ASSOCIATED LABOR UNIONS (ALU), PETITIONER, VS. HON. PURA FERRER-CALLEJA, AS DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS, MINISTRY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT; PHILIPPINE SOCIAL SECURI…

Petitioner Associated Labor Unions (ALU, for brevity) instituted
this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition to overturn the
decision of the respondent director^[1]
dated December 10, 1986,
which ordered the holding of a certification election among the rank and file
workers of the private respondent GAW Trading, Inc.  The averments in the basic petition therefor, which succinctly but sufficiently detail the
relevant factual antecedents of this proceeding, justify their being quoted in
full, thus:

“1. 
The Associated Labor Unions (ALU) thru its Regional
Vice-President Teofanio C. Nunez, in a Letter dated
May 7, 1986 (ANNEX C) informed GAW Trading, Inc., that majority of the latter’s
employees have authorized ALU to be
their sole and exclusive bargaining representative, and requested GAW Trading
Inc., in the same Letter for a conference for the execution of an initial
Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA);

“2.  GAW Trading Inc. received the Letter
of ALU aforesaid on the same day of May 7, 1986 as acknowledged thereunder and responded (sic) ALU in a Letter dated May
12, 1986 (Annex D) indicating its recognition of ALU as the sole and exclusive
bargaining agent for the majority of its employees and for which it set the
time for conference and/or negotiation at 4:00 P.M. on May 12, 1986 at the
Pillsbury Office, Aboitiz Building, Juan Luna Street,
Cebu City;

“3.  On the following
day of May 13, 1986, per Transmittal Letter on even date (ANNEX E) ALU’s Chairman of the Negotiating Panel furnished GAW
Trading Inc. ten (10) final copies of the Collective Bargaining Agreement for
Comment, or otherwise, for signing;

“4.  On May 15, 1986, ALU
in behalf of the majority of the employees of GAW Trading Inc. and GAW Trading
Inc. signed and executed the Collective Bargaining Agreement (ANNEX F) x x x.

“5.  In the meantime, at
about 1:00 P.M. of May 9, 1986, the Southern Philippines Federation of Labor
(SPFL) together with Nagkahiusang Mamumuo
sa GAW (NAMGAW) undertook a x x
x Strike x x x after it failed to get the management of GAW Trading Inc.
to sit for a conference respecting its demands presented at 11:00 A.M. on the
same day in an effort to pressure GAW Trading Inc. to make a turn-about of its
standing recognition of ALU as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative
of its employees, as to which strike GAW Trading Inc. filed a petition for
Restraining Order/Preliminary Injunction, dated June 1, 1986 (Annex H) and
which strike Labor Arbiter Bonifacio B. Tumamak held as illegal in a Decision dated August 5, 1986
(ANNEX I);

“6.  On May 19, 1986, GAW Lumad Labor Union (GALLU-PSSLU) Federation x x x filed a Certification
Election petition (ANNEX J), but, as found by Med-Arbiter Candido
M. Cumba in its (sic) Order dated June 11, 1986
(ANNEX K), without having complied (sic) the subscription requirement for which
it was merely considered an intervenor until
compliance thereof in the other petition for direct recognition as bargaining
agent filed on May 28, 1986 by Southern Philippines Federation of Labor (SPFL)
as found in the same Order (ANNEX K);

“7.  In
the meantime, the Collective Bargaining Agreement executed by ALU and GAW
Trading Inc. (ANNEX F) was duly filed on May 27, 1986 with the Ministry of Labor and Employment in
Region VII, Cebu
City;

“8.  Nevertheless,
Med-Arbiter Candido M. Cumba
in his Order of June 11, 1986 (Annex K) ruled for the holding of a
certification   election in all the branches
of GAW Trading Inc. in Cebu City, as to which ALU
filed a Motion for Reconsideration
dated June 19, 1986 (ANNEX L) which was treated as an appeal on that questioned
Order for which reason the entire record of subject certification case was
forwarded to the Director, Bureau of Labor Relations, Ministry of Labor and
Employment, Manila (ANNEX M);

“9.  Bureau of Labor
Relations Director Cresenciano B. Trajano,
rendered a Decision on August 13, 1986 (Annex B) granting ALU’s
appeal (Motion for Reconsideration) and set aside the questioned Med-Arbiter
Order of June 11, 1986 (Annex K), on the ground that the CBA has been effective
and valid and the contract bar rule applicable;

“10.  But the same Decision of Director Cresenciano B. Trajano was sought
for reconsideration both by Southern Philippines Federation of Labor (SPFL) on
August 26, 1986 (ANNEX N) supplemented by the ‘SUBMISSION OF ADDITIONAL
EVIDENCE’ dated September 29, 1986 (ANNEX O), and Philippine Social Security
Labor Union (PSSLU) on October 2, 1986 (ANNEX P), which were opposed by both
GAW Trading Inc. on September 2, 1986 (ANNEX Q) and ALU on September 12, 1986
(ANNEX R);”^[2]

The aforesaid decision of then Director Trajano
was thereafter reversed by respondent director in her aforecited
decision which is now assailed in this action. 
A motion for reconsideration of ALU^[3]
appears to have been disregarded, hence its present resort grounded on grave
abuse of discretion by public respondent.

Public respondent ordered the holding of a certification election,
ruling that the “contract bar rule” relied upon by her predecessor
does not apply in the present controversy. 
According to the decision of said respondent, the collective bargaining
agreement involved herein is defective because it “was not duly submitted
in accordance with Section I, Rule IX, Book V of the
Implementing Rules of Batas Pambansa Blg. 130″.  It
was further observed that “(t)here is no proof
tending to show that the CBA has been posted in at least two conspicuous places
in the establishment at least five days before its ratification and that it has
been ratified by the majority of the employees in the bargaining unit”.

We find no reversible error in the challenged decision of
respondent director.  A careful
consideration of the facts culled from the records of this case, especially the
allegations of petitioner itself as hereinabove quoted, yields the conclusion
that the collective bargaining agreement in question is indeed defective, hence
unproductive of the legal effects attributed to it by the former director in
his decision which was subsequently and properly reversed.

We have previously held that the mechanics of collective
bargaining are set in motion only when the following jurisdictional
preconditions are present, namely, (1) possession of the status of majority
representation by the employees’ representative in accordance with any of the
means of selection and/or designation provided for by the Labor Code; (2) proof
of majority representation; and (3) a demand to bargain under Article 251,
paragraph (a), of the New Labor Code.^[4]
In the present case, the standing of petitioner as an exclusive bargaining
representative is dubious, to say the least. 
It may be recalled that respondent company, in a letter dated May 12, 1986 and addressed to
petitioner, merely indicated that it was “not against the desire of (its)
workers” and required petitioner to present proof that it was supported by
the majority thereof in a meeting to be held on the same date.^[5]
The only express recognition of petitioner as said employees’ bargaining
representative that We see in the records is in the
collective bargaining agreement entered into two days thereafter.^[6]
Evidently, there was precipitate haste on the part of respondent company in
recognizing petitioner union, which recognition appears to have been based on
the self-serving claim of the latter that it had the support of the majority of
the employees in the bargaining unit. 
Furthermore, at the time of the supposed recognition, the employer was
obviously aware that there were other unions existing in the unit.  As earlier stated, respondent company’s
letter is dated May 12, 1986
while the two other unions, Southern Philippine Federation of Labor (hereafter,
SPFL) and Philippine Social Security Labor Union (PSSLU, for short), went on
strike earlier on May 9, 1986.  The unusual promptitude in the recognition of
petitioner union by respondent company as the exclusive bargaining
representative of the workers in GAW Trading, Inc., under the fluid and
amorphous circumstances then obtaining, was decidedly unwarranted and
improvident.

It bears mention that even in cases where it was the then
Minister of Labor himself who directly certified the union as the bargaining
representative, this Court voided such certification where there was a failure
to properly determine with legal certainty whether the union enjoyed a majority
representation.  In such a case, the
holding of a certification election at a proper time would not necessarily be a
mere formality as there was a compelling reason not to
directly and unilaterally certify a union.^[7]

An additional infirmity of the collective bargaining agreement
involved was the failure to post the same in at least two (2) conspicuous
places in the establishment at least five days before its ratification.^[8]
Petitioner’s rationalization was that “(b)ecause of the real existence of the illegal strike
staged by SPFL in all the stores of GAW Trading, Inc. it had become impossible
to comply with the posting requirement in so far as the realization of its
purpose is concerned as there were no impartial members of the unit who could
be apprised of the CBA’s contents”.^[9]
This justification is puerile and unacceptable.

In the first place, the posting of copies of the collective
bargaining agreement is the responsibility of the employer which can easily
comply with the requirement through a mere mechanical act.  The fact that there were “no impartial
members of the unit” is immaterial. 
The purpose of the requirement is precisely to inform the employees in
the bargaining unit of the contents of said agreement so that they could
intelligently decide whether to accept the same or not.  The assembly of the members of ALU wherein
the agreement in question was allegedly explained does not cure the
defect.  The contract is intended for all
the employees and not only for the members of the purported representative
alone.  It may even be said that the need
to inform the non-members of the terms thereof is more exigent and compelling
since, in all likelihood, their contact with the persons who are supposed to
represent them is limited.  Moreover, to
repeat, there was an apparent and suspicious hurry in the formulation and
finalization of said collective bargaining accord.  In the aforementioned letter where respondent
company required petitioner union to present proof of its support by the
employees, the company already suggested that petitioner ALU at the same time
submit the proposals that it intended to embody in the projected agreement.  This was on May 12, 1986, and promptly on the following day the
negotiating panel furnished respondent company final copies of the desired
agreement which, with equal dispatch, was signed on May 15, 1986.

Another potent reason for annulling the disputed collective
bargaining agreement is the finding of respondent director that one hundred
eighty-one (181) of the two hundred eighty-one (281) workers who
“ratified” the same now “strongly and vehemently deny and/or
repudiate the alleged negotiation and ratification of the CBA”.^[10]
Although petitioner claims that only seven (7) of the repudiating group of
workers belong to the total number who allegedly ratified the agreement,
nevertheless such unsubstantiated contention weighed against the factual
findings of the respondent director cannot negate the fact that the controverted contract will not promote industrial
stability.  The Court has long since
declared that:

“x x x Basic to the contract bar rule is the proposition that
the delay of the right to select representatives can be justified only where
stability is deemed paramount.  Excepted
from the contract bar rule are certain types of contracts which do not foster industrial stability, such as contracts where
the identity of the representative is in doubt. 
Any stability derived from such contracts must be subordinated to the
employees’ freedom of choice because it does not establish the type of
industrial peace contemplated by the law.”^[11]

At this juncture, petitioner should be reminded that the
technical rules of procedure do not strictly apply in the adjudication of labor
disputes.^[12]
Consequently, its objection that the evidence with respect to the aforesaid
repudiation of the supposed collective bargaining agreement cannot be
considered for the first time on appeal to the Bureau of Labor Relations should
be disregarded, especially considering the weighty significance thereof.

Both petitioner and private respondent GAW Trading, Inc. allege
that the employees of the latter are now enjoying the benefits of the
collective bargaining agreement that both parties had forged.  However, We cannot
find sufficient evidence of record to support this contention.  The only evidence cited by petitioner is the
supposed payment of union fees by said employees, a premise too tenuous to
sustain the desired conclusion.  Even the
actual number of workers in the respondent company is not clear from the
records.  Said private respondent claims
that it is two hundred eighty-one (281)^[13]
but petitioner suggests that it is more than that number.  The said parties should be aware that this
Court is not an adjudicator of facts. 
Worse, to borrow a trite but apt phrase, they would heap the Ossa of confusion upon the Pelion of uncertainty and still
expect a definitive ruling on the matter thus confounded.

Additionally, the inapplicability of the contract bar rule is
further underscored by the fact that when the disputed agreement was filed
before the Labor Regional Office on May
27, 1986, a petition for certification election had already been
filed on May 19, 1986.  Although the petition was not supported by
the signatures of thirty percent (30%) of the workers in the bargaining unit,
the same was enough to initiate said certification election.

WHEREFORE,
the order of the public respondent for the conduct of a certification election
among the rank and file workers of respondent GAW Trading, Inc. is
AFFIRMED.  The temporary restraining
order issued in this case pursuant to the Resolution of March 25, 1987 is hereby lifted.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman), Paras, Padilla, and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

^[1] Rollo, 25-27; Annex A, Petition.

^[2] Ibid., 8-11.

^[3] Ibid., 11; Annex S,
Petition.

^[4] Kiok Loy vs. National
Labor Relations Commission, 141 SCRA 179, 185 (1986).

^[5] Rollo, 9, 34; Annex D, Petition.

^[6] Ibid., 37.

^[7] Colgate Palmolive Philippines, Inc. vs.
Hon. Blas F. Ople, et al.,
G.R. No. 73691, June 30, 1988.

^[8] Sec. 1(a), Rule IX, Book V, Implementing Rules of B.P. 130.

^[9] Rollo, 16.

^[10] Ibid., 27.

^[11] Firestone Tire & Rubber
Company Employees Union, etc. vs. Estrella, etc., et al. 81 SCRA 49, 54 (1978).

^[12]
Art. 221, Labor Code, as amended.

^[13] Rollo, 175-176.