THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. OSCAR DE GUZMAN Y ENRIQUEZ, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

This is still another case involving the violation of the Dangerous
Drugs Act, specifically Article II, Section 4, thereof punishing the sale inter
alia of prohibited narcotics. The herein accused-appellant has been convicted of the offense and
sentenced to life imprisonment plus payment
of a P20,000.00 fine and the costs.^[1] He
maintains before this Court that he is innocent.

The case hinges on the question of credibility. The parties allege conflicting versions of
the facts, which the Court is asked to evaluate. In doing so, we bear in mind first the constitutional presumption
of innocence to which every person accused of a crime is entitled. We also remember that such presumption is
not conclusive but can be overcome by the prosecution with proof of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.

We note at the outset the Solicitor General’s argument that this
appeal should be dismissed for failure of the accused-appellant to submit a
brief in conformity with Rule 46, Section 16,
of the Rules of Court in relation to Rule 124, Section 7, and Rule 125,
Section 1.^[2]
The Court wryly observes that the People’s brief, like the memorandum of the
accused-appellant, does not comply with the cited Rules especially as to the
form of the prescribed pleading. That
discrepancy, to use a colloquialism,
“makes them even.”

Now to the merits.

According to the prosecution, Pat. Generoso Ramos was, on July 17, 1984, at about
six-thirty o’clock in the evening, passing by the Boron Canteen, at the corner
of Maharlika and Bonifacio Streets in San Jose City, when he smelled the
familiar scent of marijuana being smoked. Out of the canteen came Carlito Corpus and Mario Dionisio, who was
puffing on a cigarette. Ramos approached them and after introducing
himself as a member of the Narcotics Command proceeded to frisk them. He found three sticks of marijuana in
Dionisio’s wallet and confiscated them. He then took the two men to police headquarters for investigation, and
there Dionisio pointed to Oscar de Guzman as the person from whom he had
purchased the marijuana.

Phase 2 of this version is the entrapment. Ramos asked Dionisio to buy more marijuana
from De Guzman, giving him two ten-peso bills marked with the initials of Ramos
and Cpl. Rufo Salvador. The latter and
Pat. Rolando Salonga went with Ramos and Dionisio to De Guzman’s house and
stationed themselves unobtrusively as Dionisio knocked on the door. De Guzman
opened the door. Dionisio said he
wanted to buy two sticks of marijuana. De Guzman said, “Tapatan mo na lang, pare,” and Dionisio
handed him the marked bills. De Guzman
then excused himself and after a while returned with the marijuana wrapped in a
piece of paper.

Ramos had earlier concealed himself behind a fence some ten meters away but had
come nearer when De Guzman left to get the marijuana. He was hiding behind a post about two meters from Dionisio when
the latter received the marijuana from De Guzman. Now Ramos revealed himself and announced he was a narcotics
agent, to De Guzman’s consternation. He
searched both Dionisio and De Guzman, confiscating the marijuana from the
former and the marked ten-peso bills from the latter. Both Dionisio and De Guzman were taken to police headquarters for
interrogation. The marijuana was turned
over to the PC Crime Laboratory for examination and analysis.

Dionisio and Rufo Salvador, in their respective testimonies, made
substantially the same narration. Tita
B. Advincula, a forensic chemist
at the PC Crime Laboratory, testified that the leaves submitted by Ramos were
subjected to microscopic, chemical and chromatography examinations and found to
be marijuana.

The defense had, as might be expected, an entirely different
story. The accused-appellant testified
on his behalf and claimed he was taking his supper in the evening in question
when Ramos barged into his house and immediately started searching it. Finding nothing, Ramos then handcuffed him
and took him to the police station, refusing to tell him what he was supposed
to have done. Later in the jail, De
Guzman confronted Dionisio and asked him why he had implicated the
accused-appellant, and Dionisio apologized, saying, “Pasensiya ka na,
napag-utusan lang ako.” This particular assertion was corroborated by
Eusebio Casita, Jr., a detainee
in the same jail, who claimed he heard the conversation between Dionisio and De
Guzman.

The other witness for the defense was Roda Paulino, De Guzman’s
14-year old sister-in-law, who supported the accused-appellant’s version of his
arrest inside the house. She said she
remonstrated with Ramos for arresting De Guzman and even followed De Guzman
some distance when Ramos and the other policemen were taking him away. On cross-examination, she testified that De
Guzman had been unemployed since 1984. She also said her father and mother did not go to the police station
that night or even the following day to see what had happened to their
son-in-law.

In the resolution of the factual issues, the Court relies heavily on the trial court for
its evaluation of the witnesses and their credibility. Having the opportunity to observe them on
the stand, the trial judge is able to detect that sometimes thin line between
fact and prevarication that will determine the guilt or innocence of the
accused. That line may not be
discernible from a mere reading
of the impersonal record by the reviewing court. The record will not reveal those tell-tale signs that will affirm
the truth or expose the contrivance, like the angry flush of an insisted
assertion or the sudden pallor of a discovered lie or the tremulous mutter of a reluctant answer or the forthright
tone of a ready reply. The record will not show if the eyes have
darted in evasion or looked down in confession or gazed steadily with a
serenity that has nothing to distort or conceal. The record will not show if tears were shed in anger, or in
shame, or in remembered pain, or in feigned innocence. Only the judge trying the case can see all
these and on the basis of his observations arrive at an informed and reasoned
verdict.

The trial judge has made his assessment, and we see no reason to
disbelieve him. The Court agrees with him
that the guilt of the accused-appellant has been proved beyond the shadow of a
doubt. For all its faults, especially
its tedious length and atrocious grammar, the decision convicting De Guzman
must be sustained.

The inconsistencies pointed out by the defense in the testimonies
of the prosecution witnesses do not detract from their essential veracity. The truth need not be narrated with perfect symmetry. Several persons remembering the same
incident may vary in their recollections of some of the details but
these differences do not necessarily make liars of them all. What is important is, that they agree on the essential facts and that their
respective versions corroborate and substantially coincide with each other to
make a consistent and coherent whole.

On the other hand,
it is difficult to accept the defense posture that Ramos suddenly forced
himself into De Guzman’s house and started searching it, for no known reason at
all. The search having proved
fruitless, Ramos nevertheless arrested and handcuffed De Guzman and took him
away despite his protests. Later,
meeting Dionisio in the detention place, De Guzman was less than indignant and
calmly asked why Dionisio had done this to him, whereupon Dionisio gave the
lame apology, which the accused-appellant benignly accepted. An innocent man would have been infuriated
by the trumped-up charge (if indeed
it was) and, not unlikely, bitter and unforgiving too. But De Guzman appears to have taken the
whole thing in stride instead of protesting his injured innocence.

The defense also argues that De Guzman should have been asked to
initial the marked money and that this should also have been turned over to the
prosecution as an exhibit. There is no requirement, nor is it even
standard procedure, for the law enforcement authorities to have the suspect
identify the money allegedly taken from him, assuming he would agree to do
so. Ramos also explained that he had
kept the money because it was his
own although, he said, he had taken care to photocopy the two bills and also
note down their serial numbers.

What we see here is a man without any known or visible means of
support who was caught red-handed while selling marijuana in violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act. Prosecuted for the
crime, he insisted he was not at fault and claimed the authorities had framed
him although he cannot explain why. He
has not shown Ramos had an ax to grind against him or indeed that they had
known each other earlier. There was no
proof of enmity between them. There was
no reason at all for the police officers to just pluck him out of his house and
charge him with an offense punished with no less than the severest penalty
allowable under the Constitution. No
reason at all, of course, except his guilt.

While assiduous in the protection of the rights of the accused,
this Court is equally determined to cooperate with the law-enforcement
authorities in their campaign against drug addiction, which has become an
international problem and tainted even our own country. Countless numbers of our people, especially
the young, have been victimized by the “pushers” of prohibited drugs
that have blighted the future and sometimes even claimed the lives of promising
young men and women who could have made something of themselves and become
worthy members of society. It is not
yet too late to save the others. That
is why the campaign must be pursued with vigor and determination, to the end
that the evil merchants of misery and death, who prey upon the people for
sordid gain, may be apprehended and punished with the full force of the law.

It goes without saying that that campaign must be waged, always
and without exception, with due deference to justice. We are satisfied in the case at bar that justice has been done to
the accused-appellant.

WHEREFORE, the challenged decision is AFFIRMED in toto
and the appeal is DISMISSED, with costs against the accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, (Chairman), Gancayco, Griño-Aquino, and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Rollo, p. 31; Decided by Judge Juan C. Limin.

^[2]
Ibid., p. 60.