THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. BONIFACIO BALANSI ALIAS “BAN-OS”, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

The accused-appellant stands
charged with the murder of Elpidio Dalsen on January
30, 1984 at Balinciagao, Pasil, Kalinga-Apayao.  The Information
alleged that he, armed with a Garand rifle,
went inside the house of the victim,
then allegedly fast asleep, where
he shot him twice and killed him. 
Treachery was held to be
present, and so were evident premeditation and employment of means to weaken the defense of the
victim.^[1]

The accused-appellant was then the Barangay
Captain of Balinciagao Norte, Pasil,
Kalinga-Apayao, and a member of the Civilian Home Defense
Force (CHDF), while the victim was the Provincial Development Officer of Kalinga-Apayao.^[2]
The incident took place during a wedding celebration at Balinciagao
Sur, Pasil, at or about 5:30 or 6:00
o’clock in the afternoon. 
The prosecution presented eight witnesses.  The defense placed two on the stand.

The trial court found the accused guilty as charged and sentenced
him to die and to pay a total of
P590,000.00 in actual (P540,000.00 for
loss of the victim’s earning capacity) and moral damages, plus costs.^[3]

It appears that the victim, a nephew of the appellant, was then
sleeping at the house of his parents located opposite the house where the
wedding celebration was being held.  At or about 5:00
o’clock in the afternoon, Beatrice Canao,
a Balinciagao resident, saw the accused, her uncle,
standing at the door of the house of the victim’s parents, also her relatives,
armed with a gun.  She inquired what he
was doing there and he allegedly replied that he was waiting for the
victim.  She then entered the premises to
locate an old newspaper with which to wrap food, a rice cake when she saw the
victim asleep.  When she left, she saw
the accused at the doorway.  After
disposing of her rice cake (which she gave
to a certain Fr. Medina), she heard two gunshots, fired at an interval of two
or three seconds, emanating apparently from the house, to which she shortly rushed.  She
allegedly met the accused at the steps leading to the second floor, brandishing
his rifle.^[4]

She allegedly shouted “putok, putok!”^[5]
She then reported the matter to the police.

Yulo Asbok, a
fellow CHDF member of the accused and likewise a Balinciagao
resident, also heard two gunshots ring that afternoon.  He said that he was three meters from the
house where the gunshot sounds seemed to have originated.  He allegedly
proceeded there but was met by the accused at the steps.  They allegedly grappled
for possession of the rifle, which, he alleged, was still warm and reeked of
gunpowder.  He was able to wrest
possession, after which, the accused allegedly ran away and fled to Pogon, also in Balinciagao.  He later learned that the victim had been
shot and that he died at Lubuagan Hospital.^[6]

Rosalina Dalsen, the victim’s wife was
enjoying the wedding celebration when she heard two gunshots.  She made inquiries subsequently and was
informed that the victim was her husband. 
She claimed that she saw the accused standing at the entrance of her parents-in-law’s house prior thereto.^[7]

Dr. Nicolas Balais, a dentist by
profession, was also at that celebration when he heard the shots.  He then went to the victim’s parent’s house
where they, the shots, rang out from.  He
did not allegedly have in mind that somebody had actually been fired upon but
thought that maybe there had been a burglary. 
He ascended the steps of the house where the accused earlier met
Beatrice Candao and Yulo Asbok, and entered the second floor.  He saw the victim lying in his room, whom he
initially believed to be merely sleeping, but who was, in fact, dead.^[8]

The prosecution also presented Simeon Valera,
principal of Pasil
Central School,
and Artemio Dalsen, the
victim’s brother, who sought to establish a motive for the killing of the
victim, a motive they imputed to the accused. 
Valera
testified that revenge was supposedly a tradition among Kalingas
(of which both the accused and victim were members), which, however, could be
prevented by the dusa, meaning, apparently,
intervention and mediation by community elders.^[9]
Meanwhile, Dalsen claimed that the accused had nursed
a long-standing grudge against the victim, whom he accused of delaying on
alleged award for the construction of a bridge in Balinciagao
in 1979.^[10]

After the prosecution rested, the defense presented its
evidence.  It presented two witnesses,
the accused himself and Masadao Jose, who lived in Samangana, Balinciagao.

The accused claimed that he was also at the wedding celebration
on that fateful afternoon when he too heard two gunshots break in the air.  As a member of the CHDF, he allegedly took it upon himself to
investigate the matter.  He said that he
went to the direction where the shots came from and was on his way to the
entrance of the house when Yulo Asbok
allegedly prevented him from doing so, who grabbed the firearm he was
carrying.  He did not allegedly know at
that time that the victim had been shot and allegedly learned of it only on the
following day.  He admitted having ran
away but allegedly because he had been implicated.  Four days later, he voluntarily turned
himself in to the police.  Masadao Jose corroborated his statement.^[11]

In returning a verdict of guilty, the trial judge observed:  “While there is no eye witness who
testified to having seen the accused Bonifacio Balansi shoot the victim, yet all the circumstances pointed
to him as the perpetrator of the crime.”^[12]

The circumstantial evidence referred to came primarily from the
lips of Yulo Asbok and
Beatrice Candao, as well as the accused himself, who
admitted having been at the scene of
the crime.  Obviously, the judge did not
lend credence to the accused’s defense.

The accused-appellant now contends that the judge erred, first,
in appreciating circumstantial evidence, second, in appreciating treachery, and
third, in rejecting his defense of alibi.

We affirm, with modification, the decision appealed from.

While there was no eyewitness account, the web of circumstantial
evidence points to no other conclusion than that the accused was guilty of
shooting the victim, Elpidio Dalsen,
to death in the afternoon of January 30, 1982. 
These circumstances are as follows: 
(1) He was seen standing by the entrance of the house where the victim
had sojourned, armed with a long rifle, minutes before gunshots were
heard.  Three witnesses saw him:  Beatrice Canao, Yulo Asbok, and Rosalina Dalsen.  (2) Moments
later, two shots rang out, one after the other. 
Four witnesses heard them:  Canao, Asbok, Dalsen,
and Nicolas Balais. 
(3) Thereafter, Canao saw him descending from
the steps of the house.  Asbok also saw him there, whom he wrestled for the
possession of the rifle.  (4) He fled and
hid for four days.

Under Rule 133, Section 5, of the Rules of Court:

SEC. 4.  Circumstantial evidence, when
sufficient.  — circumstantial evidence
is sufficient for conviction if:

(a)  There is more than one circumstance;

(b)  The facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven; and

(c)  The combination of all
the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.^[13]

As we glean from the evidence, there is no one, other than the accused-appellant,
who could have perpetrated the offense.

The accused-appellant, as we said, disagrees.  He insists that he was there, precisely, to
investigate the matter, and armed himself for the purpose, but was stopped by Yulo Asbok.  His protests notwithstanding, we too must
reject this defense.  Two reasons
persuade us.  First, he has not ascribed
any motive to Yulo Asbok as
to why he, Asbok, should testify falsely against
him.  Second, he admits having fled
immediately thereafter.  If he were truly
innocent, he would not have done so.  We
have held time and again that flight is a silent admission of guilt.^[14]
As aptly put:  “The righteous is brave as a
lion, but the wicked man fleeth.”^[15]

If he were moreover truly innocent, and that it was Yulo Asbok who had something to
do with the killing and who had meanwhile tried to stop him from conducting an
inquiry, it would have been he, the accused, to be the first to make a report
to the authorities so that Asbok could be brought to the bar of justice.  If the latter did try to prevent him from
performing his duties, as he claimed,^[16] he should have gone to lengths to implicate Asbok, because that too was his duty.

We also reject his claims of inconsistency on the part of the prosecution’s
witnesses, notably Asbok, who stated that he was the
first to be in the victim’s house after the shooting (aside from the accused),
in the face of Canao’s testimony that she also had
been there.  The Court is not convinced
that an inconsistency exists.  For
obviously, Asbok had been mistaken.  Canao had earlier
been there.

The Court sees no need to make an inquiry on the admissibility of
testimonies attributing motive to the accused-appellant.  We are sufficiently persuaded that even
without any successful showing of a motive, the circumstantial evidence on hand
nevertheless suffices to warrant a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

The Court, however, is not convinced that the accused-appellant had committed murder arising from
treachery, evident premeditation, and means employed to weaken the defense of
the victim.  As to treachery,
jurisprudence is ample that the manner of attack must be shown.  While there are testimonies to the effect
that the victim was “fast asleep”, we can not safely presume that he
was still in that condition when the accused sprung his attack.  And since nobody saw the actual shooting, we can not justifiably say that the victim was still
actually still asleep at that time.^[17]

Neither is evident premeditation a qualifying circumstance.  In appreciating evident premeditation, it is
necessary to show:  (1) the time when the
offender determined to commit the offense; (2) an act manifestly indicating that
the culprit had clung to his determination; and (3) a sufficient interval of
time between the determination and execution.^[18]
The prior determination of the accused to do away with the victim has not been
sufficiently demonstrated by the prosecution.

That the accused also employed means to weaken the victim’s
defenses is likewise missing in this case. 
As we said, there was no actual eyewitness to the killing and hence, we
can not say for sure, based on the evidence before us, that the appellant did
employ means to weaken the defense of the victim.

We, however, affirm the trial court insofar as it appreciated
dwelling.  Although the victim was not
shot in his house
(his parents owned it) it has
been held that the dwelling place need not be owned by the victim.^[19]
In that case, it was held:

La circunstancia agravante
de morada, aunque no fuese la casa propia de los occisos, debe
estimarse porque—segun el Tribunal Supremo de España–“no solo por el respeto que el domicilio ajeno merece, como especie
de complemento de la personalidad,
y por el que es debido al hogar
de la familia, sino por el no menor de que es digna
la residencia privada de cualquier ciudadano, y por el mayor grado de malicia que revela quien
busca a su victima alli en donde se encuentra con la confianza y abandono propios del lugar elegido para el descanso y las intimidades de la vida; razon por
la cual habla el Codigo penal en el art. 10, no de domicilio
en sentido legal, sino de morada en su acepcion real, que
no es otra que la del paraje en donde una persona hace estancia de asiento, * * * a titulo de nuesped, o por otro cualquiera.”
(S. de 25 de Junio de 1886, 2 Viada,,
5. ed., 329.)^[20]

In the Basa case, the victims were
killed while sleeping as guests
in the house of another.  Dwelling there
was held to be aggravating.

According to earlier cases, including U.S.
v. Bredejo,^[21]
our ruling was that the dwelling place must be owned by the offended
party.  In another decision, People v. Celespara,^[22]
dwelling was not appreciated as an aggravating circumstance in the absence of
proof that the victim owned the dwelling place where he was killed.  In People v. Guhiting,^[23]
morada was not likewise considered for the same
reasons.

However, more recent cases have since followed the lead of Basa, notably People v. Galapia^[24] and People
v. Sto. Tomas.^[25]

“Dwelling” is considered an aggravating circumstance
because primarily of the sanctity of privacy
the law accords to human abode. 
According to one commentator, one’s dwelling place is a “sanctuary
worthy of respect”^[26]
and that one who slanders another in the
latter’s house is more guilty than if he who offends him elsewhere.  However, one does not lose his right of
privacy where he is offended in the house of
another because as his invited guest, he, the stranger, is sheltered by
the same roof and protected by the same intimacy of life it affords.  It may not be his house, but it is, even for
a brief moment, “home” to him.  He
is entitled to respect even for that short moment.

It is with more reason in this case.  The late Elpidio Dalsen died in the house of his very parents, who raised him until he could be on his own.

Under the circumstances, we affirm the lower court, but only
insofar as it held the accused-appellant responsible for taking the life of Elpidio Dalsen.  We hold him
liable for simple homicide aggravated by dwelling.  Under the
Revised Penal Code, he must suffer reclusion temporal in its maximum period,
there being no mitigating circumstances and one aggravating circumstance.^[27]

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED.  The accused-appellant is sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor to
seventeen (17) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal.  The grant of damages is
affirmed.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman), Paras, Padilla, and Regalado, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Original Records, 1.

^[2]
Rollo, 64.

^[3]
Id., 79-80.

^[4]
Id., 67-68.

^[5]
Original Records, id., 9.

^[6]
Rollo, id., 66-67.

^[7]
Id., 64.

^[8]
Id., 65-66.

^[9]
Id., 68-70.

^[10]
Id., 71-72.

^[11]
Id., 74-76.

^[12]
Id., 76.

^[13]
RULES OF COURT, Rule 133, sec. 5, now sec. 4 of the REVISED RULES ON EVlDENCE.

^[14]
See People v. Espinosa, No. 62613, January 17, 1986, 141 SCRA 110.

^[15]
See People v. Guevarra, G.R. No. 65017, November 13, 1989.

^[16]
T.s.n., Session of July 18, 1985, 177.

^[17]
People v. Antugop, 94 Phil. 1046 (1954), (Unrep.)

^[18]
1 AQUINO, THE REVISED PENAL CODE 352 (1987 ed.)

^[19]
People v. Basa, 83 Phil. 622 (1949)

^[20]
Supra, 624-625.

^[21]
21 Phil. 23 (1911).

^[22]
82 Phil. 399 (1948).

^[23]
88 Phil. 672 (1951).

^[24]
Nos. L-39303-05, August 1, 1978,
84 SCRA 526.

^[25]
Nos. L-40367-69, August 22, 1985,
138 SCRA 306.

^[26]
AQUINO, id., 315.

^[27]
REV. PEN. CODE, art. 64, par. 3.