
of a request from the latter.^[12]

There is no question that professional services were actually
rendered by private respondent to petitioner and his family.  Through his efforts, the account of
petitioner’s brother, Dewey Dee, with Caesar’s Palace was assumed by Ramon Sy and petitioner and his family were further freed from
the apprehension that Dewey might be harmed or even killed by the so-called mafia.  For such services, respondent Mutuc is
indubitably entitled to receive a reasonable
compensation and this right cannot be occluded by petitioner’s pretension that
at the time private respondent rendered such services to petitioner and his
family, the former was also the Philippine consultant of Caesar’s Palace.

On the first aspect, the evidence of record shows that the
services of respondent Mutuc were engaged by the
petitioner for the purposes hereinbefore discussed.  The previous partial payments totalling P50,000.00 made by
petitioner to respondent Mutuc and the tenor of the
demand letters sent by said private respondent to petitioner, the receipt
thereof being acknowledged by petitioner, ineluctably prove three facts, viz:  that petitioner
hired the services of private respondent Mutuc; that
there was a prior agreement as to the amount of attorney’s fees to be given to
the latter; and there was still a balance due and payable on said fees.  The duplicate-original copy of the initial
receipt issued and signed in this connection by private respondent reads:

“RECEIVED from Mr. Donald Dee, for professional services
rendered, the sum of THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00)
as partial payment, leaving a balance of SEVENTY THOUSAND PESOS (70,000.00),
payable on demand.

“Makati,
Metro Manila, July 25, 1981.”^[13]

Thereafter, several demand letters for payment of his fees, dated
August 6, 1981, December 2, 1981, January 29, 1982, March 7, 1982, and September 7, 1982 were sent by private
respondent to petitioner,^[14]
all to no avail.

On the second objection, aside from the facts stated in the aforequoted resolution of respondent Court of Appeals, it
is also not completely accurate to judge private respondent’s position by
petitioner’s assumption that the interests of Caesar’s Palace were adverse to
those of Dewey Dee.  True, the casino was
a creditor but that fact was not contested or opposed by Dewey Dee, since the
latter, as verifications revealed, was not
the debtor.  Hence, private respondent’s
representations in behalf of petitioner were not in resistance to the casino’s
claim but were actually geared toward proving that fact by establishing the
liability of the true debtor, Ramon Sy, from whom
payment was ultimately and correctly exacted.^[15]

Even assuming that the imputed conflict of interests obtained,
private respondent’s role therein was not ethically or legally
indefensible.  Generally, an attorney is
prohibited from representing parties with contending
positions.  However, at a certain
stage of the controversy before it reaches the court, a lawyer may represent
conflicting interests with the consent of the parties.^[16]
A common representation may work to the advantage of said parties since a mutual lawyer, with
honest motivations and impartially cognizant of the parties’ disparate
positions, may well be better situated to work out an acceptable settlement of
their differences, being free of partisan inclinations and acting with the
cooperation and confidence of said parties.

Here, even indulging
petitioner in his theory that
private respondent was during the period in question an agent of Caesar’s
Palace, petitioner was not unaware thereof, hence he actually consented to and
cannot now decry the dual representation that he postulates.  This knowledge he admits, thus:

“It is a fair question to ask why, of all the lawyers in the
land, it was the private respondent who was singled out by the petitioner’s
father for consultation in regard to an apparent problem, then pending in
Caesar’s Palace.  The testimony of Arthur
Alejandrino, cousin to private respondent, and the admission of the private respondent
himself supply the answer.  Alejandrino testified that private respondent was
the representative of Caesar’s Palace in the Philippines
(p. 23, t.s.n.,
Nov. 29, 1983).  Private respondent
testified that he was such representative tasked by the casino to
collect the gambling losses incurred by Filipinos in Las
Vegas.  (p. 5, t.s.n.,
Sept. 21, 1983).”^[17]

A lawyer is entitled to
have and receive the just and reasonable compensation for services rendered at
the special instance and request of his client and as long as he is honestly
and in good faith trying to serve and represent the interests of his client,
the latter is bound to pay his just fees.^[18]

WHEREFORE, the resolution of respondent Court of
Appeals, dated February 12, 1987,
reinstating its original decision of May
9, 1986 is hereby AFFIRMED, with
costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman), Paras, Padilla, and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Petition, 4; Rollo, 9.

^[2]
Rollo, 9-10, 21-22.

^[3]
Rollo, 10.

^[4]
Civil Case No. 1736 (47992); Original Record, 1-4.

^[5]
Judge Ricardo J. Francisco, presiding; Original Record,
127-132.

^[6]
Penned by Presiding Justice Ramon G. Gaviola,
Jr., Justices Ma. Rosario Quetulio-Losa
and Leonor Ines Luciano concurring; First Civil Cases Division.

^[7]
Penned, likewise, by Presiding Justice Gaviola,
Jr., with the concurrence of Justices
Quetulio-Losa and Luciano
of the same Division.

^[8]
Justice Luis A. Javellana,
ponente, with whom concurred Justices Pedro A. Ramirez and Cecilio
L. Pe;
Twelfth Division.

^[9]
Sec. 18, Rule 46 and Sec. 7, Rule 51, Rules of Court; De la Santa vs.
Court of Appeals, et al., 140 SCRA 44 (1985); Dihiansan,
et al. vs. Court of Appeals,  et
al., 153 SCRA 712 (1987).

^[10]
Rollo, 52-55.

^[11]
Vda. de Reyes vs.
Court of Appeals et al., 116 SCRA 607 (1982).

^[12]
See C.J.S., 848-849, and Hirach Bros. & Co. vs. R.E. Kennington
Co., 88 A.L.R., 1, as cited in Hilado vs.
Gutierrez David, et al., 84 Phil. 569 (1949).

^[13]
Exhibit S, Folder of Exhibits.  While objected to as self-serving (Original
Record, 102), the authenticity and due execution of this document was not
definitively denied by petitioner in his testimony (TSN, Nov. 21, 1983, 20-21).

^[14]
Exhibits B, D, E, F, and G, ibid.

^[15]
Canon 6 of the Canons of Professional Ethics, then in force, provides:  “Within the meaning of this canon, a
lawyer represents conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client, it is
his duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires him to
oppose.”

^[16]
Canon 6, id.

^[17]
Memorandum of
Petitioner, 5; Rollo, 88.

^[18]
De Guzman vs. Visayan Rapid Transit Co., Inc., et al., 68 Phil. 643
(1939).