ASSOCIATED BANK, PETITIONER, VS. HON. ARSENIO M. GONONG, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH VIII; ROLE, INC. AND ROMEO R. ECHAUZ, R…

The perfection of an appeal and the jurisdiction of a trial court
over a motion for execution pending appeal are the controverted issues in this
petition to review the order of the respondent court in Civil Case No. 82-7281,
dated December 16, 1986, denying the petitioner’s motion for execution pending
appeal on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

The petition was filed on February 17, 1987.  Private respondents Role, Inc. and Romeo R.
Echauz filed their Comments on March 24 and March 27, 1987 respectively.  The petitioner filed its Reply on June 16,
1987.  We treat the Comments as the
respondents’ Answers and decide the petition on its merits.

This case has its origins in a complaint for the recovery of a
sum of money filed by petitioner Associated Bank against respondent ROLE,
Incorporated and Romeo R. Echauz before the then Court of First Instance of
Manila, Branch 37.

On November 3, 1986, the trial court rendered its decision in
favor of the petitioner.  On November 6, 1986, respondent ROLE filed its
notice of appeal.  On November 24, 1986,
respondent Echauz followed suit.

Meanwhile, on November 19, 1986, the petitioner filed a motion
for execution pending appeal.

On December 16, 1986, the respondent court issued the questioned
order denying the petitioner’s motion for execution on the ground that the
notices of appeal seasonably filed by private respondents had already been given due
course when he issued his previous orders. 
According to the court, the filing of the respondents’ notices of appeal
and its approval of those notices deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to
entertain the motion for execution pending appeal.

This petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus
was filed to – (a) annul and set aside the order denying the petitioner’s
motion for execution pending appeal;    (b)
enjoin and prohibit the respondents, specifically the respondent court, from elevating the records of the case to the
Court of Appeals pending resolution of the instant petition; and (c) command
the respondent court to assume its jurisdiction and resolve the petitioner’s
motion for execution pending appeal.

The questioned order is based on the premise that upon the
seasonable filing and approval of the respondents’ notices of appeal, the trial
court is automatically divested of its jurisdiction over the case and,
consequently, it has no more power to act upon the petitioner’s motion.  The mistake is apparent.

Section 39 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 removed the record on
appeal as a requirement for the per­fection of an appeal.  In lieu of the usually expen­sive and
time-consuming record on appeal, the entire original records are now
transmitted to the appellate court.

In implementation of this
amendatory provision, Section 23 of the Interim Rules of Court provides:

“23.  Perfection of appeal.  – In cases where appeal is taken, the
perfection of the appeal shall be upon the expiration of the last day to appeal
by any party.”

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As long as any of the parties may still file his, her, or its appeal,
the court does not lose jurisdiction over the case.

The plaintiff or plaintiffs may not deprive the defendants or
co-plaintiffs and neither may the defendant or defendants deprive the plaintiff
or co-defendants of the right to file a motion for reconsideration or to move
for a new trial or an execution pending appeal by immediately filing a notice
of appeal.  The filing of an appeal by a
losing party does not automatically divest the party favored by a decision
of the right to move for a more favorable decision or to ask for execution
pending appeal.  It is only after all the
parties’ respective periods to appeal have lapsed that the court loses its jurisdiction over the case.  As pointed out in Universal Far East Corporation v. Court of
Appeals  (131 SCRA 642) the period
when a court considers and acts upon a motion for execution may take some
time.  As a matter of fact, the
resolution of a
motion may
take place long after the expiration of the regle­mentary fifteen-day
period for appeal.

As early as 1934, this Court in People v. Ursua  (60 Phil.
252) stressed this mode of determining when an appeal is perfected.

An appeal by the defendant in a criminal case does not result in the court’s losing
its jurisdiction to entertain a
motion for reconsideration filed by the
offended party, insofar as civil liability is concerned, within the
15-day period.  Thus we held in Ursua:

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x x x “If the accused has the right
within fifteen days to appeal from the judgment of conviction, the offended party
should have the right within the same period to appeal from so much of the
judgment as is
prejudicial to him, and his appeal should not be made dependent on that
of the accused.  If upon appeal by the
accused the court altogether loses its jurisdiction over the cause, the
offended party would be deprived of his right to appeal, although fifteen days
have not yet elapsed from the date of the judgment, if the accused files his
appeal before the expiration of said period. 
Therefore, if the court, independently of the appeal of the accused, has
jurisdiction, within fifteen days from the date of the judgment, to allow the
appeal of the offended party, it also has jurisdiction to pass upon the motion
for reconsideration filed by the private prosecution in connection with the
civil liabi­lity of the accused.” (at pp. 254?255).

The above ruling was reiterated in Simsim v. Belmonte (34
SCRA 536) where we stated:

“Timoteo Simsim balked at the order to amend the record on
appeal, contending that it was beyond the power of the Court to issue once his
appeal had been perfected by the approval of the record.  x x
x.

xxx                                                    xxx                                                       xxx

xxx                                                    xxx                                                       xxx

“x
x x Furthermore, such a view would place it within the power of one of
the parties, by the simple expedient of immediately perfecting his appeal, to
deprive the other party of the right to ask for a reconsideration of the
decision, let alone to have the court approve his own appeal if such a motion
is denied.  These consequences find no
justification in the Rules.” (at pp. 538 & 539).

As explained in the above case of Simsim, the
Rules must be interpreted to avoid impractical and absurd situations.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED.  The order of the respondent court, dated
December 16, 1986 denying the petitioner’s motion for execution pending appeal
is SET ASIDE.  The court a quo is
ordered to retain the records of the case and to resolve the petitioner’s
motion for execution.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin, and Cortes, JJ., concur.