LUALHATI A. COJUANGCO, PETITIONER, VS. PURIFICACION VILLEGAS AND THE PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH XVII, MALOLOS, BULACAN, RESPONDENTS.

Cojuangco versus Villegas

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Lualhati Cojuangco against Purification Villegas and the presiding judge of a branch of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan. Cojuangco had won a final and executory judgment of ejectment against Villegas, and a writ of demolition had been issued. Villegas then filed a separate action for specific performance before a co-equal branch of the same court, which issued a temporary restraining order and later a writ of preliminary injunction stopping the demolition. Cojuangco asks the Supreme Court to annul those orders. The case matters because it fixes two rules every reviewee must know: no court may by injunction interfere with the judgment of a court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction, and a claim for the value of improvements, being in the nature of a compulsory counterclaim in ejectment, is barred if not raised there.

Procedural History

Don Juan Cojuangco filed an ejectment case before the Municipal Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan. That court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction, treating the suit as one that properly belonged to the then courts of first instance. On appeal, the Court of First Instance of Malolos reversed the dismissal, took jurisdiction, and ordered Villegas to vacate the premises and surrender possession to Cojuangco. The case went up to the appellate court and then to the Supreme Court, and in both instances Cojuangco's right of possession was upheld. After entry of judgment, Cojuangco moved for execution before the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, which granted the motion, and a writ of demolition was issued. Villegas asked for and was given time to remove her improvements. Before that period lapsed, she filed a separate civil action for specific performance with a prayer for a restraining order and injunction. The case was raffled not to the branch that had issued the writ but to another branch, which issued a temporary restraining order and then a writ of preliminary injunction. Cojuangco then came to the Supreme Court by petition for certiorari and prohibition, alleging grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

Facts

The disputed parcel is a residential lot in San Agustin, Malolos, Bulacan, registered in the name of Don Juan Cojuangco. About sixty years before the litigation, the parents of Purification Villegas, with the acquiescence of Don Juan Cojuangco, built a residential house and later a structure housing a bakery on the lot. It was understood that they could remain on the land with his blessings and without paying rentals, on condition that they would vacate when the owner needed the premises.

After her parents died, Villegas stayed on the property, renovated the structures and spent 300,000 pesos in the process. She also leased a portion of the land to a business firm at 600 pesos a month without the knowledge and consent of Don Juan Cojuangco. That act apparently destroyed the congenial relations between them, and the landowner, through his attorney in fact, demanded that she leave. She refused despite repeated written demands, and so the ejectment proceedings were instituted. Don Juan Cojuangco later died intestate, and his wife Lualhati, together with nephews and nieces, were substituted as parties-plaintiffs.

The ejectment case was decided in favor of Cojuangco and became final. Execution was granted and a writ of demolition issued. Villegas did not oppose the demolition but asked for forty days to transfer her personal properties and remove her improvements, and the court gave her that grace period. Before it expired, she filed the separate action for specific performance, and the other branch of the same court restrained the sheriff from enforcing the demolition order. The trial court sought to justify the injunction by saying that the impending demolition would render inutile her right as a builder in good faith.

Issues

• Whether or not a court may, by injunction, stay the execution of a final judgment of a court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction.
• Whether or not Villegas may still bring a separate independent action against the adjudged owner of the lot to recover the value of the improvements she and her parents introduced, on the ground that they are builders in good faith.

Applicable Provisions

Section 4 of Rule 9 of the Revised Rules of Court, on compulsory counterclaims, provides:

A counterclaim or cross-claim not set up shall be barred if it arises out of or is necessarily connected with, the transaction or occurrence that is the subject-matter of the opposing party's or co-party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction.

This is the provision that bars Villegas from recovering the value of her improvements in a later suit, because that claim is necessarily connected with the fact of possession litigated in the ejectment case.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court ruled for Cojuangco. The injunction was improperly issued. As early as 1922, in Cabigao versus Del Rosario, the Court had laid down the doctrine that no court has power to interfere by injunction with the judgments or decrees of a court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction having power to grant the relief sought by injunction. The various branches of a court of first instance, having the same or equal authority and exercising concurrent and coordinate jurisdiction, should not, cannot and are not permitted to interfere with their respective cases, much less with their orders or judgments. A contrary rule would lead to confusion and seriously hamper the administration of justice.

On the second issue, the Court also ruled for Cojuangco. Villegas' claim to recover compensation for improvements is essentially in the nature of a counterclaim, since it is interwoven with the fact of possession. It should have been presented as a counterclaim in the ejectment suit, and it is deemed barred if not raised on time. The rule on compulsory counterclaim is designed to enable the disposition of the entire conflict at one time and in one action, and its philosophy is to discourage multiplicity of suits. Villegas argued that her claim became a ripe issue only after the ejectment proceedings, but the Court found the argument untenable: her own pleadings stressed that the house had been there as long as she could remember and that she had made improvements in the honest belief that the land had been donated to her parents, which negates any claim that the factual basis of her action arose only after the ejectment suit became final. She should have set up, simultaneously with her claim of inheritance, the alternative claim that, assuming she was not entitled to the lot, she was at least a builder in good faith entitled to the value of the buildings and improvements. A party may set forth as many defenses and counterclaims as he may have, even inconsistent ones, so long as each is consistent with itself. Since she relied solely on the defense of inheritance, the rejection of that defense was a complete resolution of the controversy, and the adjudication constitutes res judicata: what is barred by prior judgment are not only the matters actually raised and litigated, but also such other matters as could have been raised but were not. The Court added that in ejectment cases the judgment must be executed immediately when it is in favor of the plaintiff, to prevent further damages from the loss of possession, and that the equities favor Cojuangco, since for more than half a century the Villegas family had enjoyed the fruits of the land without paying a single centavo in return.

Doctrine

First, no court has power to interfere by injunction with the judgments or decrees of a court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction having power to grant the relief sought by injunction. Branches of the same trial court are co-equal, and one may not stay the execution of another's final judgment.

Second, a claim for compensation for improvements on land, being interwoven with the fact of possession, is in the nature of a compulsory counterclaim in an ejectment suit. Under Section 4 of Rule 9, if not set up, it is barred, and it cannot be revived in a subsequent independent action. The bar of prior judgment extends not only to matters actually raised and litigated but also to matters that could have been raised but were not.

Disposition

The petition was granted; the respondent court was ordered to dismiss the separate civil action and all proceedings held therein were declared null and void, while the branch that rendered the ejectment judgment was ordered to execute it immediately, with costs against Villegas, and the decision was declared immediately executory.

Remember This

Memorize the line: no court may interfere by injunction with the judgment of a court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction. Examiners use this case to test the bar on compulsory counterclaims in ejectment, the rule against forum shopping through a co-equal branch, and the immediate execution of ejectment judgments.