G.R. No. 76936. August 17, 1989
VIRGILIO RAPOSON, PETITIONER, VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, FIRST DIVISION, EXCELLENCE MARKETING AND NIXON SIOCO, RESPONDENTS.
PADILLA, J.:
The present petition for certiorari seeks to annul the
resolutions of the National Labor Relations Commission, First Division*, dated 27
December 1985, 20 May 1986
and 14 November 1986,
setting aside its earlier resolution dated 15 July 1985 which affirmed the ruling of the Labor
Arbiter that petitioner had been illegally dismissed from his employment.
The records of the case show that petitioner had been in the
employ of private respondents from July 1972 to August 1982; that his last
position was that of Sales Manager with a gross salary, including allowance, in
the amount of P1,800.00 a month; that on 31 August 1982, private respondent
Nixon Sioco, President and General Manager of
respondent company, informed petitioner that the company was incurring
heavy losses and so, it was closing down its business; and that, in
consideration of petitioner’s years of service, he was given the sum of
P1,000.00 and, from then on, considered to
have been separated from the company.[1]
Subsequently, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
against private respondents, docketed as Case No. 6-2720-83. After the parties had submitted their
respective position papers, the Labor Arbiter, on 12 December 1984, rendered a
decision ruling that the complainant (herein petitioner) was illegally
dismissed, thus –
“WHEREFORE, the respondents are hereby declared liable and are
ordered to reinstate complainant to his former or equivalent position without
loss of seniority rights and to pay his back wage computed from the date he was
illegally dismissed up to his actual reinstatement.”[2]
On appeal by the private respondents, the NLRC affirmed the
appealed decision in a resolution dated 15
July 1985, holding thus –
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision is as
it is hereby AFFIRMED en toto. Consequently, respondents-appellants
are directed to show proof of immediate compliance to (sic) the mandate of the affirmed Decision after ten (10) days
from receipt of this Resolution.”[3]
Private respondents then filed a motion for reconsideration of
the said resolution. Acting on the
motion, the respondent Commission reversed its resolution dated 15 July 1985,
in a resolution dated 27 December 1985, holding this time that there was no
illegal dismissal, thus –
WHEREFORE, premises considered the resolution promulgated by this
Commission on 15 July 1985, is hereby set aside and a new one is hereby entered
dismissing the above, entitled
case for lack of merit.
Respondents-appellants, however, are ordered to pay complainant-appellee his separation pay, equivalent to 1/2 month pay
for every year of service.”[4] (emphasis
supplied).
Two (2) separate motions for reconsideration filed by the
petitioner were denied by the respondent Commission in resolutions, dated 20 May 1986 and 14 November 1986.[5]
Hence, this recourse.
In his instant petition, petitioner mainly contends that
respondent company committed grave abuse of discretion in terminating his services, hence, his dismissal was illegal.
In its questioned resolution dated 27 December 1985, which was
affirmed in its subsequent resolutions dated 20 May 1986 and 14 November 1986,
the NLRC ruled that the petitioner’s dismissal was made in good faith, and is,
therefore, not illegal. It held that the
closing or cessation of business operations due to serious business reverses is
a justified ground for the dismissal of an employee, and that the fact that the
respondent-employer has not really closed down its business and has in fact
continued operations are immaterial, in the absence of a showing that at the
time of employee’s dismissal from employment, respondent-employer was in bad
faith, or that employee’s termination from employment was due to some ulterior
motives.[6]
In contrast, the Labor Arbiter earlier held that petitioner’s
dismissal from employment was not based
on a just cause and thus illegal,
inasmuch as no evidence
whatsoever was submitted by the respondent employer to support its allegation
that, at the time of petitioner’s dismissal from employment, the company was
suffering from business reverses and that it had ceased operations; that, on the contrary, the evidence
showed that respondent company was still in operation.[7]
On the matter of termination of employment, then Article 284 (now
Article 283) of the Labor Code
provided:
“ART. 284. Closure of
establishment and reduction of personnel. – The employer may also terminate the employment of any
employee due to x x x the
closing or cessation of operation of
the establishment or undertaking unless the closing is for the purposes of circumventing the
provisions of this title, by
serving a written notice on the workers and the Ministry of Labor and
Employment at least one (1) month before the intended date thereof. x x
x.” (emphasis supplied)
In this connection, the respondent NLRC noted that, considering
that the petitioner was the sales manager of the respondent company, he was
presumed to know the real financial condition of the company and that the
burden of proof was on the petitioner to show that the respondent company was
not telling the truth in alleging that it was suffering from business
reverses. Further, the NLRC stated that
the acceptance by the petitioner from the company of P1,000.00
signified consent on his part to the termination of his employment as well as his acknowledgment of the
poor financial business condition of the company.
We hold for the petitioner.
As the Labor Arbiter had observed, the respondent employer failed
to present evidence that the company was suffering from business losses at the
time of the questioned
termination. The said officer also
noted that the company did not even give notice of dismissal to the petitioner.
In the light of the aforecited findings
of the Labor Arbiter, it cannot be said that the dismissal of petitioner from
employment was based on the ground of closure or cessation of the employer’s
business operations nor can it be said that termination was based on any other
ground recognized by law for termination of employment. While it is true that management has the sole
prerogative to dismiss or layoff an employee, the exercise of such right must
be made without grave abuse of discretion.[8]
In other words, it must be founded on a valid and just cause supported by
reasonably substantial evidence, as distinguished from mere whim or caprice.
As to petitioner’s acceptance of the P1,000.00
from the private respondents, we hold
that this does not estop petitioner from questioning
the legality of his termination from employment as it is a settled rule that
the receipt of separation pay is not a bar to contesting the legality of dismissal from employment.[9]
Finally, the Court notes as significant that, in the instant
case, the Solicitor General, who generally represents and defends the NLRC, does not agree with the NLRC’s assailed ruling, and recommends the setting aside of
the questioned resolutions.[10]
It is even more significant to note that the
chief legal officer of
respondent NLRC does not interpose any objection to the grant of the present
petition, and in fact proposes
the reinstatement of the NLRC resolution dated 15 July 1985
which affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter.[11]
WHEREFORE, the NLRC resolutions dated 27 December 1985, 20 May 1986 and 14
November 1986 are SET ASIDE.
Its resolution dated 15 July
1985 affirming the Labor Arbiter’s decision, dated 12 December 1984, is hereby
REINSTATED, with the modification that back
salaries shall be limited to three
(3) years, in line with prevailing jurisprudence.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman), Paras, Sarmiento, and Regalado, JJ., concur.
* Geronimo Q, Quadra: Cleto T. Villatuya; and Presiding Commissioner Diego P. Atienza, the latter, dissenting in this case.
[1]
Rollo, pp. 55-56
[2]
Id., p. 34
[3]
Id., p. 47-48
[4]
Id., p. 59
[5]
Id., 74-78, 86, and 119
[6]
Id., pp. 57-58
[7]
Id., p. 33
[8]
Remerco v. MOLE, G.R. No. 56176-77, February
28, 1985, 135 SCRA
167
[9]
De Leon v. NLRC, G.R. No. 52056, October
30, 1980, 100 SCRA
691
[10]
Rollo, p. 101
[11]
Id., pp. 118-121